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 This is what I said to myself, almost as if that painful philosophy  
were of my own invention […] But then, thinking it over,  
I remembered that it was as new as Solomon and Homer  
and the most ancient poets and philosophers we know […]  
 
             Giacomo Leopardi, Dialogo di Tristano e di un amico 
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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: it explores Giacomo Leopardi’s (1798-1837) 
interpretation of, and engagement with, Greek pessimistic thought and, through him, it 
investigates the complex and elusive phenomenon of Greek pessimistic thought itself.  
 
This thesis contends that Greek pessimistic thought – epitomised by but not limited to 
the famous wisdom of Silenus, the µὴ φῦναι topos – is an important element of Greek 
thought, a fundamental part of some of Greece’s greatest literary works, and a vital 
element in the understanding of Greek culture in general. Yet this aspect of ancient 
thought has not yet received the attention it deserves, and in the history of its 
interpretation it has often been forgotten, denied, or purposefully obliterated.  
 
Furthermore, the pessimistic side of Greek thought plays a crucial role in both the 
modern history of the interpretation of antiquity and the intellectual history of Europe; I 
argue that this history is fundamentally incomplete without the appreciation of 
Leopardi’s role in it. By his study of and engagement with ancient sources Leopardi 
contributed to the 19th century rediscovery of Greek pessimistic wisdom, alongside, 
though chronologically before, the likes of Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
and Jacob Burckhardt. 
 
Having outlined some fundamental steps in the history of the reception of Greek 
pessimism, this thesis examines the cardinal components of Leopardi’s reception of it: 
his use of Greek conceptions of humanity to undermine modernity’s anthropocentric 
fallacy, his reinterpretation of the Homeric simile of the leaves and its pessimistic 
undertones, and his views on the idea that it would be best for man not to be born. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sie hätte singen sollen, diese “neue Seele” - und nicht reden! 
Wie schade, dass ich, was ich damals zu sagen hatte, 
es nicht als Dichter zu sagen wagte: ich hätte es vielleicht gekonnt! 
 
F. Nietzsche, Versuch einer Selbstkritik 3 (1886)1 
 
I 
Leopardi and the Pessimistic Philosophy of Ancient Poetry 
 
Let us observe how much imagination contributes to philosophy (which yet is its enemy), and 
how true it is that in different circumstances the great poet could have been a great 
philosopher, promoter of that reason which is lethal to the genre professed by him, and how, 
conversely, a philosopher could have been a great poet. The ability to mine a rich vein of 
similes is proper to the true poet (Homer ὁ ποιητής is the greatest and most fertile model). 
[…] Now this is the philosopher through and through: the faculty of discovering and 
recognizing relations, of binding particulars together, and of generalizing. (Zib. 1650)2 
 
And in actual fact the first sages were the poets, or rather the first sages made use of 
poetry, and the first truths were announced in verses […](Zib. 2940)3 
 
It could be said that this thesis takes its inspiration and impetus from these two passages 
of the Zibaldone, the book of notes of the Italian poet, thinker, and philologist Giacomo 
Leopardi (1798-1837). Both passages indirectly engage with the millennial quarrel 
between poetry and philosophy and their relationship with truth.4 Both find an identity 
                                                   
1    In Colli and Montinari (1972), 9. 
2   Throughout the thesis Leopardi’s works are cited from Felici and Trevi (2013) as “TPP (2013)” with 
page numbers. The Zibaldone is referenced by pages of the manuscript and the Canti by verse 
numbers. English translations of the Canti are by Nichols (2008), of the Operette by Cecchetti (1983) 
and of the Zibaldone from Caesar and D’Intino (2013). 
3    Cf. Giambattista Vico’s De nostri temporis studiorum ratione 9 for similar views, on which Berlin 
(2000), 10-11. This is not the place for a discussion of Leopardi and Vico, but the similarities between 
the two authors’ ideas have been noted before, in particular, as Roić (1997), 137-138 describes, in 
their common interest for “il problema linguistico in un discorso filosofico sulle forme della 
conoscenza”. 
4    On debates between poetry and philosophy, starting with Xenophanes, see Most (1999), 336-342; 
Most (2011) revaluates the issues questioning the existence of a quarrel before Plato (alluded in Rep. 
10.607b-c). On the quarrel and its history, cf. Asmis (1992); Levin (2001), 127-150; Halliwell (2002), 
98-117 on Plato’s notion of poetry; also Nussbaum (2001), 122-135; Barfield (2011), 10-31. Also 
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between the subject matter of poetry and philosophy and between the types of minds of 
those who partake in the two kinds of speculation.5 Leopardi’s stance is clear from these 
two fragments alone, and it is a radical (albeit not unprecedented) one in the history of 
this quarrel: poetry – “poetry” in the sense he himself intends it in Dialogo di Timandro 
ed Eleandro “libri destinati a muovere la immaginazione; e intendo non meno di prose 
che di versi” – can convey truths, says Leopardi.6  
 
1. Poetry and Philosophy 
 
These two paths towards knowledge – the story of whose contrast is almost as old as the 
oldest remains of Western literature – coexist in Leopardi’s notebook just as much as in 
his published work. The extent to which this contrasting tension fills Leopardi’s thought 
– on the one side the imaginative and epiphanic modes of poetry, on the other the rigour 
and the ambitions of philosophy – is most visibly embodied in his Operette Morali. 
Twenty-four in number, the Operette are a protean collection of prose dialogues, short 
essays, and tales. Mostly written in prose, they are dotted with verse inserts that include 
original verse compositions, translations of existing poems and imitations of tragic 
choral odes. The language swiftly shifts from unembellished dialogues to the bombastic 
                                                                                                                                                     
useful is Granger (1974) examining Xenophanes’ use of poetry as a vehicle for philosophy; Heath 
(2013) is a concise compendium of many of these themes, from truth and falsehood in poetry, to 
poetry’s claims to philosophical veracity, to Plato’s debates on poetry. 
5    See Costazza (2000), especially 46-48; Fabio (1995), 76-77. Cf. Chapter 7 of Il Parini; Zib. 1383 
(tightly connected to Zib. 1650) and Zib. 3245 – on which cf. Severino (1997), 519, 526-527 – on 
poet-philosophers throughout history; it is important that Leopardi sees Plato as one of them, cf. 
Nietzsche’s idea of Socrates and Plato in Barfield (2011), 17 discussing Nietzsche’s opinion that Plato 
attacked poetry only to channel it in his philosophy. Halliwell (2002), 105-106 suggests that Leges 
7.817b1–8 conveys the “contrast between ‘tragic’ and ‘philosophical’ interpretations of life”; what is 
remarkable is that the passage clearly implies that both the poetic/tragical perspective and the 
philosophical one tackle in different ways the same material, i.e. the nature of life. For poetry as a 
means of “coming to terms” with the “burden” of human suffering and, consequently with life itself, 
see Halliwell (2011), esp. 60. Cf. Winckelmann’s Gedanken: “Griechenland hatte Künstler und 
Weltweise in einer Person und mehr als einen Metrodor”, in Eiselein (1825), 32; cf. Pliny Nat. Hist. 
35.135. 
6   In TPP (2013), 582. Cecchetti (1983), 397: “books intended to move the imagination, in prose no less 
than in verse”. Leopardi’s meaning of “poetry” and “poetic” as expressed here will be the one used 
throughout this introduction, otherwise differently specified. Leopardi’s opinion was not always this, 
cf. Timpanaro (1965), 197. It is remarkable to recall that Leopardi thought of the Dialogo di 
Timandro e di Eleandro as “una specie di prefazione, ed un’apologia dell’opera contro i filosofi 
moderni”, in the letter from 16th June 1826 to Antonio Fortunato Stella, in TPP (2013), 1321. 
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language of religious canticles. The protagonists of each dialogue are mythical 
characters, fantasy creatures, famous men of the past and natural elements. Nothing 
could seem farther away from the dogmatic and monolithic philosophical treatise than 
this colourful array of literary motifs and genres. Yet Leopardi’s own statements on the 
Operette reveal that he intended them as “cosa filosofica”.7 In their very essence the 
Operette elude the labelling of either “poetic” or “philosophical”: making sense of the 
formal choices of this complex collection, that continuously hangs in the balance 
between poetry and philosophy, has troubled generations of commentators.8 
 
Two assessments of the Operette by Leopardi’s contemporaries Lorenzo Collini, lawyer 
and writer, and Francesco Poggi, Florentine librarian and grammarian, are extremely 
telling of the general puzzlement induced by this work.9 Reviewing the Operette – 
which Leopardi had submitted for the 1830 prize of the Accademia della Crusca – 
Collini writes:  
 
Io tengo per fermo essere profonda questa sua filosofia e frutto di lunga meditazione sui 
casi veri della vita. Non esito a creder dottissima e pregevolissima questa raccolta di 
Operette morali, da anteporsi a qualunque altra opera che in più grossi volumi e sotto più 
severe sembianze fosse dettata dal più accigliato Dottore. In questa raccolta il grave, il 
patetico giace sotto le vesti più gaie e la sostanza delude le apparenze.10  
 
                                                   
7   From the letter from the 6th of December 1826 to Antonio Fortunato Stella in TPP (2013), 1334: 
“un’opera che vorrebb’esser giudicata dall’insieme, e dal complesso sistematico, come accade di ogni 
cosa filosofica, benché scritta con leggerezza apparente”; cf. also Zib. 1393. On the Operette’s style 
and composition see Binni (1973), 97-108. Blasucci (1985), Fabio (1995), 9-77 and Cellerino (1995) 
are some of the most comprehensive treatments: Cellerino structures her chapter by “themes” that run 
through the Operette, yet seems unable to provide a convincing general outlook. Again, cf. Caesar 
(1989) who concentrates on the use of the dialogue and on the influence of Lucian; Manotta (1998) 
explores the influence of the ancients, yet mainly in the sense of imitation of classical style; cf. also 
Sangirardi (2000), 179-265.  
8    Cf. Manotta (1998), 9 on the various levels of difficulty in the Operette’s interpretation. 
9    Poggi’s opinion of the Storia as in Bellucci (1996), 124-133 as quoted by Sangirardi (2000), 15 n. 2 
and in Nencioni (2002), 1-8. 
10   In Nencioni (2002), 6-7. My translation: “I hold it as certain that his philosophy is deep and (is) the 
result of true meditation on the real circumstances of life. I do not hesitate to believe that this 
collection of Operette morali is extremely learned and of great value, something to surpass any other 
work written by frowning Doctors in bulkier tomes and with more serious appearance. In this 
collection everything that is grave and moving has joyous semblance, and the substance deceives the 
appearance.” 
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Poggi says:  
 
A dir vero parmi un infelice lavoro, che racchiude una certa confusione, non seguendo né la 
mitologia, né la filosofia e mescolando l’una e l’altra senza deciso accorgimento.11 
 
In his favourable evaluation of the Operette, Collini understands Leopardi’s use of 
fiction and imagination as subservient to the necessity of lightening “pathetic” subjects. 
Conversely, in Poggi’s analysis Leopardi is guilty of having mixed myth with 
philosophy, truth with fiction, the language of scientific analysis with that of 
storytelling. Although different in focus and in their final verdict on the work, both 
reviews hit the same spot. It is clear to both that the author is trying to do filosofia, yet 
Leopardi’s “presupposto favoloso” (in the words of another and less appreciative 
reviewer, Francesco Del Furia), i.e. the method he devised to do philosophy, is 
surprising if not actually problematic.12  
 
2. The Philosophy of Ancient Poetry 
 
This type of criticism brings us back to the earliest problematizations of the relationship 
between poetry and philosophy: it was precisely this pervasive and intrusive presence of 
the mythical and fantastic element that led Aristotle to distinguish between poets and 
philosophers.13 In the words of Glenn Most, it was by distancing themselves from the 
“the shackles of myth and religion” of the early Greek poets that the early Greek 
philosophers became the forerunners of philosophy in the (more traditionally) modern 
understanding of it.14 It is then the contamination between the two realms – myth, 
religion, and poetic language on the one hand, and reason on the other – that throws 
Leopardi’s critics into confusion.15 Just as the mythologoi’s works were “philosophically 
                                                   
11   In Nencioni (2002), 7-8. My translation: “This seems to me to be an unfortunate piece of work 
entailing some degree of confusion, insofar as it follows neither myth, nor philosophy, and it mixes 
one with the other.” 
12    In Nencioni (2002), 7-8. 
13  On Aristotle’s distinction between poets and physiologoi cf. Poetics 1.1447b, 16-20 and Most (1999), 
332-333, reminding us that the distinction was not formal (on the basis of metre). On the scientific 
worth of poetic and mythical enquiries cf. Met. 3.1000a but also 1.983b-984b.  
14   Most (1999), 333. Although in Poetics 1451b the poets’ approach is deemed φιλοσοφώτερον than that 
of the historians, since it is concerned with more general truths about the world.  
15  On the objections of ancient historians and philosophers to τὸ µυθῶδες, cf. Vernant (1978), 193-194. 
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uninteresting” for Aristotle,16 so Leopardi’s work is neither philosophical enough to be 
taken seriously nor poetic enough to be deemed successful art.  
 
The point of contact between Zib. 1650 and Zib. 2940 is Leopardi’s conviction that the 
ancients in particular were keenly aware of the potent percolation between the roles of 
poetry and philosophy. One example from a poem analysed later on in the thesis sheds 
light on this conviction: so strong is Leopardi’s belief in poetry’s ability to convey true 
wisdom – a belief especially stark in relation to the “philosophical” power of similes, as 
expressed in Zib. 1650 – that it shapes one of Leopardi’s boldest translation choices in a 
poem of the Canti, XLI Dello stesso, a translation of Simonides fr. 8 W.17 The word 
κάλλιστον (used by Simonides to define Homer’s simile of the leaves) in verse 1 is 
translated by Leopardi as “certissimo”. The significance of the Homeric simile, 
Leopardi says to his readers, goes well beyond the realm of beauty, or goodness; it is 
instead the generating power behind a truer understanding of human life, and as such it 
is symbolic of the philosophical force of poetry.18 
 
It is thus the second passage, Zib. 2940, that supplies the other driving force of this 
thesis. Delving once more into the ideas of wisdom and truth, Leopardi makes this time 
an historical point. If, then, philosophy is the passion and the striving towards wisdom 
and truth, Leopardi is saying that not only in principle, but in the reality of human 
history, the first philosophers were the poets. Not only does this understanding of 
ancient poetry do more justice to the reality of historical facts: Homer and Hesiod were 
the “educators of Greece” and the providers of wisdom before the advent of philosophy, 
and some of the first “philosophers” themselves chose to express their wisdom in poetic 
forms.19 It is also key to Leopardi’s reading and interpretation of antiquity, clarifying 
                                                   
16   Most (1999), 332. 
17  The power of similes is one aspect of the ability to grasp similarities and connections: for Leopardi’s 
notion that this ability is the root of poetry and philosophy, see Costazza (2000), 41-42. 
18   Cf. Stasi (2010), 247 for a different interpretation of Leopardi’s choice of translation.  
19   Fränkel’s (1975), 252 stance separating Hesiod’s mythology and the Pre-Socratics’ “pure philosophy” 
remained for years the standard one. On early poetry and philosophy cf. Detienne (1999); Vernant 
(1984); Gentili (1988), 40 began to challenge such strict separation. Most (1999) on the complex 
overlap between Hesiod and Homer and the early philosophers, both concerning content and style, cf. 
also Nussbaum (2001), 123-124; cf. also Vernant (1978), 193-197. Theophrastus (Theophr. Phys.Op. 
fr.2) read Anaximander fr. DKA9 (in Simplic. Phys. 24.13) as written ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως 
ὀνόµασιν, cf. Jaeger (1947), 209; Most (1999), 350. Barfield (2011), 11-14 on Plato’s Republic (Resp. 
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ancient poetry’s role in his thought. Far from being the mere source of learned 
references, or an inanimate point of comparison, ancient thought is throughout 
Leopardi’s life and work the dynamic and ineludible source of true wisdom. 
 
3. Ancient Poetic Pessimism 
 
This thesis focuses in particular on Leopardi’s engagement with, and revival of, one 
aspect of ancient Greek poetic wisdom: Greek pessimistic thought. 20  With this 
formulation I broadly understand a type of thought that – whether or not fully 
systematised into a comprehensive worldview – reflects on the human condition and on 
the place of humans in the cosmos by challenging ideas of human pre-eminence and of 
divine providence, ultimately to question the value of human existence. Given the 
controversial nature of Greek pessimistic thought, Chapter 1 of this thesis is entirely 
dedicated to its nature and to the history of its interpretation from ancient times to the 
present; I thus refer the reader there for a fuller and more careful definition. It is this 
side of Greek thought that seals the real convergence of Leopardean and ancient 
thought: in Greek poetic writings Leopardi recognises his philosophy and the very same 
understanding of the world and of the place of humans within it as his own.21 This 
meeting across millennia sparks Leopardi’s own poetic philosophy, programmatically 
grounded on the wisdom of antiquity.  
 
This thesis’s purpose is, by exploring Leopardi’s engagement with Greek pessimistic 
thought, to show how Leopardi’s work, and in particular his Operette Morali, are both a 
revival and a study of Greek pessimistic wisdom. As such, Leopardi’s work ought to be 
considered in historical and cultural relation with the other works that, in the course of 
                                                                                                                                                     
10.606e-607c) as revealing of the educational role played of poetry until Plato. Cf. also Protagoras 
326a, 339a and Lysis 213e. Barfield (2011), 24 proposes that the similarities between poetry and 
philosophy (and thus the “danger” of poetry) are behind Socrates’ attack on poetry. On Platonic 
critique of poetry cf. especially Halliwell (2002), 108-117; cf. Levin (2001), 127, n. 1-2 for further 
bibliography.  
20  It should be noted that Leopardi’s acceptance of Greek pessimism is tightly connected to his full 
acceptance of the validity of philosophical ideas in poetic forms. The otherwise widespread refusal of 
scholars and interpreters across ages to acknowledge the existence of pessimistic currents of thought 
in ancient Greece comes primarily from the downright refusal to take into consideration non-strictly-
philosophical sources.  
21   My interpretation of “poetry” and “poetic” at note 6 applies to ancient sources too. 
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the 19th century, concurred to rediscover, explore, and investigate this long-forgotten 
side of Greek culture: chiefly, Arthur Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (1819), Friedrich Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) and Jacob 
Burckhardt’s Griechische Kulturgeschichte (published in 1900 but composed more than 
three decades earlier). The crucial role of Leopardi in this process – not least insofar as 
it anticipates both Burckhardt and Nietzsche – has so far been neglected; one of the 
aims of this thesis is to bring it to light. 
 
One of the reasons for the limited number of studies on Leopardi’s role and on the 
history of the reception of Greek pessimism lies in the problematic essence of Greek 
pessimistic thought itself.22 As Chapter 1 explores in larger detail, scholarly belief in the 
existence (let alone scholarly agreement on the features) of this aspect of Greek thought 
has a long and troubled history. This thesis, which is, admittedly, the work of a 
classicist, strives then towards one more ambitious target, which is to explore the 
essence and features of Greek pessimistic thought at the same time as it analyses its 
influence on Leopardi; indeed, to use Leopardi’s readings and interpretations as a 
passageway towards the Greek sources.23 Of course, the full exploration of Greek 
pessimistic thought is beyond the scope and especially the size of this dissertation. I 
nevertheless hope to shed some new light on the topic of Greek pessimistic thought 
itself, and, given the relative lack of attention to this topic in the past decades, as 
explained in Chapter 1, I hope to open the field for more discussion of this contentious 
and fascinating aspect of Greek culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
22   In some cases Leopardean scholarship seems to deny the existence of Greek pessimism in the first 
place, cf. Binni (1973), 78; Dolfi (1986), 52. 
23   Of course, this implies awareness of Leopardi’s own hand (and, inevitably, of my own) on these texts 
and their meaning, I am thinking of Gaisser’s simile comparing works to “pliable and sticky artifacts 
that are gripped, molded […]” in id. (2002), 387, on which Martindale (2007a), 4-5; cf. also Holub 
(2008), 322-324 for a summary of the history and meaning of the concept of Erwartungshorizont. 
 8 
II 
Literature, Methods, and Structure 
1. Research So Far, and Some Questions of Method 
 
Despite the vast number of scholarly studies on both Leopardi’s relationship with 
classical antiquity and his pessimism, no study has ever engaged directly and 
thoroughly with Leopardi’s revival of Greek pessimistic thought, possibly because such 
an enterprise requires equal interest in the ancient sources and issues as in Leopardi’s 
work (whereas the greatest part of the research on Leopardi is carried out by non-
classicists). A number of works have nonetheless variously touched upon the subject. 
 
Three works have directly (although by no means exhaustively) tackled this topic. 
Giovanni Cesareo’s 1893 “I precursori greci del pessimismo” in Nuove ricerche su la 
vita e le opere di Giacomo Leopardi is an early discussion of the relationship between 
the ancient pessimistic worldview and Leopardi’s pessimism. 24  Yet, through a 
somewhat chaotic gathering of various pessimistic texts from antiquity, the author 
merely suggests that the ancients share on a general level Leopardi’s idea of life, 
eventually to deny any major influence of the former on the latter. 
 
Several decades later comes Sebastiano Timpanaro’s insightful chapter on “Leopardi e i 
filosofi antichi” in his Classicismo e illuminismo nell’ottocento italiano (1965). 
Timpanaro’s essay is, to this day, the much-praised point of reference on this topic. Yet 
the widely held opinion that Timpanaro’s treatment of the subject is final – suggested 
by the omnipresence of this work in the footnotes of subsequent scholarship as the main 
reference for Leopardi and Greek pessimism – ought to be revised.25 Despite remaining 
a milestone for its insight, and despite having the great merit of having authoritatively 
opened up this topic for the scholarly public, Timpanaro’s essay only scrapes the 
surface of this engrossing story. Two shortcomings come to mind. The first is 
                                                   
24   Cf. Sole (1990), 275 n. 37 who criticises Cesareo for the absence of philological methods, but admits 
that Cesareo’s work “ sottolinea in Leopardi l’intento di accertare che il proprio pessimismo era antico 
quanto l'uomo [...]”. On the other hand though Sole believes that the ancients, unlike Leopardi, did not 
believe suffering to be a universal feature of life “senza dedurre da tale contemplazione un principio 
universale, senza elevare il male a teoria e il dolore a necessità irrimediabile.”  
25   Truly ubiquitous, two recent examples in Miranda (2005), 42 and Brogi (2012), 16 n.10. 
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Timpanaro’s tendency (in accordance with his chapter’s title) to give preeminence to 
Leopardi’s encounter with ancient philosophical pessimism, like that of Theophrastus.26 
The second is the excessive importance given by Timpanaro to Jean-Jacques 
Barthélemy’s Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce (1788), read by Leopardi in 1823, 
as the origin of Leopardi’s awareness of pessimistic thought in Greek poetry, a notion 
that influenced generations of scholars,27 and that this thesis aims to challenge.28  
 
The third and last work is a chapter of Gaspare Polizzi’s Giacomo Leopardi. La 
concezione dell'umano, tra utopia e disincanto (2011). In its preoccupation with 
Leopardi’s (negative) anthropology, the chapter concentrates by its own admission 
almost exclusively on the direct impact of the reading of Barthélemy on Leopardi’s 
notes; even so, it neglects to address the influence of the primary sources conveyed by 
Barthélemy on the rest of Leopardi’s work, and especially on the Operette.29 
 
Various essays and chapters on Leopardi and antiquity touch collaterally upon 
Leopardi’s relationship with Greek pessimistic sources. Amongst these it is worth 
mentioning Guido Polato’s exploration of Pindar’s influence on Leopardi in Il sogno di 
un’ombra: Leopardi e la verità delle illusioni (2007), with special reference to the 
notion of man as the shadow of a dream contained in Pythian 8.30 Gilberto Lonardi’s 
L’oro di Omero (2005), although it restricts its focus to the Canti, is an open and 
intelligent analysis of the influence of antiquity on Leopardi’s work, and in several 
places it touches upon pessimistic themes shared between Homer and the Canti.31 
Alberto Grilli’s article in the collective volume of Leopardi e il mondo antico (1982) is 
                                                   
26   Cf. Timpanaro (1965), 199-202 Timpanaro uses the word “pensatori”, which from the context seems 
to exclude poets." 
27   E.g. Pacella (1991), 242, or recently Polizzi (2011), 87 (“La lettura romana del Voyage e la nuova 
antropologia della Grecia antica”) and Brogi (2012), 16 n. 10. 
28  The Voyage is an historical novel recounting the adventures of Anacharsis through 5th century Greece 
and his encounter with Greek customs, culture, and history. Two chapters in particular (number 26 
and 28) offer the reader a vast array of pessimistic statements drawn from Greek poetry and 
philosophy. After reading the chapters in the French edition Leopardi copied parts of them verbatim in 
his Zibaldone (Zib. 2671ff). Most of the scholarship claims these chapters are the exclusive basis of 
his knowledge of Greek pessimism. More about the Voyage in Chapter 1, and on Leopardi’s use of it 
in Chapter 4. 
29   Cf. also Presti (2016), 199-205 who briefly explores the influence of the Voyage. 
30   Polato (2007). 
31   See note 29. 
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a penetrating and meticulous analysis of the role of Greek thought and philosophy in 
Leopardi’s work, with special regard to the Zibaldone.32 In doing so Grilli analyses with 
particular flare some of the passages that are the subject of this thesis. Yet the article 
does not allow for a thorough treatment of the theme, and the Greek sources are only 
swiftly considered in their own right; what is more, as the title suggests (“Leopardi, 
Platone e la filosofia greca”), a good portion of it focuses on the influence of 
philosophical schools. The work of the late classical and Italian studies scholar Marcello 
Gigante (and especially the posthumously published Leopardi e l’antico) is an essential 
reference, for both the great philological care of the author and the openness of his 
interpretations; yet, only his article on Simonides and Leopardi lingers briefly on the 
relationship between the pessimistic notions present in Simonides’ poems and 
Leopardi’s use of them. This article, together with Vincenzo di Benedetto’s Leopardi e i 
filosofi antichi, is a fundamental work for the relationship between Leopardi and his 
translations from Simonides, but does not focus specifically on Leopardi’s engagement 
with Greek pessimistic thought.33  
 
This thesis originates not only from the desire to fill the gap created by existing 
scholarship’s lack of direct engagement with the theme; it also draws strength from a 
number of methodical tenets that are not completely fulfilled, and sometimes even 
entirely ignored or rejected by such scholarship. My own research is instead grounded 
in, and grows from, the belief that these tenets are vital to a thorough comprehension of 
Leopardi’s work and relationship with antiquity.  
 
Two smaller points to begin with. It is a diffuse scholarly tendency to favour the Canti 
(and secondly the Zibaldone) when examining the presence and influence of ancient 
pessimistic wisdom in and on Leopardi’s work.34 Although it does not disregard the 
                                                   
32   Grilli (1982). 
33  Di Benedetto (1967); Gigante (2003). The same topic in Orlando (1973), whose title mentions 
“pessimismo antico”, which is nevertheless only cursorily and hastily mentioned in the last paragraph 
of the piece; as a consequence the piece fails to really tackle any wider relationship between Leopardi 
and ancient pessimism. More philological precision, but even briefer attention to the pessimistic 
notions, is paid by Randino (2000). 
34   So does Cesareo (1893), cf. above. Di Benedetto (1967) and Gigante (2003) do the same. Another 
example is Lonardi (2005): many of his assumptions would be greatly beneficial if applied to the 
Operette, but, apart from very brief excursions, he restricts his research to the Canti.  
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Canti’s lyrical reception of antiquity, this thesis gives larger space to discussion of 
passages from the Zibaldone and the Operette. Secondly, in accordance with what has 
been said so far and in the hope of doing justice to Leopardi’s thought, this thesis treats 
the poetic ancient sources as having full philosophical significance and dignity: as such, 
it attempts to fill the gap left by those who (as Timpanaro himself partly did) look for 
the antecedents and inspirers of Leopardi’s pessimism in ancient philosophical writings 
alone.35  
 
Let us come to the very core of this thesis’s claims. I believe that the strict philological 
approach taken by a great part of modern scholarship in the analysis of Leopardi’s 
relationship with classical sources, whilst allowing countless important considerations, 
nonetheless blinds us in a number of other essential respects, and that we thus ought to 
allow also for different perspectives on the topic of Leopardi’s engagement with 
antiquity. The quest of modern scholarship seems to be aimed at an (unachievable) 
Quellenforschung of sorts, driven by the necessity to ascertain what Leopardi read for 
sure and what he did not, a quest for the direct sources, for the consulted editions, for 
the verbatim quotations.36 Undoubtedly such a scientific philological stance is necessary 
in many cases, and entirely vital in others, such as Leopardi’s translations of 
Semonides’ and Simonides’ poems at the end of his Canti (oddly enough, as we shall 
see in Chapter 3, the relevant scholarship is in this very instance guilty of a 
considerable number of inaccuracies and philological mistakes).  
 
If this attitude does on the one hand pay respect to Leopardi’s extensive and fecund 
philological work which is so conspicuous in many places of the Zibaldone – one can 
also think of the historian and philologist Barthold Georg von Niebuhr’s admiration for 
Leopardi, or of Nietzsche’s opinion of the Italian poet as “das moderne Ideal eines 
                                                   
35   A good example is Stefano Brogi’s recent Nessuno vorrebbe rinascere: da Leopardi alla storia di 
un’idea tra antichi e moderni (2012), which tackles both the ancients’ and Leopardi’s engagement 
with the idea of the nolo renasci (in Brogi’s own words a variation on the general theme that life 
would best be avoided or, if that is not possible, swiftly ended). Yet the ancient sources considered by 
Brogi are almost exclusively philosophical, and ancient poetry is disregarded. 
36  Cf. Most (2016) for a good definition and a brief history of Quellenforschung, including its limitations. 
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Philologen” – it does on the other fall unquestionably short, in various ways.37 First, it 
can prove both anachronistic and ill-suited to Leopardi’s specific case: although 
Leopardi does in several instances – and, one can be sure, in different ways depending 
on the kind of work he is writing – make his sources explicit, or add footnotes and 
elucidations, by no means does he do this systematically. The fact that he does, here and 
there, reference his sources explicitly should not convince us that those are the only 
sources worth considering. Doing this would mean not only overlooking the fact that 
19th century literary practice was, even in scholarly contexts, worlds apart from that of 
today. It also means not appreciating both the breadth and depth of Leopardi’s readings 
and the imaginative and independent approach of his reception of them.38  
 
Most of all, this attitude can prevent us from looking at the influence of texts that 
Leopardi certainly knew, read, and perused – texts that had been so developmentally 
determinative, texts he knew so well, that the need to reference them openly is beyond 
the point. The impact of these texts – I am thinking first and foremost of Homer, but 
then also of Lucian and many others – is so profound, shaping, and dynamic that we 
simply cannot limit ourselves to looking for it in direct quotations, or in explicit 
allusions. My point echoes Gilberto Lonardi’s observations about Homeric influence on 
Leopardi’s work and thought, when discussing the (relative) decrease in references to 
Homer over the years.39 Lonardi – whose argument can easily be applied to other 
authors and their influence on Leopardi – argues that this diminution of explicit 
references only vouches for the new role played by Homeric thought: rather than an 
individual author narrating about a number of characters, Homer has become “nature”, 
                                                   
37   Nietzsche’s Nachgelassene Fragmente 3 [23] in Colli and Montinari (1967), 98. For the contemporary 
philological context in Europe, cf. Treves (1962), 471-538; also Emden (2004), 385-386. Cf. also 
Bellucci (1996), 353-521; cf. Timpanaro (2008), esp. 96-100 on Niebuhr and Leopardi; on this topic 
cf. the two letters to Pietro Giordani (10th March 1823) and to Carlo Leopardi (12th March 1823) 
where Leopardi reports Niebuhr’s words of praise for him, in TPP (2013), 1240-1241; Rennie (2005), 
esp. 271-273.  
38  See Lonardi (2005), 113 for the distinction between Leopardi as poet and Leopardi as philosopher, 
drawing on a previous point by Timpanaro and Blasucci. 
39   It should be also noted that Homer keeps being present in the Zibaldone, where the nature of the work 
facilitates the presence of explicit references. 
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i.e. a constant subterranean presence which does not need explicit mention, but that is at 
the same time the ineludible point of reference.40 
 
Lonardi’s argument was to be discussed and praised by Marcello Gigante, who urges 
scholars not to restrict their gaze when looking at the impact of ancient sources on the 
works of the Italian poet: even a partial or an indirect contact with an ancient text – 
Gigante uses the example of Sophocles – can spark connections and ideas, and the text 
ought thus to be considered when exploring Leopardi’s thought.41 Gigante questions – 
and I wish, through him, to challenge it even further – the idea indirectly implied in the 
strict forms of source criticism, according to which reception through mediation (i.e. 
through contact with something other than the idea’s text of origin, if such a thing even 
exists) is a lesser form of reception. Charles Martindale – speaking of Velázquez’s The 
Spinners – has energetically confronted such an assumption: whether the painter used 
Ovid’s original text with the aid of experts, or translations of Ovid, or simply the 
medium of the “the Ovidian tradition in the visual arts” available to him at the time, the 
painting can have more to say about the reception of Ovid than many more direct and 
linear examples.42 Rather than hindering reception, mediation can foster it.  
This thesis contends that this more open-ended kind of source criticism – alert, with 
Lonardi, to the subterranean and yet continuous influence of fundamental texts like the 
Homeric poems and, with Gigante, to the mediated stimuli that nourish Leopardi’s 
                                                   
40   Lonardi (1969), 42. In this sense I do not believe it fitting – in general, and with many exceptions – to 
speak of Leopardi’s relationship with Greek pessimism with the terms “allusion” or “intertextuality”. 
The connections Leopardi establishes are always looser and more subterranean than both terms 
normally imply, and the attention is – at least in the restricted field of his reception of Greek 
pessimism – much less for the “text” (in its wording, but even in its isolated presentation of an idea) 
than it is for the resonance of ideas that the text projects. On intertextuality I think principally of 
Conte (1994), 814 and (1996), 29 and Kelly (2008), 165ff for definitions of intertextuality, and 
allusion; cf. the suggestion of Thomas (1999), 115 n. 8 to use the term  “reference” to eliminate the 
frivolity inherent in “allusion” in Kelly (2008), 166; Fowler (1997) is an older and more schematic 
survey of intertextuality and allusion. 
41   Gigante (2003), 52-55. 
42   Martindale (2007b), 309. Similar observations on Titian’s Europa ibid. 308. A (very selected) number 
of studies on reception theory, other than Jauss (1973, but originally 1967), used later in the thesis: cf. 
Martindale (1993) on the need for the introduction of reception theory in the study of the Classics; 
Martindale (2007a) and in general Martindale and Thomas (2007); Holub (2008 in the online version, 
but originally 1995) for a summary of the novelty of the School of Constance. 
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thought –43 is crucial for the study of Leopardi’s work, and entirely imperative for our 
understanding of his study and interpretation of Greek pessimistic ideas. Closer 
investigation of the impact of both types of influences on Leopardi’s notion of Greek 
pessimism will also assist in challenging the assumption that Leopardi’s contact with it 
has to be ascribed for the greater part to his reading of Barthélemy’s novel, already 
mentioned. 44  From this assumption – a good example of the overly philological 
approach that has been discussed so far – stems the disregard for the influence of texts 
other than those mentioned by the French abbé. Yet, the presence of pessimistic ideas in 
– among others – the Homeric epics, read by Leopardi far earlier than his first contact 
with Barthélemy, cannot and should not be overlooked when trying to grasp the extent 
of Leopardi’s engagement with this strand of Greek thought. 
 
What is more, the clear-cut separation of Leopardi’s thought ante and post contact with 
the most famous Greek pessimistic sources – those contained in Barthélemy – does 
great injustice to the flow of thoughts in the history of ideas. The full growth and 
maturity of the ideas so enduringly and gnomically expressed in the words of Sophocles 
or Mimnermus (or many of the other sources mentioned by Barthélemy) is deeply 
rooted in their relationship with even earlier literature. Far from being the sudden 
outburst of unprecedented ideas, these thoughts germinate from the relationship with 
previous formulations of, and meditations on, similar notions. We should then 
acknowledge that Leopardi’s contact with the texts of Homer is in itself a doorway into 
the future reinterpretations and developments of the ideas conveyed by the epics, ideas 
that will contribute to shaping the works of Simonides, Pindar, Sophocles, and many 
others. If we believe in this kind of movement of ideas, ascertaining Leopardi’s access 
                                                   
43   Rephrasing Gigante (2003), 55. 
44   More details on his contacts with the Voyage: the family library in Recanati hosted an edition of the 
work in its Italian translation, Viaggio d’Anacarsi il giovine nella Grecia verso la metà del IV secolo 
avanti l’era volgare, printed in Venice in 1791. Leopardi could also read excerpts of the work in Noël 
and De La Place’s Leçons de littérature et de morale (1804). Leopardi consulted the monumental 
work – 12 volumes in the edition possessed by Monaldo – at different times in his life, but we cannot 
say whether he read Chapters 26 and 28 of Volume III before 1823, when he quotes from them using 
a 1789 French edition he had access to while in Rome. Leopardi must have read parts of Barthélemy’s 
work previous to 1823, if he references him as early as Zib. 68 and 222. The Voyage is referenced 
explicitly in its Italian edition in the bibliography Leopardi himself wrote for his Storia 
dell’astronomia (1813), in TPP (2013), 857. On Leopardi and the Voyage, cf. also Polizzi (2011), 61-
128; Presti (2016), 199-205. 
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to one specific text becomes less crucial. This reasoning, just like the flow of ideas, 
works in two directions: the same argument is valid for texts later than the sources used 
by Barthélemy – like those of Lucian – texts that are in continuous and open dialogue 
with the Greek literature of preceding centuries. 
 
In light of all these observations, this thesis is at the same time a piece of comparative 
analysis and a study in reception. It is comparative, insofar as it observes the presence 
of themes or ideas in two sets of texts, those of the Greeks on the one hand and 
Leopardi’s on the other, and does not always aim at identifying specific allusions or 
even indirect references from the latter to the former. Yet, in consideration of the 
absolute certainty that Leopardi read and in fact perused many ancient works that in one 
way or another convey or presage pessimistic thoughts, this research aims to draw a 
direct link between him and them, and thus conceives of itself as a study in Leopardi’s 
reception of Greek thought. The aim of my research is thus never to prove that Leopardi 
drew this or that word, phrasing, or idea from this or that ancient source. Rather than 
narrowing down Leopardi’s sources of inspiration, this thesis intends to open the 
channels of interpretation in search of that spark of recognition that led to Leopardi’s 
study and revival of Greek pessimistic wisdom.  
 
2. Structure  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides a definition of Greek pessimistic thought, and explores 
some crucial steps in the long and complex history of its interpretation. Chapter 2 looks 
at Leopardi’s conception of the place of humans in the cosmos – and in particular at his 
use of the comparison between humans and animals as a tool to be employed against 
man’s deluded anthropocentrism – by observing his use of ancient sources, chiefly 
Lucian and Homer, to strengthen his argument. Chapter 3 explores Leopardi’s 
interpretation and re-use of the famous Homeric trope of the leaves and of the Greek 
term ἐφήµερος to describe the human condition; the chaper ends with a brief analysis of 
Schopenhauer’s reflections on the same themes. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates the 
ways in which Leopardi’s conception of the Greek notion of the µὴ φῦναι is a revival of 
ancient sources, by focusing on a number of case studies in Leopardi’s œuvre. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Τὸ µὲν δὴ πανταχοῦ θρυλούµενον: Modernity and Greek Pessimism 
 
[…] immer noch nicht losgekommen von den Fragezeichen, 
die er zur vorgeblichen “Heiterkeit” der Griechen 
und der griechischen Kunst gesetzt hatte; […] 
 
F. Nietzsche, Versuch einer Selbstkritik 145 
 
About suffering they were never wrong, 
The Old Masters [...] 
 
W. H. Auden, Musée des Beaux Arts46 
 
I 
An Old Question: The Greeks and Pessimism 
1. The Ancients on the Ancients: Towards a History of the µὴ φῦναι 
 
The relationship of modernity with Greek pessimistic thought – its existence, its nature, 
its significance for antiquity and for modernity – has a long and troubled history, filled 
with denial, criticism, but also rediscovery and revival. This chapter is dedicated to this 
history, a history that is all the more engrossing if we consider that even today there is 
little consensus on this phenomenon, which continues all too often to be forgotten or 
ignored.47 If one turns instead to what antiquity had to say on the subject of Greek 
pessimism – and more specifically, on the µὴ φῦναι, taken as the very epitome of Greek 
pessimistic thought – the story is rather different. In striking contrast with the oblivion it 
long encountered in modern times, it is almost impossible to read about the notion that 
it would be best not to be born in ancient sources without encountering mention of its 
fame and wide diffusion, as if the two were hardly separable.48  
 
                                                   
45   In Colli and Montinari (1972), 5. 
46   In Mendelson (1976), 146. 
47   Forgotten, as in the case of Sim (2015), or denied and ignored, as in Dienstag (2006), discussed at the 
end of this chapter. 
48   Less complete versions of the list of sources I present here can be found elsewhere, e.g. in Curi 
(2008), 43-44. 
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This chapter’s title incorporates a phrase from Euripides’ Bellerophon fr. 285; in it the 
speaker presents the idea that it is best not to be born by saying that it is πανταχοῦ 
θρυλούµενον,49 “in everyone’s mouth”, or “common talk everywhere”, and the gnomic 
tone of the passage seems to increase the statement’s authority:50 
 
ἐγὼ τὸ µὲν δὴ πανταχοῦ θρυλούµενον  
κράτιστον εἶναι φηµὶ µὴ φῦναι βροτῷ […]:51  
 
But there is more. Our main source for the µὴ φῦναι (most famously and commonly 
known as the “wisdom of Silenus”) is the story of King Midas and Silenus as preserved 
by pseudo-Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Apollonium,52 which professes to transmit the tale 
directly from its text of origin, Aristotle’s Eudemus (βέλτιον δ’ αὐτὰς τὰς τοῦ 
φιλοσόφου λέξεις παραθέσθαι, Cons. Ap. 115b). 53  Hunted down and eventually 
captured by King Midas, Silenus is forced to tell the King what he believes to be the 
best thing for mankind. Silenus’ answer is legendary:  
 
ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάµπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον οὐδὲ µετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ 
βελτίστου φύσεως· ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ µὴ γενέσθαι. τὸ µέντοι µετὰ τοῦτο καὶ 
πρῶτον τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνυστῶν, δεύτερον δέ, τὸ γενοµένους ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα. (Cons. 
Ap. 115 d-e) 
 
                                                   
49  Cf. Van Groningen (1966), 170: “Euripide, qui a vécu à peine un siècle après Théognis et qui disposait 
d'une bibliothèque bien fournie, connaît le premier hexamètre comme un proverbe πανταχοῦ 
θρυλούµενον”. I disagree with Opstelten’s (1952), 166-167 suggestion that (by saying πανταχοῦ 
θρυλούµενον) Euripides “called the sentiment a trite one”. 
50   See Collard, Cropp and Lee’s (2009) commentary for some of the most famous instances of the topos: 
Theognis 425; Soph. OC 1225; Eur. fr. 908.1 (a fragment on better not to be born attributed to the 
Cresphontes, cf. e.g. Harder (1985), 277 and see Chapter 4 II.3); Alexis fr. 145.14-15. The 
philosophising tone of the fragment seems to suggest the speaker is as a central character or one 
endowed with special wisdom; Curnis (2003), 124-129 suggests the speaker is Bellerophon himself. 
51  In Collard, Cropp and Lee (2009), including critical edition, testimonia, and bibliography on the 
fragment; also Kannicht (2004), 352, with list of testimonia. See also the edition in Curnis (2003), 74-
75 with comment at 104-129.  
52  I reference the Consolatio from Paton et al. (1974). On the Consolatio, Hani (1972); Grilli (1992); 
Audano (2005), 1 for previous bibliography; Audano (2014a). 
53   Editions of the Eudemus’ fragments: fr. 44 in Rose (1876), 48-49; fr. 7 (72) in Heitz (1973), 50-51; fr. 
65 Gigon (1987), 294-295; cf. Zanatta’s (2008) Italian edition. On the Eudemus, cf. Grilli (1992); 
Easterling (2013); Chroust (1966); Audano (2006).  
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In the text leading up to the presentation of Silenus’ wisdom, the author of the 
Consolatio lingers twice on the circulation of the µὴ φῦναι. The first time is when he 
relates Crantor’s opinion (115b) about the dangers and madness of persisting in grief 
(114f -115a) given the numberless evils that crowd the world, an opinion that is used as 
a prelude for the myth of Midas as Silenus.54  
 
Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν ἀλλὰ πάλαι κέκλαυσται 
τἀνθρώπινα, τιµωρίαν ἡγουµένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον 
συµφορὰν τὴν µεγίστην· (Cons. Ap. 115b)55 
 
The notion reappears again within the space of a few lines, as pseudo-Plutarch turns to 
quoting directly from Aristotle: 
 
πρὸς δὲ δὴ τούτοις διὰ στόµατος ὂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁρᾷς ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν [παλαιοῦ 
χρόνου] περιφέρεται θρυλούµενον […] (Cons. Ap. 115c)56  
 
Even beyond a verbal similarity then (the same verb, θρυλέω, in the same form in both 
Euripides and Aristotle) the thoughts of Euripides’ character, of Crantor, and of 
Aristotle (and, one could argue, of pseudo-Plutarch as well) seem to unanimously 
suggest the wide diffusion of the µὴ φῦναι, and to be interested in conveying the 
popular status of the notion.57 
 
                                                   
54  Cons. Ap. 115b is quoted among the testimonia for Crantor fr. 5b in Mette (1984), 19. Leopardi 
mentions Crantor in an early comment on the use of consolationes at Zib. 302; again at Zib. 2674 
regarding precisely this passage in the Consolatio, and mentioning the Aristotelian fragment too.  Cf. 
Audano (2014a), 24 on the fact that Silenus’ myth is chosen to iconically exemplify the understanding 
of the world under discussion in the Consolatio. 
55   Cf. Curi (2008), 44 on how pseudo-Plutarch’s vague mention of “molti e saggi uomini” increases the 
“alone sapienziale” of the myth. 
56   Cf. Audano (2014a), 25. 
57  As Audano (2005), esp. 32, reminds us, references to the diffusion of sayings are found also elsewhere 
in the Consolatio (cf. 109d, 120b and 108e), and are, partly, a feature of the genre; Audano (2014a), 
18 further suggests that these references are part of a general rhetorical strategy that uses 
“indeterminazione” to provide auctoritas; a strategy based on the “richiamo a un tempo passato, vago 
e lontano, da cui deriva, per il tramite di poeti e filosofi […] il retaggio di un’antica sapienza […].” 
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One could go on, and recall among others also Cicero’s Tusc. 1.113 as another example 
of this pattern.58 But let us linger instead on one last case of “ancient reception” that 
traces the history of the µὴ φῦναι even further back, indeed to the very beginnings of 
Greek literature. The story of the poetic contest between the two great poets of archaic 
Greece tells us that, once both performances were over, Hesiod turned to test Homer on 
a series of questions (Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 7),59 starting with what is the best for 
mortals (τί φέρτατόν ἐστι βροτοῖσιν).60 Homer’s response plays an important part in the 
history of scholarship: it was a young Friedrich Nietzsche who noticed that Homer’s 
reply, ἀρχὴν µὲν µὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,/ φύντα δ᾿ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο 
περῆσαι (“Not to be born in the first place is best for men on earth, or if born, to pass 
through Hades’ gates as fast as possible”) was in fact to be found in Stobaeus’ 
Anthology at 4.52.22 under the name of the 4th century sophist Alcidamas, a fact that led 
Nietzsche to suggest that Alcidamas’ Mouseion was the source of the oldest nucleus of 
the Certamen.61  
 
Here however, the point is neither the dating nor the original source(s) of the Certamen, 
but rather the very fact that the µὴ φῦναι is attributed to Homer. The Homeric poems in 
fact present the µὴ φῦναι in four passages, which I explore later in the thesis.62 But even 
if we choose not to consider these four instances (in light of the fact that they are not 
universal statements, but rather individual characters wishing the annulment of their 
own existence), the ascription to Homer remains extremely significant. On the one 
                                                   
58  In Giusta (1984), 87: Deorum inmortalium iudicia solent in scholis proferre de morte, nec vero ea 
fingere ipsi, sed Herodoto auctore aliisque pluribus. Again, as mentioned by Hunter and Russell 
(2011), 207, cf. Menander Rhetor 2.413-414 in Russell and Wilson (1981), 163, speaking of the fame 
of Euripides fr. 449. The case of Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus (taking the author of the verse φύντα 
δ’ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο περῆσαι as epitome of an attitude towards life Epicurus himself is 
opposing) is significant but not entirely fitting with the group considered here; the letter is transmitted 
by Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.122 (and specifically at 126) in Dorandi 
(2013), 804ff. 
59   In West (2003), 326; Certamen 75 in Allen (1955), 228. 
60   For a different version of the story see Plut. Septem Sap. Convivium 153f2-154a, see Graziosi (2002), 
107, n. 48. 
61   Cf. Uden (2010), 121-122. Nietzsche dealt with the Certamen in a series of publications between 1870 
and 1873, in Colli and Montinari (1982), 273-364; cf. Latacz (2014), 12-19. On the Certamen see the 
recent doctoral thesis of Bassino (2013), esp. 158-159. Also, West (1967), esp. 442 and n. 1; 
Richardson (1981); Uden (2010). One last example is, as recalled in the next section, Alexis fr. 145 
which introduces the Silenic wisdom with οὐκοῦν, τὸ πολλοῖς τῶν σοφῶν εἰρηµένον (14).  
62   Cf. Chapter 4, the instances are Il. 3.39-40; 18.86-87; 22.481; Od. 8.311-313. 
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hand, this attribution tells us something about the reception of the Homeric worldview:63 
even if we do not want to believe that this saying was, at some point in time, actually 
thought to be Homeric in origin, it seems beyond contention that the Certamen’s author 
saw no contrast – and instead possible harmony – between the wisdom of the Homeric 
poems and the µὴ φῦναι.64 But there is also another, more symbolic interpretation, 
according to which Homer stands as the emblem of archaic poetry, and archaic poetic 
wisdom, and his response to Hesiod’s question is the response of an age, and of a type 
of poetry. In this sense just like Homer’s second answer to Hesiod (itself a direct quote 
from Od. 9.6-11) – stating that the finest thing for mortals is the delights of the 
symposium – this one too must have sounded plausible in Homer’s mouth to the 
Certamen’s audience.65 Attributing such a saying and belief to Homer means attributing 
it to the text that was read, studied, and alluded to for centuries to come, shaping the 
minds of thinkers of all kinds. What better testimony to the significance, repercussions, 
and notoriety of an idea? 
 
2. Were the Greeks Pessimists? 
 
Let us then examine the question about the existence and definition of Greek pessimism 
broached in the Introduction: were the Greeks pessimists? For one thing, they certainly 
did not call themselves so, since the term “pessimism” was born some 2000 years later 
in Europe.66 Given the anachronism inherent in the application of the term “pessimism” 
to the ancient Greeks, a remark on the terminology is in order. The term is employed 
throughout this thesis in light of the unyielding connection between ancient and modern 
                                                   
63   Of course the dating of the Certamen influences which age’s reception we are dealing with. See Uden 
(2010) for details on the papyri. Cf. Graziosi (2002) who analyses the place of the Contest in what she 
calls “the invention of Homer” locating the text specifically within a 4th century dialogue about the 
value of Homer’s poetry in democratic Athens.  
64   One should nonetheless recall that there are puzzling moments in the Certamen in regards to what is 
typically Homeric, see Arrighetti’s (1987), 168 and Graziosi’s (2002), 174 discussion of the odd 
choices of Homer’s best lines. Of course the line as we have it appears in Soph. OC 1224-1225; on 
this connection one should then recall other aspects of the relationships between Sophocles and 
Homer, on which cf. the article by Schein (2013). 
65   Notice that Hesiod raises the expectations about Homer’s response by introducing the idea of Homer’s 
connection with the divine (θεῶν ἄπο µήδεα εἰδώς); also, note the audience’s response to Homer’s 
answers at Certamen 8. Cf. Graziosi (2002), 175. 
66  On the birth of the term, originating from the debates on the pre-existing word “optimism”, see 
Stäglich (1951/1952) and the entry “Pessimismus” in Ritter and Gründer (2006). 
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pessimistic thought: the major founders of modern pessimism – Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, but also Leopardi – had extensive familiarity with Greek culture and its texts, 
and in different degrees they all researched and engaged with the idea of Greek 
pessimism. Even if we do not want to posit causation, (and believe that modern 
pessimism was born from the discovery of ancient pessimism), the strong relationship 
between the two remains undeniable. It is in this sense – without by any means equating 
ancient and modern pessimism – that the use of the term can be justified. 
 
Asking whether the Greeks were pessimists means, then, to a certain extent, asking 
whether we trust the evidence regarding the diffusion of the µὴ φῦναι from which the 
chapter began. It is a matter of fact that what is left to us of Greek literature supports the 
statements of Euripides, Aristotle, and the other πολλοὶ σοφοί mentioned earlier.67 Let 
us take a moment to quickly review the sources we have.68 Some of these sources – like 
Solon’s narration of the myth of Cleobis and Biton at Hdt. 1.31, and, within it, Hera’s 
statement declaring that it is better for humans to die than to live,69 or Euripides’ 
Cresphontes fr. 449, voicing the same notion of Bellerophon fr. 285 – are more closely 
examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis and are thus only listed here.70   
 
Of fundamental importance is Theognis’ four-verse gnome (425-428), the mould of 
seemingly every other appearance of the theme, 71 presenting its reflection on the 
                                                   
67   In fact both the variety of media (tragedy, philosophy, moral writings) and the chronological distance 
between these sources are in themselves a guarantee of its diffusion. Cf. Easterling (2013), 162-163. 
68  This quick rundown only includes the sources that convey the explicit formulation of the µὴ φῦναι. It 
is nevertheless essential to remember that the conception animating them is vividly active in many 
other works throughout Greek literature, despite the lack of explicit formulations; more about this 
throughout this thesis, and especially in Chapter 4. A list and brief discussion of most of these 
passages can be found in Curi (2008), 148. 
69   Hdt. 1.31.3: […] διέδεξέ τε ἐν τούτοισι ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἄµεινον εἴη ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι µᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν, on 
which more in Chapter 4. 
70  Although the bibliography on the Cresphontes is referenced in Chapter 4 II.3, it is worth mentioning 
here Opstelten’s (1952), 131-132 brief exploration of Euripidean pessimism (including ibid. 131 n. 4 a 
list of pessimistic passages in Euripides), which is aware of the “strong accumulation of pessimistic 
utterances in the lost Bellerophon”. Ibid. 132 n. 3: “Bellerophon was the first melancholic in 
literature”, quoting Iliad 6.200-202. 
71   Πάντων µὲν µὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον/µηδ’ ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου,/φύντα δ’ ὅπως ὤκιστα 
πύλας Ἀίδαο περῆσαι/καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γῆν ἐπαµησάµενον. Cf. West (1989), 194 and the 
commentary by Van Groningen (1966), 169-171, who interprets both Sophocles OC 1224ff and 
Euripides’ fr. 285 as direct references to Theognis’ verses; so does Curnis (2003), 118 for fr. 285; 
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benefits of non-existence in a bipartite structure, suggesting that, after utter non-
existence, the best outcome is to die as soon as possible.72 In Bacchylides’ Ode 5 (160-
161) it is Heracles who delivers the gnome, 73 and commentators have long noticed how 
well the saying fits in with the ode’s general pessimistic tone.74 Bolstered by the 
connection with the suffering Oedipus (the very “παράδειγµα der Tragik und 
Nichtigkeit des menschlichen Lebens”)75 the chorus’ statements about the µὴ φῦναι in 
the third stasimon of Sophocles’ Oedipus Coloneus 1224-1227 voices in all its might 
the universal connection between human existence and unhappiness.76 Similar testimony 
to the Herodotean Hera’s divine conviction that it is best for mortals not to live comes 
from the already cited words of the daimon Silenus in Aristotle’s Eudemus at pseudo-
Plutarch Cons. Ap. 115b-e.77 Alexis’ fr. 145, vv. 15-16 reworks the gnome (or, more 
accurately, the content of the two hexameters, if we use Theognis as the paradigm) in 
                                                                                                                                                     
Cuny (2003) on the connection between Sophocles and Theognis (“Théognis inspirateur de 
Sophocle”); ibidem 49 believes that the two authors may well have been referring to a common 
source. On Theognis and Sophocles, cf. Opstelten (1952), 167, who sees a substantial difference 
between the two, with Theognis expressing a more personal sentiment, and Sophocles a more 
universal insight. 
72   Cf. Cuny (2003), 54 (among others) noting that the second half of the gnome is not always repeated in 
other formulations of the µὴ φῦναι. 
73   Θνατοῖσι µὴ φῦναι φέριστον/µηδ’ ἀελίου προσιδεῖν/φέγγος. In West and Maehler (1970), 21; Irigoin 
(1993), 132. Text and commentary in Maehler (2004), 44 and 125, who supports the idea – seconded 
by Van Groningen (1966) – that the original version of the gnome consisted only of the two 
hexameters, which were then expanded to form elegiacs. Ibidem 125, Maehler suggests how 
Bacchylides did not need to quote the second half of the elegiacs because “Meleager did die young”. 
Text and commentary in Cairns and Howie (2010), 166 and 241. On the ode see Steffen (1961); Stern 
(1967) on the way in which Bacchylides’ language and style contribute to convey “this dark view of 
man’s lot” (ibid. 37); Lefkowitz (1969), esp. 84-87; Svarlien (1995), esp. 42-43 arguing instead 
against a pessimistic reading of the ode, suggesting that the dark imagery of the ode is “turned into 
hope and affirmation for Hieron”, and that “the myth of Ode 5, for all its blackness, still affirms rather 
than denies the value of mortal existence”.  
74   Cf. Stern (1967), 36-37 quoting Steffen (1961), 19. 
75   Cf. Lurie (2004), 299, also referencing Halliwell (1996), 345 and in note 40 Dodds (1966), 77 on 
Oedipus as “every man”. 
76   µὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νι-/κᾷ λόγον· τὸ δ’, ἐπεὶ φανῇ,/βῆναι κεύθε' ὅθεν περ ἥ-/κει πολὺ δεύτερον ὡς 
τάχιστα; in Dawe (1996), 63. Commentaries in Jebb (1889), 193-194; Ammendola (1953), 
Kamerbeek (1984), 168-172. On the verses cf. Carey (2009), 125 who calls it “the most limpid 
presentation we have of the Greek commonplace that it is best for mortals not to be born”; Easterling 
(2013), in particular 164-170 and esp. 165 and 169 on the universality of the sentiment expressed by 
the chorus. 
77  On which Curi (2008), 27-72, insightfully exploring the double tradition of the story of Silenus’ 
wisdom in Aristotle and in Theompus as transmitted by Aelian Varia Historia 3.8, and highlighting 
Silenus’ Dionysiac aspect. The story of Silenus seeps into Cicero Tusc. 1.114, on which Audano 
(2000) and (2006) again exploring the connection with the version conveyed by Theopompus. 
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trimeters, and remarkably introduces it by suggesting, like many of the sources seen so 
far, that the saying is “οὐκοῦν, τὸ πολλοῖς τῶν σοφῶν εἰρηµένον” (v. 14).78 The list of 
evils that inevitably afflict human life – a list the reader remembers from Simonides fr. 
19 W2 among others –79 is presented with a slightly comic spin in Posidippus fr. *133 
(AP 9.359); two things are left to choose from, says the poet, not to be born, or dying 
speedily at the moment of birth.80 
 
As this brief rundown shows, the “wisdom of Silenus” is a penetrating feature of many 
of the great works of Greek literature,81 and, as we said at the opening of this chapter, it 
can well be taken to epitomise Greek pessimistic thought. This wisdom, which directly 
confronts and displays the darkest of recognitions about human existence, is the 
progeny of the utterly ubiquitous Greek urge to question the value of life: although 
primarily posited as an irrefutable answer about life, the tale of Midas and Silenus is the 
story of a question. It is from this initial question that Achilles’ description of the divine 
granting of the human lot, Solon’s replies to Croesus with the tale of Cleobis and Biton, 
the comparison of humans and leaves, and all the other meditations on, and challenges 
to, the value of existence stem.82 For this reason, and with some literary licence, the µὴ 
φῦναι has been used so far in a synecdochic manner, to epitomise the existence and 
nature of Greek pessimism.  
 
This brings us to a first and necessary caveat concerning the use of the formula “Greek 
pessimism”,83 insofar as it may suggest that the object of this research is one distinct and 
unified worldview, clearly defined in time and space. This is indeed not the case: 
                                                   
78   τὸ µὴ γενέσθαι µὲν κράτιστόν ἐστ' ἀεί,/ἐπὰν γένηται δ', ὡς τάχιστ' ἔχειν τέλος. In Kassel and Austin 
(1991), 102-103 and as fr. 141 in Kock (1934), 348. Commentary in Arnott (1996), 422-430 and esp. 
429-430: “The popularity of such a maxim, with its message of total pessimism, doubtless owed 
something to its striking paradoxy”.  
79   More on fr. 8 W in Chapter 3. 
80   ἦν ἄρα τοῖν  δοιοῖν ἑνὸς αἵρεσις, ἢ τὸ γενέσθαι/µηδέποτ' ἢ τὸ θανεῖν αὐτίκα τικτόµενον. In Austin and 
Bastianini (2002), 170-171, edition and Italian and English translations; Gutzwiller (2005), 47 with 
English translation. One further liminary case for this list is Aeschylus fr. 466, with testimonia in 
TrGF Radt (1985), 502; on fr. 466 cf. Opstelten (1952), 167 n. 5: “where however the addition of the 
words κακῶς πάσχοντα characteristically restricts the scope of the meaning”. 
81   Cf. Easterling (2013), 194 and 198, calling it a cliché. 
82   Chapter 4 of this thesis explores this theme in greater detail. 
83   The label of “pessimism” is somewhat odd for Leopardi, who rarely uses it himself and does not apply 
it to his own philosophy. 
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throughout Greek history, pessimistic thought – this would be perhaps the fairest way to 
refer to it – never found itself a label, never founded a philosophical school or gained 
followers. And yet, as we have briefly shown and as Leopardi, Burckhardt and 
Nietzsche will contend, Greek literature brims with voices that in various ways, through 
various media, and with varying nuances, question the value of human existence, any 
teleological idea of destiny and justice, and the anthropocentric understanding of the 
cosmos. Despite lacking a name and the coherence of a proper current of thought this 
worldview was strong enough to cross centuries – arching from the archaic Homeric 
times to the Hellenistic age of Posidippus – and pervasive enough to imbue a large 
variety of literary and philosophical sources.84 It is this vitality and ubiquity that led 
Jacob Burckhardt to say that the whole understanding of Greek culture before his time 
had been deeply and utterly amiss, a “falsification” of reality in stark contrast with the 
evidence offered by the texts themselves.85 Rather than simply a current within Greek 
thought, for Burckhardt (and Leopardi) Greek pessimism is Greek thought, a force 
profound enough to shape the whole of Greek culture, ultimately to be essentially 
indistinguishable from Greek culture itself. 
 
Beside the various moral judgements which, across history, have been held against the 
worldview depicted by Greek pessimism,86 what more than anything caused the modern 
mind to resist the notion of the Greeks as pessimists is the long-perpetuated vision of 
Hellas as a place of perfect beauty, pondered serenity, and heroic idealism. This vision 
has an engrossingly complex history, and roots as deep as the Roman fascination with 
Greece and Virgil’s “creation” of Arcadia.87 But most of all, this vision is born from 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s interpretation of ancient art (and more generally of 
ancient culture) and from the ensuing process of reinterpretation and re-imagination of 
                                                   
84   Cf. Burckhardt in Burckhardt et al. (2005), 368: “Die Klage über das Elend der Menschen, wie sie 
sich aufdringlich und überall bei den Griechen hören läßt, ist ohne einige Wiederholungen nicht wohl 
zur Darstellung zu bringen; ein und derselbe Gedanke wird bald einfacher bald reicher, mit allerlei 
Beziehungen und Vorstellungen gemischt ausgesprochen.” 
85   See II.3 in this chapter. 
86   See II.1-2 in this chapter. 
87  Cf. Snell’s essay on Arcadia in Snell (1953); Rosenmeyer (1969); Jenkyns (1989); Iser (1989); 
Panofsky’s essay on Et in Arcadia Ego in Panofsky (2010). 
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antiquity that enveloped Europe through the age of Romanticism and beyond it.88 Even 
more than from Winckelmann’s conception of the Greeks’ joyousness of disposition, 
their privileged contact with nature, or their enlightened government, the “Greek ideal” 
was born from Winckelmann’s theoretical recognition of the principles of “unity” and 
“perfection” as the root not only of Greek art and beauty, but of Greek civilisation as a 
whole.89 The ensuing idea of Hellas was, and indeed still is, hard to reconcile with a 
darker and gloomier notion of Greece. Winckelmann himself came across some of the 
literary evidence of this other side of Greek thought, and could feel the contrast between 
the “tragic muse” of Aeschylus and the limpid, rational literature of the Socratic age;90 
the only safe way out of this impasse was to attribute such divergence to an erring step 
in the path of a developing culture. 
 
In truth the two things – serenity and striving for beauty on the one hand, and a 
pessimistic interpretation of the world on the other – are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. As we shall see in this chapter, most of the people who proposed that 
modernity ought to acknowledge the existence and importance of ancient pessimism did 
not suggest that ancient pessimism had anything to do with sadness, resignation, or lack 
of enthusiasm for life.91 Rather, they saw in the Greeks a precocious, unclouded, and 
uncompromising cognisance of the condition of human life. The joy for life, the 
enthusiasm for missions and goals, and the appreciation of beauty are undeniably part of 
the Greek mode of life, as they exude from the poetry, the art, and the political 
achievements of ancient Greece.92 Could it perhaps be this feature of Greek life that has 
discouraged attempts at seeing what lay behind – or better, what lay at the roots – of the 
                                                   
88   See Silk and Stern (1981), 6 on Winckelmann’s enduring influence. Also Held (2004) on 
Winckelmann’s and Nietzsche’s views of Hellas. Emden (2004), 378 connects Wincklemann’s 
idealistic conception of Greece and its wide reception with the historical circumstances of 18th and 
19th century Europe. 
89  Cf. Emden (2004), 376: “This very specific understanding of beauty is dependent on the ideas of 
wholeness and perfection which he discovered in Greek sculpture and regarded as a main attribute of 
Greek antiquity as a whole.” See also Silk and Stern (1981), 4-6. 
90   Silk and Stern (1981), 5-6 and note 5 referencing Forschepiepe (1943), 21ff. Cf. Butler (1935), 46.  
91   Cf. Die Geburt der Tragödie 7 and 11. 
92  See the Vorrede 4 to Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in Colli and Montinari (1973), 19:“Oh diese 
Griechen! Sie verstanden sich darauf, zu l e b e n : dazu thut Noth, tapfer bei der Oberfläche, der 
Falte, der Haut stehen zu bleiben, den Schein anzubeten, an Formen, an Töne, an Worte, an den 
ganzen Olymp des Scheins zu glauben! Diese Griechen waren oberflächlich — a u s  T i e f e !”, cf. 
Held (2004), 419.  
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shimmering beauty of the Greeks’ existence? Nietzsche phrased it beautifully, as he was 
writing his self-criticism to The Birth of Tragedy - Man erräth, an welche Stelle hiermit 
das grosse Fragezeichen vom Werth des Daseins gesetzt war.93 The Greeks’ pessimism 
is the act of questioning – more fundamentally than the act of challenging – the value of 
existence. The way one may go and practically live life – which choices, which self-
rewards, which entertainment, which aspirations – is not necessarily touched by such a 
question.  
 
What are we to do then with the question regarding the Greeks’ pessimism? One could 
dismiss the notion of Greek pessimism on the grounds that pessimistic thoughts are at 
some point found in every civilisation, as we do find them in Egyptian literature or in 
many Eastern traditions, and are merely a moment in the development of a culture.94 
According to this view all these statements and reflections are simply the 
commonplaces and proverbs that emanate from this general popular mood and deserve 
little attention.  
 
Without pretending that the presence of such thoughts straightforwardly makes the 
Greeks into pessimists and nothing else, I instead contend that it is crucial to listen to 
this evidence and try to grasp the significance of this side of Greek wisdom (and 
theodicy), a side that – as the following parts of this chapter illustrate – has been long 
forgotten, purposedly deleted, or simply unacknowledged. In order to do this, I suggest 
we embark on a journey through history, to see what the reaction of those who came 
across this controversial aspect of Greek thought was. This chapter aims at tracing a 
short account of the reception and understanding of Greek pessimism. A great and long 
history could be written, and would deserve to be written, on this topic; here, however, 
the limited space only allows us to sketch some of the most important steps of this path 
of denial, curiosity, and rediscovery. 
                                                   
93   From his Versuch einer Selbstkritik 1, in Colli and Montinari (1972), 6. 
94  A selected bibliography on other traditions of pessimism: Guttmacher (1903) on optimism and 
pessimism in the Bible; Daiches (1928) on the Mesopotamian Dialogue of Pessimism; Brandon 
(1962) on a comparative analysis of ideas of destiny in various religious beliefs; Lambert (1963), 
again on the Dialogue of Pessimism; Bottéro (1992) on Mesopotamic religion and especially “The 
Dialogue of Pessimism and Transcendence”, pp. 251–267; Sneed (2012) on pessimism in the 
Ecclesiastes; Enmarch (2013). On this topic cf. Burckhardt et al. (2005), 350, 360-361 and Nietzsche 
in Versuch einer Selbstkritik 1 in Colli and Montinari (1972), 6.  
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II 
A Modern History of Ancient Pessimism 
1. The Querelle Des Anciens et Des Modernes 
 
The second step in this brief history of the reception of Greek pessimism is distant in 
time from the writings of Aristotle or pseudo-Plutarch. We are now in 17th century 
Europe, with one of the most extraordinary, extensive, and long-lasting events in the 
history of the modern understanding of antiquity. The Querelle – whose “official start” 
is usually identified with Charles Perrault’s declaration of the Modernes’ superiority in 
his Le siècle de Louis Le Grand on January 27th 1687 at the court of Louis XIV – is the 
child of three centuries of incessant discoveries and cultural revolutions. On the one 
hand, the rediscovery of a multitude of ancient works, which cooperated in prompting a 
new (paralleling and) comparison between the achievements of antiquity – whose 
superiority had until then lived unchallenged –95 and the possibilities of modernity; on 
the other hand, the renewed trust in man born with the Renaissance, resurrecting man’s 
faith in the possibility of surpassing the deeds of the past, the newly born idea of 
progress, and the scientific advancement professed by the Baconian method.96  
 
The whole Querelle burst out with tremendous gravity. More than just pervading the 
many years of skirmishes that involved the personal lives of the contestants,97 the 
atmosphere of battle kept metaphorically informing the discourse on the Querelle 
through the language and iconography of war.98 The reason for such gravity and 
controversy lies with the question at the root of the Querelle.  Rather than simply a 
matter of mere superiority (who is to be deemed superior, antiquity or modernity?)99 the 
                                                   
95   Cf. Gillot (1914), 125-142 on the myth of antiquity as “mother of Sciences and Arts”. 
96  Cf. Baron (1959), 15. Cf. Tassoni (1620). Gillot (1914) suggests national pride and patriotism in 
France as other elements in the birth of the Querelle. Cf. Gilbert (2015), looking at aspects of the 
Renaissance as prelude to the Querelle. On the Querelle, cf. also Dejean (1997).  
97  Cf. Fumaroli (2001), 194-195 on the final make up between Perrault and Boileau with a public 
embrace in the Académie française in 1694. 
98  Jonathan Swift’s Battle of the Books (1704) is perhaps the most famous example; cf. also a drawing on 
the frontispiece to the 1714 English edition of François de Callières’s Histoire poétique de la guerre 
nouvellement déclarée entre les Anciens et les Modernes, as seen in Levine (1991), 130 showing the 
line up of the troops of anciens and modernes depicted as armies facing each other.  
99   Winckelmann’s own theory is in itself one monumental answer to the question posed by the Querelle: 
from the idea, brought forward early on in his Gedanken, that art is imitation of the ancients to the 
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real controversy runs much deeper, to involve the beating core of the relationship 
between antiquity and modernity: what can (and should) modernity do with the history, 
the fame, the inheritance of antiquity? Far from trivial, the Querelle tackled crucial 
questions about the future of literature, science, and, among other things, modern man.  
 
As Marc Fumaroli reminds us, the main kernel of the Querelle fragmented to produce a 
multifarious series of “mini-Querelles” and a number of corollary battles (“de l'art avec 
les techniques, du génie avec la méthode, de la vision poétique avec l’univocité de la 
déduction logique” among others).100 Insofar as the notion of superiority was concerned, 
the Modernes armed themselves to scrutinise each and every aspect of the (alleged) 
ancient superiority – the knowledge of the various sciences, their philosophical 
doctrines, the beauty of their verses, to name but a few – an enterprise well epitomised 
by Perrault’s Parallèle des anciens et des modernes (1688-1697). Due to the limited 
scope of this section, I am forced to concentrate quite drastically on one specific point 
of contention between the two parties, i.e. the thorny subject of antiquity’s religion, 
morals, and worldview.  
 
The bickering, fickle, and supremely flawed gods of the Homeric pantheon, the 
recurring and undisguised absence of providence,101 the unfair punishment of the just in 
so many Greek tragedies, these and many other issues inevitably were a difficult item 
on the battlefield of the Querelle.102 The problem was akin to the one faced by 
Winckelmann, but all the more irksome insofar as the contestants of the Querelle were 
directly concerned not only with the aesthetic realm, but also, and openly, with those of 
morals and philosophy. The scattered and yet undeniable evidence of this aspect of 
Greek culture inevitably jarred with the modern (and what is more Christian) mind.103 
This feature – the intrinsic irreconcilability of ancient literature’s worldview and 
religion with modern mœurs and theological convictions – is what makes this one 
subject unique in representing a problem for both Modernes and Anciens, both finding 
                                                                                                                                                     
explicit declaration of the superiority of antiquity, his work is a decisive defence of antiquity’s 
superiority. Cf. Held (2004), 413. On the question, cf. Gillot (1914), 32. 
100   Cf. Fumaroli (2001), 203-204. 
101  This is, of course, a generalisation that does not mean to encompass the whole of Greek thought, 
which includes, above all, the Stoic theory of divine providence.  
102  Cf. the “demi-dieux […] capricieux” of Perrault’s Le siècle. 
103  See Manuel (1959), 15-53; Vyverberg (1958), 86. 
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themselves inevitably at odds with it:104 the former shrewdly and lavishly used it to 
undermine antiquity, forcing the Anciens – troubled themselves by the religious and 
moral implications of Greek literature – to justify it in a multitude of more or less 
convincing manners.105  
 
The assault of the Modernes was biting and, more than anything, utterly ubiquitous. 
One can hardly go far into any of the works that tackle the dispute without encountering 
mention of the blasphemous character of the ancient mœurs. A few examples should 
suffice. Decades before the official start of the Querelle, and in line with Charles 
Sorel’s programme to attack “nonedifying forms of fiction”, the Berger extravagant’s 
(1627) characters criticise the ancients for their ridiculous and farcical depiction of the 
divine, and essentially for the ancients’ attempt to pass off “fables” as theology.106 The 
“demi-dieux […] capricieux” in Perrault’s Le siècle resurface in his Parallèle in the 
mention of the “mauvais exemples des dieux de L’Iliade”: rather than giving the gods 
all the vices of men, Homer ought to have given men all the virtues of the gods.107 Even 
somebody as moderate as François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon could regard 
ancient religion as “ridicule et monstrueuse” in his Lettre à l'Académie (1718).108 Issues 
with the theological assumptions of antiquity in the light of their clash with Christian 
beliefs are at the core of the work of Jean Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin.109 All these various 
attacks bring forth a “radical reappraisal of Greek religion and theology as a mythic and 
                                                   
104 Cf. Fumaroli (2001), 167-168 on the fact that some Anciens too were unconfortable with the 
representation of human life drawn by the ancient poets. See Levine (1981), 78-79 for examples of 
other instances in which the two fronts agreed on their judgements of antiquity in general. 
105  Huet’s reminder that poetry has to be educational and instructive gives us a sense of why the Anciens 
found ancient morals troublesome, cf. Huet’s Lettre de M. Huet à M. Perrault sur le parallèle des 
anciens et des modernes in Fumaroli (2001), 398. 
106  Cf. Tucker (2000), 347 and n. 3 and Sorel’s (1627) Le Berger Extravagant, Libre III, 137. 
107  Cf. Perrault’s Parallèle Tome 3, in Fumaroli (2001), 372 on Horace’s use of Homer and on the 
latter’s “les mauvais exemples des dieux de L’Iliade que dans la vie et les écrits des philosophes, et il 
devait dire, comme Cicéron, qu’Homère eût mieux fait de donner aux hommes toutes les vertus des 
dieux que de donner aux dieux tous les vices des hommes.” 
108  Fénelon (1911), 66-67. 
109  Cf. Desmarets at Rigault (1856), 80-81, 86, 93 (on the gods of Homer), where Desmarets professes 
himself an enemy of the Homeric theology precisely in light of his being Christian. Insofar as 
Christianity was the point, the issue was not – or at least was not always – the ancients’ polytheism 
and paganism per se, but rather and more deeply the clashing features of the gods of antiquity 
compared to the God of the Bible and to the other monotheistic religions.  
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superstitious mentality of a primitive people, on a level with American savages”, as one 
can see in Fontenelle.110  
 
Everywhere (and especially as far as Homer is concerned) we find an abundance of 
arguments against the theology and the gods of antiquity. But perhaps the greatest 
testimony to the Modernes’ feelings towards the ancients’ pessimistic worldview can be 
found in their reaction to Greek tragedy.111 As shown by Michael Lurie in his discussion 
of the reception of Sophocles, well into the 16th century and before the 
“Christianisation” of the interpretation of tragedy,112 tragedy was conceived as “a 
warning representation of the mutability of unpredictable fortuna, and hence of the 
frailty of human happiness and the misery of human life”.113 With their descriptions of 
arbitrary fate and divine injustice, it was thus only natural for tragedy’s worldviews to 
become one of the weapons turned against antiquity.114 For reasons well explained by 
Lurie, and connected to the difficulty inherent in any attempt to Christianise this 
tragedy’s plot (and to the history of such attempts), Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex played a 
prominent role amongst the whole of Greek tragedy.115 In his The Ancient and Modern 
Stages Survey’d (1699) (once the Querelle had landed in England) James Drake plainly 
and unmistakably denounces the lack of virtue in the plot of the Oedipus Rex, accusing 
it of convincing man of the “lubricity of fortune” and the “instability of human 
greatness”.116 Drake’s opinion was nothing new. Eight years earlier, in his Réflexions 
sur la Poétique (1691), Fontenelle had exposed the Sophoclean play as morally 
deficient insofar as it conveyed what we can now call a pessimistic interpretation of the 
human condition.117 At the beginning of the following century the Abbé Jean Terrasson 
in his Dissertation critique sur l’Iliade d’Homère (1715) identified in Greek tragedy the 
                                                   
110  Fontenelle (1691–9), 30–32. Quotation is from Lurie (2012), 448. 
111  It is not by chance that Philipp Melanchthon’s exegetical lectures on Sophocles’ plays – attempting to 
discern the action of divine justice and thus the theological correctness of each play – do not include 
the Oedipus Rex, cf. Lurie (2012), 444. 
112  Cf. Melanchthon’s Cohortatio and Lurie (2012), 442-444. 
113  Lurie (2012), 442. 
114  Lurie (2012), 448. 
115  See Lurie (2012) and Saint-Évremond (1692), 182 on which Lurie (2012), 448. 
116  Drake (1699), 131-132. 
117 “On ne remporte d’Œdipe, et des pièces qui lui ressemblent, qu’une désagréable et inutile conviction 
des misères de la condition humaine”, from Fontenelle (1818b), 19. 
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workings of an “idée impie” by which the innocent are unduly punished by fate and the 
gods.118  
 
Terrasson’s discussion of Greek tragedy had been prompted by the attempt of Ancien 
André Dacier to reconcile in the plot of the Oedipus Rex a providential vision of divine 
justice – by which the guilty are punished – with the Aristotelian concept of hamartia – 
according to which the punishment comes in light of an error made unknowingly and 
unwillingly by the character. To make sense of the terrible turn of events in the play, 
Dacier had to prove Oedipus guilty, and thus righteously castigated: to do so he argued 
that “involuntary, yet nonetheless morally culpable” character flaws were the 
justification for the gods’ action.119 Dacier’s untenable interpretation quintessentially 
exemplifies the Anciens’ attitude in the face of the pagan beliefs of the Greeks: unable 
to thoroughly accept – let alone to embrace – the ancient worldview as it is, but 
nonetheless forced to defend their party, the Anciens resorted to a variety of means, 
which fall mostly into two categories. On the one hand they proposed to interpret and 
explain the unacceptable aspects of ancient theology and Weltanschauung by resorting 
to a prisca theologia and to a number of allegorical readings.120 Such was the approach 
of Anne Dacier, wife of André and famous Homerist, who used Christianising 
interpretation to pursue the moralising endeavour of justifying the gods of Homer 
(attacked by Antoine Houdar de La Motte amongst others).121 A different approach was 
taken by all those who variously suggested that moral judgements should be waived 
entirely, and ancient literature enjoyed for the many other pleasures and teachings it can 
offer.122 Both attempts are a testimony to the Anciens’ essential inability and refusal to 
read, interpret, and accept in full the very works they were defending. The gap between 
the accepted moral systems of modernity and the beliefs of ancient Greece is, at this 
point, unbridgeable.  
 
 
                                                   
118  Terrasson (1715), 188. 
119  Lurie (2012), 447. 
120  See Melanchthon’s moralising interpretations of Greek tragedy on which Lurie (2012), 443-444. 
121  Cf. Perrault (1692), 55; Dacier (1714), 100-108; Hepp (1968), 410. Cf. Levine (1991), 141-145 for De 
La Motte’s and Terrasson’s criticism of Homer. Details of Dacier’s arguments in Dacier (1714), 101-
102, 104, 106; Patey (2008), 54.  
122  As did Brumoy, on which Lurie (2012), 450-452. 
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2. Jean-Jacques Barthélemy: Moralism and the Disguise of Philosophy 
 
Jean-Jacques Barthélemy’s Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce was a publishing 
phenomenon: appearing for the first time in 1788, by the end of the next century it had 
been reprinted over forty times and in different languages. 123  The Voyage is 
simultaneously a novel – recounting the travels of the Scythian Anacharsis through 4th 
century Greece –124 and an erudite scholarly enterprise, which aims at shaping both a 
liberal history and a social and cultural history of Greece. Through the looser and more 
narrative guises of fictional literature, the French scholar had the chance to include and 
discuss anything ranging from religious beliefs and customs, to culinary digressions, to 
the artistic and musical practices of the time. All this material is gathered from 
Barthélemy’s extensive acquaintance with ancient sources, sources that are both 
referenced in the dense note apparatus and listed at the end of the last tome of the novel. 
But on top of this, the fictional form allows Barthélemy to make the Greeks speak for 
themselves, and to introduce direct dialogues with not only common people, but also 
with important witnesses in the history of Greek culture, Badolle’s “grands hommes de 
l’histoire”.125 Clothed in alluring storytelling, the Voyage is formed by innumerable 
collections of ancient sources relating to each subject, a testimony to the author's 
mesmerising erudition. It is one of these collections that wins the Voyage a place in this 
history of Greek pessimism: albeit extremely briefly – and, as we shall see, in a peculiar 
manner – Chapter 28 of Barthélemy’s work is one of the first modern collections of 
ancient Greek pessimistic statements. To the best of my knowledge no work has 
discussed this section of Barthélemy’s Voyage or explored the role played by ancient 
pessimistic thought within it.126  
 
Chapter 28 of the Voyage (Suite des moeurs des Athéniens) begins with a hectic scene 
of city life, meant to give the reader a taste of the “vie civile” of the Athenians, subject 
                                                   
123  Cf. Silver (1990), 145-148. The bibliography on the Voyage is sparse to say the least. After Maurice 
Badolle’s (1927) book, the Voyage has been the subject of very little research, and mostly directed at 
observing this work’s influence on other works or authors. One exception is Silver (1990). Someone 
even suggested the author owed his life to his work, cf. Silver (1990), 145. 
124  On Anacharsis as a “figura storica” cf. Polizzi (2011), 69-70. 
125  Badolle (1927). 
126 Polizzi (2011), 125-126 discusses briefly Chapter 78, reaching very different conclusions. 
 33 
also of the prequel to this chapter, number 20, Mœurs et vie civile des Athéniens.127 It is 
after some time spent among this not so pleasant crowd of pretentious characters, 
annoying chatterers, and slimy parasites, and after a brief encounter with Diogenes 
himself, that the protagonist begins to recount an altogether different type of meeting, 
taking place at the “portique de Jupiter” on a different day. The group of people 
gathered in the porticus is described as “quelques Athéniens qui agitoient des questions 
de philosophie”.128 Immediately the reader is immersed in medias res in the on-going 
conversation, just like the passer-by Anacharsis. The central topics under discussion are 
the essence of the world and the role of man in it. Each character in turn gives a short 
speech outlining their opinions, and the reader learns that each of them is a disciple of a 
philosophical school: disciples of Heraclitus, Democritus, Plato. It is here that the 
chapter gathers and presents the reader with a choice of Greek beliefs, part of which 
overlaps with the much more extensive pseudo-Plutarchean collection mentioned above, 
the Consolatio ad Apollonium. The speakers utter these notions as part of their 
philosophical beliefs about the world’s essence: man is the dream of a shadow, the 
worst of evils is to be born, the best thing is to die.129  
 
The extent of Barthélemy’s engagement with these pessimistic thoughts is rather 
limited, as the brevity of the entire passage (only a few pages in the French edition used 
here) shows. But the real peculiarity of the abbé’s approach lies in the mechanism by 
which he inserts these textual references. The vast majority of the pessimistic notions 
conveyed by the speakers – and then punctiliously referenced by the author in the 
footnotes, in line with his erudite approach – come from non-philosophical works, and 
especially from poetic ones. Yet they are repositioned in what is a downright 
philosophical sketch; the character of the philosopher is used to utter statements that 
come for example from tragedy (Soph. OC 1224-27) and lyric (Pind. Pyth. 8.95-96). 
The non-judgmental inclusion of these pessimistic notions in Barthélemy’s work is a 
crucial step in the history of the modern engagement with ancient pessimistic ideas. 
                                                   
127 I quote from Barthélemy (1789-1790), with tome and page numbers. 
128  Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 3, 135. 
129 Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 3, 135-139. A brief rundown of the ideas mentioned here and of the 
sources which Barthélemy supplies for each of idea can be found on the table in Appendix 1. In the 
“source” column I copy Barthélemy’s text and add in square brackets references to the loci in the 
modern notation. The speakers’ numbers in brackets indicate if one speaker appears more than once.  
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And yet, although the fact that they are quoted testifies (at least partially) to the author’s 
acknowledgement of the existence of this dark worldview, Barthélemy’s handling of his 
sources reveals that we are still far from a complete acceptance (let alone an embracing) 
of such worldview. By choosing philosophers as the spokespersons of poets – who first 
divulged these ideas, but are not mentioned in the body of the text – Barthélemy 
“disguises” poetry as philosophy, thus revealing that he fails to fully espouse the 
philosophical worth of poetic writings. Although the speakers (and the author via them) 
positively use concepts derived from ancient poetry, thus proving that the content of 
these poetic statements is considered sound and valuable, we are nonetheless assuredly 
albeit inexplicitly told that poetry needs the backing and sanctioning of philosophy in 
order to be considered serious and credible. 
 
Yet this is not the only instance of a somewhat censorial attitude towards pessimistic 
poetic thought in the Voyage. Whereas Barthélemy’s “disguise” of poetry is indirectly a 
statement about the author’s opinions on the validity and authority of a literary form – 
and in a sense once more a stance in the age-old quarrel between poetry and philosophy 
– a later section of the Voyage informs us that Barthélemy had words of caution also for 
the subject matter of this pessimistic wisdom. Chapter 78 (Sur le bonheur) takes up 
where Chapter 76 had left off, i.e. with the continuation of Anacharsis’ visit to Delos, 
guided (among others) by the native Philocles. The atmosphere that pervades these 
chapters is one and the same, a joyful mix of festive cheerfulness (the festival on the 
island, and a wedding celebration), exposure to quasi-divine beauty (that of Ismene, 
Philocles’ daughter, and her groom) and an overall sense of partaking in an ideal life. 
One detail contradicts quite powerfully the fresco of uncontaminated happiness painted 
by the author as he describes the celebrations on Delos in Chapter 77. As the offerings 
are brought in, the bystanders present tales about the Hyperboreans and their legendary 
health, beauty, and happiness, all lived in a perpetual spring.130 In the face of the 
unmissable feature of the Hyperborean country – its distance from known human 
abodes – the narrator has to comment that “c’est ainsi que les hommes n’ont jamais su 
placer le séjour du bonheur, que dans des lieux inaccessibles”.131 Barthélemy’s treatment 
                                                   
130  Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 428. 
131  See Curi’s (2008), 39-42 section “L’altrove della felicità” and ibid. 30-31; Curi explores the version 
of Silenus’ story trasmitted by Aelian, whereby Silenus speaks of the two cities that are on a continent 
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of the Hyperborean legend entails some degree of contradiction: this myth that 
envisions the land of perfect happiness outside the boundaries of the known world (or 
even in no physical and existing place, as Pindar’s Pythian 10. 29-30 seems to say) is 
mentioned in the context of an idealised representation of Greek life. Although its 
premises are inherently at odds with much of chapters 76-78, Barthélemy acts almost as 
if he could not resist the temptation to insert this one more piece of erudition, but then 
supplies no explanation for it and the myth remains somewhat adrift in the narrative, 
testimony to a worldview that Barthélemy is about to criticise in Chapter 78. 
 
It is in Chapter 78 that we learn more about Philocles, his wisdom, his philosophical 
education and his “système de conduite” aimed at the achievement of happiness, a 
target which Philocles seems to have successfully reached. Chapter 78 looks, 
accordingly, rather like a short treatise “on happiness”. As we realise immediately 
Philocles’ discourse is nothing else than an anti-pessimistic venture, an assault on 
pessimistic worldviews, purposefully meant to respond to (and attack) all those who see 
happiness as incompatible with human life. By trial and error Philocles has learned that 
men seek happiness in the wrong places, be it pleasures, excessively stern virtue, or the 
strictest reason; real happiness comes, this is Philocles’ conclusion, from love.132 One 
could say that Philocles’ stance is a modus vivendi and not a Weltanschauung, in that it 
does not deny per se any of the pessimistic notions on the human condition, but it 
merely suggests the best way to cope with existence. And yet the fact that Barthélemy 
directly opposes such pessimistic ideas is strikingly evident from the very start of 
Philocles’ speech. Here the pessimistic conception of human existence is summarised 
and at the same time denounced in two powerful rhetorical questions: “Est-ce donc pour 
couvrir la terre de malheureux, que le genre humain a pris naissance? Et les dieux se 
feraient-ils un jeu cruel de persécuter des âmes aussi faibles que les nôtres?”.133 No, is 
the vigorous (albeit indirect) response of Philocles, whose entire speech is a negation of 
such conceptions of the world. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
beyond this world. The inhabitants of the “pious” city live in happiness and die laughing (cf. the 
fragment by Theopompus cited by Aelian in Jacoby (1927), 551, fr. 75 c4.) 
132  And especially selfless love. The last, love-centred part of Philocles’ speech is prompted by the 
heartfelt request of young Lysis, who cries out “Ah! Philoclès, nous sommes faits pour le bonheur”. 
133  Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 446. 
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It is in Philocles’ response to these questions that we catch again repeated glimpses of 
Barthélemy’s problematic relationship with Greek pessimistic ideas. Whether or not 
with this passage in mind, Philocles’ discourse implicitly engages with the Homeric 
discourse on the human understanding of divine action, and in particular with the 
Odyssean Zeus’ much-debated speech on the role of the gods in the causation of human 
suffering (Od. 1.32-41). Philocles’ stark reply  (“Je ne saurais me le persuader; c’est 
contre nous seuls que nous devons diriger nos reproches”)134 is in line with the most 
moralising readings of the speech,135 according to which Zeus is stating that the gods 
have no part in the causation of mankind’s sufferings, an interpretation which is 
untenable not only in the face of the very plot of the Odyssey itself, but also on a purely 
linguistic level.136 Consciously or not, Philocles is siding with those who see in man’s 
own doings the root of human trouble, thus implicitly disregarding the anti-teleological 
stance of so much of Greek literature, and its characters’ cries against malevolent gods. 
 
The following part of Philocles’ speech confirms our thesis about the author’s views on 
pessimistic interpretations of the world. Philocles engages with the idea (widespread in 
Greek literature) that man’s lot is a mix of goods and evils, an idea that finds its earliest 
expression in Achilles’ speech to Priam at Iliad 24.526-534. There is nevertheless a vast 
                                                   
134  Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 446. 
135  See for example Dietrich (1965), 324. Although Kullman (1985), 5 acknowleges that “as frivolous as 
the gods may appear to us, their actions account for the whole of human suffering and weakness”, he 
still believes the Odyssey to introduce ever since the council of the gods “another way of thinking”.  
136  An interpretation I deem untenable. There are two textual reasons for which Zeus’ clearcut denial of 
responsibility becomes highly implausible. Those who wish to rule out any divine role in human 
misery neglect to consider and translate the καὶ in verse 33 (as pointed out by Allan (2006), 16 n.73 
and Tsagarakis (2000), 47 n.163. Fränkel (1975), 221, n. 6); the impossibility of reading in this 
passage merely the complete denial of involvement on the gods’ part is restated by Heubeck, West 
and Hainsworth (1988), 77, clarifying that Zeus’ speech is in no way a denial of divine interference in 
causing evil (κακά, ἄλγεα) to men. Furthermore the concept conveyed by the καὶ is in my opinion 
restated once again in the following line, as Zeus says that “(mortals) through their wickedness have 
sufferings ὑπὲρ µόρον”, a phrase often overlooked in textual analyses or translated rather generically 
as “beyond that which was ordained” as by Murray (1919) and similarly by Lattimore (2007). Given 
that Μόρος is the part allotted to a man in the course of his life, “one’s due share”(as in Heubeck, 
West and Hainsworth (1988), 78),  to translate it as “that which was ordained” is to stress a vagueness 
which is not in the text, as µόρος referes to the share of humans. Thus “beyond one’s share” implies 
that human action adds to a lot that is already decided (by external forces), thus reinforcing the notion 
that human wickedness and depravity merely add to divine action. By acting wickedly, man brings 
upon himself disgraces beyond what was allotted to him: but it is the gods and the superior forces who 
allot man his basic lot.  
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and striking difference between Philocles’ conception of the distribution of goods and 
evils and that conveyed by Greek literature. According to Philocles, humans receive 
good mingled with evil (“Des lois constants mêlent sans interruption le bien avec le 
mal”).137 But describing the evil, Philocles suggests that some of it may well reveal to be 
real good, as opposed to pleasure (which is what humans understand as “good”), and 
that ultimately “pour la plupart des mortels, la somme des biens serait infiniment plus 
grande que celle des maux”.138 Nothing could be farther from the description of the jars 
given by Achilles, a description that only envisions two possible scenarios, and whose 
overall tone is certainly incompatible with the optimistic conclusion of Philocles. On 
the one hand, Achilles describes the possibility that a man would get a mixed lot (529-
530), on the other hand the one according to which man receives only evil 
(ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, 531-532).139 The description of the two jars and the practical 
explanation of their meaning for human life provides an efficacious seal to Achilles’ 
dark and irrevocable statement at 525-526, stating that the gods have destined men to 
live in pain. Pindar’s Pythian 3.82-83 (ἓν παρ ̓ ἐσθλὸν πήµατα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς 
ἀθάνατοι) similarly deals with the allotment of good and evil; David Young has 
suggested that, by stating that for each good man is given two evils, Pindar has correctly 
understood the Iliadic myth of the two jars, and channeled “the attitude of most Greeks 
toward life itself”.140 Although superficially reminiscent of the Greek outlook on the 
apportionment of the human lot, Philocles’ discourse twists it to transform it into a tale 
of human happiness and even, ultimately, of divine benevolence (“Si vous demandiez 
des raisons d’un si funeste partage, d’autres vous répondraient peut-être que les dieux 
nous devaient des biens et non pas de plaisirs; qu’ils ne nous accordent les seconds que 
pour nous forcer à recevoir les premiers”).141 
 
Chapter 78 is thus to be read in conjunction with the observations on the state of the 
world that the Greek philosophers (and the poets through them) presented in Chapter 
28. Philocles is then the one who – having had a philosophical education with “les plus 
célèbres philosophes de la Grèce” – goes beyond the teachings of philosophy, 
                                                   
137 Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 447. 
138 Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 447. 
139 See Curi (2008), 145, quoting Magris (1984), 83ff. 
140  Young (1968), 50-51. 
141  Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 6, 447. 
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surpassing them with his own empirical discoveries about life and happiness. 
Barthélemy’s hand is unmistakably visible throughout the book in the recurring 
moralising tone; at times the distance and deprecation felt towards the things Anacharsis 
is witnessing is so stark that the author can explicitly condemn this or that custom (as he 
does, for example, with the ancients’ handling of unwanted newborns in Chapter 26).142 
With his ode to happiness, strikingly positioned towards the end of the whole œuvre, as 
a last word on many of the ethical and philosophical positions analysed in the book, 
Barthélemy makes his presence vividly felt. This – the idealised worldview of Philocles, 
in line with the joyful scenarios of Arcadian flavour with which Barthélemy surrounds 
his character – is what the author wants the reader to take away from this historical (but 
also moral) trip to antiquity. Any belief that contradicts this vision – such as the (poetic) 
pessimistic statements uttered by the philosophers in Chapter 28 – is only suited to 
remain an inconsequential erudite detail among hundreds, fatally open to criticism, but 
most of all chastised as the flawed perspective of people who fail to really understand 
the cosmos. 
 
3. A Different Tyranny: Pessimistic Greece in 19th Century Switzerland 
 
As the three stages sketched so far briefly and yet unmistakably show, the history of the 
reception and understanding of Greek pessimistic thought is long, vexed, and complex. 
Despite acknowledging the presence of pessimistic thoughts in Greek culture – and thus 
going far beyond the various reactions of the Querelle’s Anciens – Barthélemy’s work 
still betrays the author’s unease towards some of their ethical and religious implications. 
One has to wait for the 19th century for things to change, and for a new era in the history 
of the interpretation of Greek thought to come about. Strikingly, this interpretative 
revolution has been, with the significant exception of Giacomo Leopardi, thoroughly 
German, taking place in the nation that had ever since Winckelmann shown an 
especially voracious interest in all classical (and especially Greek) things.143 Partly 
                                                   
142  Cf. Burckhardt’s very different treatment of the custom in Burckhardt et al. (2005), 378, which he 
connects specifically to the Greeks’ pessimistic understanding of the cosmos. On this cf. Gossman 
(2000), 332. 
143  See Nietzsche’s comment at Die Geburt der Tragödie 15, in Colli and Montinari (1972), 94: “[…] 
dass die Griechen unsere und jegliche Cultur als Wagenlenker in den Händen haben”. 
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foreshadowed in the works of earlier generations (such as that of August Böckh),144 this 
radical rethinking of Greek culture was chiefly brought about by Jacob Burckhardt 
(1818-1897) in his Griechische Kulturgeschichte and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
with his Die Geburt der Tragödie. The role of another (minor, but nevertheless 
essential) character in this rediscovery, Arthur Schopenhauer, and his treatment of 
Greek pessimistic thought will be at the centre of one section of this thesis;145 for this 
reason he does not appear in the following pages. 
 
Despite being published posthumously in 1900,146 the Griechische Kulturgeschichte is 
the result of the research that Burckhardt carried out for a series of lectures on Greek 
culture that he delivered for the first time at the University of Basel in 1872, the very 
same year as the publication of Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy.147 Albeit in drastically 
different manners, both Burckhardt’s work (in the chapter Zur Gesamtbilanz des 
griechischen Lebens) and Nietzsche’s book (which the author himself subtitled “oder 
Hellenismus und Pessimismus” when he republished it in 1886) potently state the 
burning necessity of considering the pessimistic side of Greek thought. Much is left for 
us to wonder about the relationship between the two works, very likely conceived in the 
years of Burckhardt’s and Nietzsche’s friendship in Basel. We can hardly believe that 
no spark or idea of what was to form these coeval works was shared between the two in 
the long chats we know about, and yet as Arnaldo Momigliano’s short but enlightening 
essay tells us, we lack documentation to prove any such sharing, and we have, on the 
contrary, some proof that official collaboration never took place.148  
 
Reflecting the personality, the age, and the ultimate ambitions of their authors, the two 
works differ widely in both style and interpretation of this uncharted territory of Greek 
culture and thought. Although undoubtedly novel and risqué for its times in his intuitive 
                                                   
144  Cf. Gossman (2000), 302. On the relationship between Böckh’s and Nietzsche’s conception of 
philology and the study of antiquity Porter (2000a) in various places, esp. 67 (contrasting Böckh’s 
“historical and antiquarian” approach with Gottfried Hermann’s) and 201-202. 
145  See Chapter 3 III. 
146  Cf. Gossman (2000), 304-307 on the genesis of the lectures and on the posthumous process of 
publication by Jacob Oeri. On the Kulturgeschichte, Murray’s Introduction to Murray and Stern 
(1998), 3-12. 
147  And then again for a number of times until 1885, when he decided to concentrate solely on art history, 
cf. Momigliano (1955); Gossman (2000), 304; Ghelardi (2002), 37 n. 6.  
148  Momigliano (1955), 290. On their relationship, Müller (2005), 55-74; ibid. 94-95.  
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and wide-sweeping interpretation of Greek culture,149 Burckhardt’s chapter on Greek 
pessimism in his Kulturgeschichte is still remarkably academic when compared to 
Nietzsche’s “impossible” book.150 Die Geburt der Tragödie is a visionary work that 
merges insightful intuitions – such as the comprehension of the Greeks’ pessimistic 
nature – with blatant historical and philological errors, and combines them in a majestic 
and powerful fresco of the cultural history of ancient Greece that of modern Germany.151 
In Aby Warburg’s famous words, the prophetic force that is alive in both Burckhardt 
and Nietzsche manifests itself in two almost opposing ways: on the one hand the 
maenad-like Nietzsche, who showed with his own existence the need for his epiphanic 
intuitions to take body, inform reality, and change the future;152 on the other hand, 
Burckhardt, who is content with teaching the prophetic wisdom he has grasped without 
allowing it to shake the roots of his existence. 
 
Yet what the two works really have in common is a core of profound tenets and beliefs 
that run significantly deeper than any difference ever may. First is the consciousness of 
the revolutionary character of their re-reading of the history of the understanding of 
antiquity. Both Burckhardt and Nietzsche, immersed as they were in the climate of 
German Hellenism, were fully aware of the magnitude of their break with tradition.153 In 
                                                   
149  On Burckhardt’s awareness of the difference of his own work and of the future judgement of Basel’s 
viri eruditissimi see Momigliano (1955), 290; Gossman (2000), 307. 
150  In Versuch einer Selbstkritik 2, in Colli and Montinari (1972), 7. 
151  Cf. Henrichs (2004), 125-126 on the divergence between Nietzsche’s academic writing and Die 
Geburt der Tragödie, which Henrichs suggests can be regarded also as work of fiction. On Die Geburt 
der Tragödie, see Von Reibnitz’s (1992) commentary. 
152  See Warburg’s essay in Ghelardi (2002), 7-12. Cf. Johnson’s (2012), 141-146 analysis of Warburg’s 
views on Burckhardt and Nietzsche. It is worth being reminded here of Nietzsche’s peculiar 
interpretation of the myth of Silenus, as revealing of his conception of pessimism at Die Geburt der 
Tragödie 3 (in Colli and Montinari (1972), 31): as Halliwell (2008), 339-340 describes, Nietzsche 
“makes Silenus break out into piercing laughter before uttering his irredeemably grim 
pronouncement”, and Silenus’ is undoubtedly an “existentially charged laughter”. His conception of 
pessimism is tackled in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882; 1887) as he attacks “romantic” pessimism 
and his call for a “classical” or “Dionysian” pessimism, cf. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft 370 in Colli 
and Montinari (1973), 301-304.  
153  Cf. Held (2004), 412, also quoting Die Geburt der Tragödie 20, Colli and Montinari (1972), 125: 
“Sollten wir, um nicht ganz an dem deutschen Geist verzweifeln zu müssen, nicht daraus den Schluss 
ziehen dürfen, dass in irgend welchem Hauptpunkte es auch jenen Kämpfern nicht gelungen sein 
möchte, in den Kern des hellenischen Wesens einzudringen und einen dauernden Liebesbund 
zwischen der deutschen und der griechischen Cultur herzustellen? [...] anderwärts tändelt eine 
gänzlich wirkungslose Schönrednerei mit der ‘griechischen Harmonie’, der ‘griechischen Schönheit’, 
der ‘griechischen Heiterkeit’”; Henrichs (2005), 456 names this radical shift rather mildly a 
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both authors this awareness is joined with the strong conviction that every other reading 
of Greek culture – all those “flirting with ‘Greek harmony’, ‘Greek beauty’, ‘Greek 
cheerfulness’”154 and in short all those interpretations who denied the existence of Greek 
pessimistic thought – had been nothing but the mightiest historical falsification.155 This 
idea is expressed by both scholars at different points, phrased in a language that wavers 
between explicit hostility, slight ridicule, and proud offence at the extent of such 
falsification.156 Burckhardt’s is perhaps the most thorough and final presentation of the 
idea:157  
 
In Betreff der alten Griechen glaubte man seit der großen Erhebung des deutschen 
Humanismus im vorigen Jahrhundert im Klaren zu sein: im Wiederschein ihres 
kriegerischen Heldenthums und Bürgerthums, ihrer Kunst und Poesie, ihres schönen Landes 
und Klima's schätzte man sie glücklich und Schiller's Gedicht “die Götter Griechenlands” 
faßte den ganzen vorausgesetzten Zustand in ein Bild zusammen, dessen Zauber noch heute 
seine Kraft nicht verloren hat. Allermindestens glaubte man, die Athener des perikleischen 
Zeitalters hätten Jahr aus Jahr ein im Entzücken leben müssen. Eine der allergrößten 
Fälschungen des geschichtlichen Urtheils welche jemals vorgekommen, und um so 
unwiderstehlicher, je unschuldiger und überzeugter sie auftrat. Man überhörte den 
schreienden Protest der ganzen überlieferten Schriftwelt, welche vom Mythus an das 
Menschenleben überhaupt beklagt verschätzt, und in Betreff des besondern Lebens der 
griechischen Nation [...]158 
 
Burckhardt’s discourse is passionate and yet composed, and resonates (without 
explicitly referencing them) with the ideas of those who had preceded him, such as 
                                                                                                                                                     
“differentiated view of Greek culture”. Cf. Robert Pöhlmann’s opinion on the Griechische 
Kulturgeschichte in Gossman (2000), 308: “an important testimony to the deep-rooted transformation 
of historical judgment of the Greeks in the second half of the nineteenth century”. Apropos of the two 
scholars’ awareness of earlier interpretation, cf. Albert Henrichs (2004), 121 who insightfully 
identifies a reference to Winckelmann in the way the Nietzsche of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 
speaks about Greek life at the “recession” of the Olympian gods, using the terms “düster” and 
“ängstlich”, antonyms of the “buzzwords” of German classicism after Winckelmann. 
154  Die Geburt der Tragödie 20 in Colli and Montinari (1972), 126. 
155  Similarly, Gossman (2000), recalls Burckhardt’s refusal to “transfigure” or “prettify” antiquity. 
156  See Held (2004), 413: “Nietzsche himself in a notebook entry from 1888 underlines this, claiming 
that when the comedies of Winckelmann’s and Goethe’s Greeks, along with Victor Hugo’s Orientals 
and Scott’s thirteenth-century Englishmen, are uncovered, it will become evident that all are false 
historically, though in modern terms all true.” Of course, as Held himself suggests (and Henrichs, see 
above n. 151), Nietzsche’s work himself can often be considered little short of pure fiction. 
157  Cf. Gossman (2000), 313-314. 
158  Burckhardt et al. (2005), 350. 
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Winckelmann himself. The brief enumeration of their misleading and embellishing 
interpretations eventually erupts in a potent statement that leaves no space for 
oppositions: the image of the happy Greeks that we have received and interiorised is 
“one of the most tremendous historical falsifications that have ever occurred”. Set in a 
somewhat unexpected and secluded spot halfway through the chapter he dedicates to 
Greek pessimism, this passage is indirectly and yet unmistakably a programmatic 
manifesto of what he is presenting as his own uncompromising interpretation of Greek 
culture. That Burckhardt is not only thinking of the political and social happiness 
granted by the much-praised (and much idealised) Greek democracy – a subject that he 
deals with at length in the Kulturgeschichte – is evident from his mention of literature 
and myth. Myth and literature are personified and depicted in the act of screamingly 
protesting against the falsified ideality that has been forced upon them.  
 
It is precisely this complete acceptance of poetry in its widest (and Leopardean) sense 
that places Burckhardt and Nietzsche apart both from the preceding tradition and, as we 
shall see, from future attitudes. By embracing what the ancients’ literature tells us about 
their understanding of life, the two scholars finally bestow philosophical, ethical, and 
ultimately existential dignity onto poetic expression. Thus the artistic representation, the 
mimesis enacted by poetry is now the explicit source of evidence for the Greek 
worldview.159 Burckhardt uses myth – such as the story of Philomela and Procne – to 
convey the horror that the Greeks felt as inherent in existence, just as Nietzsche brings 
forward tragedy as the example of how “Der Grieche kannte und empfand die 
Schrecken und Entsetzlichkeiten des Daseins”.160 Although the material used in the two 
treatments oftentimes converges – as it does for the focus on the figure of Prometheus –
161 the way in which Burckhardt and Nietzsche use and resort to literature is different. 
On the one hand is Burckhardt’s more linear exposition, which employs examples from 
                                                   
159 Burckhardt et al. (2005), 350. On the place of pessimism in poetic and literary form, and on the quality 
of the Greeks’ acceptance of the nature of existence, see Burckhardt et al. (2005), 365: “In weit 
überwiegendem Maße aber tritt uns in Poesie und Prosa der Griechen der Pessimismus als eine 
volksthümliche Thatsache entgegen, und zwar gar nicht als Resultat der Reflexion, und vollends lohne 
alle die vielseitige Begründung, welche er in unserm Jahrhundert erfahren hat, vielmehr wird er von 
Stimmungs wegen insgemein recht kurz und barsch in die Welt hinausgerufen.” 
160 Die Geburt der Tragödie 3 in Colli and Montinari (1972), 31. See also Die Geburt der Tragödie 17, 
ibid. 105 “wir werden gezwungen in die Schrecken der Individualexistenz hineinzublicken”. 
161  Burckhardt et al. (2005), 353, 364, 368 and Die Geburt der Tragödie 9. 
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a variety of sources (with a high recurrence of the Homeric poems); on the other is 
Nietzsche’s more opinionated writing, which often goes long stretches without any 
explicit reference to specific works or texts.  
 
The embracing of poetic forms as the medium for philosophical notions goes hand in 
hand with the acceptance of the different morals espoused by the Greek mind. 
Everything that is un-Christian, immoral, and illogical to the modern mind – such as the 
causation behind the punishment of the innocent –162 is understood, explored, and 
recognised.163 But there is more: the fear of previous generations – that the immorality 
of Greek beliefs could taint modernity – is turned around by Nietzsche, who suggests 
that the Greeks’ insight into the essence of the world is precisely what modernity needs 
to live life at its fullest, having acknowledged the real state of the human condition. So 
Greek man – who, according to Burckhardt is not scared to consider the coming of 
death,164 and can enjoy life having uncompromisingly accepted its real terms and who, 
according to Nietzsche, is the epitome of the “pessimism of strength” –165 becomes the 
model for modern man to look up to. This complete overturn is made possible by the 
fact that both authors are able to observe one aspect of the Greek soul – the pessimistic 
understanding of human existence – without denying, and in fact explicitly stressing, 
the other side, i.e. the ability to make the most of life’s delights, be it the joy of art, the 
excitement of political engagement, or the simple pleasure of wine. Burckhardt 
expresses it with his usual flair: 
 
Die ganze Erscheinung des griechischen Pessimismus erhält nun ihre volle Merkwürdigkeit 
durch den entschiedenen Optimismus des griechischen Temperaments, welches vom tiefsten 
Grunde aus ein schaffendes, plastisches, der Welt zugewandtes ist und außerdem – an der 
Oberfläche – die Verwerthung und den Genuß des Augenblickes sehr zu schätzen weiß.166 
 
                                                   
162 Cf. Die Geburt der Tragödie 14 in Colli and Montinari (1972), 88 and Burckhardt et al. (2005), 356: 
“Was am Schicksal vor Allem hervorgehoben wird, ist nicht die Gerechtigkeit sondern die 
Unvermeidlichkeit”. 
163  An example is Nietzsche’s response to the traditional interpretations of tragedy, cf. Die Geburt der 
Tragödie 22. 
164  Burckhardt et al. (2005), 359, on Laertes’ case. 
165  As in Versuch einer Selbstkritik 1, in Colli and Montinari (1972), 6. 
166  Burckhardt et al. (2005), 364.  
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One side does not forbid the other; on the contrary it is precisely the Greeks’ thorough 
recognition of the nature of life that permits their full enjoying of what is allowed to 
men.167 It is this remarkable clarity with respect to the somewhat paradoxical nature of 
Greek pessimism and its seeming clash with the Greeks’ life that is peculiar to 
Burckhardt and Nietzsche.168 Drawing a distinction between the understanding of life 
and the practical response to it, both works loudly spell out that pessimism is to be 
confused neither with a gloomy attitude nor with “resigned acceptance” of what one 
sees.169  
 
But there is one further and crucial similarity between these two works. In different 
ways both Nietzsche’s Geburt der Tragödie and Burckhardt’s Kulturgeschichte respond 
to the peculiarly 18th and 19th century necessity to understand what to do with the 
classics, a question inherited from the post-Renaissance and Querelle era, and newly 
posed by so many German intellectuals. Both Nietzsche’s and Burckhardt’s efforts 
firmly deny that the answer could ever be mere specialist study or pure 
antiquarianism.170 The study of the past has to be made relevant for the present because 
it intrinsically has the potential to impact and influence people’s lives. Cardinal to both 
authors’ works was thus the belief that their respective disciplines – philology for 
Nietzsche and history for Burckhardt – needed profound and radical changes in order to 
be significant for the current century and those to come.171  
 
What philology had failed to do in Nietzsche’s mind was to become an “interpretative 
discourse” (to use Christian Emden’s words)172, i.e. a discipline able to penetrate the 
nature and thought of a people or a culture. The new mission of philology is an almost 
                                                   
167  Nietzsche describes this complete acceptance in Die Geburt der Tragödie 9, Colli and Montinari 
(1972), 67, through the Aeschylean Prometheus’ attitude: “Alles Vorhandene ist gerecht und 
ungerecht und in beidem gleich berechtigt.” 
168 Of course stressing this point – the double nature of Greek pessimism – was vital to Nietzsche’s 
argument of the pessimism of strength. Cf. Invernizzi (1994), 502. 
169 See Die Geburt der Tragödie 6, Colli and Montinari (1972), 44 and Burckhardt et al. (2005), 361, 363-
364 et al.  
170 On Nietzsche’s philological career, see among others Most (2000); Latacz (2014); Babich (2014); 
Porter (2014). 
171  Cf. Emden (2004), 380. 
172  Cf. Emden (2004), 385. 
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obsessively recurrent topic throughout Nietzsche’s early writing,173 but they find special 
intensity and limpidity of expression in some of the Nachgelassene Fragmente dating to 
a few years after the publication of the Birth of Tragedy, fragments that were originally 
notes for Nietzsche’s Wir Philologen: 
 
Die Philologie als Wissenschaft um das Alterthum hat natürlich keine ewige Dauer, ihr 
Stoff ist zu erschöpfen. Nicht zu erschöpfen ist die immer neue Accommodation jeder Zeit 
an das Alterthum, das sich daran Messen. Stellt man dem Philologen die Aufgabe, seine 
Zeit vermittelst des Alterthums besser zu verstehen, so ist seine Aufgabe eine ewige. — 
Dies ist die Antinomie der Philologie: man hat das Alterthum thatsächlich immer nur aus 
der Gegenwart verstanden — und soll nun die Gegenwart aus dem Alterthum verstehen? 
[...] (Nachgelassene Fragmente 3 (62), März 1875)174 
 
Whether or not the enterprise Nietzsche has in mind here has to be identified with the 
Geburt itself, the Birth of Tragedy is unquestionably an attempt to provide the world 
with the new insight into modernity that can be gained by looking at the past.175 In 
Nietzsche’s case this struggle to make philology a discipline for the future (to use the 
sneering phrase of his great detractor Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff) 176 
coincided with his personal struggle as a professor of Classics in Basel, merging into a 
heightened “alienation” from both philology and the professional world where he 
practiced it.177 What Nietzsche was doing for philology, Burckhardt was doing for 
history. Moving from a history in the manner of the Annales to a history of the 
Antiquitates (to borrow a famous Momigliano distinction) Burckhardt independently 
echoes a Nietzschean creed, maintaining that in the search for the particular historians 
                                                   
173  Silk and Stern (1981), 17-18 collect a number of quotations from Nietzsche’s letters on this topic. See 
also Porter (2000a), especially the Introduction, for a broad sketch of Nietzsche’s relationship with 
philology over the years; cf. Porter (2014), esp. 27. 
174  In Colli and Montinari (1972), 107. 
175  See Lloyd-Jones (1976), 13; Most (2000), 163-166. Cf. Henrichs (1986), 379 on how the Geburt 
made of Nietzsche a “cultural critic” but ruined his reputation as a philologist.  
176  Wilamowitz’ article in response to Nietzsche’s work was indeed entitled Zukunftsphilologie. 
Wilamowitz was to criticise Burckhardt’s project too, cf. Gossman (2000), 307. 
177  Henrichs (2005), 446 on Nietzsche’s early (1871) foreboding to be more suited to philosophy than to 
philology, on which also Stroux (1925), 72–80. Silk and Stern (1981), 22-23. See Porter (2000a). 
Lloyd-Jones (1976), 3 on the complex interweaving between philology and philosophy in Nietzsche’s 
history.   
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have lost sight of the essential:178 for Burckhardt the essential is the “inner life of past 
humanity”, the very “large, bold brushstrokes” of Nietzsche’s words.179 Burckhardt’s 
new cultural history is different from previous attempts, and – as the example of the 
discussion on infant exposure well shows –180 it escapes the dangers of moralism that 
Barthélemy had conversely stumbled into. A new history and a new philology then, 
united by the desire to be more relevant to the present and the future, and by the wish 
not to lie about or embellish the past, thus portraying the entirety of the soul of a culture 
without censoring its darkness.  
 
4. Conclusion: Leopardi’s Role and the Destiny of Greek Pessimism 
 
This briefly sketched history is meant to give a taste of some of the reactions to Greek 
pessimistic thought in a number of key periods. Ultimately this background better 
equips us to understand the role that Leopardi played in this history, to understand the 
extent of the novelty of his contribution. 
 
The debates during the Querelle had shown how Greek pessimistic thought – although 
of course not yet identified as such – represented at best an awkward aspect of ancient 
wisdom, at worst a real obstacle to the appreciation and embracement of ancient works. 
The Querelle continued much longer than the lives of those who first started it, and 
went on to inform subsequent discussions on antiquity and modernity (although those 
are not often considered in the light of the Querelle itself). In his Literaturgeschichte als 
Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft (1967), Hans Robert Jauss challenged the 
tendency of the standard interpretations of German classicism to starkly isolate it from 
its historical milieu and especially from the results of the French Enlightenment. 
Conversely, Jauss argues, works like Friedrich Schlegel’s Über das Studium der 
                                                   
178  Cf. Momigliano (1955), 284-285; Gossman (2000), 309-310 on the programmatic introduction to the 
Kulturgeschichte. For Nietzsche’s opinion in a nutshell cf. Nietzsche’s letter to Carl von Gersdorff on 
the 6th of April 1867 in Colli and Montinari (1975), 208-212: “Denn wir wollen es nicht leugnen, jene 
erhebende Gesammtanschauung des Alterthums fehlt den meisten Philologen, weil sie sich zu nahe 
vor das Bild stellen und einen Oelfleck untersuchen anstatt die großen und kühnen Züge des ganzen 
Gemäldes zu bewundern und — was mehr ist — zu genießen. Wann, frage ich, haben wir doch einmal 
jenen reinen Genuß unsrer Alterthumsstudien, von dem wir leider oft genug reden.” 
179  Cf. the passage in note 178 and Gossman (2000), 309. 
180  Cf. above Chapter 1 II.2. 
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griechischen Poesie and Friedrich Schiller’s Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung 
ought not only to be read more attentively in their historical context, but they benefit 
from being understood as “responses” to the Querelle.181  
 
I propose that it is equally fundamental to see Leopardi’s reception of antiquity as a 
direct response to the (question of the) Querelle, something that, to the best of my 
knowledge, has so far been entirely neglected by scholarship. Whether direct or indirect, 
the comparison of ancients and moderns is ubiquitous in Leopardi’s works, the Operette 
Morali being possibly the most striking example of his engagement with the various 
aspects of the relationship between antiquity and modernity.182 One might think for 
instance of the Dialogo di un fisico e di un metafisico, where the two debate on whether 
a long existence (granted by the “miracles” of modern science) is per se preferable; it is 
the wisdom of antiquity that Leopardi chooses to counter this argument, a wisdom 
distilled from the myth and literature of ancient Greece.183 Again, it is the ancients’ 
knowledge and use of dreams as a means of relieving one’s existence that Leopardi 
praises in his Dialogo di Torquato Tasso e del suo genio familiare. Throughout, 
modernity stands for everything that is an erroneous and damaging illusion (such as the 
ignorant wish for eternal life) or misplaced and blind faith (such as that in progress). 
Antiquity, on the contrary, represents the fuller ability to enjoy and live life (OM 259-
260), the courageous strength to admit life is not good per se, and at the same time the 
mastery of those skills that can make existence more bearable. But what the ancients are 
hailed for over and over (and even outside the explicit comparison with the moderns) is 
their unyielding, uncompromising, and truthful understanding of life. The moderns’ 
lack of insight into the real nature of human existence is the direct opposite of this 
remarkable and brave ancient attitude. Here lies Leopardi’s revolutionary riposte to the 
Querelle’s enigmas. Unlike both Anciens and Modernes of the 17th and 18th century 
debates, Leopardi can appreciate and accept this part of Greek culture. But most of all, 
as a defender of antiquity himself, he can do what the Anciens had entirely failed to do, 
                                                   
181  Jauss (1973), 67-106. 
182  See among others the passages on the ancients at TPP (2013), 501, 527-528, 536-537, 543, 603. Dolfi 
(1997), discusses some of the passages mentioned here, but without the connection to the Querelle. 
183 The exemplum of the centaur Chiron, who chose to renounce his immortality and the double 
(Herodotean) story of Cleobis and Biton and Agamedes and Trophonios, both displaying how for man 
it is best not to be born, or to die soon; for this cf. Chapter 4, II.2.1). 
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that is to defend and support the ancients precisely for their dolorous and brave 
worldview. This – their pessimistic Weltanschauung – is the reason antiquity beats 
modernity, and the reason modernity ought to look back and up to the past’s insights. 
 
Ever since Sebastiano Timpanaro’s ground-breaking chapter “Il Leopardi e i filosofi 
antichi” (first published in 1965),184 scholarship on Leopardi has – so to speak, and as 
we explained in the Introduction – rested on Timpanaro’s laurels as far as research into 
Leopardi and Greek pessimism is concerned. One claim in particular, reasonable though 
it is in its original context, has been taken too far. Timpanaro was, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first to notice and comment on the role played by Leopardi’s reading of 
Barthélemy’s aforementioned chapters, which undoubtedly supplied the Italian poet 
with a number of sources he was not familiar with. Yet this link and the importance of 
Barthélemy’s impact have been overstated by later scholarship, or, more simply, overly 
relied on as if they represented full resolution to the question about Leopardi’s 
interpretation and use of ancient pessimistic thought. Thus for decades now countless 
footnotes refer to Timpanaro and Barthélemy, failing to question or to further 
Timpanaro’s discovery and thus avoiding a direct discussion of Leopardi’s life-long and 
complex relationship with Greek pessimistic thought.185  
 
What Barthélemy’s chapter is undoubtedly responsible for is providing Leopardi with a 
collection, presenting his reader in one place and at one time with several Greek 
pessimistic notions. In the same months in which Leopardi was reading the Voyage, two 
other collections listed in Leopardi’s Elenchi di letture (Stobaeus’ chapter 34 from book 
4 of the Anthology and Marcello Adriani’s vulgarisation of pseudo-Plutarch’s 
Consolatio ad Apollonium) were playing similar roles for the Italian author.186 The role 
of these collections (and chiefly of Barthélemy’s, insofar as it may have been the first 
which Leopardi accessed, according to the available information) is important primarily 
                                                   
184  Timpanaro (1965), esp. 202-208. 
185  Recently Brogi (2012), 16 confines the topic to a note (n. 10) despite the very subject of his book is, 
as the title clarifies, Nessuno vorrebbe rinascere: Da Leopardi alla storia di un’idea tra antichi e 
moderni. Binni (1973), 78 argues that Leopardi “brought his pessimism to Antiquity” (“Pessimismo 
portato entro il mondo antico”) as to imply that antiquity knew no such a thing; similarly Dolfi (1986), 
52. Polizzi (2011), 108 speaks of “pessimismo greco” in inverted commas.  
186  On the work of Adriani cf. Polizzi (2011), 98-111. 
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in light of their very nature, which sketches a theme by collating various evidence. Yet, 
there are at least two reasons why this importance should not be overplayed. First, 
Leopardi might not have known some of the sources mentioned in Chapter 28 of the 
Voyage, but he most certainly had thorough knowledge of some others among them; 
one should in this respect bear in mind that in many instances the fact that we cannot be 
sure Leopardi read something does not straightforwardly mean he never did. As the 
chapters of this thesis explain in greater detail, many of the notions expressed by 
Barthélemy’s characters are already in nuce or even very openly present in works that 
Leopardi had great familiarity with, such as the Homeric poems.  
 
But the second and more crucial reason is that Leopardi’s presentation and 
interpretation of Greek pessimistic thought is so entirely different from Barthélemy’s 
that we are forced to face the novelty of Leopardi's outlook on the subject. On the one 
hand stands Barthélemy’s rather sparse collection of sources, spanning only a few short 
pages in a chapter and therein contained; the themes briefly resurface at the end of 
Barthélemy’s œuvre only to be refuted and morally chastised. On the other hand we 
have Leopardi’s continuous engagement with Greek pessimistic thought, which is 
researched and explored, and ultimately interiorised to provide a springboard for 
Leopardi’s own worldview. What is one among hundreds of themes in Barthélemy’s 
work, is instead a crucial and essential point of reference for Leopardi, whose interest in 
Greek pessimism is catalysed by the belief that this ancient understanding of life ought 
to be paradigmatic for the modern world.  
 
Bolstered by the daring efforts of Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Burckhardt, and Nietzsche, 
one would expect the road for modernity to fully embrace Greek pessimism to be paved 
successfully once and for all.187 Things instead did not go so smoothly. Briefly (if at all) 
                                                   
187  It is worth reminding that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were familiar with Leopardi’s work. Cf. 
Schopenhauer’s conclusion to Chapter 46, discussed in Chapter 3 III. Leopardi (although still guilty, 
according to Nietzsche, of being a “pessimist”) is for Nietzsche one of the highest examples of the 
poet-philologist (cf. Nachgelassene Fragmente 5 [17] in Colli and Montinari (1967), 120 and the 
letter to Marie Baumgartner from the 29th of December 1878 in Colli and Montinari (1980), 375), and 
one of the most profound voices to describe the human condition. Cf. Dahlkvist (2007), 216 on how 
“Nietzsche does not describe himself as a pessimist. On the contrary: pessimism is true, but we need 
something that saves us from this truth”. Cf. Levy (1921), 272 for Hans von Bülow’s letter to 
Nietzsche from the 1st of November 1874, whereby Bülow refers to Leopardi as “Schopenhauers 
 50 
mentioned in the many “histories of pessimism” that flourished in the 70’s and 80’s of 
the 19th century – histories inspired by the increasing role played by modern 
philosophical pessimism in 19th century Europe – Greek pessimism is still poorly 
acknowledged and its connection with modern pessimism is most of the time not 
drawn.188 James Sully, whose 1877 monograph on pessimism post-dates Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy, finds for example that it is Buddhism that should be seen as the 
“direct progenitor of the modern German systems”.189 Sully is not blind to the existence 
of pessimistic notions in Greek culture and spends some words discussing the Greeks’ 
concept of decadence and decline as it emerges from their mythology, and the way in 
which it opposes the modern idea of progress.190 Nevertheless his conclusion is that in 
“Greek thought, we find, on the whole, ideas conducive to optimism rather than 
pessimism”. Somewhat similar is the view of Elme Marie Caro in his Le pessimisme au 
XIXe siècle (1878): Caro acknowledges that antiquity developed “sentiments analogue” 
to those of modern pessimism.191 Yet those are rather explained away as “des traits de 
profonde mélancolie” and Caro too fails to see the more profound nature of Greek 
pessimistic thought.192  
 
The 20th century, alongside the appearance of Burckhardt’s Kulturgeschiche, saw some 
development with the publication of two academic articles focusing on Greek 
pessimism, both in 1921: Hermann Diels’ “Der Antike Pessimismus” and “Der 
Pessimismus und seine Überwindung bei den Griechen” by Wilhelm Nestle.193 Other 
                                                                                                                                                     
großer romanischer Bruder”, inviting Nietzsche to translate Leopardi into German, in Colli and 
Montinari (1978a), 600-601. On Nietzsche and Leopardi, cf. Negri (1994), commenting on previous 
bibliography at 39-60. 
188  Amongst the many, one can mention the works of Agnes Taubert, Eduard von Hartmann, Elme Marie 
Caro, James Sully. Some of these figures are analysed in Dahlkvist (2007), 62-112. 
189  Sully (1877), 37, agreeing with his contemporary Max Müller. 
190  Sully (1877), 39: “The contrast between this idea of decline and the modern idea of progress is a 
remarkable one, and serves very materially to lessen the balance of pessimism which would otherwise 
mark off modern thought from that of antiquity.” Views on the existence of progress in antiquity vary: 
Bury (1920) began the debate denying its existence, on the grounds of the fact that the ancients 
thought the world to be in constant decline. Later scholarship challenged Bury’s interpretation, cf. 
especially particularly Edelstein (1967); Dodds (1973), 1-25; Blundell (1986), 103-108, 165-202; cf. 
also Nisbet (1994); Burkert (1997).  
191  Caro (1878), 4. 
192  Caro (1878), 4. 
193 These articles are good overviews of the presence of pessimistic thought in Greek literature, but not 
much more (both for their relative brevity and for their lack of in-depth analysis). Cf. also Marquard 
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works of scholarship (albeit mostly briefly) dedicate some space to Greek pessimistic 
thought, such as Nestle’s article “Odysee-Interpretationen II” (1942) or William Chase 
Greene’s Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (1944). Nevertheless in 1985 
an Italian article addressing the question of the pessimistic character of early Greek lyric 
can still lament the lack of thorough research on “il complesso fenomeno del 
pessimismo greco”.194 Two works have in more recent years addressed the topic more 
satisfactorily. Umberto Curi’s recent Meglio non essere nati (2008) is perhaps the single 
work to extensively address the topic; Curi’s analysis is mostly organised by theme, 
moving freely through a variety of sources following the philosophical threads that 
connect them, with balanced attention to philosophical and poetic sources alike (with 
great relevance given to tragedy, among the latter). Possibly because of its special focus 
on the idea of the µὴ φῦναι, Curi’s monograph does not exhaust the scope for research 
on Greek pessimism; many sources that are inextricably connected to the historical and 
literary milieu of the µὴ φῦναι remain out of Curi’s gaze, or are simply touched upon 
(the relevant example being the comparison of men and leaves, observed in Chapter 3 
of this thesis). Ultimately, despite being too brief to provide a complete assessment of 
the vast phenomenon of Greek pessimistic thought, this monograph is an example of 
what studious and at the same time creative research can produce in this field.  
 
The final work worth mentioning here – Henk Versnel’s “The Gods: Divine Justice or 
Divine Arbitrariness” in his Coping with the Gods (2001) – is not directly concerned 
with Greek pessimism, but rather with the overlapping subject of Greek notion(s) of the 
gods’ role in, and power over, human existence and the world.195 Despite the difference 
in focus and the relative brevity (for the vastness of the topic) of the chapter, Versnel’s 
analysis has a number of very valuable merits. First, it brings together many of the 
passages that, throughout Greek literature (and especially Greek poetry), convey 
pessimistic worldviews; although Versnel spends only a few lines on each passage, he 
manages to convey with remarkable clarity the role it plays in the wider network of 
Greek thought. Most of all, Versnel speaks openly of “pessimism”, and succeeds in 
                                                                                                                                                     
(1905). Other brief treatments of the theme are Max Pohlenz’s review of Diels, Pohlenz (1922) and 
Opstelten’s work focusing on Sophocles, Opstelten (1952).  
194  Laurenti (1985), 51. 
195  Versnel (2011), 151-234. 
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painting a summarised but well-balanced portrait of the nuanced and sometimes 
contradictory aspects of the Greek view(s) of the world and the divine.196 
 
The scarcity of research into Greek pessimistic thought in modern classical scholarship 
is perhaps one of the causes for the disregard of ancient pessimism in the broader field 
of the studies of the history of ideas, a lamentable gap indeed, especially if one 
considers the 19th century path of the rediscovery of Greek pessimism and its 
inseparable connection with cultural history. Joshua Foa Dienstag’s Pessimism: 
Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit is recent proof that there is no wide acknowledgment of, and 
consensus on, the existence and significance of ancient Greek pessimism. Dienstag 
presents an innovative and insightful analysis into the history of the idea of pessimism, 
setting out to undertake the complex task of proving that pessimism was and is not a 
personal tendency to discontent and spleen, but instead a worldview with philosophical 
dignity.197 As such, pessimism plays a role in the history of ideas and Dienstag analyses 
several steps in this history, even including a chapter on Leopardi’s pessimism. Yet, 
throughout the book the author readily dismisses the existence of pessimism in antiquity 
without further discussion: pessimism is irrefutably established by Dienstag to be a 
“conceptual child of Modernity”.198 It is thus no surprise that the essential connection 
between ancient and modern pessimism, and between those who formulated modern 
pessimism and the ancient pessimistic worldviews is entirely missed; Dienstag can 
mention with condescension “Nietzsche’s characterization of the pre-Socratic Greeks 
as pessimists” or “Nietzsche’s characterization of the Greeks as pessimists”.199  
 
Attitudes similar to Dienstag’s can be found elsewhere. In his analysis of Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche George Simmel maintains that the idea of suffering as an a priori in life 
appears for the first time with Schopenhauer, and that before him pessimism was merely 
the malheureux outlook of some individuals on life.200 Curiously enough, the connection 
                                                   
196  E.g. his words on Hesiod at Versnel (2011), 151-156. Something similar had convincingly been done 
for the Odyssey by Clay (1983) in the chapter “The Double Theodicy of the Odyssey”. 
197  Similar attempts at clarifying the nature of philosophical pessimism had been made long before, for 
example by Sully (1877), 1, 4, a testimony to the difficult reception of the idea of pessimism. 
198  Twice on one page, Dienstag (2006), 16. 
199  Dienstag (2006), 166, 168 n.16. My italics. 
200  Simmel (1991), 53. 
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between ancient and modern pessimism is implicitly made by a book that does not aim 
to cover intellectual history or history of reception. Despite not being concerned with 
the history of the idea itself, David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been Born (2006) – 
which treats as an ethical challenge the idea that existence is harmful to man – includes 
in its bibliography both the ancient works that convey the notions of Greek pessimism 
and those by modern pessimists. Despite suggesting he will investigate the history of 
pessimism as a philosophy, Stuart Sim’s A Philosophy of Pessimism entirely forgets the 
Greeks.201 Coming back to Dienstag, it is not by chance then that one more crucial 
connection gets lost, that is the tie between poetic expression and pessimistic 
philosophical content.202 Like Barthélemy, Dienstag seems to struggle with the idea of a 
pessimism not expressed in philosophical form(s). As he approaches Nietzsche’s 
identification of the Greeks as pessimists, he rather avoids drawing into the discussion 
any of the ancient evidence that lacks philosophical character: he speaks of “pre-
Socratics” in a way that seems to encompass only the philosophical schools before 
Socrates and mentions Heraclitus as the only one whose thought could have borne 
vague resemblance to Nietzsche’s idea of Greek thought.203  
 
It goes without saying that Dienstag’s chapter on Leopardi’s pessimism entirely ignores 
antiquity. This mistake had not been made by the already mentioned Caro, who, more 
than a century before Dienstag, had not missed the prominent part played by ancient 
thought in Leopardi’s pessimistic philosophy. 204  And yet, his interpretation had 
undermined, just like Dienstag’s, the real extent of the importance of Greek pessimism 
and, in so doing, had denied Leopardi’s interpretation of antiquity and understanding of 
the history of ideas any philosophical or academic value: 
 
Quoi qu’il en soit de ces symptômes philosophiques, le genre de sentiments qu’ils 
expriment est rare chez les anciens, et c’est un grave tort au poète du pessimisme, à 
Leopardi, d'avoir imaginé pour les besoins de sa cause une antiquité de fantaisie, et voulu 
nous persuader que le pessimisme était dans le génie des grand écrivains d'Athènes et de 
                                                   
201  Sim (2015). 
202 Sully (1877), 31 deals (in passing) with the idea that optimism and pessimism are traditionally 
expressed in the form of “reasoned truths”, as affirmations or gnomai. 
203  Dienstag (2006), 168. 
204  The subtitle of Caro’s work is “Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Hartmann”. 
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Rome. Système ou erreur, ce point de vue gâte en lui le sens si pénétrant et si fin qu'il a de 
l'antiquité.205  
 
Despite fully appreciating how much Leopardi incorporated ancient sources and their 
mythology and literature into his own pessimistic worldview, Caro suggests that 
Leopardi’s use of antiquity and Leopardi’s claim about the existence of ancient 
pessimism are nothing but the making of a “fantasy antiquity” that never existed in 
reality. The aim of this thesis is to challenge both Dienstag’s silence regarding ancient 
pessimism and Caro’s accusation against Leopardi. In fact, this thesis proposes to use 
Leopardi’s studious exploration and revival of Greek pessimistic thought to prove both 
the crucial importance of such a worldview in ancient Greece and its absolute centrality 
in shaping the thought and philosophy of one of 19th century Europe’s greatest 
intellectuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
205  Caro (1878), 13. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Animals and Humans, Animals on Humans 
 
Les Hommes veulent bien que les Dieux soient aussi foux qu’eux; 
mais ils ne veulent pas que les Bêtes soient aussi sages. 
 
Fontenelle, Dialogues des Morts 5: Homère, Esope.206 
 
I have always felt we speak too much about human beings. This world is crowded 
with humans, but also with animals, birds, fish, and insects. They were here before 
we were and they will still be here should the day come when there are no more 
human beings. 
 
Günter Grass207 
 
The Earth, somewhere, some time. The human race has gone and a Sprite and a Gnome 
are discussing the matter. This is the scene presented by Leopardi’s Dialogo di un 
folletto e di uno gnomo, through whose eyes we look at a world without man.208 It is 
here that a subtly spoken yet arresting truth confronts the (human) reader: nothing has 
happened. Man has disappeared and so has every sign of his presence on earth, from the 
measuring of time to the naming of things. Humanity is no longer imposing its 
organisational frame on the universe, and yet the universe and its inhabitants go on as 
they always have. One final and amused smile sparks from the memory of man, as the 
Sprite and the Gnome imagine what man’s pretension and egotism would have to say 
faced with a world that has perfectly outlived their race.209 
 
The unrealistic setting of this dialogue (to which I will return later in the chapter) and 
the presence of fabulous creatures are not a unicum in the Operette. Primarily a work on 
man, in order to capture the essence of human life and spirit the Operette Morali exploit 
the unreal to supply a variety of perspectives on man. It is not just men, then, who are 
                                                   
206  Fontenelle (1683), 62. 
207  Grass (1991). 
208  On the idea of the end of the human race, cf. Galimberti (1998a), 123. On the motif of “il mondo 
senza gente”, cf. Sangirardi (1998), 319-321; Blasucci (2003), 87-88 referring to Fubini (1977), 623 
Polizzi (2008), 55-102. Ibid. 61 examines Noël-Antoine Pluche’s Le Spectacle de la Nature (1732), 
which Leopardi knew, as epitomizing the vision according to which “lo spettacolo offerto dalla natura 
è stato allestito da Dio in funzione di un unico privilegiato spettatore, l’uomo dotato di sensi e di 
ragione”; of course, the reversal of such belief is one of the cardinal points of many of the Operette. 
209   TPP (2013), 509. 
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called to discuss the features of the human condition, but a manifold array of gods, 
divine or legendary beings, and natural entities and creatures. In doing so Leopardi is 
postulating that, given man’s ineptness at understanding his own life, external outlooks 
and voices are needed to explore the depths of the place of humans in the world.210 
 
The idea of using an outside character to comment on or satirise a given subject is at the 
core of an enduring set of traditions which is hard to label univocally.211 These traditions 
variously merge satire with philosophical enquiry, observation of, and reflection upon 
(contemporary or a-temporal) reality with the use of fantasy; they have most commonly 
been called Menippean satire,212 or satirical dialogue.213 Leopardi himself, as we shall 
see, was well aware of the existence of these traditions, and of the fact that his work 
would engage with them. His main point of reference in this respect was the work of 
Lucian of Samosata,214 one of whose most representative characters was that very 
Menippus of Gadara to which Menippean satire owes its name.215  
 
This chapter starts, then, from Leopardi’s and Lucian’s use of distance and perspective 
as tropes of enquiry, a similarity that has been noticed before, chiefly by Giuseppe 
Sangirardi in his Il libro dell’esperienza e il libro della sventura, to which we shall refer 
                                                   
210  Speaking specifically of the Dialogo tra due bestie (on which below), Blasucci (2003), 87 calls this 
process “straniamento” (but fails to describe it further); similarly Bellucci (2005), 232-233 briefly on 
the Sprite’s perspective “dall’alto”, which the Gnome lacks. Cf. Bazzocchi (1991), 55 on the “totale 
eliminazione del punto di vista umano dale cose del mondo”. Sangirardi (1998), 360 sees the 
protagonists of Leopardi’s Lucianic Operette as “testimoni soprannaturali, e quindi al tempo stesso 
obiettivi e dotati di una visuale amplissima, della miseria (cioè dell'imperfezione fisica, ma soprattutto 
morale e intellettuale) del genere umano”; Sangirardi forgets how these characters are observers of 
something much wider, the human condition. 
211  Cf. Weinbrot’s (2005), xi definition of “the oxymoron of rigorous fluidity or borderless border”, 
referring also to Samuel Johnson’s idea of “regular literary enclosures regularly burst by the unruly 
imagination”. 
212  Weinbrot (2005), 110 defines Menippean satire as mingling “at least two genres, voices, or even 
historical periods to resist a dangerously threatening false orthodoxy”. Two cardinal studies in the past 
century are in Bakhtin (1984) (but originally 1929) and Frye (2000) (originally 1957). 
213  Cf. Relihan (1993), 21-25, on the cataloguing of fantastic settings: “posthumous judgements, 
dialogues of the dead, divine assemblies, heavenly symposia, sojourns in heaven or Hades.” Ibid. 22, 
n. 41 for bibliography on “the fantastic elements imputed to Menippus’s writings”.  
214  Cf. Sangirardi (2000), 60. On the adherence of Lucian’s writing to the label of Menippean and on his 
claim to have invented the comic dialogue (as part of the broader issue of defining the form and 
content of Lucianic style) cf. Duncan (1979), 10-11; Whitmarsh (2001), 249.  
215  Cf. Geri (2011), 18 on the staple features of Menippus as a character. On the historical Menippus cf. 
for example Branham (1989), 14-15; Weinbrot (2005), 23-31; Navia (1996), 156-159. 
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again.216 More specifically, it focuses on their shared attention to, and use of, animals as 
part of this enquiry into the human condition. Both Lucian and Leopardi employ 
animals – or, similarly, animal-like creatures or other living beings – as ἐπισκοποῦντες, 
distanced and privileged observers of humankind. The rooster of Lucian’s Gallus – 
discussed later in section III 1 – is a revealing example; so are Leopardi’s Sprite and 
Gnome who, although not animals in the proper sense, are part of the living cosmos 
and, just like animals, are ignored or considered inferior by humans. But there is more. 
In both authors animals feature not only in this capacity, but also, and prominently, as a 
comparandum for man: the likening of humans and animals restores man’s correct place 
among all other creatures, dissolving a deep-rooted belief in human primacy. The 
service offered by animals to the two satirists is invaluable: at once they supply 
externally located objectivity and a means of attack against the nonsensical and 
hubristic constructs of anthropocentrism. These are, for Leopardi, the unavoidable 
starting-point of a realistic understanding of the cosmos, and the very root of his 
pessimistic depiction of the human condition. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the way in which the use of external observers, the 
distancing craft of a removed perspective, and the collation of humans and animals are 
blended by Leopardi to create his personal pessimistic satire of the human condition. 
Simultaneously, we shall observe how ancient sources – chiefly, Lucian, and through 
him, earlier works, like the Homeric poems – cooperate in providing Leopardi with 
ideas, structures, and tropes, ultimately to form the core of his anti-anthropocentric 
fight. Highlighting the role played by ancient sources in Leopardi’s anti-
anthropocentrism does not by any means deny the important influence played by many 
other chronologically intervening works – such as, for example, Fontenelle’s Entretiens 
sur la pluralité des mondes, expertly analysed by Guido Polizzi217 – on this aspect of 
Leopardi’s thought. Our aim is to explore some of antiquity’s impact on this specific 
feature of Leopardi’s critique of anthropocentrism, and thus to fill at least partly a void 
in the scholarship.  
 
                                                   
216 Sangirardi (2000), 105-107. Ibid. 103 on Zib. 1085-86 on “guardare dall’alto” as philosophical 
activity. 
217 Polizzi (2008), 55-102. 
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This chapter begins (section I) with a brief excursus on Leopardi’s place in the history 
of the reception of Lucianic satire, observed also in the light of Leopardi’s own 
statements about his interpretation of Lucian and about the role he wished to play 
among the vast crowd of Lucian’s imitators, commentators, and interpreters throughout 
the centuries. Section II explores Leopardi’s interpretation and reappropriation of 
Lucian’s distancing craft especially insofar as it prompts the comparison between 
humans and animals, and, consequently, as it serves to attack man’s anthropocentric 
fallacy. Section III brings together a Zibaldone passage, a Lucianic piece, and two 
passages from the Homeric epics for their underlying use of animals as a means of 
revealing and describing the (sorrowful) peculiarity of the human condition. 
 
I 
Leopardi and the Reception of Lucian 
1. Of Gods and Fish: Leopardi, Lucian, and Insightful Distance 
 
In the famous 1819 note that foreshadows the composition of the Operette, Leopardi 
refers to his future project as: 
 
Dialoghi Satirici alla maniera di Luciano, ma tolti i personaggi e il ridicolo dai costumi 
presenti o moderni, e non tanto tra morti, giacchè di Dialoghi de’ morti c’è molta 
abbondanza, quanto tra personaggi che si fingano vivi, ed anche volendo, fra animali; (come 
sento che n’abbia fatto il Monti imitatore di Luciano anche nel Dialogo della Bibl. 
Italiana, 218  e in quelli, che inserisce nella sua opera della lingua), insomma piccole 
commedie, o Scene di Commedie.219 
 
                                                   
218  See Monti (1838) for the dialogues published in the Proposta di alcune correzioni ed aggiunte al 
vocabolario della Crusca (1817-26) and Monti (1841) for three more dialogues (including the one 
alluded to by Leopardi as published in the Biblioteca Italiana). 
219  From his Disegni letterari 4, in TPP (2013), 1109. My translation (with changes in punctuation): 
“Satirical dialogues in the manner of Lucian, but without the characters and the ridicule of present or 
modern customs, and not [set] among the dead, since there is great abundance of Dialogues of the 
dead. Rather, but rather [set] among characters pretending to be alive, and even among animals (as I 
hear that Monti, imitator of Lucian, has done also in the Dialogue of the Biblioteca Italiana, and in the 
dialogues that he included in his work on language). In short, small comedies, or scenes from 
comedies”. It is appealing to remember here Photius’ description of Lucian as author of “comedies in 
prose on the life of the Greeks”, in Bibliotheca 128.30 in Henry (1960), 102, cf. Geri (2011), 21. 
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Not only does Leopardi mention Lucian, but he also shows awareness of a long 
tradition that, throughout modernity, followed in Lucian’s footsteps.220 When he writes 
“there is great abundance of dialogues of the dead”, the reader thinks immediately of the 
vogue of “Dialogues des morts” in 17th and 18th century France, including especially the 
works of Fontenelle, Fénelon, or Boileau’s Les Héros de Roman, which the author 
himself calls “à la manière de Lucien”.221 Leopardi’s own notes and references, the lists 
of his readings (edited by Giuseppe Pacella), and the catalogue of Leopardi’s library in 
Recanati show that Leopardi knew and read several of these works.222 Leopardi’s 
acquaintance with the tradition of the “dialogo satirico” shines through again years after 
the 1819 note and well into the composition of the Operette. In the notes for a dialogue 
that will not be part of the Operette (Dialogo tra due bestie, p. e. un cavallo e un toro) 
Leopardi makes clear that he knows what role he wants to play in such a tradition:  
 
Si avverta di conservare l’impressione che deve produrre il discorrersi dell’uomo come razza 
già perduta e sparita dal mondo, e come di una rimembranza, dove consiste tutta l’originalità 
di questo dialogo, per non confonderlo con tanti altri componimenti satirici di questo genere 
dove si fa discorrere delle cose nostre o da forestieri, selvaggi ecc. o da bestie, in somma da 
esseri posti fuori della nostra sfera.223 
 
Centuries before Leopardi’s external onlookers, Lucian had peered at the Earth from far 
away on the wings of his Menippus or gazed at it through the reed globe of his 
Nigrinus, and had observed man from the detached divine perspective of – amongst 
                                                   
220  Cf. Scheel (1998), 29 on mentions of Lucian in Leopardi’s work, e.g. Zib. 1394, also referencing 
Blasucci (1989), 197-211. 
221  Cf. Polizzi (2008), 69-81 analysing the (remarkable) influence of Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la 
pluralité des mondes (1686) on Leopardi’s Operette; on this also Fabio (1995), 100ff; Galimberti 
(1964). 
222  Pacella (1966) and de las Nieves Muñiz Muñiz’s (2013) additions to Pacella; Campana and Pasquini 
(2011). A passage from Leopardi’s 1812 Dialogo filosofico sopra un moderno libro intitolato 
“Analisi delle idee ad uso della gioventù” in TPP (2013), 734 explains further Leopardi’s idea of the 
use of the dialogue and provides valuable information on his sources and readings (among which, of 
course, is Lucian). On the use of the dialogue form and on the complex interweaving in Lucian’s work 
between the heritage of philosophical dialogue form and his new comic type, see Lucian’s own 
reflection in Bis Accusatus, on which Halliwell (2008), 432-433. 
223  TPP (2013), 611. My italics. My translation (with changes in punctuation): “One needs to make sure 
to preserve the impression produced by the discussion of man as a race already lost and disappeared 
from the world, and as a memory. Here lies all the originality of this dialogue, not to confuse it with 
many other satirical compositions of this kind where it is foreigners, savages etc. or beasts (in short 
beings placed outside of our sphere) who discuss our business.”  
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many – his Prometheus or from the point of view of the dead in his Dialogi 
mortuorum.224 Seamlessly at ease with his distancing craft, Lucian plays with it freely, 
and the distance he employs to deepen the insights of his characters is at times entirely 
physical (as is the case in the Hermotimus and the Nigrinus), at times purely (but 
nonetheless equally intensely) mental or philosophical, as in the Icaromenippus or in 
the Charon.225  
 
Just like the gods of archaic Greek literature, the creatures and characters employed by 
Lucian – and, centuries later, by Leopardi – observe, comment on, and ultimately judge 
humankind. Here lies one of the paradoxes of the genre, endowing animals or non-
existent creatures with the same claim to perspective and profound insight that belongs 
to the gods, making them equally capable of functioning as critical commentators on 
humanity. As Giuseppe Sangirardi noted, this connection between animals and gods in 
light of their distance from, and perceptiveness about, the real nature of humans crops 
up in the aforementioned 1819 disegno letterario that foreshadows the Operette. Here 
Leopardi mentions, as a possible setting, a world seen from the perspective of fish: 
 
Argomento di alcuni Dialoghi potrebbero essere alcuni fatti che si fingessero accaduti in 
mare sott’acqua, ponendo per interlocutori i pesci, e fingendo che abbiano in mare i loro 
regni e governi, e possessioni d’acqua ec., e facendo uso de’ naufragi e delle tante cose che 
                                                   
224  Cf. Duncan (1979), esp. 13-16 thoughtfully (albeit briefly) examining Lucian’s penchant for the 
figure of the episkopos or kataskopos and the idea’s connection with Cynicism (on which also 
Bompaire (1958), 327). Cf. esp. 16: “All of his writings reflect in some way the search for a detached 
point of vantage, a rejection of prior commitments, a compulsion to get out in order to look in.” Ibid. 
15 n. 7 quotes Bompaire’s (1958), 327 definition of the term and history of its meaning. Two 
significant examples of ἐπισκοπέω in Lucian are Somnium 15 and Nigrinus 18. Halliwell (2008), 443-
446 discusses the Charon (whose complete title is Χάρων ἢ Ἐπισκοποῦντες), whose protagonist is yet 
another – and this time in-between men and gods – observer of human life from outside. Ibid. 441 on 
death as another possible perspective on life: “It is a remarkable fact about Lucian’s comic-cum-
satirical repertoire that the perspective on life ‘from death’ is almost an obsession of his. For him, 
death is the very reverse of a taboo subject: it is, in a peculiar way, both a mediator and an object of 
laughter.” Cf. Anderson (1976), 23-25 on Lucian’s debt to Aristophanes’ Aves and Pax for the idea of 
“celestial journeys”. Cf. Geri (2011), 206-209 on Erasmus and the Lucianic topos of “La vita umana 
vista dall’alto”. 
225  In Nigrinus 35 we observe the connection between metaphorical and physical travel being made by 
Lucian himself. Having listened to Nigrinus – who guides him on a “philosophical tour” of Rome 
(and the world) – Lucian feels “like the Phaeacians”, who, not by chance, had listened to and 
metaphorically travelled through the words of Odysseus. 
 61 
sono nel fondo dei mare, o ci nascono, come il corallo ec., […] trovando in ciò materia da 
satireggiare.226 
 
Sangirardi perceptively connects this passage with a note found in Zib. 41-42 (dating 
from the same period), which analyses the difference between the “comedic sense” (“il 
ridicolo”) of ancients and moderns.227 In it Leopardi recalls the simile found in Lucian’s 
Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόµενος (J.Conf. 4) that “compares the Gods [in fact, just Zeus] hanging from 
the Parcae’s spindle to the small fish hanging from the fisherman’s rod”. It is 
impossible for us to securely ascertain whether Lucian’s image could be directly 
responsible for the idea sketched in the disegno;228 nevertheless, the idea of exploiting a 
distant and overturned perspective to say something about the human world has 
undeniable connections with the way the Lucianic gods – if not in the Ζεὺς 
ἐλεγχόµενος, in many of Lucian’s works – look at the world of men. The idea of the 
disegno will not be carried out as it is, and there is no fish world in the Operette, yet the 
satirical potential of Lucian’s notion must have struck Leopardi and prompted him to 
improvise on the theme. And if Lucian had already postulated that gods are like fish, 
then for Leopardi-follower-of-Lucian a world of gods speaking about humans can 
satirically become a world of fish speaking about humans. The end is one and the same: 
an inverted and external viewpoint from which to gaze at human life.229  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
226  TPP (2013), 1109. My translation (with changes in punctuation): “Subject of some dialogues could be 
facts one could pretend have happened at sea, underwater, taking fish as speakers, and pretending that 
they had at sea their reigns, and governments, and water goods etc. and exploiting shipwrecks and all 
the things which are at the bottom of the sea, or that are born there (like corals etc) […] finding in this 
material for satire”. 
227  Sangirardi (2000), 34. 
228  Of course the Zibaldone note is later than the disegno, but, as Pacella (1966), 559 shows, by 1819 
Leopardi had already read the Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόµενος. 
229  Cf. Duncan’s (1979), 21 idea of “compulsive detachment” as an explanation for many of Lucian’s 
choices, among which the predilection for the dialogic form: “Lucian's speakers tend to be far 
removed from the battle. His mythological characters talk like men but belong to a timeless world. His 
Gods comment on life from above, his Dead from below, and even his Courtesans gossip off-duty. 
Perspective is variously achieved.” 
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2. “À la manière de Lucien”, “Alla maniera di Luciano”230 
 
Witty interpreter of contemporary life and society, pious moraliser or irreverent 
detractor of religion 231  – in the history of his modern reception, translators, 
commentators, and imitators have created for Lucian an arrestingly varied array of 
literary personae. Similarly, everything and anything was made of Lucianic forms, 
manners, themes, and ideas throughout the modern history of his reception, the only 
constant being perhaps the enduring vivacity with which he was translated, read, 
debated upon, and reused.232 Such a complex and rich history could not be summarised 
in this context, and many works have thoroughly addressed it in recent years. 
 
Yet one main pattern in this history catches the eye and proves useful in this context to 
compare and contrast with Leopardi’s own use of Lucianic manners and designs. 
Lucian’s outlook of contempt for, and dissatisfaction with, the world as a whole, 
including religion and its constructs and man and his beliefs – an outlook often carried 
out by mocking the vice without pointing at the virtue – posed a problem for the vast 
majority of his followers across the centuries.233 This ungodly and destabilising aspect 
did not prevent Lucian from being loved and imitated, but rather caused him to be 
adapted and softened in light of Christian principles and notions sometimes openly at 
odds with the more controversial aspects of Lucian’s own thought. 234  In Henry 
                                                   
230   TPP (2013), 1109. 
231  Cf. Geri (2011), 29: “[…] si nota una duplice interpretazione di Luciano: da una parte come un autore 
“morale”, dall’altro come uno scrittore irridente e irrispettoso”. 
232  On the reception of Lucian in modern Europe see Robinson (1979); Cox (1992); Weinbrot (2005); 
Ligota and Panizza (2007); Geri (2011), 9-29. Ligota and Panizza’s (2007) introduction, 1-16, offers a 
concise summary of Lucian’s reception up to Byzantine times. Ibid. 12, n. 72 for bibliography on the 
history of Lucian’s reception, including Mattioli (1980); Marsh (1999); Mayer (1984). 
233  Cf. Icaromenippus 4, where, even before he decides to embark in his trip to truly know the world, 
Menippus is convinced of the evilness of the human world. Weinbrot (2005) 63-64 provides examples 
of authors who blamed Lucian for his lack of pars construens.  
234 This tendency interested many of the translators, commentators, and imitators of Lucian’s Dialogues 
of the dead in particular, a genre bourgeoning especially in 17th and 18th century France, cf. especially 
Weinbrot (2005), 40-85. On the need for redeeming touch-ups, Weinbrot (2005), xi, 69. See also ibid. 
63-66 for a summary of the accusation laid against Lucian for his supposed impiety; ibid. 72 on 
Fontenelle’s Christianising rejection of suicide apropos of Menippus. For different ages’ ideas of 
Lucian’s impiety see also Baldwin (1973), 7-20; 97. Hughes (1730), xvii credits Fontenelle with a 
general betterment of Lucian, who is judged as one who “laughs too loud, is often licentious, and 
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Fielding’s Lucianic trip to the underworld (his 1749 Journey from This World to the 
Next) the character of the biting Menippus himself disappears, abolished in favour of a 
more forgiving and moralising atmosphere.235 Matteo Maria Boiardo’s 1490-91 Timone 
substitutes the very bleak ending of Lucian’s Timon with “uno ottimistico e allegro, in 
linea con il tanto amato ideale tardoquattrocentesco di una vita semplice e priva di 
preoccupazioni”.236 At other times Lucian is (more or less lovingly and more or less 
directly) reproached for his unseemly views. Fénelon’s Herodotus accuses Lucian of 
impiety (“Impie, tu ne croyais pas la religion!”);237 John Hughes, responsible for the 
1708 translation of Fontenelle’s Dialogues des morts, can burst into an incredulous 
“Whether this be decent, or like a banquet of the gods?” when faced with one of 
Lucian’s many invectives.238 Respected, loved, and imitated, Lucian is nevertheless a 
thorny author for his ungodly mockeries and disrespectful handling of human and 
divine matters.  
 
On the other hand the harshness of Lucianic satire, aimed with (often dark) seriousness 
against – to use Weinbrot’s words – an “orthodoxy” that is often as wide as man’s 
pretension or the nonsensicality of human religion, was too weighty a matter for other 
followers or imitators, who preferred to direct their versions of Lucian’s cutting irony 
and reproachful tones towards more specific, more temporal, and often more personal 
targets. The note of the printer to the late 16th century Satyre Ménippée, a large and 
collective political satire stimulated by the contemporary religious wars, well explains 
                                                                                                                                                     
sometimes course in his raillery. He has not thought it sufficient to make his dead reason, but they 
scold too, and are ready to fight in the presence of Jupiter himself”. 
235  Cf. Weinbrot (2005), 81-82 who illustrates it well with the case study of chapter 7 of Fielding’s work 
compared to Lucian’s Necyomantia, cf. Fielding (1798), 25-30. 
236  Tomassi (2011), 107. Interestingly, Baruffaldi (1809), 182 commentator and editor of the Timone, 
suggests that the first lines of the last scene (atto V, scena ultima) “mai più non usciran: non gli 
aspettate” are to be related to Zaccaria Vallaresso’s 1724 tragedy Rutzvanscad, the same referenced by 
Leopardi’s Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo (Folletto. Voi gli aspettate invan: son tutti morti, 
diceva la chiusa di una tragedia dove morivano tutti i personaggi); cf. also Bellucci (2005), 227. 
237   Fénelon (1917), 202. 
238  Hughes (1730), xviii. As we have seen in Chapter 1’s section on the Querelle this difficulty is 
consistent with the problematic relationship of both Anciens and Modernes with the pessimist, 
ungodly and anti-providential side of the classics. Weinbrot (2005), 63 reminds of the Christianising 
readings of Lucian during the 17th century, making him a champion against paganism. Fontenelle’s 
prefatio to his Dialogues des morts (1683) is a letter to Lucian in which the author himself declares he 
will forgo some of Lucian’s harshest features, e.g. the setting in hell, cf. ibid. ii. 
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such a tendency. 239 The note, related by Weinbrot from its English translation, explains 
the work’s title and the type of satire as one that contains “evil speech in it, for the 
reproof, either of publike vices, or of particular faults of some certain persons”.240 At the 
same time it unwittingly but effectively summarises one of the most striking differences 
between Lucian’s and this understanding of satire which, intrinsically tied to the 
contemporary circumstances of its composition, often fails to be as universal as 
Lucian’s concerns with humans, gods, and the world.241 
 
Of course there are exceptions in authors who could face the dark heterodoxy and 
unapologetically piercing modes of many of Lucian’s works, and who fully engaged 
with their philosophical, theological, and intellectual aspects. Leon Battista Alberti can 
use Lucianic modes and themes to tackle the trouble of his own times without losing the 
ability to critique atemporal and universal aspects of human nature: his Charon is 
positioned up close (rather than high above) but what he sees are still human ineptia and 
improbitas, prompting him to prefer hell to earth in order to escape the belua homines 
(Mom. 4.70).242 Voltaire’s Candide (1759) fully inherits Lucian’s grimly farcical view 
of human achievements, reenacting it in a fight with contemporary Leibnizian 
optimism. Again, Wieland could read, translate, and interpret Lucian with remarkable 
clarity and full intellectual appreciation, grounded as he was both in the philological 
study of Lucian’s work and in his lucid and anti-idealistic interpretation of ancient 
Greece.243  
                                                   
239   Weinbrot (2005), 88-89. 
240   Weinbrot (2005), 89. 
241  Robinson (1979), 110-115 on the example of Hutten’s Phalarismus. For many of these works – as 
Robinson (1979), 114 states – “it is difficult to disentangle any Lucianic influence from that of 
Juvenal and the whole tradition of the anti-court satyre.” Branham (1989), 15 compares Aristophanes’ 
heroes’ “concrete topical complaints arising from actual events” and Menippus who “appears in a 
timeless ‘classical Athens’”, and his motive is accordingly more universal and less dependent on the 
concerns of a particular audience or occasion.” 
242  Cf. the comment of Garin (1975), 224-226; also Acocella (2007); Geri (2011). Ibid. 117 apropos of 
Alberti’s Momus “un Alberti che si compiace di mostrarsi più disincantato e pessimista dello stesso 
Luciano.” 
243  Cf. Wieland’s (1820), x-xi description of the character, merits, and small flaws of Lucian’s work in 
his preface to his translation of Lucian, which I reference from the English edition. A few lines later 
Wieland says: “After a lapse of seventeen hundred years […] his satire [is] still applicable”. Ibid. xvii 
Wieland describes Lucian as a lover of truth, whose satire aims at unmasking delusions and 
falsehoods of all kinds and Ibid. xviii Wieland defends him against the (many) accusations of 
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Joining these ranks, Leopardi’s interpretation is not only entirely free of Christianising 
concerns, but utterly accepting of Lucian’s sceptical and questioning attitude towards 
religion and, more generally, human belief and dogma. What others found awkward or 
troublesome, Leopardi embraced, or even amplified: the case – examined in Chapter 4 
of this thesis – of the centaur Chiron is emblematic: turned into a character full of 
optimistic faith in the gods in Fénelon’s remake,244 he is for Leopardi one of the cardinal 
symbols of the universal validity of the µὴ φῦναι.245 As a consequence, Leopardi 
appreciates and inherits Lucian’s unforgiving and crude (but realistic) view of humanity 
and its shortcomings, not tainted by ideas of forgiveness and charity. The dark, 
destabilising character of Lucian’s understanding of the world is precisely what 
Leopardi needs to observe his target in its naked truth.  
 
To a certain extent Leopardi himself was aware of the distance that separates his from 
some of his predecessors’ use(s) of Lucian. In the letter to Piero Giordani (dated 6th 
August 1821) 246 in which he briefly discusses his future Operette, Leopardi takes great 
care to especially distance his project from Vincenzo Monti’s interpretation of Lucian, 
culpable, for Leopardi, of adopting Lucianic modes to jest on unimportant matters; 
Monti had in fact written a number of Lucianising dialogues as part of his wider attack 
on the linguistic bigotry of the Accademia della Crusca. The Operette, writes Leopardi, 
“will be dedicated to much graver subjects than the grammatical trifles to which Monti 
adapts him (Lucian)”.247 Thus, for example, the Lucianic idea of Menippus flying over 
the Earth and “seeing only the world’s horrors” (to use Weinbrot’s words again) 248 is 
reused by Leopardi in the strongest possible way: in Leopardi’s La scommessa di 
Prometeo the spokesman of the utter disappointment and horror at the (aerial) view of 
mankind is no other than Prometheus, the very creator and supporter of the human race. 
                                                                                                                                                     
ridiculing the gods. See Steinberger (1902); Deitz (2007). Others could be added to the list, among 
whom Erasmus. 
244   In Le Centaure Chiron et Achille, in Fénelon (1917), 150. 
245   Cf. Chapter 4 II.2.1. 
246   TPP (2013), 1218. 
247  My translation. The original: “[…] rivolto a soggetti molto più gravi che non sono le bazzecole 
grammaticali a cui lo adatta il Monti”. Sangirardi (2000), 39 discusses the passage within a neat 
analysis of the “prehistory” of the Operette.  
248  Weinbrot (2005), 65. 
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The significance of Menippus’ dismay and consternation over the world is magnified by 
Leopardi’s reworking of the Lucianic material, taunting one of modernity’s dearest 
achievements: human progress.  
 
Indifferent to the shortcomings of different categories of men through the ages, 
Leopardi adopts the staples of the Lucianic satirical dialogue, which often sets the 
discourse outside reality, to speak of man across time, against the background of all 
other living creatures, and against the spectrum of the metaphysical beings within the 
universe. In short, Leopardi’s satire wants to speak of the human condition.249 Their 
mutual target brings Lucian and Leopardi closer than ever, united in a quest against 
man’s false conceit, his twisted understanding of the world, of religion, and of his 
rightful due. It is suggestive to recall that the very namesake of the Menippea, 
Menippus of Gadara, was said by Marcus Aurelius to have mocked the perishable and 
ephemeral nature of human life (cf. 6.47.1. αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ ἐφηµέρου τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς χλευασταί, οἷον Μένιππος καὶ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι).250 The aim of this thesis 
is, in a way, to show just how similar Leopardi is to this Menippus. 
 
3. Lucian and Leopardi, So Far 
 
Although much has been written over the years about Lucian’s influence on Leopardi, 
the relationship between the two authors and the real significance of the Lucianic 
influence on the Italian poet still remain to a certain extent controversial.251 On the one 
hand, Leopardi has been little if at all considered by scholarship on the modern 
reception of Lucian: in his Lucian and his Influence in Europe, for example, 
Christopher Robinson is content with mentioning Leopardi in the epilogue as an 
example of the presence of “traces of Lucian’s influence in the works of major 
                                                   
249  Cf. Halliwell’s understanding of Lucian’s satire in Halliwell (2008), 431; as Halliwell recalls, not 
many among Lucian’s critics and not all among Lucian’s imitators perceived the extent to which 
Lucian’s laughter is “attached” to “life and death”. 
250  From Dalfen (1979), 56-57. 
251  Much less has been written on Leopardi and the wider tradition of satirical dialogue; most authors 
merely mention the Operette’s possible characterisation as satires or Menippean satires, for example 
Prete (1998), 20; Piscopo (1999), 42. 
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writers”.252 Leopardi scholars, on the other hand, have (especially in the past) considered 
Lucian to have a merely formal impact on the Operette, or even to be the “ispiratore 
[…] delle meno felici delle Operette” in Sebastiano Timpanaro’s words.253 Although in 
the last couple of decades the importance of Lucian for Leopardi has been positively 
reconsidered and many works have reassessed his role in Leopardi’s works,254 several 
issues remain unexamined.  
 
One issue in particular interests us here. A great part of recent scholarship on Leopardi 
and Lucian only approaches the topic as part of the wider study of the role of laughter 
and irony in Leopardi’s work, thus ruling out any other influence that Lucian could have 
exerted on Leopardi; the idea that Lucian is not much more than a formal source for a 
generic comic tone seems extremely widespread. In his otherwise brilliant Libro 
dell’esperienza, libro della sventura Giuseppe Sangirardi affirms that there is no 
connection between the content of the Operette and Lucian’s work.255 Frazzled by the 
forms and the humour of Lucianic works, or in search of specific references, Leopardi 
scholars have been often drawn to disregard the ways in which Lucian’s content and 
substance have influenced Leopardi. It is not only Lucian’s humour, or his brilliant use 
of the dialogue that inform Leopardi’s Operette, but also, and importantly, Lucian’s 
critique of human pretension, his unveiling of human delusions, and his satire of 
religion, among others.  
 
                                                   
252  Robinson (1979), 237. 
253  Scheel (1998), 27-28 admits to having underestimated the importance of Lucian for Leopardi in his 
previous work, Scheel (1959); ibid. 28-29 for a short history of Lucian’s “mis-fortune” among 
Leopardi’s critics and in particular the general disdain for the satirical and Lucianic works of Leopardi 
during the last century, for example Vossler (1923), 391. 
254  Cf. Mattioli (1982), neatly records the presence of Lucian in Leopardi’s corpus and also explores 
Lucian’s impact on the Operette; Mariani (1991), 47-53, who ends his short chapter on Leopardi’s use 
of irony in the Operette with bibliography on the same theme; Scheel (1998). Cf. also the essays on 
the “Lucianizing” Leopardi in Il riso leopardiano (1998). See also Di Benedetto (1967); Timpanaro 
(2008), 110, 112 n. 40; also Fabio (1995), 36-49 and 177-196 who presents analyses of the linguistic 
influence of Lucian in the Operette. Especially remarkable is the work by Sangirardi (2000), 25-86, 
who presents a very insightful analysis of the history of the composition of the Operette with specific 
and thoughtful attention to the role of Lucian in this process. Ditadi (2011) is a somewhat odd 
collection of Leopardean works (or pieces of works) on the theme of animals, published by Agire ora 
edizioni, a publishing house dedicated to animal rights. 
255  Sangirardi (2000), 39. 
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One point follows closely. Dignifying Lucian’s content, and believing him to be not 
only a “satiric artist”, but also a “thinker” – to use and revert Duncan’s distinction –256 
means to appreciate his intellectual inspection and judgement of earlier and 
contemporary thought, religion, philosophy, and poetry. Graham Anderson expresses it 
clearly, saying that “we can never strictly speaking talk of ‘Lucianic’ themes, but we 
should learn to recognise typical ‘Lucianic’ blends of Plato, Aristophanes and the 
rest.”257 Both these aspects – the impact of Lucianic thought and the influence of 
Lucian’s engagement with earlier intellectual and religious views – must be taken into 
account when observing the Lucianising Leopardi. Lucian is, for Leopardi, also a lucid 
and enlightened eye through which to look at, and to reflect upon, the works of archaic 
and classical Greece.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
256  Duncan (1979), 17. 
257  Anderson (1976), 21. 
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II 
Μύρµακες ἀνάριθµοι: Anthropocentrism and The Place of Man 
 
In summa, si mortalium innumerabiles tumultus, e Luna, quemadmodum 
Menippus olim, despicias, putes te muscarum, aut culicum videre turbam inter se 
rixantium, bellantium, insidiantium, rapientium, ludentium, lascivientium, 
nascentium, cadentium, morientium.  
 
Erasmus, Stultitiae Laus 48258 
 
Vide anche le formiche e le api intente ad un’opera più intelligente, ma vana del 
pari. In preda alle passioni della vita, gli uomini non potevano giudicare la inutilità 
dei loro atti; ma chi, come lui, era uscito fuori alla riva del pelago dopo esservi 
stato immerse sino ai capelli, riconosceva nel consorzio umano un formicaio più 
grande, un alveare più complicato, dove tutto si riduceva, come nei piccoli e 
semplici, a nascere, a crescere, a procreare ed a morire. 
 
Federico de Roberto, L’imperio (1894-)259 
 
1. Numberless and Insignificant 
 
When, in the bucolic collection par excellence, Theocritus decides to give his readers a 
taste of urban life, he does so with the utmost vividness. After the customary chatter, 
Gorgo and Praxinoa, the two garrulous protagonists of Theocritus’ Idyll 15, get ready to 
go out and attend the festival of Adonis that is taking place in town.260 As we 
accompany them along the streets of a festive Alexandria, busy with the celebrations of 
the festival, we feel all the pressure of a city literally filled with humans. We are 
dragged through a constant crowd that pushes, crushes, and obstructs the way in every 
direction: men, women, and animals fill up the living space of the city and the ὄχλος is 
everywhere in the poem as it is in Alexandria itself (44, 59, 73). Ultimately the 
excitement of joining the public festivity is shadowed by the many annoyances and 
dangers that the overpopulated Alexandria presents to the two friends. The fear of the 
royal horses that run recklessly through the streets, the memory of recent criminality 
Αἰγυπτιστί (48), ‘à l'égyptienne’, the rudeness – and bland racism – of a man in the 
crowd, these things somewhat offset the couple’s amazement at the luxurious ceremony. 
                                                   
258  In Schmidt-Dengler (1975), 116. 
259  De Roberto (2009), 401. Federico De Roberto is also author of a work on Leopardi, from 1898. 
260  Edition and commentary in Gow (1965). 
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Yet the problem is not the city, endowed with beautiful architecture and better 
government (46ff) by the new king, but the people. When she is first faced with the 
crowd at 44-45, Praxinoa is overwhelmed by the fear, anxiety, and oppression caused 
by the ὄχλος and immediately bursts out: µύρµακες ἀνάριθµοι καὶ ἄµετροι!261 Humans 
are the real problem: the festival, as the progression of the idyll shows, only exposes the 
uncountable flaws of men and multiplies them for the numberless people that cram 
Alexandria on that specific day. The sudden perception of this sometimes hostile and 
certainly faceless crowd triggers Praxinoa’s metaphor of the people at the Adonia as 
innumerable ants. Praxinoa, coming from the quietness of a house ἐπ’ ἔσχατα γᾶς (8), 
perceives all the alterity of this unknown mass; to her external eyes the multiracial 
inhabitants of Alexandria become one large heap of minuscule, indistinguishable 
insects.262 
 
Theocritus’ Praxinoa already experiences a significant degree of detachment from the 
hectic crowd that she calls “ants”, and yet her analogy remains restricted to the people 
in Alexandria, on that very day. Let us take a leap of more than 2000 years to see a 
different take on the metaphor of the ants. Henry David Thoreau’s Walden or Life in the 
Woods (1854) enacts a “battle of the ants” which is most certainly a powerful metaphor 
for human warfare, very likely inspired by the struggles of contemporary America.263 
The battlefield of red and black ants is one day casually discovered by the narrator next 
to his woodpile. The sudden realisation of this violent and bloody war – “the ground 
                                                   
261  Cf. Gow (1965), 280 on the two adjectives as signifying that “the crowd can neither be counted as 
individuals nor estimated as a mass.” Ibid. on instances of µύρµακες to describe “a busy multitude”. 
262  Cf. Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 44 listing Theocritus Id. 15.45 for the use of ants to represent  
“vast numbers”. Ibid. on ants as symbol of “great wealth” in Theocritus Id. 17.107. In this second 
instance the mention of ants is not neutral: Hunter (2003), 179 n. 107 remarks that “The acquisitive 
and apparently tireless activities of ants may be regarded negatively as miserly hoarding, as here and 
at Crates, SH 359.6–7, or positively as sensible forethought, as at Hes. WD 778, Hor. Sat. 1.1.32–40, 
and Virg.Georg. 1.186”; Hunter connects this passage with the “rejection of hoarding” in various 
ancient sources. Theocritus’ mention of ants in Id. 17 serves thus the purpose of drawing a second 
(and negative) connection between men and ants (or at least between some human habits and a certain 
interpretation of the insects' behaviour). Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 44 seem to find no special 
connection between these instances of the use of ants and the idea of impersonality or insignificance, 
which they instead find in some Greek proverbs listed on the same page, e.g. “No path even for an 
ant”. Beavis (1988), 204 notes how “in a number of places great crowds on the roads or elsewhere are 
compared to ants” and lists a number of occurrences including Theocritus 15.45. 
263   In Harding (1995), 223-224; cf. Ross (1965). 
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was already strewn with the dead and dying, both red and black” – is accompanied by 
surprise at the incredible silence that engulfs the fight; the meaningfulness of the ants' 
mortal combat is miniaturised by the – relatively – gigantic human perspective and 
turned into utter meaninglessness. It is quite remarkable that Thoreau’s first explicit 
signpost to signal the link between animal and human warfare is a reference to the Iliad, 
as he calls the fighting insects “these Myrmidons”.264 Throughout the Iliad men’s hectic 
and heroic activity inside and outside the Trojan walls is paralleled by the many 
moments in which the gods realise the inherent unimportance of this frenetic human 
war, insofar as all men’s destiny is ultimately death.265 The Iliad’s ability to bestow 
extreme dignity on human military deeds and at the same time downplay them by 
shifting attention to the immortal level of the gods is likely to have been in the mind of 
the classically-trained Thoreau as he compared his ants to the ant-men that form 
Achilles’ contingent.266  
 
There is no explicit sense in Praxinoa’s metaphor that all men (let alone the essence of 
humanity) are like ants, as perhaps the text of Thoreau might lead us to infer. Yet such 
an implication is far from absent in Greek literature, as this chapter will show, and 
Thoreau’s own reference to the Homeric poems is itself extremely telling. The notion 
that men observed at a distance or from an external point of view resemble a 
numberless, faceless, and sometimes animalised crowd has a lively history in Greek and 
                                                   
264  The reference is followed by a further mention of Iliadic characters a few lines below, where Achilles 
and Patroclus are drawn in as comparison for some of the ants’ behaviour in the battle.  
265  Albeit punctuated with proofs of the gods’ involvement with mankind – from gods intervening in 
battle, to gods fighting or even deceiving each other for the sake of particular individuals or sides – 
the Iliad offers powerful testimony to the opposite behaviour, as the gods choose to distance 
themselves from the world of men. In four instances the notion that there is a definite limit to the 
trouble worth taking for the sake of humans is conveyed by the formulaic phrase βροτῶν ἕνεκα 
(1.573-576, here ἕνεκα θνητῶν; 8.427-431; 21.379-380; 21.462-467), which significantly appears at 
times in which the gods are brought to explicitly reflect on the merit and desirability of excessive 
involvement with men, e.g. the quarrel of Zeus and Hera soothed by Hephaestus at 1.573-576 – on 
which Halliwell (2008), 59-64 – or Zeus’ threat to Hera and Athena at 8.427-431. In the sudden 
recollection of the real pointlessness of battling for mortals and as they realise how much more 
important they themselves and their activities are (Greene (1944), 192), the gods forget the favoured 
heroes or the preferred side of the fight, to make (and speak) of mankind as an undifferentiated, 
unimportant mass. Cf. Greene (1944), 197-198 on the metamorphosis of the “God the All-Knowing 
Watcher” into the “god who is not watching”. 
266 According to a scholium to Pindar Nem. 3.21 Hesiod – in his Catalogue of Women fr. 205 Merkelbach 
and West (1967), 105 – said that the Myrmidons originated from ants that Zeus transformed into men 
to keep company to his son Aeacus. 
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Roman literature. Praxinoa’s miniaturised vision of Alexandrian men as a blurred mass 
of insects is a splendid and animated variation on this analogy.  
 
Leopardi’s La ginestra (The Broom or The Flower of the Desert) (1836), written only a 
few years before Thoreau’s Walden and explored in the next section, presents the very 
same simile linking men and ants. But what is more remarkable about this comparison – 
possibly the most lyrical moment in Leopardi’s discourse about man’s foolish 
anthropocentric vanity – is that it is built on Leopardi’s long-lasting questioning of 
humanity’s place in the cosmos. More specifically, it originates from one specific strand 
of this questioning, that we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Before, during 
and, as La ginestra shows, after the Operette, Leopardi makes a point of exploring the 
real place of man in the universe by comparing him (often to man’s disadvantage) to 
animals. This process is carried out in a variety of ways throughout the years, but it 
ultimately grows to maturity in Leopardi’s insistent “animalisation” of mankind in his 
Operette, to become one of the constitutive pillars of Leopardi’s pessimistic worldview.  
 
Both in the ideas it brings forward and in the forms it takes, Leopardi’s animalisation of 
mankind – aimed at undercutting human self-conceit and at gathering a more truthful 
view of man’s role, destiny, and function in the universe – resonates with what antiquity 
had to say about men, animals, and the cosmos. Greek literature’s idea of miniaturising 
man and his importance – found also in two very striking instances of the trope from 
Lucian’s Icaromenippus and Hermotimus, which will be discussed later, and connected 
to the (very Homeric) propensity for comparing men and animals – effectively provide a 
grand counter to anthropocentrism, which Leopardi intends as the first essential step to 
the understanding of the world as it really is.  
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2. View from Vesuvius: La ginestra and the Trope of the Ants 
 
La ginestra is one of Leopardi's last poems, composed in Naples where he spent the 
final years of his life and published posthumously. The poem opens with a powerful 
close-up of the humanised “back” of mount Vesuvius, the “slayer mountain” where the 
broomflower grows. The barren landscape of Vesuvius, where no other plant manages 
to grow and where the looming threat of possible eruptions scares natural life away, is 
for Leopardi the perfect metaphor for humanity’s destined abode. Just as it did with the 
resilient broom, Nature has placed man in a precarious universe, where the slightest 
event can prove fatal and human life is constantly at stake.267 Leopardi means both to 
depict veraciously the condition of men on earth and to ridicule the wishful thinking of 
those who believe they live in the best of all possible worlds: in La ginestra the proud 
humans, inflated by a modern faith in progress – “dell’umana gente/le magnifiche sorti 
e progressive” (50-51) – are just like little yellow flowers on the slope of an active 
volcano.268 The text of La ginestra can be found at Appendix 2. The first strophe closes 
on the idea of humanity’s vain faith in betterment and prompts the following two 
strophes to concentrate on modern man’s foolishness, on his brainless rejection of past 
wisdom, and on his senseless backward walk which he insists on calling “progress”. 
The first three strophes thus explore and dismantle man’s own conception of the cosmos 
he inhabits, a cosmos that is figuratively collated with the parched volcanic landscape. 
As if in preparation for what is to come, at v. 98 the narrator addresses man with the 
term “animal”. The term is far from fortuitous: by specifying (99) that man is not any 
animal, but a foolish one (“stolto”), Leopardi clarifies that the difference between men 
and other creatures is human foolishness, clearly exemplified by man’s ludicrous 
optimism (“quel che nato a perir, nutrito in pene, / dice, a goder son fatto”, 100-101) 
and pride (102). 
 
                                                   
267  On the theme of violent, destructive nature – connected to the idea of “natura matrigna”, see Biral 
(1974), 30-58; Solmi (1987), 99-110; Timpanaro (1965), 379-407. 
268  The critique of man’s optimistic vision of progress is omnipresent in Leopardi’s work; two other 
significant instances among many are the Proposta di premi fatta dall’accademia dei sillografi, on 
which Chapter 3 II.1; Dialogo di Tristano e di un amico, on which cf. the conclusion to this thesis. 
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In the fourth strophe, after walking up the slope of Vesuvius gazing at the infertile 
scenery, Leopardi – and the reader with him – turns around to sit down (158-161) and 
look at the view from the mountain. The distance gained by the narrator-spectator is not 
only the most obvious one, allowing him to gaze at the spectacle below from a point of 
vantage. Rather, Leopardi plays expertly with multiple distances. The relatively closer 
and undisturbed view of the sky provokes a realisation of the incredible smallness of 
even the largest items in the human landscape – the land and the ocean – when 
compared to the size of stars. At the same time, the sullen and deserted landscape 
visible from Vesuvius prompts the memory of the fertile fields, luxuriant scenery, and 
famous cities that were once visible from the same spot, before the volcano destroyed 
them.269 The two types of physical distance – the view from above and the view to the 
above – merge with the imagined distance afforded by the recollection of historical 
facts, to trigger an even deeper epiphany about mankind. “Questo / globo ove l’uomo è 
nulla” (172-173): man lives on a globe – the earth, the unwelcoming space comparable 
to the volcano – where he himself is nothing. Since the earth is a “granel di sabbia” 
(191), how much more infinitesimal, then, is man?  
 
A release of tension eventually arrives with the fifth strophe, where the two themes – 
the threatening cosmos and the nothingness of man – converge in the long metaphor that 
likens men to ants (this strophe is in italics in the Appendix). In La ginestra it is the 
narrator himself who, hiking up the slopes of Vesuvius and gaining the necessary 
distance from humanity, becomes the external observer that can name humanity for 
what it is: ants. The image of an apple falling on and destroying an anthill mirrors the 
natural calamities that can endanger human existence. The list of disasters continues 
through the following strophe, ending on a renewed mention of men's foolish claim to 
eternity (296). Like Thoreau, Leopardi emphasises the immense and organised effort 
that underlies the actions of the ants: “con gran lavoro”, with great toil the little 
creatures have managed to build their dwellings. All this toil is doomed to be in vain 
                                                   
269  Cf. Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo: “non si trova più regni né imperi che vadano gonfiando e 
scoppiando come le bolle, perché sono tutti sfumati”, TPP (2013), 508; Sangirardi (2000), 271 traces 
the image of the bursting bubbles to Lucian Ch. 19, suggesting that the Lucianic influence is stronger 
than that of Ariosto’s Orlando furioso 34.76; a similar image appears also in the very Lucianic 
Somnium by L. B. Alberti (Intercenales 4.1). 
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and to have no bearing on the outer world: such, Leopardi suggests, are man's hectic 
efforts in a world that is not meant for him.  
 
3. Lucianic Mountains and Ancient Ants 
 
The moment in which the narrator of Leopardi’s poem climbs up the height of the 
volcano is in itself profoundly Lucianic. As I have mentioned already, Lucian’s 
ἐπισκοποῦντες famously and frequently rise to points of vantage from which they can 
look at the world.270 Although, as I briefly noted, the height is very often metaphorical, 
in many cases the ascension is properly physical, as is clearly exemplified by Hermes’ 
organisation of Charon’s visit to the land of the living in Lucian’s Charon.271 Once 
Hermes has taken up the role of guide – parallel to Charon’s position in the land of the 
dead – the god has to see to the details of Charon’s trip and, in particular, has to find a 
suitable viewpoint (τὴν ἱκανὴν σκοπήν, Ch. 3) from which Charon will be finally able 
to observe men to his heart’s content. The care that Hermes puts into this part of the 
plan and the length of the passage mark the importance of perspective needed to obtain 
thorough judgement of the object of one’s interests. Hermes will not only resolve to 
choose a mountain as his viewpoint, but even to pile several famous mountains one 
upon the other in a parody of a Homeric motif: first Ossa, followed by Pelion, Oeta, and 
Parnassus.272  
 
But even more than the climb that grants the narrator of La ginestra the vantage point 
for his observations on human life, it is the spectacle that lies below that proves 
authentically Lucianic. The visualisation of humanity as ants features repeatedly in 
Lucian’s works and prominently in combination with the motif of the view from above. 
                                                   
270  The text of Lucian is from Macleod (1972-1987). On Lucian’s use of distance and perspective, cf. the 
dense pages of Duncan (1979), 13-21; Anderson (1976), 12. Bompaire (1958), 327 sees in the role of 
the kataskopos who examines humans from removed view points (“du haut d’une montagne ou d’un 
astre”) and despises them the influence of Cynic modes. 
271  Significantly this is one of the first Lucianic dialogues read by Leopardi, in February 1819, cf. TPP 
(2013), 1113. 
272  See Duncan (1979), 18. Note the reverse perspective in the Prometheus, where the Titan has to be on 
the mountain but not quite too high as to be invisible from the perspective of men on earth (Prom. 1). 
The image of the height – and in this case specifically of the height from a figurative mountain – 
appears also in Rhetorum Praeceptor 5-7. Cf. Od. 11.315-316. 
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In the Icaromenippus Lucian narrates the story of Menippus’ quest for the truth about 
the world; failed by each and every philosopher on earth Menippus resolves to fly above 
it in person and learn the truth for himself. 273  The dialogue skilfully merges 
metaphorical and physical distance, and the notion that distance and perspective equal 
(a higher degree of) understanding is essentially embodied by Menippus’ path of 
knowledge.274 And although in many other Lucianic passages even a metaphorical 
distance is presented as sufficient to the pursuit of knowledge, the Icaromenippus 
scorns the mental distance from the world paraded by the philosophers and replaces it 
with an entirely physical one.275  
 
As he recounts his expedition to a friend, Menippus recalls his surprise at the realisation 
of the smallness of entire regions (Icar. 18), a realisation, as we have seen, very similar 
to the one that the narrator of La ginestra will experience. The smallness of relatively 
vast natural areas prompts Menippus’ friend to inquire about the look of man-made 
areas – cities – and of men themselves. Instead of directly answering, Menippus bluntly 
and quite abruptly turns to describing a community of ants:  
 
Οἶµαί σε πολλάκις ἤδη µυρµήκων ἀγορὰν ἑωρακέναι, τοὺς µὲν εἰλουµένους περὶ τὸ 
στόµα τοῦ φωλεοῦ κἀν τῷ µέσῳ πολιτευοµένους, ἐνίους δ’ ἐξιόντας, ἑτέρους δὲ 
ἐπανιόντας αὖθις εἰς τὴν πόλιν· καὶ ὁ µέν τις τὴν κόπρον ἐκφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἁρπάσας ποθὲν ἢ 
κυάµου λέπος ἢ πυροῦ ἡµίτοµον θεῖ φέρων. εἰκὸς δὲ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς κατὰ λόγον  τοῦ 
µυρµήκων βίου καὶ οἰκοδόµους τινὰς καὶ δηµαγωγοὺς καὶ πρυτάνεις καὶ µουσικοὺς καὶ 
φιλοσόφους. πλὴν αἵ γε πόλεις αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι ταῖς µυρµηκιαῖς µάλιστα ἐῴκεσαν. (Icar. 
19) 
 
The only apt response to his friend’s enquiry is a simile that compares the view of men 
from the sky to the human perspective on an anthill. 276 But there is more to Menippus’ 
                                                   
273  Text with commentary of the Icaromenippus in Camerotto (2009). Leopardi read the dialogue in 
August 1824. 
274  It is worth remembering that Menippus’ narration of the aerial view of the Earth contains an 
embedded reference (τὰ µέντοι κεφάλαια τῶν πραγµάτων τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο οἷά φησιν Ὅµηρος τὰ ἐπὶ 
τῆς ἀσπίδος· Icar. 16) to another vision of the world from outside, the ekphrasis of the shield of  
Achilles at Il. 18.468-607. 
275   See Duncan (1979), 18.  
276  Duncan (1979), 19 sees the comparison of the ants as peculiarly Lucianic, part of his “large, 
simplifying metaphors of human life”, but fails to explore it. Menippus’ flight has been compared to 
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description than meets the eye. The comparison with ants, it turns out, is appropriate not 
only in light of how small humans look from a removed perspective but, more 
remarkably, for how similar the ants seem to human society when looked at more 
closely. Lucian’s Menippus is thoroughly aware of both sides of the comparison: he 
concentrates on the one hand on the smallness of humans, but he also focuses on the 
design of the ants’ society that, just like man’s, has its own “architects and politicians, 
magistrates and composers and philosophers”. What Menippus describes is thus not 
merely his newly gained idea of the objective dimension of men, but his realisation of 
the fallacy and bias that spring from man’s un-distanced observation of his own kind.  
Men are blind to the high level of organisation of the myrmecic society, blind to the 
similarity between that society and their own, and thus oblivious to the conclusions one 
can derive from such similarity.  Man’s lack of awareness is, quite literally, a flaw of his 
vision: only because of the (physically and metaphorically) biased viewpoint from 
which humans observe themselves can they dismiss the undeniable similarity with, 
among others, the ants’ society. 
 
That which is possible to the flying Menippus – a trip above the clouds to examine the 
world and man’s place in it – is nothing but a dream for the protagonist of Lucian’s 
Hermotimus. The dialogue recounts, as he chats with Lycinus, Hermotimus’ year-long 
pursuit of happiness through philosophy, a search that, from the very start, is described 
through images alluding to the act of travelling and mountaineering (Herm. 2-4);277 the 
path is a long, tiring, and most importantly ascensional hike at whose summit stand 
virtue and happiness. What lies on the top is the fullness of understanding granted by 
the high and remote position that the most enduring hikers have so exhaustingly gained: 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Trygaeus’ in Aristophanes Pax, cf. Halliwell (2008), 430; Camerotto (2009), 21. Camerotto suggests 
that the Lucianic idea of ants is also to some extent inspired by Trygaeus’ outlook on the world from 
above; at Pax 819-822, describing the view from above Trygaeus stresses the smallness of humans 
(µικροὶ δ᾽ὁρᾶν ἄνωθεν ἦστ᾽. v. 821). But it looks here as though a bigger distance is not 
straightforwardly conducive to clearer understanding, and the men who seem κακοήθεις from afar 
appear as πολύ τι κακοηθέστεροι at a closer glance. More than a direct inspiration, Camerotto sees in 
the Aristophanic passage a similar “ethical reading” of humans from a distance. On Lucian and 
Aristophanes, and in general on Lucian’s use of his sources see Anderson (1976), 21. 
277  See for example ἔστιν ὁ οἶµος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν µακρός τε καὶ ὄρθιος καὶ τρηχύς; ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ γενόµενον, 
Herm. 2; ἐν τῇ ὑπωρείᾳ κάτω ἔτι, Herm. 3. 
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ὅσοι δ’ ἂν εἰς τέλος διακαρτερήσωσιν οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ ἄκρον ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ 
ἐκείνου εὐδαιµονοῦσιν θαυµάσιόν τινα βίον τὸν λοιπὸν βιοῦντες, οἷον µύρµηκας ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ὕψους ἐπισκοποῦντές τινας τοὺς ἄλλους. (Herm. 5) 
 
The Hermotimus takes the discourse on human insignificance to a different – and this 
time openly metaphorical and theoretical – level. It is not only the physical mileage 
between the flying Menippus and the soil of the earth that makes men look like ants, but 
men appear to be the very same also from the abstract distance which one reaches 
through ceaseless philosophical inquiry. Thus men are in two ways minuscule, both in a 
strictly physical sense against the background of the wider natural universe and in a 
theoretical sense, insofar as their importance is questioned by the more alert among 
humans. As if Lucian was keen to seal the crucial insight granted by the comparison of 
men and ants from the dual perspective of physical and metaphorical distance, what the 
Icaromenippus ascertains by physical travel, the Hermotimus confirms through the 
piercing gaze of philosophy. The physical and the metaphysical intertwine to make of 
this trope an adamant and unassailable descriptor of the truth about humans in the 
cosmos.  
 
Menippus consciously employs his intuition about the similarity of men and ants in 
light of the structure and high level of organisation of their respective societies to make 
a point about human life, the ultimate target of Lucianic inquiry. But the same similarity 
between the features that humans are keen to consider distinctively and uniquely theirs 
and those of other animal species (and, prominently, of ants) is observed by many 
ancient sources before and after Lucian, sources that variously praise the efficiency of 
the ants’ organised society.278 Going one step further, Aelian draws a direct link between 
ants’ and men’s behaviour and life-style, interpreting the ants’ choices and habits 
according to specifically human needs and reading in the pattern of the ants’ society the 
                                                   
278  On insects in the ancient world Keller (1909-1913), esp 416-421 on ants; two books from the 80’s are 
entirely dedicated to the subject, Davies and Kathirithamby (1986) and Beavis (1988); see also Hunter 
(2003), 179 n. 107; a short section on ants is in Kenneth and Kitchell (2014), 3-4. See a good 
summary of praises of the ants’ society in Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 38-40; and in Kenneth 
and Kitchell (2014), 3. Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 42 contains their only mention of Lucian’s 
use of ants (Icaromenippus 19). 
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very patterns that regulate the communal life of humans.279 Although not concerned with 
questioning or challenging man’s view of the cosmos, ancient sources nevertheless 
highlight the same unwelcome similarity noticed by Lucian in the Icaromenippus and in 
the Hermotimus.  
 
Observation and praise of ants’ behaviour can be found in several places throughout 
Leopardi's work, and especially in his notes. He mentions ants for their innate 
organisational abilities (Zib. 210), for the way they form groups for the common good 
(Zib. 287), or for specific aspects of their societies (Zib. 370). What is more, he praises 
ants for skills that humans often lack, such as the attitude to forming resilient bonds 
between groups and individuals (Zib. 587).280 In line with the tendency mentioned 
above, Leopardi’s marked interest in the life of ants as well as in that of bees and other 
animals revolves around the similarities between the life and behaviour of ants and 
those of men. And here, as in Lucian’s case, lies the principal reason for Leopardi’s use 
of ants: they closely resemble human society in organisation, lifestyle, and life choices; 
they are even – as every animal is – endowed with the “principle τοῦ λογισµοῦ” (Zib. 
370). But it is precisely here that the similarities end, as man, unlike ants, chooses to 
employ λογισµός differently, to rise above his station, and to demand a higher status 
above all other beings. 281  
 
But let us go back to the comparison of ants and men within Leopardi’s programme of 
human animalisation. Despite the absence of such a striking trope as the ant simile of La 
ginestra, the Operette too perform a complex interweaving of the ideas of human 
                                                   
279  Cf. the argument regarding the ants’ organisation of their dwelling, which Aelian NA 6.43 interprets 
according to the need to have different quarters for different genders, cf. Keller (1909-1913), 418. 
Aside from Aelian, Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 42 lists other authors who “compare and 
contrast the societies of man and the ant”. One can recall Strabo 8.6.16 for the habit of comparing 
laborious groups of people to ants, as in McCartney (1954), 234. 
280  Often animal societies (and chiefly ants and bees) are indicated by Leopardi as examples of natural 
societies, such as even the human one must have been in some distant past. If men have not 
completely and always lacked those abilities, they certainly do not have them in the present, but might 
have had them in antiquity; see for example Zib. 587-590.  
281  Newmyer (1999), 99 begins his article on the notion of animal and human reason in the ancient world 
saying that “Since antiquity, a sharp dichotomy between animalkind and humankind has been posited 
by those who, for one reason or another, are eager to claim a unique and privileged position for 
humanity in the spectrum of creation”.  
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animality and human smallness. Animalisation and miniaturisation are constant – and 
often intertwined – means of getting at the foundation of man’s deluded understanding 
of life, i.e. his misconception of the place of humans in the universe. As in La ginestra, 
distance is an essential element in prompting clear-minded opinions of the human 
condition and generally the bigger the distance, the deeper the acuity of the cogitations 
about man’s existence. Yet unlike La ginestra, the Operette employ most of the time a 
metaphorical rather than a physical distance, and often achieve it by resorting to non-
humans as their ἐπισκοποῦντες: the gods of Storia del genere umano observe the newly 
created human race from their immortal abodes; the mummies of Dialogo di Federico 
Ruysch e delle sue mummie look at human life from the realms of death; the Earth and 
its inhabitants are watched by Hercules and Atlas as they juggle with the Earth like a 
ball (Dialogo di Ercole e di Atlante), and then by the Earth and the Moon themselves in 
Dialogo della terra e della luna. But what is the image of man that this varied array of 
characters contributes to sketch?  
 
4. Giving Things Names: Man’s Naming Obsession and What are Men? 
 
This chapter opened with the Sprite and the Gnome’s discussion about the end of 
mankind.282 The first reaction of the Gnome, who is at first unaware of mankind’s 
disappearance, is, paradoxically, to suggest that the news that men are gone is so 
striking that it ought to hit the newspapers: “Oh cotesto è caso da gazette”. The first 
implication of the vanishing of humans is that the human obsession with giving things a 
name has died out with them. For the human mindset, when a thing is not defined, not 
named, and not announced, this thing lacks solidity, reality, and even existence; 
newspapers are the symbol of this attitude, and the Gnome’s point – biased by human 
perspective – is that, if something does not appear in print, one cannot be sure that it has 
actually happened.283 It is not until the Sprite mocks him that he realises the sheer 
absurdity of his statement, and it takes quite a while for the Gnome to understand that 
the disappearance of names and labels (for example the days of the week, of the months, 
and of the years) does not impact in any way on the natural course of time on all other 
                                                   
282  On this dialogue, see Celli (1992); Blasucci (2003), 85-102; Bellucci (2005); Polizzi (2008). 
283  On Leopardi’s satirical attitude towards the role of newspapers, see Palinodia 19-21, 151-153, 206; 
see also Tristano’s comment in Dialogo di Tristano e di un amico; Galimberti (1998a), 123 n. 11.  
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natural things (Sprite. “What do you think? That if you don’t call them by their names 
they’re not going to come?”).284 
 
The depiction of man’s obsession with names and the swiftness with which names have 
disappeared once man himself has gone, combine to depict humans as a bunch of 
vainglorious creatures entirely deluded about the significance of their own existence.285 
But as we keep reading the dialogue, we see that this fixation plays also a more specific 
role. Initially in a subtle way and then with increasing frequency and emphasis, the two 
creatures stress one specific aspect of human life, i.e. its sameness with other animal 
races. The significance of the theme is underscored throughout by the recurring 
presence of the language of natural sciences that made a first prominent appearance in 
the notes to a short piece – the Dialogo di un cavallo e un bue – which anticipates this 
dialogue. In it Leopardi had listed a long series of references to ideas of evolution, 
anthropology, and zoology extracted from a variety of ancient and modern sources, to 
confirm that he saw in this idea of human zoology the roots of this work.286  
 
Leopardi begins by introducing the idea with remarkable subtlety as the Sprite reveals 
to the Gnome that humanity has vanished: 
 
Folletto. Voi gli aspettate invan: son tutti morti, diceva la chiusa di una tragedia dove 
morivano tutti i personaggi.  
Gnomo. Che vuoi tu inferire?  
Folletto. Voglio inferire che gli uomini son tutti morti, e la razza è perduta. 
                                                   
284  TPP (2013), 508. Cecchetti (1983), 89. In several works Leopardi stresses the vanity of human works, 
activities, and inventions on earth, see Galimberti (1998a), 124 n. 13 for a list of other instances and 
for a brief history of the motif. 
285  On the vanity of names (as opposed to the reality of things), see Zib. 2487; see also Galimberti 
(1998a), 125 n. 15: “si conclude la disputa tra il personaggio che guarda alla realtà delle cose e quello 
che tiene conto dei loro nomi, meri flatus vocis, e nemmeno innocui se, definendo, mettono a nudo la 
miseria della condizione umana.” 
286  Cf. the notes at TPP (2013), 612-613. On these notes see Fabio (1995), 51 who sees in this long set of 
footnotes an encyclopedic tendency that, still present in Leopardi’s earlier works, will progressively 
disappear; also, Polizzi (2008), 88-91 on the scientific works that inspired Leopardi’s scientific 
knowledge and curiosity. 
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Gnomo. Oh cotesto è caso da gazzette. Ma pure fin qui non s'è veduto che ne ragionino. (OM 
5, 123)287 
 
What at this point could seem little more than a mere coincidence or a slight allusion – 
since the term “race” (razza) is a common enough word to define humans – is stressed 
over and over again to become an inescapable fil rouge in the two characters’ discourse. 
The adumbration in the Sprite’s speech is taken up again by the Gnome, as he accepts 
that the end of mankind is reality, and made utterly explicit twice, to leave the reader 
with no doubts regarding the implications of the term “razza”: 
 
Gnomo. A ogni modo, io non mi so dare ad intendere che tutta una specie di animali si possa 
perdere di pianta, come tu dici. (OM 5, 126) 
 
Folletto. Tu che sei maestro in geologia, dovresti sapere che il caso non è nuovo, e che varie 
qualità di bestie si trovarono anticamente che oggi non si trovano, salvo pochi ossami 
impietriti.288 
 
Humans are a “race”, a “species of animals”, “beasts”, etc. And most importantly, as 
one gathers from the Sprite’s remark about geology, man is just one amongst the 
thousands of animal races that existed and then disappeared in the history of the 
universe.289 We find even greater confirmation of Leopardi’s keenness on this point in 
the couple of sketched dialogues (dating to 1820-21 and not included in the Operette’s 
final edition) whose themes he will reemploy in the Dialogo di un folletto e di uno 
                                                   
287  My italics. TPP (2013), 508. Cecchetti (1983), 87. “Sprite. You look for them in vain. They are all 
dead, you could hear at the end of a tragedy in which all the characters died. / Gnome. What do you 
mean? / Sprite. I mean to say that men are all dead, and their race is lost. / Gnome. Oh this is a scoop 
for newspapers! But so far we haven't read it anywhere.”  
288  My italics. TPP (2013), 508.-509 Cecchetti (1983), 91. “Gnome. In any case, I can't understand how a 
whole species of animals can be completely lost, as you say.” / “Sprite. A master geologist like 
yourself should know that it’s not such a novelty and that in ancient times there were on earth many 
kinds of animals that aren’t there any more – except for a few petrified bones.” My italics. 
289  Of course the fact has been noted before, e.g. Blasucci (2003), 87, but, in my opinion, not sufficiently 
explored, especially in connection with the Greek sources. On the satirical generalisation of mankind 
cf. Dialogo di un Galantuomo e del mondo, as the World compares men to eggs: “A questo non devi 
pensare. Non ci dev'essere un uomo diverso da un altro, ma tutti devono essere come tante uova”, a 
comparison which Fabio (1995), 41 interprets as a “metafora comico-riduttiva”. Fabio then goes on to 
present some other comical metaphors such as the one that compares men and horses on the grounds 
of their similar need for shouts and spurs. 
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gnomo.290 The two dialogues – the Dialogo tra due bestie, p.e. un cavallo e un toro and 
in particular the Dialogo di un cavallo e un bue, which I mentioned earlier for its 
abundance of scientific language and evidence – reinforce with utmost clarity the 
equivalence between humans and animals. Perhaps due to the rougher state of these 
sketches – still containing Leopardi’s notes to himself about his objectives and 
arguments – the fact that Leopardi wants his reader to understand humans as another 
animal species is spelled out here repeatedly. 291 
 
It becomes clear then that the human compulsion to name things is just another aspect 
of this wider portrayal of men as animals. Just like any other animal, man has 
distinctive customs and habits, here epitomised by the necessity to give things a name. 
Yet the problem with human habits – as opposed to those of other species – is that they 
are entirely disconnected from (a realistic understanding of) their habitat and their role 
in it. As the obsession with name-giving clearly elucidates, man’s customs attempt to 
bind the human species to earth in a unique and privileged manner, but in fact do 
nothing but display the complete and unnatural detachment between this particular 
animal and his habitat.292  
 
The two sketches for dialogues mentioned above – the Dialogo tra due bestie, p.e. un 
cavallo e un toro and the Dialogo di un cavallo e un bue – deserve further note. Cesare 
Galimberti has briefly but insightfully traced a path that, starting from the reference in 
the Discorso di un italiano intorno alla poesia romantica (1818)293 and two Zibaldone 
                                                   
290  On these two sketches and the Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo, Fabio (1995), 52; Blasucci 
(1989); Sangirardi (1998) and Blasucci (2003), 85-102; Bellucci (2005.) 
291  From the Dialogo di un cavallo e un bue: “B. Che sorta di animale era? C. Mia nonna mi disse ch'era 
una scimia. Per me aveva creduto che fosse un uomo e questo m’avea messo una gran paura. B. Un 
uomo? che vale a dire un uomo? C. Una razza d'animali”, TPP (2013), 611 and ibid. “[L’uomo] Era 
una sorta di bestie da quattro zampe come siamo noi altri, ma stavano ritti e camminavano con due 
sole come fanno gli uccelli, e coll'altre due s’aiutavano a strapazzare la gente”. 
292  Compare the Bull’s speech in the Dialogo tra due bestie, p.e. un cavallo e un toro: “Non viveva già 
naturalmente, e come tutti gli altri, ma in mille modi loro propri”, TPP (2013), 611. On Il. 6.146 and 
the comparison of men and leaves (subject of Chapter 3) cf. Redfield (1975), 102: “For a moment 
Glaucus moves back and sees men as the gods see them – creatures as ephemeral and insignificant as 
all the other creatures of nature.” 
293   TPP (2013), 993.  
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notes (19 and 1469),294 describes Leopardi’s relationship with the ideas expressed by 
Xenophanes of Colophon in his elegiac poetry (B15).295 After the references in the 
Discorso and in the two Zibaldone pages, Galimberti sees the Dialogo tra due bestie as 
a further, although non-explicit allusion to the Xenophanic fragment. Fr. 15 ridicules 
and criticises the anthropomorphic tendencies of human religion, by suggesting that 
every species would imagine and draw their gods in its own image. The idea is 
explained first by postulating that animals – exemplified by horses, oxen, and lions – 
would draw theriomorphic divinities, and, in B16, by suggesting that different 
populations would imagine gods ethnomorphically as bearing their physical traits.296  
 
Both titles of the two versions of the “dialogue between two beasts” include a horse, 
and, while the former uses a bull (“toro”), the latter refers precisely to an ox (“bue”). 
Leopardi’s interpretation of Xenophanes’ critique of religious anthropomorphism shifts 
the original focus ever so slightly from the way in which we imagine the gods to the 
way in which we relate to our cosmos and its inhabitants. Of course the two concepts 
are closely interconnected, and it is precisely man’s pretension that triggers both his 
anthropomorphic imagination of the divine and his conviction of diversity from animal-
kind. The mockery of human conceptions – of themselves, of the divine, of other 
creatures – animates both Xenophanes’ fragment and Leopardi’s dialogues.297 Although 
Xenophanes focuses primarily on the relativisation of man’s ability to understand the 
divine, his fragment B15 nonetheless straightforwardly pairs humans and animals by 
likening their inability to grasp the nature of the gods.298 Leopardi’s choice of the horse 
                                                   
294  Zib. 9 seems to be tightly connected with the Discorso, and thus possibly coeval; Zib. 1469 dates to 
August 1821, thus either in the same time frame of the two sketches or immediately after it. See 
Sangirardi (1998) for interpretation of the connection between these passages and the Dialogo di un 
folletto e di uno gnomo. 
295 Galimberti (1998a), 121-122. On B15 (and the connected B16) see Diels and Kranz (1951-52), 132-
133 and Lesher’s (2001) edition and commentary at 89-95.  
296  B15 from Diels and Kranz (1951-52): ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες <ἵπποι τ’> ἠὲ λέοντες/ ἢ γράψαι 
χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, / ἵπποι µέν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁµοίας/  καί <κε> θεῶν 
ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώµατ’ ἐποίουν/τοιαῦθ’ οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέµας εἶχον <ἕκαστοι>. B16: Αἰθίοπές τε 
<θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιµοὺς µέλανάς τε / Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πέλεσθαι>. 
297  On Leopardi, Xenophanes and in general man’s tendency to interpret the universe according to 
himself, see Negri (1998), 68-75. 
298  Warren (2014), 44: “just as it would be ridiculous to think that horses, say, are right about what the 
gods are like when they draw equine gods, so too it would be ridiculous to assert that any of the 
human conceptions are correct”. Cf. Halliwell (2008), 269 n. 13 on Babut (1974), 116-117. 
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and the ox as representatives of animal-kind channels all the relativising force of 
Xenophanes’ comparison to transport it into a world which, finally freed of humans, can 
once and for all prove the utter meaninglessness of man’s self-conceit. To use Deborah 
Levine Gera’s words, written in relation to Xenophanes but equally apt for Lucian and 
Leopardi too: “These imaginary animals are good to think with, for they teach us about 
ourselves, humans.”299 
 
5. Il Copernico: Heliocentrism and the Scala Naturae 
 
Perched on the slopes of the volcano, the narrator of La ginestra owes his insights not 
only to the view from above, granting him perspective onto the world below, but also 
and especially to the celestial scene above him. The consideration of the true immensity 
of the stars in contrast with the human perception of their size (little more than dots, 
says Leopardi) had prompted a spinning mise en abyme reversing man’s fallacious 
viewpoint and leading to the ultimate and inevitable conclusion that our earth is a 
punctum, and man is nothing (170-173). The dialogue Il Copernico,300 composed in 
1827, tackles the same theme, playing more closely with the history of man’s ideas and 
knowledge of the earth and space, and toying with modern man’s unyielding 
anthropocentrism, seemingly unshaken by the Copernican discoveries about the 
universe.301 The scientific premise is enacted in a lively theatrical piece that centres 
around the Sun’s refusal to labour any longer for the benefit of man, and consequently 
around Copernicus’s visit to the Sun, aimed at subverting the order of things and at 
getting the lazy Earth to move around the sun instead.  
                                                   
299  Levine Gera (2000), 41. 
300  On Il Copernico, Galimberti (1998b); Giachery (1999); Galluzzi (2001); Di Meo (2001); Bonito 
(2008). 
301  Earlier in the Operette, the theme had been touched upon in Dialogo d’Ercole e di Atlante, cf. Melosi 
(2015), 513-514 for a quick overview of the development in Leopardi’s use of astronomical 
knowledge for philosophical enquiry on man; cf. Giachery (1999), 73 on how the theme appears also 
in the Paralipomeni della Batracomiomachia. Leopardi’s interest in astronomy is long lived, as 
shown by his precocious and dense Storia dell’astronomia (1813). Cf. Lucian’s (and the 
Icaromenippus’ in particular) influence on Kepler’s Somnium seu opus…de astronomia lunari in 
Romm (1989); Pantin (2007), 115-128; Ligota and Panizza (2007), 14-15. From Sabnis’ (2008) 
BMCR review of the latter: “Kepler’s citations of Lucian’s Icaromenippus and Verae 
Historiae indicate his interest in the scientific underpinnings of fiction; far from misunderstanding the 
nature of Lucian's satire, as some have argued, Kepler saw in Lucian a fruitful combination of 
fictional play and philosophical labor.” 
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The interplay between the physically elevated point of view offered by the Sun’s abode 
and the metaphorical detachment that grants Copernicus a clearheaded understanding of 
the limits of humanity (which is, surely, going to reject the Sun’s plan) creates an ideal 
background for a lucid observation of mankind’s role in the cosmos. As one would 
expect, this dialogue weaves together the themes of human animality and human 
smallness especially tightly. First appearing in the words of the Sun himself – connoted 
by a diminutive “quattro animaluzzi” and with the miniaturisation of the Earth (“un 
pugno di fango, tanto piccino, che io, che ho buona vista, non lo arrivo a vedere”,)302 – 
the notion arises once again in the speech by the First Hour, who calls humans “quei 
poveri animali”.303  
 
Besides being a theme common to both the Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo and Il 
Copernico, human animality connects the two works in one specific way. Let us look at 
two moments in the two dialogues, starting from the Copernico. Copernicus is, as we 
were saying, called to the rescue and asked to promote the change in the universe, 
convincing the Earth that she has to take up what the Sun is now refusing to do. The 
dialogue plays smilingly and acutely with this subtle confusion between physical and 
metaphysical, and merges the practical difficulties of lifting and moving the lazy Earth, 
with the mental challenge involved in revolutionising humans’ self-conception, which is 
used to thinking of the universe as revolving around the Earth’s throne (“trono”).304 It is 
in this setting that the relationship between animals and humans and the insights it 
offers into human existence come yet again into play, as Copernicus realises what the 
consequences of the revolutionary transformation that the Sun demands are:  
 
Copernico. […] Ma voglio dire in sostanza, che il fatto nostro non sarà così semplicemente 
materiale, come pare a prima vista che debba essere; e che gli effetti suoi non apparterranno 
alla fisica solamente: perché esso sconvolgerà i gradi della dignità delle cose, e l'ordine 
                                                   
302   TPP (2013), 586. 
303  TPP (2013), 587. Cecchetti (1983), 419. Ibid. the Sun calls the Earth “a small grain of sand”; compare 
La ginestra vv. 190-191 “in questo oscuro / granel di sabbia, il qual di terra ha nome”. 
304  TPP (2013), 590. Cecchetti (1983), 435. Monti’s I poeti dei primi secoli della lungua italiana: 
Dialogo in cinque pause in his Proposta di alcune correzioni ed aggiunte al vocabolario della 
Crusca (1817-26) interestingly presents a similar comical take on the physical change in the universe 
followed to the scientific discovery of heliocentrism, cf. Monti (1838), 2.  
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degli enti; scambierà i fini delle creature; e per tanto farà un grandissimo rivolgimento 
anche nella metafisica, anzi in tutto quello che tocca alla parte speculativa del sapere. E ne 
risulterà che gli uomini, se pur sapranno o vorranno discorrere sanamente, si troveranno 
essere tutt’altra roba da quello che sono stati fin qui, o che si hanno immaginato di essere.305 
 
Let us pause and turn to the Sprite and the Gnome, which we had left as they were busy 
criticising humanity’s narrow and deluded perspective: men understood and called 
“their own events world revolutions and the histories of their own peoples world 
histories”, and believed that “there was no other reason for everything in the world to 
exist, except for their own personal use”, says the Gnome.306 Within the space of a few 
words the discourse returns to animals, epitome of the world’s perfect capability to 
survive without humans – “those animals, however, that had been created only for their 
benefit never realised that such world revolutions existed”.307 The Gnome’s definition of 
animals is incidental (quite literally squeezed, in the Italian original, in between two 
commas), yet essential in leading the discourse towards Leopardi’s next point:  
 
Folletto. Ma i porci, secondo Crisippo erano pezzi di carne apparecchiati dalla natura a posta 
per le cucine e le dispense degli uomini, e, acciocché non imputridissero, conditi colle anime 
in vece di sale.308 
 
The change requested by the Sun will turn upside down the order of beings and the 
“ladder of the dignity of things”, and will “switch the purposes of creatures”. The 
Sprite’s reference to Chrysippus (fragment SVF 2.1154, which Leopardi obtained from 
Cicero De Natura Deorum 2.160) comments ironically on man’s belief that pigs – 
                                                   
305 TPP (2013), 590. Cecchetti (1983), 435. “Copernicus. But I mean to say that this business of ours is 
not going to be simply material, as it appears at first sight, and that its effects are not going to be 
restricted to physics, for it will upset all the steps in the ladder of the dignity of things and the order of 
beings; it will switch the purposes of creatures; and therefore it will cause an extremely great 
revolution in metaphysics as well – in fact, in everything that touches the speculative side of 
knowledge. And as a result, if men can or want to reason well, they'll discover that they are something 
completely different from what they have been until now or from what they have imagined 
themselves to be.” 
306  In TPP (2013), 509; Cecchetti (1983), 93. Cf. the Dialogo di un cavallo e un bue at TPP (2013), 611 
for an earlier version of the passage. 
307 TPP (2013), 509. Cecchetti (1983), 93. 
308 TPP (2013), 509. Cecchetti (1983), 93. “Sprite. But pigs, as Chrysippus believed, were pieces of meat 
especially prepared by nature for the kitchens and the pantries of men, and to keep them from rotting, 
they had been dressed with souls rather than with salt.” 
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symbolising all animals useful to men – are created solely for man’s use. 309 The 
allusion, subtle and nevertheless glaring in the Copernico, is clarified by the Sprite’s 
remark: Leopardi is thinking of the notion of the scala naturae.310 Remarkably, neither 
the presence of this idea nor the fact that it acts as a fundamental link between the two 
dialogues are noted by some of the latest commentaries on the Operette.311 Similarly 
Alberto Grilli reduces the Sprite’s mention of Chrysippus’ opinion to a mere humoristic 
note (“un ‘bon mot’”), without further comment.312  
 
Yet the idea implied in the reference to Chrysippus’ belief about pigs plays an essential 
part in the critique of anthropocentrism that is so crucial to these two dialogues. It is 
useful then to mention that we know that Leopardi was familiar with the notion long 
before both dialogues: the scala naturae appears in Zib. 2899-2900, dating to 1823 (one 
year prior to the Sprite and Gnome’s dialogue and four years before the Copernico),313 
where Leopardi challenges its traditional order, dethroning man from his spot at the 
peak of the ladder. The challenge to the Stoic belief advanced by Chrysippus and 
supported at length by Cicero plays a similar overturning role. One of the most striking 
features of Cicero’s depiction of the universe – aimed at proving that “omnia quae sint 
in hoc mundo quibus utantur homines hominum causa facta esse et parata”314 – is the 
almost complete annihilation of every other inhabitant of the earth, where the sole 
meaningful dwellers are humans and divine beings (ND 2.154-155). The blindness of 
the vision of the Stoics as exposed by Cicero lies precisely in the complete omission of 
                                                   
309  Chrysippus in Arnim (1903), 333, on which Jedan (2009), 27; Cicero ND in Ax and Plasberg (1961), 
114-115. The entomologist Giorgio Celli has concentrated on the theme from a scientific perspective 
in his introduction to Leopardi’s Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo in Celli (1992), 5-17. 
310  Cf. the initial chapter of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The great chain of being: a study of the history of an 
idea (1960) for the development of the notion from Plato to Aristotle. 
311  Galimberti (1998a); Melosi (2015). 
312  Grilli (1982), 61 n. 34.  
313  Cf. Caesar and D’Intino’s (2013) commentary to Zib. 2900. 
314  On the Stoics’ faith in the gods’ “special concern for man”, Dragona-Monachou (1976), 154-156 for a 
discussion of N.D. 153ff and 156 on divine providence for humans. Dragona-Monachou (1976), 157 
discusses the alternatives objectives for the aim of the creation of the world and lists the fragments 
that support “the anthropocentric character of providence” (SVF 2.1118; 1149; 1152; 1154; 1156; 
1157; 1161; 1162; 1163; 1165; etc.). On SVF 2.1152-1154, Gould (1970), 156-157. On the ten 
arguments that Dragona-Monachou (1976) ascribes to Chrysippus (including the one contained in 
SVF 2.1154), Jedan (2009), 21-23. For the link between Chrysippus’ argument and Cleanthes', see 
Meijer (2007), 81 n. 446 and 82. 
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animals, with the one exception, i.e. only to the extent to which they serve man.315 One 
can think that the Xenophanic relativism that Leopardi so profoundly adopts in his 
Dialogo tra due bestie – and later in the dialogue of the Sprite and the Gnome – would 
have something to say about the straightforward connection that men draw between 
themselves and the gods.  
 
The themes we have been discussing – human pretension and the significance of 
humans in the universe – are so crucial in Leopardi’s thought as to inform virtually all 
of his work. Yet, as we have seen, the Copernico and the Dialogo di un folletto e di uno 
gnomo are especially connected by their use of the idea of human animality as a 
distinctive and fundamental means of enquiry into such themes. It is in this light and by 
engaging with and challenging ancient sources that Leopardi ties these two dialogues 
further together. 
 
The studious and almost scientific attitude by which the Sprite and the Gnome break 
down the patterns of specifically human behaviours, describe them, and finally 
contextualise them in the mechanisms of the wider universe characterises the two 
characters as for-the-time zoologists. Just as a botanist or a zoologist would comment 
on the disappearance of this or that animal or plant, so the two creatures converse about 
the utter annihilation of human life. The distance necessary to the external observers in 
order to perceive the truth about humankind is created by a quasi-scientific detachment 
that transforms men into the objects, as it were, of a wildlife documentary and the Sprite 
and the Gnome into the reporters.  
 
Here lies one striking paradox, as the two characters simultaneously have their own 
specific place in the world (and are as such equal to humans and all animals) and are the 
external judges of human behaviour. Insofar as they are equal to all other species they 
should not be allowed such a judgemental say, and even less should they proceed to the 
conclusion that “the world is made for the gnomes” (TPP 509) or for the sprites – or, 
                                                   
315  Compare Voltaire’s Sixième Discours of his Discours en vers sur l'homme for animals uttering the 
idea that the world is made for them, cf. Della Giovanna (1899), 44-45 and Polizzi (2008), 87. On the 
influence of Voltaire on the Operette, see among others Cellerino (1995), 312-318. 
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again, and even more explicitly, for horses or bulls, as in the Dialogo tra due bestie.316 
Against this background the distance between humans and the little creatures created by 
Leopardi’s fantasy fades and invites the reader to question the architecture of the 
operetta.317  
 
One answer – which is not intended to be either conclusive or exclusive – could be that 
the underlying moral is that every time someone puts himself in the position of humans 
(that of judging and establishing a hierarchy) he falls into the same detrimental lack of 
objectivity that men famously display. Thinking like men leads astray, and the 
paradoxical notion provided by the Sprite and the Gnome means to question more than 
to solve, thus encapsulating and symbolising the bias and precariousness of man’s 
outlook on the world.318 Of course, even this reading is at last obliterated (or, perhaps, 
reinforced?) by humour, since the ultimate voice, Leopardi, is a man himself. Many of 
Lucian’s dialogues end on similarly inconclusive paradoxes: in one case in particular it 
is the very notion of man’s ability to look at the world from an (enlightening and 
laughter-provoking) distance which is presented and yet destroyed within the space of a 
piece, the Icaromenippus. The flying Menippus is granted a removed view of the earth, 
but this prerogative is to last but briefly: soon Zeus is to strip him of his wings and send 
him back down to earth. As Stephen Halliwell suggests, “As the mythologically loaded 
title of Lucian’s work, Icaromenippus (‘Icarus-Menippus’), implicitly makes clear (with 
its evocation of a fateful fall back to earth), the person who tries to laugh at the whole of 
life cannot really transcend the human viewpoint for long.”319 
 
 
                                                   
316  TPP (2013), 611. 
317  Cf. Sangirardi (2000), 63-65 on the paradox of having childish and unauthoritative judges to speak of 
the human folly and delusion in the Operette, as part of the “carattere sottilmente autoironico 
dell'invenzione mitologica”.  
318  Cf. Blasucci (2003), 89 for another explanation, suggesting that Leopardi believed that all animal 
species thought of themselves as the target of creations. I deem such an explanation untenable: 
although some evidence (like Zib. 390, from 1820, quoted by Blasucci) seems to support it, it is 
obvious from the whole of Leopardi’s following production that he thought of man as the only 
creature to hold such hubristic views of the world. Blasucci also interprets Xenophanes B15 as 
supporting this theory, offering an awkward reading of the fragment that makes it into a statement 
about animals rather than about humans.  
319  Halliwell (2008), 430. 
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III 
(Speaking) Animals and the Human Condition 
 
Denn der Mensch ist kränker, unsicherer, wechselnder, unfestgestellter als irgend 
ein Thier sonst, daran ist kein Zweifel, — er ist das kranke Thier: woher kommt 
das?  
 
F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, 3.13320 
 
1. Life of Men, Life of Animals: Lucian’s Gallus 
 
The very Schopenhauerian note that extends from page 2411 to 2414 of the Zibaldone 
outlines, according to Leopardi's own theory of pleasure, the proportionality between a 
being’s self-love (described also as the being’s inner life, and the activity of his mind) 
and the unhappiness of such a creature. It follows that since man is the creature that has 
the greatest intensity of life and self-love, he is also the one that is born the unhappiest 
of all other living creatures. Such belief is crystallised by Leopardi in a gnomic 
statement: 
 
Quindi l’uomo per essenza propria e inseparabile, è, e nasce più infelice, o meno capace di 
felicità che verun altro genere di viventi, o di esseri.321 (Zib. 2412) 
 
The sentence starkly separates from an ontological point of view (“per essenza propria e 
inseparabile”) man and every other living being on the grounds of their different 
chances of happiness. The exploration of the various aspects adumbrated here – 
Leopardi’s theory of pleasure, his evolving conception of the condition of humans 
within nature, and again his understanding of the differences between men’s and other 
creatures’ approach to emotion, reason, and life – would require far more space than is 
allowed here. My focus for this last section of this chapter is thus more confined, being 
concerned once again with the ways in which animals can variously offer insight into 
humans. So far, we have seen animals acting as (direct or indirect) detectors and 
indicators of the real place of humans in the cosmos. In this section, we wish to look at 
                                                   
320  Colli and Montinari (1968), 385. 
321 “Hence man by his own inseparable essence is, and is born, more unhappy, or less capable of 
happiness, than any other type of living creature or being.”  
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animals insofar as they (directly or indirectly) tell us something about the nature of 
human life, and the human condition. 
 
Two texts will act as our guides through this brief probe into the statement of Leopardi 
quoted above, in the belief that they can help us grasp more of its subtle subtext. The 
first is Lucian’s Gallus. Awoken halfway through a beautiful dream by his rooster, the 
cobbler Mycillus realises that the animal is chatting to him with the voice and propriety 
of a human being.322 The main plot of the dialogue is simple, rotating on the one hand 
around Mycillus’ yearning for the life of the rich, and on the other hand around the 
Rooster’s personal story, involving multiple reincarnations, from Pythagoras, 
Euphorbus, and Aspasia, to a variety of animals. The two stories intersect as the 
characters discuss the best type of life, and the Rooster attempts to convince the cobbler 
– both through arguments and via incognito trips to the houses of a number of rich 
individuals – that the life of the wealthy is not enviable after all. 
 
The dialogue is certainly remarkable for our purposes by virtue of the fact that it 
features an animal in the educational role of the giver of wisdom. The Rooster is the 
ἐπίσκοπος, and an enhanced version of it at that: his multiple lives – crossing genders 
and even kinds – offer him an extraordinary detached perspective, and, consequently, 
more profound insights, that he variously employs to instruct Mycillus. Undoubtedly, a 
lot of wisdom comes to the Rooster from some of the human lives he has lived, which 
have supplied him with the direct experience to back up some of his arguments. But we 
would be mistaken if we thought that this is all, and that the body of a rooster is merely 
a rhetorical device to contain pieces of human knowledge. Instead, Lucian’s stress on 
the animal side of things is paramount throughout the dialogue.  
 
Not only has the Rooster lived several lives as animal, but he has now been a rooster 
multiple times (Gall. 20). Eventually, we discover, it is precisely his experience of life 
                                                   
322  The Rooster (like the Homeric horses that he uses as a reference to Mycillus for the fact that speaking 
animals are nothing new, Gall. 2) speaks like a human (ἀνθρωπίνως ἐλάλησεν). Cf. Heath (2005), 
40;49 for discussion of Il. 19.407 (also referencing Chrysippus SVF 2.144 for a description of the 
Homeric horses as speaking in human fashion); ibid. 49 on the fact that “Achilles’ horses are granted 
a human voice (auden) but we hear nothing of noos.” 
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as an animal that grants him the ability to judge other kinds of existence. To this 
judgement and explanation the Rooster turns once he has introduced himself fully: the 
life of the poor, knows the Rooster, is better than that of the rich (Gall. 21), as the latter 
are constantly preoccupied with not losing their wealth.323 Even the epitome of the 
enviable life, that of the king, is demystified and demythologised by the Rooster, who 
has tried it for himself. Rather than πανευδαίµων (Gall. 24) as Mycillus imagines it, the 
life of the king is a bundle of anxiety, duties, and worries. It becomes increasingly clear 
that the Rooster has one major parameter for judging types of existence, which is the 
degree of preoccupation or freedom from it that they entail. The root and origin of this 
µέτρον becomes strikingly apparent at Gall. 27, as the Cobbler asks the Rooster – who 
has at this point compared the lives of the poor, the rich, and the king – how life as an 
animal compares to life as a human: 
 
οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἀπραγµονέστερος τῶν βίων ἔδοξέ µοι τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου. 
 
The question, says the Rooster, should be answered in greater detail, but in short every 
one of the animals he has embodied has an easier existence than man. The life of 
animals (presented last, not by chance, after those of the poor, of the rich, and of the 
king) is the µέτρον from which the Rooster-ἐπίσκοπος can look at and judge human life. 
Something more can be said if one considers the Rooster’s definition and conception of 
life as one of the dialogue’s allusions to Herodotus.  
 
Herodotean seems to be, for example, the Rooster’s allusion to Mycillus’ previous life 
as a gold-digging ant (Gall. 16).324 But most Herodotean of all is the question arching 
over the entire dialogue – what is the best life? – reminding us of the dialogue between 
Croesus (a rich man and a king, no less) with Solon (a philosopher, one of the lives of 
the Rooster).325 And although in Herodotus the question is differently posed (who is the 
                                                   
323  Cf. Lucian’s Timon for the same theme. 
324  In Lucian also at Sat. 24. Hdt. 3.102-105 on which McCartney (1954); Karttunen (1989), 171ff with 
previous bibliography; Pigoń (2008), 19-22. 
325  The episode (and its significance for Herodotus’ conception of the divine) has been vastly debated, 
and the passage has been variously connected to other places in the Histories (esp. the speech of 
Artabanus at 7.10e.1). Of the vast bibliography, cf. the commentary of Asheri (2007), 93-104; Lloyd 
(1987); Cairns (1996); Griffin (2006); Versnel (2011), 179-187; ibid. 182 n.73 for earlier 
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ὀλβιώτατος man? 1.30.2) and the criteria for Solon’s various responses are more subtle 
and controversial, we still find in their conversation a comparison between the 
immensely wealthy Croesus and the average man Tellus, which ends in favour of the 
latter to the utmost surprise and outrage of the former. Indeed, Lucian has his Mycillus 
inquire about the life of the king, which he imagines to be πανευδαίµων (Gall. 24), 
while in Herodotus Croesus’ (impressive) εὐδαιµονίη (1.32.1-2) had not been enough to 
grant him a place in Solon’s list. 
 
Puzzling choices as they may be, 326  Solon’s ὀλβιώτατοι are all humans. Lucian 
introduces one further element, animals, going smilingly one step beyond Herodotus, 
and uses one of them to illustrate the misery common (albeit to different degrees) to all 
possible nuances of the human condition: the best life, one deduces, is anything but 
human life, which, even at its best, is ridden with preoccupation and anxiety.327 The 
formulation’s litotes emphasises a concept that could have been conveyed more plainly 
(“every animal....” or “the life of every animal…”). Within it Lucian nestles the term 
ἀπραγµονέστερος, in itself the negation of what follows the initial alpha privativum: 
ἀπράγµων encapsulates the opposite of what man is, making human life all about 
things, necessity of action, and, eventually, trouble. Leopardi read the Gallus in July 
1824, too late for it to bear a direct influence on Zib. 2412, but early enough to impact 
on many of the Operette: and although the Talmudic sources for Leopardi’s Cantico del 
gallo silvestre (dating to November 1824) have been thoroughly identified and 
discussed, it would seem odd that Leopardi’s wild rooster – prophetically announcing at 
dawn the unhappiness of life to mortals – was not at least partially a recollection of the 
Lucianic animal who had so clearly illustrated the hardship of the greater part of human 
existence.328 
                                                                                                                                                     
bibliography; the doctoral and post-doctoral work of Anthony B. Ellis – in Ellis (2013) and id. (2015) 
– to whom I am greatly indebted for a clearer understanding of the logos of Croesus and its 
implication for Herodotean theology.  
326 Chapter 4 discusses Cleobis and Biton, the two precociously deceased youths picked by Solon at 
1.31.1. 
327 On the Gallus, cf. Herchenroeder (2008), 370, who considers it an example of works on “animals with 
superior intelligence and the ability to speak” used “as satiric foils for deficiencies in human 
behavior”. 
328 In agreement with me, Bonanno (2006), 60-70 who convincingly comments on the many similarities 
(among them the sweet dream at the beginning of each work, and the philosophical penchant of both 
roosters). Briefly also Ronzitti (2012), 58. Mattioli (1982), 93 reckons differently: “L’unico punto di 
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2. Homeric Comparatives and the “Preeminence of Unhappiness” 
 
The comparative with which the Rooster describes human life is ἀπραγµονέστερος. To 
conclude this chapter, and as a further commentary to the Zibaldone passage with which 
I began this section, I pause for a moment on two other comparatives, that, albeit of 
diametrically different connotations from the Rooster’s, are equally informative of the 
differences between the human and animal condition. The passages are famous: the first 
comes from the speech of Zeus as he looks at the mourning horses of Achilles at Iliad 
17.442-447; the second from that of Odysseus at Od. 18.130-137. Significantly, the 
horses of Achilles – and more specifically the moment at which one of them, Xanthos, 
becomes a “speaking animal” at Il. 19.408-417 – appear at the very onset of the Gallus 
(2), as the Rooster explains to his bewildered master that speaking animals are not 
something extraordinary, and that Homer himself described Xanthos’ speech.329  
 
Away from the battlefield, Achilles’ horses learn of the death of Patroclus (17.426-
428).330 The narrative slows down to dwell at considerable length (17.426-440) on the 
reaction of the pair: the horses in fact start crying (κλαῖον at 427 and δάκρυα θερµὰ 
κατὰ βλεφάρων at 437-438). One striking detail about this rather surprising scene is that 
the reader is given a dual perspective on what is happening. On the one hand there is the 
narrator’s description of the horses’ reaction; on the other hand there is Zeus’ speech to 
the pair that serves as a commentary on the scene we have just witnessed. Zeus is 
touched with pity for the two horses and addresses them (17.443-447): 
 
ἆ δειλώ, τί σφῶϊ δόµεν Πηλῆϊ ἄνακτι 
θνητῷ, ὑµεῖς δ’ ἐστὸν ἀγήρω τ’ ἀθανάτω τε; 
                                                                                                                                                     
contatto fra i due testi è che in tutti e due i casi si ha un gallo provvisto di parola”. On the Hebraic 
sources cf. Melosi’s (2015) commentary and, among others, Felici (2005). Perfetti (2013), 33: “the 
philosophical reader cannot but think that this Cock endowed with reason, placed between heaven and 
earth, is the post-human replacement of the former role of the centrality of man so widespread in 
philosophical literature”; ibid. 42 on the similarities between the views of the Gallo silvestre and the 
Dialogo di un folletto e di uno gnomo. 
329  Throughout, in splendidly absurd Lucianic fashion, the dialogue is fraught with literary references, 
channelled both by the wise (and ex-philosopher!) Rooster and by the supposedly ignorant Mycillus 
(cf. Gall. 2).  
330  On the horses of Achilles, Harrison (1991) albeit only on the horses as symbol of Homer’s allegiance 
in the war; Heath (1992) on the horses in connection with other divine gifts. 
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ἦ ἵνα δυστήνοισι µετ’ ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε’ ἔχητον;      445 
οὐ µὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀϊζυρώτερος ἀνδρὸς 
πάντων, ὅσσά τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει. 
 
The passage makes synergic use of multiple elements in order to define human nature 
and the human condition. Partaking in the same scene we have the divine, immortal and 
all-knowing; the human, both in the person of dead Patroclus and of the human throng 
that crowds the battlefield; ultimately we have the animals, who are in this case 
endowed with a special status that makes them closer to the divine, and yet still 
representing by contrast the idea of non-sentient creatures.331 In the face of death these 
animals are able to have profound insight into the despair of the human condition, to the 
point of awakening Zeus’ pity with their tears.332 Zeus is thus prompted to cry out about 
the peculiar – and miserable – nature of man’s existence. Such is the degree of man's 
misery that Zeus feels sorry to have sent another creature to witness it and mingle with 
some of that sorrow (443-445).333 Man is ὀϊζυρώτερος, more woeful, more miserable 
than every single one of them.334  It is interesting to notice that the adjective ὀϊζυρὸς 
appears very early on in both epics to describe the respective protagonists. It is used for 
Achilles at Il. 1.417 and for Odysseus at Od. 3.95: in both cases there is great emphasis 
on the hero’s bond with sorrow (Achilles is ὀϊζυρὸς περὶ πάντων and Telemachus says 
of Odysseus that περὶ γάρ µιν ὀϊζυρὸν τέκε µήτηρ), making the two epics the tales of 
two exceptional sufferings among the ubiquitous suffering of mankind.335 Going back to 
our passage, of course at this point in the Iliad Xanthos has not yet been granted the gift 
                                                   
331  Heath (2005), 40 and n. 5 for horses’ association with “death and fate” and bibliography on the 
subject. 
332  Patroclus’ death is par excellence the symbol of the human mind’s failure at grasping the bigger 
picture of life; Achilles fooled himself into believing that his twofold wish would have been granted 
by Zeus (Il. 18.74-77) and the thwarting of part of it teaches him about the unpredictability (and short-
sightedness) inherent in human life, a theme expressed elsewhere in the Iliad (cf. 17.201- 208 and 
18.361-367.) 
333  Edwards (1991), 107: “We may compare the happy life of Poseidon’s horses, whose master is 
immortal (12.23-38)”. Heath (1992), 389-390 “the painful juxtaposition of an immortal gift of the 
gods (Thetis) and the tragedy of mortality (both Peleus’ natural but deserted senescence and Achilles’ 
precipitate race towards death) […]”. 
334  In both cases the exceptionality of the hero’s sorrow is connected with his coming into existence (and 
more specifically with the act of being given birth by his mother).  
335  Cf. Halliwell (2011), 3 on the fact that Telemachus’ remark to Penelope at 1.354-355 that it was not 
just Odysseus who encountered a sorrowful destiny in the nostoi “suggests that the truth in question is 
more a matter of the “human condition” than of any individual life”.  
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of speech, and it is Zeus, and not the horse, who gnomically describes the human 
condition. And yet, can we not think of the horses’ tears as being themselves a 
statement about the human condition, powerful enough to prompt Zeus’ pity and 
reflection?  
 
At the beginning of Odyssey 18, Odysseus gets in a fight with the beggar Irus. The 
suitors stand and watch the fight, loudly cheering and mocking. Odysseus wins and is 
congratulated by some of the suitors, among them Amphinomus, who wishes Odysseus 
good fortune for his future (χαῖρε, πάτερ ὦ ξεῖνε· γένοιτό τοι ἔς περ ὀπίσσω / ὄλβος· 
ἀτὰρ µὲν νῦν γε κακοῖσ’ ἔχεαι πολέεσσι, 122-123). Amphinomus’ wish centres on the 
opposing ideas of ὄλβος and κακά and expresses the positive side of the notion of the 
instability of human fortune: in the same way in which Odysseus has obtained his 
present state of suffering, he may well gain happiness in the future.336 
 
Odysseus’ response tackles a twofold objective. On the one hand, he very practically 
wants to encourage Amphinomus to leave, so as to save him from the forthcoming 
slaughter.337 On the other hand, however, Odysseus feels he has to engage with the 
theoretical premise of the suitor’s wish, and the two aims are skilfully merged in one 
speech.338 As he responds, Odysseus shifts the focus ever so slightly: it is not the 
alternation in itself, nor the divine causation behind it, but rather the way the human 
mind interprets man’s rotating destiny.  
 
οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώποιο                    
[πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει.] 
οὐ µὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω, 
ὄφρ’ ἀρετὴν παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ’ ὀρώρῃ· 
                                                   
336  It should be noted that this expression of faith in the optimistic possibilities of the future does not 
straightforwardly entail the belief in some form of justice in the way human affairs are brought about: 
as Jenny Clay's insightful chapter on the double theodicy of the Odyssey has shown, the idea of divine 
justice normally finds expression, as here, in the abstract context of wishes and prayers. Note how the 
wish for good fortune only refers to the future, as the present is full of woes. Apropos of the Odyssey's 
faith in the gods’ good will towards men see Clay (1983), 221ff, as she suggests that this wishful 
attitude is only ever visible in wishes or prayers (expressed in the optative) and never in factual 
statements (expressed in the indicative). 
337  Clay (1983), 228. 
338  Brilliantly analysed by Clay, ibid.  
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ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ µάκαρες τελέωσι, 
καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόµενος τετληότι θυµῷ.                      135 
τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, 
οἷον ἐπ’ ἦµαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.339 
 
The fact that the gods bestow both good and evil upon men is stated matter-of-factly at 
133-134; such divine power and freedom have been often spoken about in the course of 
the Homeric poems, in some cases with more specific reference to the amount of good 
and evil that befall humans.340 What Odysseus cares to concentrate on here, however, is 
man’s inability to appreciate both the actual internal workings of such alternation of 
fortunes and the very fact that such rotation is a key component of his existence.341 The 
nature of man’s intellect (described in vv. 136-137)342 prompts him to disregard all 
possible future woes at the time at which he is given good things from the gods (132-
133), woes that he will inevitably be forced to face once the wheel turns.343  
 
In the passage from Iliad book 17 the presence and the attitude of the horses brings 
animals into the limelight, as it is their grief that triggers Zeus’ consideration. In both 
cases animals are the comparandum for man’s condition: man is ὀϊζυρώτερον (more 
miserable) and ἀκιδνότερον (feebler) than all other creatures.344  Each of the two 
passages – and the two comparatives – says something slightly different about the 
                                                   
339  Leopardi could read the passage also at Cons. Ap. 104d-e. 
340  We briefly discussed this in Chapter 1 II.2 and will tackle it again at Chapter 4 II.1. 
341  On the concept behind ἐπ’ ἦµαρ ἄγῃσι, Russo et al. (1992), 56 and Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
342  See the discussion apropos of the term ephemeros in Chapter 3. 
343  Fénelon’s dialogue Ulysses et Grillus tackles the very theme of the difference between life as humans 
and life as beasts, with Gryllus promoting the advantages of animal life, while Odysseus sides with 
human reason. Just as in Lucian’s Gallus, Fénelon presents a being who, once a human, prefers life as 
an animal; the grounds for such choice are again similar to the Rooster’s characterisation of animal 
life as ἀπράγµων compared to that of man. The hog-Gryllus goes a little further: his life as an animal 
has given him insight on something that not even the cunning Odysseus perceives, which is that the 
entirety of man’s claims to happiness and privilege is an illusion and nothing but a shade: “Ne me 
parlez plus de l'humanité ; sa noblesse n'est qu'imaginaire; tous ses maux sont réels, et ses biens ne 
sont qu'en idée”, says Gryllus (at Fénelon (1917), 138). Of course Fénelon's dialogue is a close 
reinterpretation of Plutarch's Gryllus, on which Herchenroeder (2008), who provides bibliography on 
the dialogue. Yet whereas Plutarch seems concerned with the features that make beasts better than 
humans (for example courage, Mor. Bruta 987f.; see Herchenroeder (2008), 360 and 364; and 369 for 
his idea that Gryllus’ argument is basically a “typical expression of the Golden Age theme”), Fénelon, 
like the Gallus, focuses especially on which life is to be considered best. 
344  Russo et al. (1992), 55 on ἀκιδνότερον, the rarity of the term and the other occurrences within the 
Odyssey. 
 99 
human condition, but both aspects are the two faces of the same coin. Man is weak and 
foolish enough to hope for the best, as Odysseus describes, and not to see the worst that 
will inevitably come, as the situation faced by Achilles’ horses well displays. Man’s 
feebleness is increased by his sensitivity, and when the worst strikes the blow can be 
made harsher by the recollection of previous hope, as in the case of Achilles’ shock at 
realising that part of his wish to Zeus had been thwarted, and that Patroclus would not 
come back alive.345 
 
The idea that unhappiness is inherent in, and inextricable from, human existence is at 
the core of both Leopardi's note and the two Homeric passages. Leopardi’s “per essenza 
propria e inseparabile” marks this peculiarity just as the comparatives (ἀκιδνότερον, 
ὀϊζυρώτερον) do in the Homeric Greek. Odysseus and Leopardi arrive, from different 
perspectives, to the same distinction: humans and the rest of living beings are 
irremediably apart when it comes to their condition in the world and the attainability of 
happiness. For Odysseus the cause of the gulf that separates men and other creatures is 
the limits of human knowledge (especially regarding one’s own destiny), a notion 
otherwise very dear to Leopardi, who used it profusely, not least in his translation of 
Semonides, as we shall see in Chapter 3. For Leopardi it is instead the tendency 
inherent in man’s self-love to hold wishes (or one could say hopes) for his own 
existence, provoked and galvanised by the greater sensitivity of the human species. Yet 
the conclusion is similar: man is born with consciousness and intellect surpassing all 
other creatures, but such intellect stimulates man to pursue destiny beyond the 
capabilities of his mind, and to sorely feel the restrictions placed on his will to live and 
on his striving towards happiness. Not limited enough to lack the need to inspect his 
own existence, as animals do, and yet too far from attaining to the level of the divine, 
this is the specificity of the human condition.  
 
I have brought together these passages in the belief that they can help us to grasp the 
deepest nuances not only of the note at Zib. 2412, but also of the entirety of Leopardi’s 
conception of the human condition within the cosmos. A passage from a later work – 
                                                   
345  Edwards (1991), 107: “It is man’s […] awareness of his mortality which makes him more wretched 
than they.” 
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the Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio, written five years after the 1822 note – 
corroborates the possibility that at least one of these Homeric passages is directly at the 
origin of Zib. 2412. Centred around Plotinus’ discovery that Porphyry has been 
contemplating suicide and his decision to confront his friend about it, the dialogue has 
its emotional peak in Porphyry’s attack on Plato, triggered by Plotinus’ mention of 
Plato’s thoughts about suicide.346 Porphyry’s passionate attack is rooted in the belief 
that, having persuaded man that the afterlife may contain punishment and suffering – 
possibly according to one’s behaviour during life – Plato has led man to “fear the port 
more than the tempest”, i.e. to fear death rather than life. Life, instead, is the tempest, 
and Porphyry is keen to describe in full the nature of this life he has thought about 
renouncing, and the inescapable unhappiness inherent in it. In Leopardi’s hands, 
Porphyry the philosopher not only resorts to a poet to find adequate description of the 
misery of existence, but turns more precisely to that antichissimo Homer, whose role as 
the educator of Greece Platonic thought had long tried to attain:347 
 
“ […] tu vedi, Platone, quanto o la natura o il fato o la necessità, o qual si sia potenza 
autrice e signora dell'universo, è stata ed è perpetuamente inimica alla nostra specie. Alla 
quale molte, anzi innumerabili ragioni potranno contendere quella maggioranza che noi, per 
altri titoli, ci arroghiamo di avere tra gli animali; ma nessuna ragione si troverà che le tolga 
quel principato che l’antichissimo Omero le attribuiva; dico il principato della infelicità.”348 
 
The passage is bitterly sarcastic: the only superiority of which man can boast over other 
creatures is the distinctive misery inbred in his existence. This time Homer is explicitly 
chosen directly as the authoritative spokesman of man’s uniqueness, a uniqueness that 
Leopardi has by this point in time explored multifariously in both the Canti and 
                                                   
346  On Leopardi’s “manipulation” of the ideas of the protagonists see Galimberti (1998b), 455-456. 
Galimberti nonetheless recalls how some of these notions can be authentically traced back to the 
characters (the case in point is Plotinus Enn. 2.9, 18, where the philosopher invites to “rimanere nella 
casa del corpo finché giunga il termine della partenza”). 
347  Cf. Rep. 10.606e,  Most (1999) on Homer and Hesiod as educators and “early philosophers”; also, 
Granger (1974), 426; Vernant (1978), 193-197.  
348 TPP (2013), 593. Cecchetti (1983), 449: “You see, Plato, how much Nature, Fate, necessity, or 
whatever the power that is the author and the ruler of the universe has been and is a perpetual enemy 
of our species. Many, indeed, innumerable reasons, may dispute that supremacy, which, by other 
titles, we claim for ourselves over all animals; but no reason will be found to strip us of that 
preeminence which most ancient Homer attributed to us: the preeminence of unhappiness.” On 
Leopardi and Platone, among others, cf. Trabattoni (1999). 
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Operette. It is a path that goes from (at least) as early as 1820, the year of the Dialogo 
tra due bestie, to 1827 with the Copernico, and beyond. Over the course of time and 
experience the comparatives of Zib. 2412 (“più infelice, o meno capace di felicità”) 
which described the distance between humans and animals become Porphyry’s enraged 
and spiteful “pre-eminence”, the only superlative man is entitled to, and, at the very 
same time, the core of his own ineluctable sorrow. 
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  CHAPTER 3 
Oἵη περ φύλλων γενεή: Ancient Ideas of Ephemerality 
 
Das Leben und die Träume sind Blätter eines und des nämlichen Buches.  
Das Lesen im Zusammenhang heißt wirkliches Leben. [...]  
Nimmt man nun den Standpunkt der Beurtheilung außerhalb Beider an,  
so findet sich in ihrem Wesen kein bestimmter Unterschied,  
und man ist genöthigt, den Dichtern zuzugeben, daß das Leben ein langer Traum sei.  
 
Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung349 
 
Quando questa musica suona, noi sappiamo che i compagni,  
fuori nella nebbia, partono in marcia come automi;  
le loro anime sono morte e la musica li sospinge,  
come il vento le foglie secche, e si sostituisce alla loro volontà. 
 
Primo Levi, Se questo è un uomo350 
 
“Si sta come d’autunno sugli alberi le foglie”.351 Giuseppe Ungaretti’s Soldati, written 
from the front-line of the First World War, laconically yet powerfully captures the 
precarious character of the lives of the soldiers by comparing them to autumnal leaves. 
Composed in July 1918, it is only one in a large constellation of literary works that 
employ this comparison; resurfacing at different times in a variety of literary, 
geographical, and cultural contexts, the simile that compares humans and leaves crosses 
the history of Western literature. To the leaves of the forest Percy Bysshe Shelley 
compares both his own life and his thoughts in Ode to the West Wind (1819), and in a 
similar manner leaves are both Nashtenka’s present dreams and her earthly existence in 
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s White Nights (1848).352 The sight of the shedding autumnal trees 
triggers Rainer Maria Rilke’s realisation that, just like the leaves, we humans fall too 
(Herbst, 1902).353 The comparison with the falling leaves of Autumn offers Baron 
Taittinger (the somewhat oblivious character of Joseph Roth’s 1939 Die Geschichte von 
                                                   
349   In von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 1, 50. Nussbaum (2006), 346 comments on the passage.  
350   Levi (2014), 44. 
351   In Piccioni (1970), 87. 
352   Shelley in Buxton Forman (1882), 290-293. Dostoevsky in Heinemann (1918), 22-23. 
353  In Zinn and Sieber-Rilke (1955), 400. Cf. Schier (1967) on Rilke’s poem and Hölderlin’s Die 
Eichbäume. 
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der 1002. Nacht) one of the very few epiphanic moments of understanding of his story 
and condition.354  
 
But far from being a creation of modernity, this trope has a lively history in the literary 
works of ancient Greece (and Rome). The life of the simile begins with the Iliad, where 
the trope comes up twice, first in the words of the warrior Glaucus at Il. 6.146-149 and 
then in the god Apollo’s speech to Poseidon at Il. 21.462-467.355 A fragment preserved 
by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 6.5) attributes the same comparison to the mythical 
poet Musaeus.356 Lyric poetry variously elaborates on the idea, from the direct reference 
to the Homeric passage contained in Simonides fr. 8 W2 to Mimnermus’ comparison of 
men and leaves in fr. 2.357 The simile appears again in Bacchylides Ep. 5.63-67, where it 
is used for men who are already dead:358 it is their souls which resemble the leaves 
moved by the wind on Mount Ida.359 
 
                                                   
354  Roth (1956), 700: “Ach, er neigte keineswegs zu poetischen Empfindungen. Jetzt in dieser Sekunde 
aber begann er, irgendeine merkwürdige, lächerliche Zärtlichkeit für das armselige Blättchen zu 
empfinden. Es kündete den Herbst, gewiß! Wie oft hatte er schon welke Blätter den Herbst künden 
gesehn! Dieses Blatt aber, dieses besondere, kündigte ihm, speziell ihm, dem Taittinger, seinen 
speziellen Herbst an. Ihn fröstelte.” 
355    Other comparisons of (groups of) men with leaves are Il. 2.467-468; Il. 2.800-801. 
356  Cf. fr. 5DK in Diels and Kranz (1951-2), 23: Πάλιν τοῦ Μουσαίου ποιήσαντος· ὡς δ' αὔτως καὶ 
φύλλα φύει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα· ἄλλα µὲν ἐν µελίῃσιν ἀποφθίνει, ἄλλα δὲ φύει· ὣς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων 
γενεὴν καὶ φῦλον ἑλίσσει; on it, cf. Piccaluga (1980), 248 and n. 27, elaborating on the pre-existing 
theme of the “comune origine, dagli alberi, degli uomini e delle foglie, soggetti perciò, sia gli uni che 
le altre, ad un medesimo destino di morte” and Burgess (2001), 125.  
357  Mimnermus’ long comparison starting with ἡµεῖς δ’, οἷά τε φύλλα in West (1992), 85-86. 
358   Bacchylides, Ep.5.63-67: ἔνθα δυστάνων βροτῶν/ ψυχὰς ἐδάη παρὰ Κωκυτοῦ ῥεέθροις,/ οἷά τε φύλλ’ 
ἄνεµος/ Ἴδας ἀνὰ µηλοβότους/  πρῶνας ἀργηστὰς δονεῖ. In Maehler (2004), 41 and in Cairns and 
Howie (2010), 160; also in Irigoin (1993) 129; on the simile in Bacchylides cf. Lefkowitz (1969), 65-
66.  
359    These are not the only sources to employ the trope. For a list of occurrences in the works of Homer 
and Hesiod cf. Burgess (2001), 190-192. Cf. Babut (1971), who compares Simonides 8 W, Semonides 
1 W2, and Mimnermus 2 W2; Shannon (1975), 47ff.; Redfield (1975), whose focus on the 
insignificance of the species will be dealt with in the epilogue to this chapter; Lowry (1995), who lists 
the various scholarly interpretations of the trope in Iliad 6 up to his days; Sider (1996). Another 
interesting appearance of the simile is Aristophanes Aves 685: φύλλων γενεᾷ προσόµοιοι, on which 
Dunbar (1995), 429 commenting that the passage describes “the weakness and transience of human 
life in contrast to that of the gods”; note also σκιοειδέα at 686 and ἐφηµέριοι at 687, terms to which I 
come back later in the chapter. An interesting passage is Lucian Charon 19, referencing Homer’s 
simile: Οὐδὲν χεῖρον σὺ τοῦ Ὁµήρου εἴκασας, ὦ Χάρων, ὃς φύλλοις τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ὁµοιοῖ. 
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But going back to Soldati, rather than simply representing one late-blooming example 
of the use of the simile, Ungaretti’s poem exemplifies well two possible attitudes 
towards the origin of this trope. Did the simile resurface from memories of Ungaretti’s 
school and university years, or did it emerge independently in the mind of the young 
soldier – who was in fact fighting in the trenches of the wood of Courton in those very 
months? Is it a reminiscence of the many literary works that employed it, or is it 
triggered by the soldier’s observation of the human condition and the existence of the 
leaves surrounding him? The question is, in short, whether we are dealing with the 
spontaneous generation of an idea or instead with cases of literary reception or allusion. 
The presence of this trope as early as the first text of Western civilization (Homer’s 
Iliad) has often led interpreters to read occurrences of the trope as examples of literary 
reception.360 The opposite has been argued as well: focusing exclusively on ancient 
Greek literature, which contains already many different takes on the simile, Jonathan S. 
Burgess suggests that the repeated recurrence of the motif is not a case of literary 
allusion or reception, but instead an example of the liveliness of a “commonplace”.361  
 
In many cases, such as the ones listed above, it is hard if not impossible to establish the 
source of the trope, and most of all to grasp whether the author intended the reader to be 
aware of a source. Giacomo Leopardi’s use of it, however, is a completely different 
story. The image of the leaves as a comparison for humankind is strongly present and 
has a complex history in his works and thought, but what is especially striking about 
Leopardi’s use of this trope is that throughout his work he makes sure the reader knows 
that his use of the simile originates from ancient literature. This chapter explores 
Leopardi’s study, interpretation, and re-use of this motif in the turn of years between 
1823 and 1827, a period that sees Leopardi returning over and over again to the Greek 
conception of human life as embodied both in the simile of the leaves, and, similarly, by 
the Greek term ἐφήµερος. Although some publications have tackled aspects of, or 
moments in, this long process, no work has explored this theme thoroughly; in 
particular, as this chapter clarifies repeatedly, scholars have for the most part failed to 
engage properly or at all with the Greek texts involved in their own rights: this has 
                                                   
360  Cf. Burgess (2001), 119 n. 252 for a list of scholars who believe in Mimnermus’ debt to Homer (and 
in the idea of reception of the trope). Also, Laurenti (1964), 91; Privitera (1970), 70.  
361  Burgess (2001), 121. 
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resulted in a lack of exploration in the best cases, and in real inaccuracies in others.362 
This chapter aims thus both at correcting past imprecisions and, most of all, at tackling 
the yet unexplored connections between the Greek texts and their poetic descriptions of 
human life and Leopardi’s work. Through Leopardi, I hope to shed some light on the 
meanings and implications of these motifs in their ancient context.  
 
I 
Leopardi and the Trope of the Leaves: from the First Homeric Readings to the 
Simonidean Translations (1809-1824) 
 
That Leopardi read and re-read the Homeric poems as a child is no secret.363 Even 
before he started to learn ancient Greek around 1813, he had pored over the two epics: 
his first attempt at poetry is the 1809 sonnet La morte di Ettore, in which an Iliadic 
theme serves the purpose of challenging the young poet’s imagination.364 Written 
between 1815 and 1816, his translations of the pseudo-Homeric Batrachomyomachia 
and the first book of the Odyssey are some of his earliest from Greek.365 More detailed 
evidence about Leopardi’s acquaintance with the Homeric epics is available starting 
from the following year, as he begins his Zibaldone, between July and August 1817: 
some of its very first pages, tackling the aim of the “belle arti”, compare Achilles and 
Aeneas and their role within the respective epics.366 From several details in this note 
(Zib. 2) one can perceive the degree of ease and familiarity between the 19 year-old 
Giacomo and the subject matter – and interpretation – of the Iliad. The page is written 
in the nonchalant tone of someone who deals with familiar topics: the present Leopardi 
writing the note to the future Leopardi possesses an already advanced degree of 
reflection on the two poems that can only come from intense reading and perusing.  
                                                   
362  The works of Gigante (1998) and Randino (2000) are the remarkable exceptions, engaging soundly 
with the Greek material in its own right. 
363   Cf. Timpanaro (2008), 16. 
364  Cf. Leopardi’s Indici delle opere composte da Giacomo Leopardi compilati da lui stesso, in TPP 
(2013), 317 and cf. ibid. 1036.  
365  Cf. Timpanaro (2008), 19; 101. That Leopardi chose to translate the Odyssey ought not to lead one to 
believe he was less acquainted with the Iliad. By the time Leopardi was writing, Vincenzo Monti’s 
famous translation of the Iliad had already been published, but Italy lacked a translation of the 
Odyssey. The introductory lines to his translation are testimony to the fine philological and linguistic 
skills of the young Leopardi, in TPP (2013), 422-423.  
366   Zib. 2. 
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That Leopardi read and knew the Homeric simile that links men and leaves, a simile 
twice present in the Iliad (6.146-149 and 21.462-467), is confirmed – if ever proof was 
needed – by a note (Zib. 3276) dating to August 1823, where he comments on the very 
Iliadic passage that contains the first trope of the leaves. The note does not directly 
comment on the trope, and in fact uses the Iliadic episode only as an exemplum of the 
“blindness” with which young people freely and selflessly offer their generosity and 
empathy: similar blindness must have taken Glaucus when he decided to exchange his 
golden armour for Diomedes’ copper one. Yet, it is precisely this year that opens to a 
period of intense engagement with the complex and fascinating set of ideas behind the 
Iliadic simile of the leaves.  
 
Around the same period in which this Zibaldone note was written, Leopardi was 
working on the translations of a number of Greek works which he labels 
Volgarizzamenti di alcuni versi morali dal greco.367 He himself places these translations 
between the end of 1823 and the beginning of 1824, somewhat overlapping with the 
beginning of the composition of the Operette, which will start in January 1824.368 The 
Volgarizzamenti are the poetic translations of a handful of Greek verses by scoptic or 
comic poets: Archilochus, Alexis, Amphis, Euboulus, and Eupolis. Originally part of 
this group were two poems by (so Leopardi thought) the same Simonides of Ceos who 
inspired his Canzone all’Italia.369 We now know that whereas number XLI Dello stesso 
is in fact a translation of the version of Simonides of Ceos fr. 8 W which Leopardi read 
in the version preserved by Stobaeus,370 number XL Dal greco di Simonide is instead 
                                                   
367   TPP (2013), 1040.  
368   Cf. Orlando (1973), 927. 
369  On these two traslations see Di Benedetto (1967); Orlando (1973), 926-937; De Robertis (1978), 512; 
Pasquini (1984); Gigante (1998); Randino (2000) on XL; Sole (2001); Lonardi (2005), 205ff. Carella 
(2010), 176-196 whose work on the two Simonidean translations is highly derivative from Gigante 
(1998); Stasi (2010); the short and not in depth section by Presti (2016), 205-210 on XL. 
370   Stobaeus is mentioned in the Zibaldone as earli as Zib. 501 (1821) and then again in the passages 
listed in TPP (2013), 2635 s.v. “Stobeo”, cf. Polizzi (2011), 90 n. 34. Cf. Di Benedetto (1967); a very 
detailed account of Leopardi's familiarity with the text of Stobaeus is in Gigante (1998), 164-166 and 
Randino (2000); also Carella (2010), 178-179, n. 114. 
 107 
Leopardi’s version of fr 1 W2 by Semonides of Amorgos, a poet whose existence 
Leopardi ignored.371 
 
The special status of the two pieces is in many ways evident, not least in light of the fact 
that the two translations were chosen to conclude Leopardi’s Canti, otherwise only 
comprising the poet’s original work. Leopardi laboured on the two translations very 
intensely and with fine philological care, as is shown by some of his choices and by the 
originals of the various versions he wrote for each poem.372 That this labour was intense 
and, in a way, never conclusive, is also evident from the fact that an alternative version 
of (part of) XL appears in one of the Operette, Il Parini, ovvero della gloria, which 
Leopardi composed later in 1824.373 Despite – or perhaps because of – the strenuous 
philological toiling, XL and XLI somewhat fail to be merely translations, but become 
painstakingly well-researched reinterpretations of the original poems.374  
 
                                                   
371  Fr. 8 W in West (1972), 114-115 appears as fr. 19 W2 in West (1992), 123 followed by 20 W2, the 
text discovered in P.Oxy 3965. I refer to the fragment as 8 W (from West’s first edition) since this 
edition presents the texts (broadly speaking) as it is preserved by Stobaeus, and before the changes 
brought about by the discovery of the papyrus. On the debates about the authorship of 19 and 20 W2 
and on their connection cf. especially Hubbard (1994) and (1996), Sider (1996). Hubbard (1996), 259-
260 lists positive arguments in favour of a Semonidean authorship for fr. 19 (despite the evidence 
provided by P.Oxy 3965: interestingly one of the grounds is its close thematic similarity to Semonides 
fr. 1 W2, the same similarity which undoubtedly lead Leopardi to treat the two poems as a couple, see 
later in the chapter). Babut (1971) argues for Semonidean authorship for fr. 8 W (before the discovery 
of P.Oxy 3965); cf. Sider (1996), 267 n. 6 for a list of scholars who argued for a Semonidean 
authorship, while Sider himself suggests the author is Simonides. On Leopardi and Simonides (and his 
ignorance of Semonides) see Timpanaro (2008), 108-109 and Pasquini (1984), 605-607.  
372  Pasquini (1984), 608 stresses how Simonides’ poetry is not only the only instance of translation in the 
Canti, but also in the Operette, in which the fragment of the Stobean Simonides is one of only two 
poetic fragments, the other one being Leopardi’s Coro dei morti in Dialogo di Federico Ruysch e 
delle sue mummie; cf. ibid. for a useful link between the Coro and the two Simonidean translations. 
373  TPP (2013), 549.  
374  On the status of the two pieces, as translations or reworkings, see Sole (2001); Orlando (1973), 928, 
on Leopardi’s search for a “morale” in the texts he translates. On Leopardi’s translations from ancient 
texts cf. Bigi (1967); De Robertis (1978); Pasquini (1984), 603 n. 1 for a summary of the scholarship 
on the subject; Fasano (1985), 51ff in the chapter “Come gli antichi greci”. Gigante (1998), 191 
usefully suggests to bear in mind Leopardi’s own words about the process of translation of a work 
from ancient Greek contained in his Discorso sopra la Batracomiomachia; also Carella (2010), 185. 
On the philological labour behind the two translations, cf. Gigante (1998), 166, 172-191; Carella 
(2010), 191-192 on the two manuscripts of XLI, both contain copious corrections and the first one is 
rich in marginalia.  
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A few paragraphs previously we mentioned how Leopardi used one detail from the 
Homeric scene which includes the simile of the leaves in August 1823. It must have 
been around the same time that he set about the task of translating Simonides’ poem. 
Leopardi could read it in the version preserved by Joannes Stobaeus, who includes the 
Simonidean elegy in chapter 34 of the fourth book of his Anthologion.375 Chapter 34, 
entitled περὶ τοῦ βίου, ὅτι βραχὺς καὶ εὐτελὴς καὶ φροντίδων ἀνάµεστος, is a collection 
of 75 texts and excerpts of texts ranging from elegy, to fragments from tragedy, 
comedy, and philosophy among others. The 28th entry of the chapter is the text that 
Leopardi will transform in his XLI. The Stobean text of Simonides and Leopardi’s XLI 
Dello Stesso can be found at Appendix 3a and 3b.376 
 
In the Stobean Simonides Leopardi found the Homeric simile of the leaves introduced 
by the double auctoritas of the Cean poet and the “man from Chios”, as verse 2 of 
Simonides’ fragment quotes in full Il. 6.146: οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν. 
The poem as Leopardi read it can be subdivided into 3 main parts. 377 First comes the 
gnome, the Homeric Glaucus’ opinion about the generations of men (1-2). Second 
comes men’s general failure to understand its meaning (3-9). Last is Simonides’ own 
view about the truth behind the Homeric statement (10-12), which appears joined to his 
own practical suggestion about how to act upon the real understanding of the quotation 
(12-13). Although to today’s reader, familiar with the problematic nature of the 
fragments’ authorship and original structure, the matter seems more complicated, one 
can see how the fragment as Leopardi would have seen it gravitates heavily around the 
Homeric quotation. The Stobean Simonides places great emphasis on the Iliadic 
                                                   
375  Cf. Hense’s (1958) edition, 834-835. As Randino (2000) suggests, Leopardi could read Stobaeus in 
two 16th century editions, that of C. Gessner (first edition 1543, Leopardi certainly saw the 1559 
edition, cf. the author’s note 6 to Il Parini, ovvero della Gloria in Melosi (2015), 342) and that of 
Henry Estienne (1560). Leopardi had access over time to various editions of the text of Stobaeus, both 
in the original and in Latin translations; for a summary of the editions he consulted, see Gigante 
(1998), 164-166. 
376  Text from West (1972), 114-115. For both Simonides 8 W and Semonides 1 W2 I use the text of West 
(the first edition for Simonides and the 1992 edition for Semonides), although I am aware that this is 
not exactly what Leopardi could consult. However, the textual differences relevant to this study are 
tackled in the course of the chapter. XLI in TPP (2013), 216.  
377  It does not quite matter that the two poems as we have been talking about them may not be in their 
original form: this (with small changes according to the editions) is the shape Leopardi had access to, 
and the one that formed his understanding of these works and their worldview. 
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reference: if one saying can be singled out as τὸ κάλλιστον within the large and awe-
inspiring Homeric production, the reader ought to pay attention. The fame of the 
Homeric saying is again established by verse 3: the notion that “few mortal men 
welcome it in their ears and store it in their hearts” indirectly testifies to the vast 
circulation of the Iliadic verse. But verse 3 also serves the purpose of making 
Simonides’ fragment into a piece of Homeric exegesis: vast as its diffusion may be, 
there are few men who grasp the real meaning of the Homeric gnome, and Simonides 
prepares his audience to understand his reading of the trope as the correct one and the 
one to be internalised.  
 
I argue that Leopardi’s XLI ought to be seen not only as a charged – albeit respectful – 
interpretation of Simonides’ poem, but consequently also as another attempt at an 
exegesis of the Homeric trope thereby contained. That XLI is not merely a translation, 
but also a vehicle for some of Leopardi’s own sentiments about the theme of the 
Stobaean Simonides is evident in the many more or less free interventions that the 
Italian poet makes in the Greek text. Although several of these choices can be ascribed 
to his desire to be philologically true to the original text or to linguistic necessities, 
many others testify more clearly to the presence of Leopardi’s own voice in the text.378 
As such, they let the reader have a glimpse of Leopardi’s stance on various aspects of 
Simonides’ fragment, and, consequently, of Leopardi’s understanding of the Homeric 
saying.  
 
The following sections focus first on Leopardi’s use of botanical language in his 
translation of Simonides in XLI (section 1) as a case study in the former’s reception of 
the trope of the leaves. I shall then concentrate (section 2) on the first line of XLI, which 
I believe to be a privileged place which offers deeper insight into Leopardi’s 
interpretation of the fragment as a whole and its take on the Homeric gnome.  
 
                                                   
378  These choices – both on the poetic and on the philological level – have been the subject of a number 
of publications, see Lonardi (1969); Orlando (1973); Randino (2000); Sole (2001). The scholarship on 
the subject has variously explained them by Leopardi's desire to create a work of independent poetic 
beauty. Although a few more remarks could be made on the topic, this is not the place for another 
detailed comparison of the Greek and Italian versions. 
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1. Germinating from the Sources: XLI and Botanical Language  
 
Let us first observe how Leopardi tackles the translation of the Homeric quotation 
contained in Simonides’ text.  
 
οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν. 
φύλλα τὰ µέν τ’ ἄνεµος χαµάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ’ ὕλη 
τηλεθόωσα φύει, ἔαρος δ’ ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη· 
ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἣ µὲν φύει ἣ δ’ ἀπολήγει. (Il. 6.146-149) 
 
The gnomic first line of the Iliadic comparison – which in Iliad 6 develops over three 
more lines – is spread over two lines in the Italian translation (4-5): “conforme ebber 
natura le foglie e l’uman seme”. In the original Greek the simile revolves around the 
two parallel parts introduced by οἵη and τοίη. Leopardi chooses instead to discard the 
two correlative pronouns in favour of a more explicit phrasing: rather than being like 
each other, men and leaves share a common “nature”. What happens to the Greek word 
γενεή?379 
 
The major editions in the principal European languages around Leopardi’s time are 
unanimous in translating the word γενεή as “race” or “generation”: in the English-
speaking world Alexander Pope’s edition (1715-1720) translates γενεή as “race”, as will 
William Cowper’s (1791) and William Sotheby’s (1831).380 In France Anne Dacier 
(1699) chooses to liken directly the two parts of the simile (men and leaves) without 
translating γενεή (“Telles que sont les feuilles dans les forests, tels sont les hommes sur 
la surface de la terre”); half a century later Leconte de Lisle (1866) will render γενεή 
with “génération”. 381  Again in Germany both Johann Heinrich Voss (1793) and 
Friedrich Leopold Stolberg (1843) choose “Geschlecht”.382 Leopardi knew the Italian 
                                                   
379  The word, ionic version of γενεά, is used with various meanings in Homer, cf. Liddell Scott s.v. 
γενεά: with the meaning of “living family”, Il. 20.306 ; “birth” (Il. 11. 786) or “birthright”, Od. 
1.387); of “stock” or “breed” for animals, in particular horses, Il. 5.265; “race” or “generation”, as in 
the passage examined. On its meaning as referring both to the moment of birth and to the place of 
such birth in a succession of births and generations cf. Redfield (1975), 102 n. 4.  
380 Pope (1806), 147; Cowper in Southey (1837), 152; Sotheby (1833), 192. 
381 Dacier (1819), 269, 271. Leconte de Lisle (1867), 106. 
382 Voss (1839), 150; Stolberg (1823), 204. 
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translation of the Iliad by Vincenzo Monti (1810), who translates the Greek term with 
“stirpe”.383  
 
Just as he had abandoned the Homeric parallelism of οἵη and τοίη, Leopardi chooses not 
to use one term (γενεή) to refer to the two types of races (φύλλων and ἀνδρῶν). Instead, 
the subjects of the comparison are straightforwardly the leaves and the “uman seme”. 
The term γενεή is not directly reemployed by Leopardi; neither “natura” nor “uman 
seme” take up the function that γενεή had performed in the Greek clause. Yet both 
words recirculate and diffuse some of the ideas it conveys, as if the conglomeration of 
meanings implied in it had found two different points to discharge in Leopardi’s poetry. 
Albeit stripped of the formal roles of sole subject and “glue” for the two components of 
the simile, the word γενεή resurfaces in the word “natura” and in the expression “uman 
seme” only to bind the two parts of the simile even more tightly together. The human 
seed – which does of course symbolise the human race – indirectly connects men and 
leaves on account of their common origin, however metaphorically one wants to 
understand the root of human life. 
 
The effect of these choices – both the introduction of the concept of “natura” in line 4, 
and the translation of γενεή with “natura” and “uman seme” – is that Leopardi’s 
translation of the Homeric gnome orbits heavily around the idea of vegetation which, in 
the original verse, is only present in the mention of the leaves. But the image of 
vegetation must have struck a chord for Leopardi: in addition to the two points just 
observed (“natura” and “seme”) XLI is dotted with the language of flora. Line 10 
contains “vermiglio” (which substituted the earlier drafts’ “verdeggia” and “verzica”) 
and “fiore”, line 11 calls youth “etade acerba” (unripe age), and line 13 the verb 
“educa”.384 This dense presence is all the more striking if one considers that, just as it 
was only once mentioned in the Homeric verse, the flourishing of botanical terms in 
Leopardi’s adaptation is nowhere to be found in the text of Simonides, which contains 
one sole reference to flowers (ἄνθος) in verse 6. In XLI the image and the idea of ἄνθος 
                                                   
383 Monti (1815), 139. 
384  For “educare”’s semantic connection with the botanical world cf. Sole (2001), 339 and ibid. n. 40. See 
also Nicolò Tommaseo’s and Bernardo Bellini’s (1977), Dizionario della lingua italiana s.v. Educare, 
470. The version of the translation contained in Carte Leopardi X 1 2.b, reads “verdeggia” (and 
before “verzica”) instead of the final “vermiglio” (line 10), cf. Peruzzi (2009), 658. 
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is expanded and elaborated. What is simply “the flower” in the Stobean Simonides, 
becomes for Leopardi the periphrasis “when the flower of our unripe age is still 
crimson”. The semantic area of flora is present not only in the literal translation of 
ἄνθος with “fiore”, but also in the vivid visual note of the colour of the young and new 
flower and in the adjective chosen to accompany the word “etade”: although “unripe” is 
certainly a slight shift from the image of the flower to that of the fruit, the semantic area 
remains the one of vegetation, and of vegetation upon a tree. 
 
What could have prompted Leopardi to do so? Without aspiring to be conclusive, I 
propose two possible explanations: the former concerning the text of Homer quoted by 
Simonides, the latter instead focusing on the context in which Leopardi found the 
Simonidean text. Although it is true that Il. 6.146 only contains one term pertaining to 
the semantic area of botanics (φύλλων), this is not the case for the remaining part of the 
simile, which occupies three more verses until verse 149. Having compared men and 
leaves, Glaucus goes on to describe the life cycle of the leaves, from the moment of 
their end – as the wind scatters them on the ground – to the birth of new ones with the 
arrival of spring.385 This description is filled with the vocabulary of natural life in 
general (the wind and the ground at 147, to the season of spring at 148) and of 
vegetation (the forest at 147, the participle of τηλεθάω describing the blooming of the 
trees and the verb φύω at 148). The parallel between the leaves and humans is reiterated 
by the repetition of φύω for both parties, highlighting the similarity in their paths of 
existence.  
 
It is true that the two texts – Leopardi’s XLI and Homer Iliad 6 – make different use of 
the semantic area of botanics. The botanical language of Il. 6.147-148 is only 
metaphorical insofar as it can indirectly apply to men within the comparison of men and 
leaves – men’s death is, in a sense, being scattered to the ground; the idea of φύειν 
instead can be more obviously related to both humans and leaves, as the text itself 
reminds us – and it otherwise describes in a realistic manner the physical states of the 
                                                   
385  On the encounter between Glaucus and Diomedes cf. Redfield (1975), 102; Piccaluga (1980), 
concentrating on the general meaning of the episode in the wider context of the Iliad, more 
specifically on 6.146ff from page 247; Lowry (1995) on the details of the heroes’ interaction; Burgess 
(2001), 118-123. 
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life of the leaves. Leopardi’s use of botanically-related terms instead pours out from the 
space of the simile, spreading freely over the Simonidean text. It exports the language 
of vegetation to describe by analogy moments or features of the existence of humans. 
And yet the strong vibrant presence of botanical language in XLI could be Leopardi’s 
way of reminding the reader (the reader of his poem as well as that of Simonides’) of 
the original context of the trope, and of the fact that, whereas Simonides only reports 
one verse (Il. 6.146), the original simile was much longer, and delved in more detail into 
the similarities between the life of men and that of natural elements such as the leaves. 
386 Giulia Piccaluga has furthermore suggested that the role of vegetation in the Glaucus-
Diomedes episode ought to be seen not only in the space of the simile of verses 146-
149, but also in the “dietary requirement” that forces βροτοί to cultivate and eat cereals 
to survive.387 But although the direct influence of the Homeric passage in shaping the 
language of XLI cannot be proven, the abundance of botanical terms certainly testifies 
to the fact that the Homeric trope of the leaves is for Leopardi the very core of the 
Simonidean fragment, key to the understanding of Simonides’ thought and crucial to 
Leopardi’s expression of his own worldview. 
 
There is yet another explanation, which takes into account the context in which 
Leopardi found the text of Simonides. In book 4.34, only a few pages away from the 
Simonidean fragments, Stobaeus quotes a fragment by Mimnermus (Mimnermus 2 W2) 
that shares with Simonides’ text not only the focus on the brevity and suffering of life 
mentioned by the title of Stobaeus’ chapter, but also the use of the trope of the leaves. 
The two fragments are so remarkably similar in focus that it has been suggested 
repeatedly that they are connected and that one was written in response to the other.388 
Just like Simonides’ fragments, Mimnermus 2 explores the link between the life of man 
and that of the leaves. Similar to Simonides’ fragment it tackles the brevity of existence, 
and it even expands on the age of youth as the only possible moment of happiness in a 
life that is otherwise short and miserable. More than Simonides’, fr. 2 elaborates on the 
language of vegetal growth (φύλλα, πολυάνθεµος, ἔαρος, and ἄνθεσιν, all in the first 
                                                   
386 Cf. Bierl and Latacz’s (2008), 59 commentary: “Blätter, Blüten oder Gras sind ein verbreitetes Bild für 
die Vergänglichkeit der Menschen.” 
387  Piccaluga (1980), 240 and 252-253. 
388  Cf. Babut (1971) and Hubbard (1994) and (1996). Burgess (2001) suggests that Mimnermus is 
entirely independent from Homer. 
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three verses). The flourishing of this semantic area brings Leopardi’s interpretation of 
Simonides one step closer to Mimnermus’ fragment, and so do two other details in 
Leopardi’s translation. First is the notion of unripeness and thus the presence of the 
fruit, a different stage in the growth of the plant: this is absent in Simonides, but appears 
in Mimnermus at verse 9 (καρπός). Second comes Leopardi’s decision to turn the third 
person of Simonides’ narration into a first person plural: the choice – which can be also 
justified by the desire to increase the emotional intensity of the poem – seems all the 
more striking if one compares it to the powerful Ἡµεῖς that opens fr. 2.389 
 
2. Umana cosa picciol tempo dura: Brevity and Ephemerality 
 
XLI’s first line – “Umana cosa picciol tempo dura” – is Leopardi’s adaptation of a verse 
composed by Joachim Camerarius (1551). Faced with a 13-verse poem (which we had 
up until the discovery of POxy 3965) starting with a pentameter, Camerarius fashioned 
a hexameter, in the attempt to fill in the gap and to complete the poem, which would 
have otherwise been limping on a pentamentric beginning.390  
 
οὐδὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι µένει χρῆµ' ἔµπεδον αἰεί391 
 
The scholarship which has dealt with Leopardi’s translation of Simonides in XLI has 
achieved diverse results in tackling the nature of its first line. While Saverio Orlando’s 
analysis of the two Simonidean translations entirely ignores the issue, both Antonino 
Sole and Claudia Carella seem to maintain that the line is in fact Leopardi’s own 
creation. Sole states that the line is “interamente leopardiano”,392 and similarly does 
Carella in her 2010 book crediting the whole verse to Leopardi (although, oddly 
enough, she does not seem to be familiar with Sole’s 2001 article).393 And yet Marcello 
Gigante’s “Leopardi e Simonide” (published in La parola del passato in 1998 and again 
                                                   
389  For Leopardi’s knowledge of Mimnermus, cf. Zib. 2589; Carella (2010), 178 (Carella does not seem 
to be acquainted with Sole’s (2001) work). 
390  See Sider (1996), 266 n. 5 for a brief history of the conjecture; Gigante (1998), 166-167. Note that 
Camerarius thought that only one verse must have been missing from the original. 
391  As Sider (1996), 266 n. 5 has correctly pointed out, Camerarius’ suggestion finds some validation in 
the text of the new papyrus, which reads παρµεν* in line 4 of fr. 20 W2.  
392  Sole (2001), 337.  
393  Sole (2001), 337; Carella (2010), 193. 
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in 2003 in the collection Leopardi e l'antico) clearly makes the point that Leopardi did 
not invent the line, but instead accepted it as part of the original poem.394  
 
But beyond acknowledging that the line is not Leopardi’s, one ought to confront the 
interpretative issues behind both Camerarius’ original and Leopardi’s translation. 
Sharing not only the mistake of attribution, Sole and Carella reach similar conclusions 
as to the verse’s meaning, having paid little more than cursory attention to it. Having 
(correctly) stressed the line’s gnomic character, Sole suggests that its role is that of a 
“conceptual compendium” for the entire fragment;395 similarly Carella states that the 
line is “una sentenza, che riassume il tema centrale”.396 Marcello Gigante, whose main 
aim is not to tackle the interpretation of the line (a fact justified, perhaps, by the fact that 
he knows well that the line is not Leopardean) does not delve deeper into Leopardi’s 
relationship with this line, being content with stating that Camerarius’ verse “non 
suscitò né repugnanza né diffidenza nel Leopardi”.397  
 
In this section I wish to argue against the idea that Leopardi saw in XLI’s first line 
merely a summary of the themes of the poem. I instead propose that by translating the 
verse as he does, he is programmatically creating a conceptual bridge between his 
translations of the Stobean Simonides and Semonides 1, thus asking his reader to 
connect the two original poems. In particular, I believe that Leopardi is especially keen 
to link his understanding of two aspects of the poems, i.e. the trope of the leaves in the 
Stobean Simonides and the idea of ephemerality in Semonides 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
394  Gigante (1998), 166 recalls how Hense deemed the verse “worthy of Simonides”, and included it in 
his edition of Stobaeus. Gigante’s seminal piece is oddly not referenced by Sole (2001) on the very 
same topic, resulting in Sole’s mistaken interpretation. Carella’s error is all the more surprising if one 
considers that her section on the Leopardi’s Simonidean translations draws heavily (and sometimes 
word by word) on Gigante’s article.  
395   Sole (2001), 337. 
396   Carella (2010), 193. 
397   Gigante (1998), 167. 
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2.1. A New Verse: Οὐδὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι µένει χρῆµ’ ἔµπεδον αἰεί 
 
Let us first tackle the content and form of Camerarius’ Greek verse, and its possible 
meanings. When fashioning his conjectural verse, Camerarius must have turned to the 
corpus of Greek hexametric poetry he knew. This line is in fact carefully crafted from 
existing phrases and expressions. The very end of Camerarius’ hexameter ἔµπεδον αἰεί 
is found many times across Greek literature and with a tendency to recur in the position 
at the end of a hexameter.398 Two of the occurrences listed in note 398 come from 
Theognis’ collection (1.316; 318) – which Camerarius commented and annotated – 
where ἔµπεδον αἰεί is placed at the end of a hexameter. 
 
The expression ἐν ἀνθρώποισι is a very common noun phrase, often used idiomatically 
in clauses with an adjective in the superlative to indicate the extension of the superlative 
itself. 399 In some cases, such as Hesiod Op. 719-720 (γλώσσης τοι θησαυρὸς ἐν 
ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστος φειδωλῆς) the combination ἐν ἀνθρώποισι + superlative can be 
interpreted in the more literal sense: for men (but not for animals, or other beings) the 
best treasure is a sparing tongue. However in many other instances (and not exclusively 
when in combination with a superlative) ἐν ἀνθρώποισι acquires a meaning similar to 
“on earth”, “in the whole world”, or “under the sun”.400 The phrase is remarkably well-
attested in the corpus of the Theognidea, with seven occurrences; 401  even more 
strikingly Th. 131 begins with the very combination of οὐδὲν and ἐν ἀνθρώποισι which 
Camerarius chose for Simonides’ fragment, which leads us to imagine that the scholar 
might have used the corpus of Theognis as a study springboard for the fashioning of the 
                                                   
398  Using the text of Stobaeus as a sample field ἔµπεδον ἀιεί is found 3 times: once in Book 1.3.53.8; and 
twice in two quotations from Theognis’ elegiacs at 3.1.8.4 and 3.37.3.2. A few other instances in 
which the phrase occurs at the end of hexametric verse: Apollonius Rhodius 1.1076; Theogn. 1.316, 
318; Hes. fr. 294 (Schol. Eur. Phoen. 1116 in Schwartz (1887), 366 ) in Merkelbach and West (1967), 
152; Argonautica Orphica 347 in Vian (1987), 99.  
399   See for example Franco Montanari’s (1996), Vocabolario della lingua greca s.v. Ἄνθρωπος, 211.   
400   Cf. Sophocles Trachiniae 421, where the phrase is used in the context of an exclamation, to mean 
“To whom on earth (did I say it)?” (ποίοις ἐν ἀνθρώποισι;) or in Hdt 1.53.2 (Κροῖσος ὁ Λυδῶν τε καὶ 
ἄλλων ἐθνέων βασιλεύς, νοµίσας τάδε µαντήια εἶναι µοῦνα ἐν ἀνθρώποισι) where arguably the 
µαντήια are on the earth or in the world, rather than among men. This process of generalisation (that 
brings the formula to be less about men than about the general condition of things) can lead to 
instances where ἐν ἀνθρώποισι is doing little more than reinforcing the superlative itself. When this is 
the case, translators may be even completely forgo the formula in their translation.  
401   Th. 131; 623; 637; 647; 1003; 1135; 1139. 
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missing verse. Two possible translations thus can be imagined for the line. One, more 
literal, reads “nothing lasts forever amongst men”. The other, which takes into account 
the idiomatic meaning of ἐν ἀνθρώποισι, translates along the lines of “nothing lasts 
forever on earth”. However one chooses to intend Camerarius’ take at a Simonidean 
hexameter, the verse concentrates on the impossibility of duration; in what sense we 
ought to think about duration remains to be seen. 
 
One could argue that there is little if any difference in meaning between the two 
translations. And yet for someone as preoccupied as Leopardi was with the sorrowfully 
unique status of mankind – that pre-eminence of unhappiness we have observed in 
Chapter 2 – and as keen as he was to investigate it, the difference is paramount. It is 
reasonable to argue that Leopardi, who by 1823 had read a vast amount of Greek 
literature, was aware of the two possibilities.  “On earth” or “in the world” would not 
entail the necessary focus on humanity, which is after all at the very core of the 
Homeric and Simonidean texts as well. Significantly then Leopardi opts not only for the 
non-idiomatic version (“among humans”), but his translations emphasises further the 
presence and role of humans. Leopardi’s first line begins with the adjective “umana”, 
which – strictly speaking nowhere to be found in Camerarius – translates precisely ἐν 
ἀνθρώποισι, as if it were an adjective relating to χρῆµα (“umana cosa”). Leopardi sees 
in ἐν ἀνθρώποισι a sure reference to humankind, and only to humankind. The decision 
to bring it to the very opening of the verse – and thus to the very opening of the entire 
poem – emphasises Leopardi’s interpretation of the poem as a poem about human 
nature, and man as the focus of the enquiry of Simonides-commentator-of-Homer  (and 
consequently of Homer).  
 
Leopardi’s second step is to tackle the idea of duration conveyed by Camerarius’ 
ἔµπεδον αἰεί (which of course has to be read with the negation of the initial οὐδέν). First 
of all Leopardi chooses to discard the negation which is the very start of Camerarius’ 
concept. Whereas for Camerarius no-thing (οὐδέν χρῆµα) lasts forever (ἔµπεδον αἰεί), 
in XLI human thing(s) last but a “small” time. Leopardi suppresses the idea of a 
negative infinitum, opting instead for the notion of a small span of time. In this sense 
Leopardi’s version is more prosaically pessimistic than the 16th century Greek text: 
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human things not only do not last forever, but really they last only a “small time”. But 
what is crucial is that Leopardi’s translation brings the first verse one step closer to the 
rest of the text, both Homer’s and Simonides’, and thus closer to their own pessimism. 
The (objectively) brief life of the Homeric leaves is surely much more truthfully 
depicted by Leopardi's “picciol tempo” than by the idea of the lack of eternity. What is 
more, “picciol tempo” is in fact the literal translation of the Simonidean χρόνος ὀλίγος 
(11).402 
 
These are, arguably, Leopardi’s main actions in translating Camerarius’ verse. But what 
did Leopardi see in verse 1 and how are we supposed to understand the idea that 
“umana cosa picciol tempo dura”? I believe that Leopardi’s translation of verse 1 points 
us towards two different ways of reading the trope of the leaves. The first one is to see 
in XLI’s line 1 the first proposition of that idea of brevity which is to play such a crucial 
role in the poem: section 2.2. thus explores the ways in which the original Homeric 
passage, Simonides’ poem, and, as a consequence, Leopardi’s XLI can be seen as 
perspectives on the brevity of human existence. Section 2.3. then proposes that 
Leopardi’s translation of Camerarius’ verse 1 is meant to lead the reader towards a 
further and different meaning of the simile of the leaves.  
 
2.2. Leaves and the Brevity of Human Life 
 
One obvious interpretation is to say that the line – “human things last but a small time” 
– refers quite simply to the briefness of human existence. That this motif could be read 
in the Iliadic episode from which Simonides is quoting does not surprise, as the 
shortness of human life is in many ways present in the Homeric scene.403 First, the idea 
that life is brief is obvious in the context of the encounter between two warriors of 
opposites sides, the Trojan Glaucus and the Greek Diomedes. Everything in the text – 
from Diomedes’ unsuppressible bravery in his aristeia in book 5, to Helenus’ speech to 
Hector and Aeneas’ warning about the seriousness of the threat that Diomedes still 
represents for the Trojan army in book 6.96-101 – suggests that one of the two lives is 
                                                   
402  Already a Homeric combination, cf. Il. 19.157; 23.418. 
403   Cf. Kirk’s (1990), 176 commentary reading in the simile the idea that “life is transient”. 
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at stake.404 And although to the audience’s surprise the meeting will not result in battle 
and death, but in civilised conversation and ultimately in the exchange of armour, the 
notion of the fast approach of death, and of the possibility of premature departure from 
the world of the living remains hanging in the air. But aside from the context, it is the 
actual conversation between the two warriors – and in particular Glaucus’ use of the 
trope of the leaves – that sheds more light on the role of the notion of brevity in the 
episode.  
 
As the two warriors meet on the battlefield, Diomedes addresses Glaucus by asking him 
who he is among mortal men (τίς δὲ σύ ἐσσι φέριστε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, v. 123), 
adding through the exemplum of Lycurgus his reason for asking: he wants to make sure 
he is not going to fight a god, and, since gods have been mingling in the battle 
indistinguishable from humans, it is vital to ascertain Glaucus’ identity.405 It is to this 
question that the Greek warrior replies with the simile that compares men and leaves (Il. 
6.146-149): men are like leaves which the wind scatters to the ground, but the forest 
grows back once spring has come.  
 
The entire simile is grounded on ideas of time and duration. This is evident first and 
foremost in the mention of the seasons of nature: spring (ἔαρος) is explicitly mentioned 
at 148, and the wind (ἄνεµος) of verse 147 can be seen as symbolising the cold seasons. 
The idea of time is once again present in the incessant and cyclical movement of 
regrowth and death, death and regrowth, which is visually represented by the mention of 
the two alternate moments: death and life for the leaves (147-148), and life and death 
for men (149), in a never-ending cycle. The alarming proximity of the two moments is 
further conveyed by the handful of months that separate the leaves’ birth from their 
falling, and by the physical closeness of φύω and ἀπολήγω, curtly listed in verse 149: 
the simile cannot but leave the human reader with a sense of the shortness of his 
existence. Together with the sense of the swiftness of life, the trope also instills in man 
                                                   
404  And possibly Glaucus’ life. Also, book 6 opens on the tense atmosphere of a long list of mortal 
combats (Il. 6.5-36) and the one encounter which we observe in close-up – the one between Adrastus 
and Menelaus – ends with Menelaus’ rejection of the Trojan’s appeal for salvation. 
405  Cf. Gaisser (1969), 166-167 on Diomedes’ awareness of the limitations of his mortal status (with 
textual examples). Piccaluga (1980), 238-243 on Diomedes’ insistence on avoiding a fight with an 
immortal. 
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the feeling of the necessity of his mortality. Only two moments connect the existence of 
the leaves to that of men: the moment of birth and growth (φύω in both cases) and that 
of dying (χέω and ἀπολήγω respectively). If all else is subject to change, these two 
moments are unavoidable and necessary.  
 
On the basis of the simile, men and leaves share two cardinal moments of existence, 
birth and death. In both cases – the briefness of existence and the necessity of death – 
the likening of men and leaves seems to hint at another term of comparison. In 
comparison with whose life is the life-span of humans as short as that of the leaves? 
And again, which being is exempt from mortality, which seems to be the very staple of 
existence? The response is, in both cases, the gods. The difference in duration between 
the life of men and gods is virtually unmeasurable; set against the existence of the 
immortals the life of humans is all too similar to the seasonal life-span of the leaves, 
and the comparison gains credibility. And it is again the gods who, alone, are immune 
to the binary rhythm of human and natural life.406 There is some irony in this: the being 
which man believes he resembles the most, the one that men imagine and portray as 
better versions of themselves, and the being which Diomedes is so scared to meet in 
battle, indistinguishable from other humans, is in fact the one being which is eventually 
less similar to man than the leaves are. The gods are the necessary counterpart to the 
two halves of the simile, men and leaves.407 Not only is their implicit presence entirely 
understandable in the context of a response to the enquiry of Diomedes, aimed at 
verifying Glaucus’ nature, but it is also vital in highlighting and underscoring further 
the briefness inherent in human existence.408 It is worth remembering that the trope 
reappears in the words of a god, Apollo, at Il. 462-466, as he tells Poseidon that he will 
                                                   
406  Cf. Piccaluga (1980), 247 who sees the episode as “tramato sulla falsariga dell’opposizione 
immortalità/morte”. 
407 Cf. Nagy (1999), 179-210 who, discussing Hesiod Works and Days, contrasts the “artificial continuum 
of immortality” and “the natural cycle of life and death as symbolized by the flourishing and wilting 
of leaves on trees”. The lack of winter in the Golden Age (Op. 117-118) as on the Isles of the Blessed 
(Op. 172-173) is contrasted with the inevitability of the passing of time on earth. 
408  It is precisely the comparison between the duration of the life of man in the sight of the immortality of 
God that triggers in Psalm 89 (4-6) the connection between men and another natural element, grass, 
cf. Fränkel (1946), 132, using this passage in his analysis of ephemeros.  
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not join the human fight; the nature of humans – their brevity and their unbridgeable 
difference with the gods – is the reason the fight is not worth it.409 
 
The shortness of human existence figures prominently also in Simondes’ fragment as 
Leopardi would have read it.410 It seems certain that Simonides understood the Homeric 
simile to convey the sense of the brevity of human life: verses 4-12 of the Stoabean 
Simonides delve into the vain hopes of the man who is not aware of his mortality, and 
verses 10-12 in particular remind the reader of how brief (ὀλίγος) life is. But Simonides 
goes further: not only does he remark and comment upon the notion of the shortness of 
life, but he further suggests that the trope of the leaves is also warning man about the 
shortness of youth. In Simonides’ interpretation then the comparison with the leaves 
provides a parallel not only for the overall brevity of human existence – from life to 
death – but also for the swift nature of the bloom of young age. Youth is par excellence 
the time for those hopes and illusions (5) which are destined to be proved false by the 
arrival of old age, illness, and in the end, death (6-9). What this blinding hope ultimately 
does is to prevent man from seeing the brevity of life and youth (ἥβης καὶ βιότου 
ὀλίγος, 11-12).  
 
XLI shows without a doubt that Leopardi too thought of brevity as being one of the 
crucial notions conveyed by the trope of the leaves. Not only does he translate the 
references to brevity already contained in Simonides’ fragment (lines 17-19), but once 
again he intensifies the presence of this theme in his own rendition of the Greek poem. 
The two portions of Simonides’ statement that χρόνος ἔσθ’ ἥβης καὶ βιότου ὀλίγος 
θνητοῖς (where both βίοτος and ἥβη depend on χρόνος) are now made independent and 
turned into two separate clauses (lines 16-18 in XLI). The first one depicts the velocity 
of youth – described metaphorically as winged – and the latter develops the idea of the 
brief span of life (χρόνος βιότου ὀλίγος) by suggesting that in the metaphorical path of 
                                                   
409  Nagy (1999), 178 on φθινύθουσιν as portraying the “natural aspect of death” common to humans and 
leaves. 
410  Babut (1971), 24 seems to agree that brevity is at the core of fr. 8 W, as he briefly suggests that the 
fragment is not about “l'instabilité, l'inconsistance de la nature humaine” but rather about the modern 
idea of ephemerality. Yet he seems to interpret the mention of human ephemerality – together with the 
invitation to enjoy the present pleasure at the close of the poem – as a sign of the poet’s hedonistic 
superficiality, and as a minor carpe diem (contrasting this hedonism with the “more profound” work 
of Mimnermus).  
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life, the cradle is (almost physically) very close (but literally “poco lontano”) to the pyre 
(“rogo”). Brevity is also, very clearly, in the final line of XLI (“La breve età commetti”). 
This time however the term chosen by Leopardi (“breve”)411 does not translate any 
specific Greek word, but rather echoes the idea expressed by βιότου ποτὶ τέρµα (12): 
the man who is close to death is invited to trust the brief time he has left (“breve età”) to 
the present enjoyments. 
 
2.3. “Umana cosa picciol tempo dura”: Leaves and the Precariousness of Human 
Life 
 
The first line of XLI could thus easily be taken simply as a statement on the short span 
of all human things: from the objective brevity of human existence to the even shorter 
life of its seasons. As we have seen, this statement is on its own – as Camerarius wrote 
it – and in Leopardi’s translation a declaration of the brevity of human things; 
furthermore, both the importance of the notion of brevity in the original Homeric 
episode and in the Stobaen Simonides, and Leopardi’s peculiar attention to this concept 
in his rendition, vouch for the centrality of the theme. And yet I wish to suggest that 
Leopardi’s translation of Camerarius’ verse points the reader (also) in another direction. 
 
The choice of rendering the Greek µένει with the Italian “durare” is possibly the least 
striking part of Leopardi’s translation of Camerarius’ verse: the overlap of meaning in 
the two languages is almost complete. Yet the same Italian verb is also found 
somewhere else in Leopardi’s Simonidean translations in a much less obvious place. 
“Durare” appears – in the same person and number as in XLI – in line 9 of Leopardi’s 
XL Dal greco di Simonide, the translation of Semonides 1 W2, which Leopardi could 
again read in Stobaeus 4.34. Here are the first verses of both texts, which are discussed 
more closely in this section. The complete texts can be found at Appendix 4a and 4b.412 
 
ὦ παῖ, τέλος µὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος 
                                                   
411  The previous version read “dubbia” instead of “breve”, showing how the final choice is the result of a 
complex process, cf. Gigante (1998), 187. Ibid. 189 recalls how critics have suggested that even the 
choice of the metre is the result of a wish to render “il breve rapido scorrere della vita”. 
412 Semonides’ text is from West (1992), 99-100. Cf. Gerber’s (1984) commentary. XL in TPP (2013), 
215. 
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πάντων ὅσ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τίθησ’ ὅκηι θέλει, 
νοῦς δ’ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώποισιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπήµεροι 
ἃ δὴ βοτὰ ζόουσιν, οὐδὲν εἰδότες 
ὅκως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός.                     5 
 
Ogni mondano evento 
è di Giove in poter, di Giove, o figlio, 
che giusta suo talento 
ogni cosa dispone. 
Ma di lunga stagione                                           5 
nostro cieco pensier s’affanna e cura, 
benchè l’umana etate, 
come destina il ciel nostra ventura, 
di giorno in giorno dura.413 
 
Semonides’ poem begins with a discussion of the role of god in the world, combined 
with the declaration of man’s utter incapacity to understand not only the unfolding of 
such action, but even the factuality of the absolute freedom and power inherent in god’s 
role (1-5).414 In the following verse man’s inability is further explained with the human 
tendency to hope for an optimistic future (6-10). Verses 11-19 unveil the truth about the 
vain nature of human hope, thus piecing together the first two sections of the poem. If 
man knew more about the real operation of the world’s mechanisms, he would not 
entertain vain illusions, but instead look at reality for what it is: the arrival of grim old 
age, the diseases, the chances to be slain at war or on the sea, or even to die by one’s 
own hand. The poem closes on two notes. On the one hand, the conclusion about the 
myriad of evils that surround man, of which one grows aware once he has removed the 
veil of false hopes (20-22); on the other hand the poet’s recommendation not to wallow 
in sorrows, tormenting our heart more than it already is tormented (22-24).  
 
                                                   
413 “Whatever happens here/ Is in the power of Jove, O son of man,/ And he decides it all/ According to 
his will./ But blindly we take thought/ And struggle after things of distant date,/ Although it is our 
fate,/ As Heaven determined was to be the way,/ To live from day to day.” 
414  Cf. Gerber (1984), 126 on ὅκηι θέλει for other instances within Greek literature of “the [common] 
idea that Zeus (or the gods) disposes according to his wishes”. Cf. Versnel (2011), 153-154 and 157-
158 for a collection of other lyric sources expressing similar worldviews. 
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Let us concentrate on Leopardi’s translation of Semonides’ 3-5, which become lines 5-9 
of XL. As one can see at a first glance, Leopardi’s translation of these verses is far from 
literal.415 The two texts are in fact so remarkably different that it can seem problematic 
to follow Leopardi’s reasoning in translating the passage. Semonides’ text as we have it 
is quite linear. It begins with a blunt statement about man’s lack of νοῦς: from what 
man is not – or rather has not – the fragment goes on to describe man’s state: men are 
ephemeroi and they live like cattle.416 The second half of the passage seems to disclose 
the reason behind the similarity: humans are like animals insofar as they ignore the 
mechanisms of divine action. These very mechanisms are the ones that the fragment is 
going to explore in verses 11-19, and to ultimately declare irrevocably at 20-22. 
Leopardi’s line of reasoning is significantly different. After having stated the 
overarching power of Zeus in lines 1-5 – and, in doing so, having remained 
substantially faithful to the Semonidean text – Leopardi needs to tackle Semonides’ 
declaration of the limits of human understanding. In his version, the blind human 
intellect worries and distresses about a long span of time (presumably in the future), 
despite the fact that in reality human life “lasts from day to day”, and that the sky (the 
divine) decides our destiny (lines 5-9).  
 
The marked difference between the two texts is first of all explained by the textual 
differences between our text and the one preserved in the editions available to 
Leopardi.417 The 16th century editions presented a number of different readings for verse 
3 and 4, originating from the corrupted text possessed by Gessner.418 As Simonetta 
Randino has convincingly suggested, the vain and agitated wanderings of XLI’s “Ma di 
lunga stagione / Nostro cieco pensier s’affanna e cura” are explained by the Stephanus’ 
lectio νόος δ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώποισιν οὑκ ἐφηµέροις ἔστ', ἀλλ' ἐφήµεροι βροτοὶ δὴ ζώοµεν.419 
                                                   
415 Cf. Sole’s (2001), 328-329 analysis of this passage which presents very different conclusions, mostly 
summarised in the idea that the translation has a “spiccato animus leopardiano”. Noteworthy is the 
mention of the position of “di giorno in giorno dura”, placed at the end of line 9, which according to 
Sole mirrors “la collocazione in clausola, ossia, in posizione evidente, di ἐπήµεροι”. 
416 See Gerber (1969) on the interpretation of Semonides 1.4. See also Gerber’s commentary (1984) on 
ἐπήµεροι, summarising the various positions of interpreters. 
417  Cf. Gessner (1559), 529. 
418 See Randino (2000), 247-248 for details of the (obviously) incorrect text of Gessner’s edition 
preceding his conjectures. 
419  This version resembles Gessner’s conjecture, see Randino (2000), 248. 
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Henry Estienne’s text is certainly one of the reasons for Leopardi’s choice to drop the 
reference to animals: although he read βροτοί in Estienne’s edition, he could find βοτά 
in Gessner’s, as part of the damaged text which Gessner will amend, substituting βοτὰ 
with βροτοί.420 One further reason for Leopardi to avoid the reference to cattle is that he 
simply could not agree with Semonides’ understanding of other living creatures as a 
comparandum for man; as I have shown in Chapter 2, Leopardi rather believed that the 
type of νοῦς possessed by animals allows them to be superior to men in the art of 
living.421 For Leopardi, it is rather that the human type of νοῦς is incorrectly directed, or 
even blind.422 Leopardi substitutes for the absence of thought, one of the attributes that 
he deems most distinctive of the human intellect, and at the same time one of the most 
harmful to humankind: the tendency to look at the future. It could also be argued that 
Leopardi is in such a way rendering the future tense – that future at which humans gaze 
without understanding – of Semonides’ verse 5 (ἐκτελευτήσει). Aside from being 
triggered by the variants in the two editions, this notion draws on the wider content of 
Semonides 1 and on its discussion of man’s hope. 
 
Leopardi thus designs an opposition between the human tendency to gaze into the future 
and man’s congenital inability to see (“cieco pensier”), let alone understand, the 
operation behind such future events (a lack of knowledge already expressed by 
Semonides: νοῦς δ’ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώποισιν; οὐδὲν εἰδότες). But more than contrasting 
man’s leaning towards the future and the state of man’s mind (the lack of 
consciousness), XL contrasts this peculiar human propensity and the state of man’s life. 
The real condition of man’s existence is, as Leopardi understands it, ephemerality. What 
did Leopardi make of Semonides’ notion of ephemerality in the context of XL? Whereas 
Semonides used ἐπήµερος as an adjective referring to ἀνθρώποισιν, Leopardi on the one 
hand modifies the reference to humans: Semonides’ ἄνθρωποι become “l'umana etate”. 
On the other hand he employs one whole line (line 9) for the purpose of translating 
ἐπήµερος, which he translates as “di giorno in giorno dura”. Leopardi’s translation 
                                                   
420  Gerber (1969) on βοτά in Semonides 1.4 
421  Cf. Babut (1971), 20-21 proposing that the fact that Semonides sees intelligence as the distinctive trait 
of humans – rather than the more Homeric “faiblesse” – may suggest that for Semonides it is precisely 
man’s reason which “le rend le plus misérable des êtres ‘qui respirent et qui marchent sur la terre’ ”. 
422  For the characterisation of man’s limitations of understanding as a physical impairment, and, 
specifically blindness, cf. Parmenides 6 DK 6-9 in Diels and Kranz (1951-2), 232-233. 
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preserves the etymological origin of the adjective and makes it explicit by directly 
referencing the day (ἡµέρα) as the core of the concept. Line 9 – read jointly with its 
subject in line 7, “umana etate” – suggests that human life lasts “from day to day”.423  
 
One could be tempted to read in this yet another declaration of the brevity of human 
existence. And yet, although this notion is here indirectly implied, the point is different. 
Rather than focusing on the duration of human life, Leopardi concentrates on the 
reasons behind its possible brevity. Human life can be brief, but indeed it can also be 
long and lead to a painful old age, or it can be full of woes and illnesses. The point is 
rather that man is not in control. From day to day man is at the complete disposal of the 
god who τέλος ἔχει […] πάντων ὅσ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τίθησ’ ὅκηι θέλει (fr. 1.1-2) and who 
ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει (5).424 In interpreting ἐπήµερος in such a way, Leopardi is using 
Semonides’ own conception of the condition of humans as found in fr. 1: XL’s line 8 
(“Come destina il ciel nostra ventura”) is the translation of Semonides’ verse 5 (ὅκως 
ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός), which Leopardi joins with his interpretation of the 
Semonidean notion of ἐπήµερος. What Leopardi reads in ἐπήµερος is chiefly the 
fluctuation and precariousness inherent in the position of humans in the universe. The 
role of humans is that of passive recipients at the mercy of external forces, a portrayal of 
man that strongly resonates with Achilles’ description of the condition of humans and 
of the role of the gods in Iliad 24 –425 humans to whom the gods assign the thread of 
destiny (ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι, Il. 24.525) and who live awaiting the lot 
contained in the two jars to which only Zeus has access.  
 
But there is more: with his translation of ἐπήµερος Leopardi is constructing a parallel 
between XLI’s first verse “umana cosa picciol tempo dura” and lines 7 and 9 of XL, 
“l'umana etate […] di giorno in giorno dura”. This parallel, far from being merely 
formal and verbal, is crucial to Leopardi’s interpretation of the wisdom of Simonides, 
                                                   
423  The meaning does not change if one translates “etate” with the more obvious “age”. 
424  Cf. Laurenti (1964), 86-87 understands man’s attitude in Semonides as “rinunciatario” and 
“indifferente”, although at the same time admitting that man could not fairly claim what is not in his 
power. Ibid. 87 for a list of other lyric sources expressing a similar message about the role of the 
divine. See Babut (1971), 20 on fr. 1: “un tableau fortement contrasté, opposant la puissance divine, 
qui paraît ici sans limite, à l'impuissance de l'homme”. 
425  And with a number of other passages in Greek literature, cf. Chapter 4. 
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and essential to the formulation of Leopardi’s own worldview and conception of human 
existence as a reception of Greek thought. The comparison of humans and leaves – and 
hence the notion of the brief duration of human existence – is now tightly interlocked 
with the idea that whatever happens to human affairs is out of man’s control.426 The idea 
of duration (“dura” in both texts) is now imbued with the idea of the complete 
fluctuation of man’s destiny: man’s brevity is but one aspect of the wider nature of the 
human condition. The simile of the leaves acquires thus another layer of meaning: just 
as the leaves are subject to the winds and to all sort of external elements, so men are at 
the mercy of the will – or even simply of the behaviour – of the divine. I thus wish to 
argue that we ought to see Leopardi’s two poems also as a purposeful study about the 
Greek conception of human existence. As he works and reworks the Greek texts, 
Leopardi explores, scrutinises, and ultimately internalises the portrait of human 
existence painted by the comparison with the leaves and by the idea of ephemerality. 
Each helps explain the other, and they both cooperate in resurrecting the Greek notion 
of human life, and in creating Leopardi’s own.427 
 
Finally, I wish to look at Leopardi’s interpretation of ἐπήµερος in the context of the 20th 
century debate about the meaning of the Greek term, centred around Hermann Fränkel’s 
1946 article “Man’s 'Ephemeros' Nature According to Pindar and Others” and Matthew 
Dickie’s “On the Meaning of ἐφήµερος” (1976). The disagreement between the two 
scholars is certainly grounded in a different interpretation of the Greek term, and yet the 
difference between the respective arguments is not unbreachable; in fact, to a certain 
extent and regarding specific points, Fränkel and Dickie are in agreement. Yet, partially 
because Fränkel is very keen to stress one particular side of his interpretation, and 
partially because Dickie fails at times to do justice to the nuances of Fränkel’s reading, 
the two are often read in opposition. Let us first look at the basic assumptions of the 
opposing sides of the debate.  
                                                   
426  That the two ideas could indeed be understood as closely relating is apparent in Theocritus Id. 30.31-
32 (ἔµε µάν, φύλλον ἐπάµερον σµίκρας δεύµενον αὔρας, ὀνέλων ὦκα φόρει πνόᾳ); Gow (1950), 517-
519 connects the passage with Il. 6.146 and comments that Theocritus’ “point is not the brevity of 
human life but the levity of human affections and emotions, which are the sport of every wind”, but 
does not go further and does not connect the passage with passages containing ἐφήµερος. 
427  Leopardi’s belief that the two poems had shared authorship contributed to the creation of this 
connection.  
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In his article Fränkel proposed that the Greek term “does not mean ‘creature of one day, 
shortlived’, but ‘subject to the (changing) day, variable’”.428 Fränkel’s argument does in 
truth heavily insist on the idea that ἐφήµερος refers to the changeability of the human 
nature and of the human mind; as in Pindar’s Nemean 6.3-6 or in Odyssey 18.130-140 
the instability of the human mind conveyed by ἐφήµερος coincides with our ignorance 
about our destiny, a point very similar to that made by Semonides fr. 1 about man’s lack 
of νοῦς.429 Yet, nowhere does Fränkel claim that this is the only meaning of ἐφήµερος, 
but suggests that ἐπήµερος can present the human condition from an external point of 
view, as the collection of events – both fortunes and misfortunes – that will affect man 
during his life span (Fränkel thinks of the Herodotean Solon πᾶν ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος 
συµφορή at Hdt. 1.32 or of ἐφήµερος as corresponding to the Latin in potestate 
fortunae).430 Dickie, who is not convinced that ἐφήµερος conveys the meaning of 
internal changeability or of human lack of understanding, acknowledges almost 
exclusively Fränkel’s contention that ἐφήµερος signifies internal mutability, or that “the 
human spirit is subject to abrupt shifts – it is sometimes confident and sometimes 
despondent”.431  
 
Dickie proposes that ἐφήµερος means “short-lived”, and should be read as a description 
not only of the duration of human existence, but also of the “inconstancy of human 
fortune and the brevity of human felicity”. 432  Both Fränkel and Dickie analyse 
Semonides 1 in search of the meaning of ἐφήµερος. Whereas Fränkel understands the 
term as if it were meant to be explained by the following clause (ἃ δὴ βοτὰ ζόουσιν, 
οὐδὲν εἰδότες ὅκως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός) and thus as conveying man’s lack of 
understanding, Dickie interprets it as instead another term to describe the ἄνθρωποι of 
verse 3.433  
                                                   
428   Fränkel (1946), 131. 
429   Fränkel (1946), 135,137. 
430  Fränkel (1946), 134-135. Although it is true that Dickie’s critique of Fränkel applies to Fränkel’s 
interpretation of Pythian 8.95f, in which the latter reads the “mutability of the human spirit” rather 
than the “inconsistency of human fortune”, cf. Fränkel (1946), 134; Dickie (1976), 8. 
431   Dickie (1976), 8. 
432  In doing so Dickie’s analysis actually encompasses some of the meanings that Fränkel too considers. 
433  Cf. Fränkel (1946), 137; Dickie (1976), 10-11. On ἐφήµερος cf. also Babut (1971), 21, according to 
whom Semonides 1 employs the term to define human nature “instable et sans consistance”; 
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Leopardi’s reading of ἐφήµερος in Semonides 1 anticipates and responds to the future 
debate in several ways. If Fränkel’s insistence on the new meaning of ἐφήµερος – not 
“short-lived” but “changeable” – is to be taken as a sign that the privileged 
interpretation among his contemporaries was indeed “short-lived” (i.e. having a brief 
life) then Leopardi’s nuanced understanding of the term is one step ahead of the game. 
With his translation of ἐφήµερος in XLI – and with the connection he draws between it 
and the exegesis of Homer Il. 6.146 in XL – Leopardi is, many years before Fränkel, 
opening up the discussion about the meaning of the term and at the same time providing 
a nuanced range of possible interpretations. Leopardi is also, in a way, anticipating 
Dickie’s point: just as Dickie will suggest, in XLI ἐφήµερος is read and understood in 
the context of Semonides’ wider text (and in particular in the context of verses 1-5, 
stating the passive condition of man in the universe) thus allowing for the three 
meanings – brevity, submission, and fluctuation – to tightly coexist in the two 
Simonidean renditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Vermeule (1979), 24 concentrates on the fact that it is man’s lack of intelligence that renders us 
ephemeroi, and unable to understand our destiny. Gerber (1984), 127 on ἐφήµερος at verse 3 “there 
may be nothing in the context […] to suggest a reference to the brevity of human life, but why should 
the rest of the context determine the meaning of this particular adjective”; in doing so Babut is reading 
Dickie’s “short-lived” in the most literal sense. Babut believes Dickie to have “thrown much doubt” 
on Fränkel’s idea. 
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II 
Ephemerality, the Operette, and the Zibaldone (from 1823) 
1. Ἐφήµερος, Pindar and Simonides – 1823-1824 
 
That the Greek notion of the human condition conveyed in the trope of the leaves and in 
the word ἐφήµερος had a strong impact on Leopardi’s own conception of man’s nature 
and existence is shown not only by the extraordinary care that he dedicates to the two 
ideas in his Simonidean translations, but also by the recurrence of such motifs at critical 
points in his later work. I wish now briefly to discuss the presence of this idea in one of 
the Operette Morali, the Proposta di premi fatta dall’accademia dei sillografi, with the 
aid of a constellation of passages from other works as well. The Proposta delves into 
the idea of human ephemerality chiefly by skillfully playing with an image drawn from 
Pindar’s Pythian 8, an image that likens men to dreams of shadows (Pyth. 8.95) and that 
becomes for Leopardi the centre of reflections on the peculiarities of human existence. 
Such reflection is profoundly woven into the fabric of Leopardi’s contemporary 
interests: composed in 1824, the Proposta’s rethinking of the Pindaric gnome takes 
place shortly after – or perhaps even at the same time as – the translation of the two 
Simonidean fragments. In tackling the Pindaric gnome and the conception of human 
existence offered by the two Simonidean texts Leopardi is exploring common territory: 
the similarity between the two is underscored by the fact that the very same verse of the 
Pindaric ode (Pyth. 8.95) employed in the Proposta begins with the terms ἐφήµερος.434 
This makes Pindar’s Pythian – and consequently its interpretation in the Proposta – 
another text fundamental to Leopardi’s reading of ἐφήµερος, and thus one worth 
considering alongside the two Simonidean translations.435 
 
The Proposta di premi fatta dall’Accademia dei Sillografi is a heavily satirical piece 
whose main target is modern man’s deluded faith in progress, and the vanity and 
                                                   
434  In the Pythian the characterisation which Leopardi employs – man as the dream of a shadow – 
appears as the response to the double question τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις; But this definition comes in fact 
after the one given at the very beginning of verse 95, where βροτοί are called ἐπάµεροι. Cf. Gentili 
(1995), 585: “‘effimeri’, nel senso di ‘creature che mutano condizione in un giorno’”. The notion of 
man’s nature as ἐφήµερος is thus set in between the expression of the brevity (ἐν δ᾽ ὀλίγῳ) of human 
joy (τὸ τερπνόν) and the aforementioned reference to human life as the dream of a shadow. 
435 Polato (2007), 65-114 on Leopardi and Pindar is one of the best works on Leopardi and antiquity, and, 
despite some difference in interepretations, a fundamental work on the subject of this section. 
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ultimate insubstantiality of progress itself. Set in an ever-evolving age of the machine 
(in which man’s material needs are accommodated by a variety of devices) the Proposta 
foreshadows a future in which man’s spiritual needs too will be fulfilled by machines. 
This new state of human evolution sees men further and further removed from active 
participation in the affairs of human life, which is now almost entirely in the hands of 
the machines. Such a situation is the ultimate and intrinsic defeat of the idea of progress 
and is shaped by the conviction that no real internal progress is possible for mankind, 
whose unhappiness and flaws are so deeply rooted and so profoundly inherent in the 
human condition that the only way to improve it is to have the machines take over 
human activity whenever possible.   
 
In the Proposta Leopardi describes the institution of the Accademia dei Sillografi and 
its newly launched contest for the creation of three revolutionary machines.436 Having 
illustrated the features that the first device ought to have – those of a true friend, loyal 
and trustworthy in every respect – Leopardi goes on to present the Accademia’s 
thoughts on the creation of such an appliance. Surely, thinks the Accademia, building 
the machine will be neither impossible nor very hard: the mechanical skills that have 
already allowed man to build marvellous and ingenious devices, such as those able to 
draw, write, or even play chess are proof.437 It is at this point that the author introduces 
two more arguments to prove the ease of production of the machine:438 
 
Ora a giudizio di molti savi, la vita umana è un giuoco, ed alcuni affermano che ella è cosa 
ancora più lieve, e che tra le altre, la forma del giuoco degli scacchi è più secondo ragione, 
e i casi più prudentemente ordinati che non sono quelli di essa vita. La quale oltre a ciò, 
per detto di Pindaro, non essendo cosa di più sostanza che un sogno di un’ombra, ben 
debbe esserne capace la veglia di un automato.439  
 
                                                   
436  TPP (2013), 506-507. On the Accademia and the silloi, see Galimberti (1998a), 110 n. 1, who 
connects it to Zib. 4035. 
437 See Melosi (2015), 70 notes 38-41. 
438 Cf. Simonides 646 PMG for the idea of παίζειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. 
439 TPP (2013), 507. Cecchetti (1983), 81: “Now, in the judgment of many wise men, human life is only a 
game; and some even declare that it is more frivolous and that, among other things, the game of chess 
is more rationally constructed and its moves more wisely organized than those of human life – which, 
according to Pindar, is no more substantial than the dream of a shadow, and thus a robot should easily 
be able to discharge its function”. 
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Two different comparisons are put forward for the purpose of describing the lack of 
difficulty of the task. The first one draws on the aforementioned example of the chess-
playing machines, suggesting that life is a game. The second comparison follows 
immediately, somewhat wedged inside the idea of the similarity between human life and 
a game of chess. The trivial character of human existence is validated by the fact that – 
besides being a game – human life does not have more substance than a “dream of a 
shadow”. The two ideas – the game and the dream of a shadow – are tightly 
interconnected: if human life is nothing but the dream of a shadow – a double layer of 
dormant insubstantiality – then a “waking automaton” (as Leopardi calls it) can 
certainly parallel, and possibly surpass, the performance of any man.440  
 
As Leopardi himself makes sure to acknowledge, the second comparison is not his own, 
but Pindar’s.441 This simile is, in fact, a direct quotation of Pythian 8.95-96 – with the 
one difference, that in Pindar’s poem man is the dream of a shadow, whereas Leopardi 
makes “human life” the subject of the definition.442 The “mistake” appears not only in 
the Proposta, but also in the Zibaldone entry that precedes it, Zib. 2672, dated to 
February 1823: 
 
Le plus grand des malheurs est de naître, le plus grand des bonheurs, de mourir. (Sophocl. 
Oedip. Colon. v. 1289. Bacchyl. et alii ap. Stob. serm. 96. p. 530. 531. Cic. tusc. l. i. c. 48. t. 
2. p. 273.) La vie, disoit Pindare, n’est que le rêve d’une ombre (Pyth. 8. v. 136.); image 
sublime, et qui d’un seul trait peint tout le néant de l’homme. Même ouvrage. ch. 28. p. 137. 
t. 3. (10. Feb. 1823.). 
 
                                                   
440  Cecchetti (1983) fails to translate the Italian “veglia” (wakefulness), which is opposed to the idea of 
“dream” in the original.  
441  Just as it had been for his use of the notion of ephemerality in his revival of Simonides, the Proposta 
shows Leopardi’s willingness to declare the source of the idea. Although the Proposta is rather 
unclear about the provenance of the two comparisons within the piece – whether they ought to be 
ascribed to the narrator or to the members of the Accademia – Leopardi is instead very careful in 
displaying their sources, which perform the role of auctoritates. The former is announced as matter of 
agreement amongst those who have wisdom “a giudizio di molti savi” (in the judgement of many wise 
men). Whereas this attribution remains rather vague, the latter idea is instead preceded by a specific 
reference to Pindar. Rather than weakening the argument, the pre-existence of the idea is for Leopardi 
an invaluable validation of its soundness. Polato (2007), 78 recalls how Leopardi could read in 
Barthélemy’s chapter the idea that Pindar was held as auctoritas by not only ancient poets but also 
philosophers. 
442  Polato (2007), 65-66. Cf. also Polizzi (2011), 92-93. 
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As Guido Polato has correctly spotted, the difference in the quotation is a clear 
indication of the source of Leopardi’s reference to Pindar, the “même ouvrage” 
mentioned by Leopardi himself, who had been consulting the work of the Barthélemy 
for some time: the Zibaldone quotation comes in fact from the chapter “Suite des 
moeurs des Athéniens” of the Voyage.443  
 
Pythian 8 is written for the occasion of Aristomenes of Aegina’s victory in the wrestling 
competition of 446 BC.444 The poem, besides being a celebration of Aristomenes’ 
success, is a reflection on the nature of victory that opens out to become a reflection on 
the contingencies of human life, a theme that finds explicit articulation towards the end 
of the poem.445 Just as the poet recollects the champion’s past victories (78-87) he goes 
back once and for all to the theme he has hinted at several times earlier in the poem: the 
instability of human fortunes.446 The theme is brought to full light from verse 88 
onwards, and in particular in verses 92-96, where the idea is expressed in general terms 
that suggest the universal validity of the notion conveyed. Here occurs the passage 
referenced in the Proposta.  
 
ἐν δ’ ὀλίγῳ βροτῶν 
τὸ τερπνὸν αὔξεταῐ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ πίτνει χαµαί, 
                                                   
443  The fact that Leopardi chose to reference Pindar’s idea in the form in which he had read it in the 
Voyage does not in any way mean that Leopardi never had access to the original work of Pindar, see 
instead Polato (2007), 67-68 and 73 on the editions available in Leopardi’s library.  
444 On Pythian 8, cf. Fränkel (1946), 131-133, who starts with it his analysis of ἐφήµερος; he believes the 
Pythian to have “nothing whatever to do with the brevity of human life” and everything to do with the 
notion of “exposed and subject to every actuality as it arises”, i.e. our personality is shifting with the 
changing day. See also Pippin Burnett (2005), 220-238, more specifically 236-237 on the verses 
discussed here. Giannini (1982) is entirely concerned with verses 95ff and especially with the 
meaning of the phrase τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις .  
445  See Stern (1967), 41 on this theme in Bacchylides 5, variously related to Pindar, suggesting that this 
aspect of Bacchylides’ thought is in accordance with the general pessimism of the ode; it is to be 
noted that he sees Bacchylides’ repeated comparison and linking of men and plants as another aspect 
of such pessimism, a notion confirmed by Bacchylides’ wish to Hieron that he may have 
εὐδ]αιµονίας πέταλον (186). On the theme in Herodotus, Lloyd (1987), 23; Pelling (2006), 147-148.  
446  Gentili (1995), 585 on vv. 95-97: “Il passo condensa le riflessioni fin qui fatte sulla mutevolezza della 
sorte umana”; ibid. on τί δέ τις; τί δ’ οὔ τις; “essere ‘qualuno’ (cioè famoso) o essere ‘nessuno’ (cioè 
ignoto) non ha valore definitive perché l’uomo può essere sia l’uno che l’altro per volontà degli dei”. 
Pippin Burnett (2005), 226-227 on the historical circumstances of Aegina leading up to 446, also 
providing (n. 10, 227) a summary of the various scholarly positions regarding the extent to which we 
should read in the cautiousness of Pindar’s invitation to Aristomenes a reference to such 
circumstances. 
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ἀποτρόπῳ γνώµᾳ σεσεισµένον. 
ἐπάµεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ’ οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ                95 
ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ’ ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ, 
λαµπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ µείλιχος αἰών. (Pyth. 8.92-97)447 
 
The central idea in the image of man as the dream of a shadow is, unquestionably, one 
of insubstantiality: what can be more immaterial and tenuous than a shadow that does 
not even belong to the world of reality, but to the realm of dreams?448 But what does 
Pindar mean by insubstantiality, and how does he characterise such lack of substance? 
 
Although scholars have differed (sometimes surprisingly, as in the case of Nagy’s 
reading mentioned in note 448) in their opinion, the answer seems to come naturally 
from the context of the phrase. Man is insubstantial insofar as he, and his own 
happiness, are subject to a cyclical reversal of fortunes. The phrase in question is in fact 
formally encased between two statements about the fluctuating nature of human affairs. 
First, the alternation inherent in the destiny of humans is encapsulated in the bipartite 
structure of verses 92-93 (ἐν δ᾽ὀλίγῳ βροτῶν τὸ τερπνὸν αὔξεται: οὕτω δὲ καὶ πίτνει 
χαµαί): in a short span of time human happiness can increase (αὐξάνω) or fall to the 
ground.449 This alternation between the presence and absence of joy is bound to be 
cyclical in the existence of the individual just as in the life of the species, and we can 
thus imagine these two states repeating themselves unceasingly throughout history. The 
passage is strongly reminiscent of the Homeric simile of the leaves, and this connection 
contributes to increase the sense of human precariousness channelled by the ode. It is 
                                                   
447   In Maehler (1984), 105 after Snell (1964). 
448  Cf. Pippin Burnett (2005), 236-237. Giannini (1982), 69 agrees that the general meaning of the 
passage is an “affermazione della labilità e della mutevolezza della condizione umana”; in general his 
reading of verse 95ff suggests that the whole passage is grounded on the “opposizioni polari” and 
“movimento pendolare a cui la vita umana è continuamente sottoposta per il volere del dio” (cf. page 
74). Gentili (1995), 585 on σκιᾶς ὄναρ: “locuzione che denota il non plus ultra della vanità delle 
vicende umane”, quoting Theodore Metochites in the apparatus of his edition, ibid. 228 and in Müller 
(1966), 392. The idea of shadow hints also to lack of glory (as opposite of αἴγλα, v. 96). Nagy (1990), 
195-196 proposes a radically different interpretation, according to this passage refers to us living (and 
in the moment of victory) as “the realization of the dreams dreamt by our dead ancestors”. 
449  Cf. Sotiriou (1998), 114 on vv. 96-97: “Pindar will aber nicht, dass ein lobendes Gedicht, das den 
grossen ahletischen Erfolg des Aristomenes im Ringkampf feiert, pessimistisch endet, und deshalb 
macht er zum Schluss eine freudige Feststellung”. I disagree with Polato (2007), 91 who believes the 
pessimism conveyed by the idea of “dream of a shadow” (especially as quoted by Barthélemy) “si 
fonda sulla rimozione dei versi che seguono”. 
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not only the binary organisation of the thought that reminds us of the two (recurring) 
states in the life of the leaves as described by Glaucus at 6.147-148 and Apollo at 
21.464-466. What reminds the reader further of the Iliadic episodes – and in particular 
of the trope as employed by Glaucus – is the language used by Pindar to depict the 
crushing of human τερπνόν, which falls to the ground (χαµαί) just like the leaves of the 
Homeric simile had fallen on the ground (χαµάδις).450 But of course αὐξάνω (93) is not 
only “to increase”, but also, and remarkably “to grow”, and in this new botanical image 
we have another allusion to the Homeric vegetation: without quoting Homer, like 
Simonides had done, Pindar achieves to resurrect the memory of the Iliadic passage.   
 
The alternating quality of human affairs is then restated in vv. 96-97, as the poet –
providing perhaps a parallel for verse 94 – reminds his audience that, just as an 
ἀπότροπος γνώµη can destroy man’s happiness, so can heaven-sent light (αἴγλα 
διόσδοτος) bestow serenity on humans. Yet ultimately man’s flimsiness is additionally 
reinforced by the sense of intrinsic subjection that underscores the final part of Pythian 
8. Man is not the one in charge of his own destiny, which is instead allotted by divine 
sources, who in turn augment or decrease human happiness. Man’s utter lack of control 
over his own existence is also remarked by the mention of the fleetingness with which 
the affairs of human life can change course (ἐν δ᾽ὀλίγῳ, 92), the same adjective used to 
characterise both the sole happy time of man (youth) and in general human life in the 
Stobean Simonides (11). It is not in man’s own hands to choose when to be happy, and 
neither is the power to decide for how long he can hold onto such pleasure once he has 
received it.  
 
Both sides of this idea – the notion of the mutability of human fortunes and that of 
human subjection to external forces – play a significant role in the Proposta. They are 
both implied in the idea that human existence is a game, a game more disorderly than 
chess (and thus far more variable and unpredictable). Inherent in the functioning of a 
game like chess (and of many others too) is the fact that the game pieces are not the 
ones to actively play the match, but it is instead some external entity that has the power 
                                                   
450  Following Fränkel, Burton (1962), 190-191 and Sotiriou (1998), 113-114 connect ἐπάµεροι of Pyth. 8 
to Od. 18.137 and 21.85. 
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to manoeuvre them. The topos of life as a game must have been especially significant 
for Leopardi, who used it at different times throughout his work,451 and in particular 
profusely in the Canti: a game is the comparison for the “opre de’ mortali” in A un 
vincitore nel pallone 32-33 (1821); in La vita solitaria, from the same year, the naïve 
and enthusiastic attitude of the youth towards life is compared to a dance or a game 
(51), but the poet makes it immediately clear that such an approach is the one taken by 
“wretched mortals”, thus establishing a connection between the misery of existence and 
its game-like quality; again, the image of life as a game resurfaces in Leopardi’s 
production of the 30’s, both in Il pensiero dominante (47) and in the Palinodia al 
marchese Gino Capponi (166).452 In several of these instances we perceive clearly that 
the game is not an enjoyable one, or, even, that it is intrinsically evil: for an explicit 
linguistic point, one can think for example of the adjective “reo” which Leopardi 
chooses to define “gioco” in the Palinodia. Similarly, life had been called “tristo gioco” 
much earlier in Leopardi’s writings, in the 1816 Appressamento della morte (Canto 
Secondo, 61).453  
 
Aside from the ideas of passivity and negativity, there is one further meaning which – 
adumbrated in some of the above quotations – powerfully shines out in a fragment of 
the early and unfinished pastoral tragedy Telesilla (1816), centred on the forbidden love 
of Telesilla, wife of Danaino, and Girone, Danaino’s best friend. Here it is not life 
which is likened to a game, but instead the speaker’s (likely to be Girone) present 
understanding of the extent of his past sufferings compared to the ones he is now 
experiencing: 
 
E in mio poter fu posto ch’or ne fosse immune oh quanto oh quanto fui pazzo 
che fora or quel dolore ch’io proverei? e che fu quello che ho provato per 
l’addietro? Un’ombra un gioco. Questo sì ch’è fieriss. travaglio. Oh se mai 
                                                   
451  Cf. Melosi (2015), 71 n. 42 suggesting that the motif “è centrale nella psicologia leopardiana, fin dalle 
Memorie del primo amore del 1817, dove l'approccio con Gertrude Cassi Lazzari avviene giocando 
una partita a scacchi tutt’altro che metaforica”, linking to Verdenelli (2004), 185-215; yet Melosi fails 
to explore the presence of the theme in Leopardi’s work further, limiting herself to the Memorie’s 
purely functional reference to the game of chess. 
452  A un vincitore nel Pallone 32-33; La vita solitaria 50-52; Il pensiero dominante 44-52; Palinodia al 
marchese Gino Capponi 165-169. 
453  TPP (2013), 293. 
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fatto io non l’avessi! oh come or sarei fortunato. Adunque io punto Non 
m’inganno? io peccai! Giron, peccasti? Mi pare un sogno. Ahi, ahi, chi l’avria 
detto? Ch’io dovessi peccar quasi innocente Non fossi stato infin da quando 
io nacqui? Più ch’io ci penso parmi essere un altro. Oh virtù mia come sei 
gita. […]454 
 
This passage, part of the draft of a section of the tragedy which Leopardi never 
completed, is interesting to us because of the close connection it invokes between the 
image of the game and that of the shadow. Both are very clearly employed to convey 
the sense of how utterly insubstantial past misery is compared to present. To render the 
nothingness of previous torments in the face of those now endured, Leopardi chooses to 
use and combine the two images, as if one alone could not depict the full extent of the 
disparity: the idea of the shadow fully portrays the notion of flimsiness and lack of 
concreteness, and the image of the game supplies the description of the past sufferings 
with a sense of triviality. The juxtaposition of the two ideas helps the reader understand 
how he is supposed to interpret the mention of the game: beyond the obvious elements 
of triviality and frivolity, Leopardi wants the reader to grasp the ultimate 
inconsequentiality and unimportance inherent in games. This passage, despite being 
nothing more than the draft of an early work, is thus paramount for the interpretation of 
the two comparisons in the Proposta: it informs us indirectly and yet clearly about 
Leopardi’s understanding of the meaning of games. But there is more: a few lines below 
the reference to shadows and games, Leopardi draws in dreams too. It seems significant 
that Leopardi would have gathered the three ideas (“ombra”, “gioco”, “sogno”) which 
were going to appear so clearly connected in the Proposta in one passage, and a passage 
altogether concerned with describing various states and degrees of unreality and 
insubstantiality.455 
                                                   
454  TPP (2013), 468. My translation, with uncertainties due to the fragmentary nature of the draft: “And I 
had the power to avoid this oh how crazy how crazy I was, what would now be the pain I would feel 
[if I had avoided it]? And what was that which I felt in the past? A shadow, a game. This [the present 
one] is indeed a most fierce distress. Oh, if only I had not done it. Oh how fortunate I would be! 
Certainly I am not fooling myself? I sinned. Giron, have you sinned? It feels like a dream. Ah, ah, 
who could have said? That I would sin as if I had not been innocent since my birth? The more I think 
about it the more I feel like I am another person. Oh my virtue, you have gone away! […]” 
455  This conception of games is elaborated – and this time within the comparison with human life – in A 
un vincitore nel pallone, where human existence is nothing more than a game, thus underscoring its 
inherent insignificance. 
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The fact that Leopardi’s interpretation of the image – so closely connected in the 
Pindaric text to the definition of humans as ἐπάµεροι – revolves so heavily around the 
idea of the externally-commanded instability of human fortunes, suggests that he 
thought of the adjective ἐφήµερος as pertinent to this wider representation of reality. 
Just as the blind human intellect of Semonides 1 W2 (“nostro cieco pensiero”) fails to 
understand the real circumstances of its own existence – circumstances which are 
instead not only understood but actively brought about by the divine – so in the 
Proposta humans are the unwilling game pieces being played in a game whose rules 
they cannot make sense of – and that appears to them as irreparably chaotic and 
disorganised. 
 
The two Simonidean translations and the Proposta are crucial evidence of Leopardi’s 
increasing captivation with the Greek conception of human existence around the end of 
1823 and the beginning of 1824, and in particular of his preoccupation with the various 
shades of meaning revolving around the term ἐφήµερος. Both the translations and the 
use of Pindar in the Operette point to a deep consideration of the possible meanings of 
the term in the ancient texts; at the same time, the scholarly approach is eventually 
channelled – by means of a profound personal engagement – into a revival of the 
wisdom of the ancients, which, as the Proposta proves, is not only significant for the 
present, but also for a distant and possibly dystopian future.  
 
2. Plants and Insects: The Zibaldone (1826-1827) 
 
Before turning to the final part of this chapter, I wish to point the reader towards one 
last instance of Leopardi’s engagement with the Greek notion of human existence 
conveyed by the trope of the leaves and by the notion of ephemerality, embodied in two 
passages of the Zibaldone (Zib. 4175 and 4270), which date to the years 1826 and 1827 
respectively. 
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Zib. 4174 is perhaps one of Leopardi’s darkest attacks on existence. 456  Every 
euphemism is dropped: beginning with the caustic and laconic “tutto è male” 
(everything is evil), the passage lists with relentless tenacity the full extent and the full 
details of the inbred evils of existence. Existence is evil, and so are the goal, the order, 
the condition, the laws and the natural course of the universe. The attack ultimately 
spirals into one all-encompassing conclusion: there is only one good, which is the lack 
of existence. It is this thought – the idea of the evil inherent in any kind of life – that is 
expanded and developed in the following page of the Zibaldone. Zib. 4175 is on the 
whole one consistent attempt at showing that existence is evil not just for the individual 
and not just for humans, but instead for every single component of the universe. The 
entire passage can be found at Appendix 5. 
 
Overturning the classical image of the locus amoenus Leopardi chooses the image of a – 
seemingly idyllic – garden to represent the omnipresent pain of existence. The garden is 
pretty and well kept and we are observing it during a benevolent season, and yet it is a 
collection of brutal sufferings. In reading the note the reader is decidedly (albeit 
indirectly) reminded of the likening of men and leaves with which, by 1826, Leopardi 
had several times engaged. Although no direct comparison of humans and leaves occurs 
in the passage, the connection between the natural elements of the garden (which 
include leaves) and humankind is implicit in two ways. First, the demonstration of the 
common unhappiness of universal existence at the beginning of Zib. 4175 had taken its 
start from men (“Non il genere umano solamente ma...”), and from there it had 
progressively opened up to encompass larger and larger entities such as systems and 
worlds. The link between the garden, chosen as an example of a multitude of natural 
beings, and humans themselves, is in this sense straightforwardly part of the path which 
Leopardi clearly delineates. But what is more, the comparison is reinforced throughout 
the passage by the continuous anthropomorphisation of the elements of the garden: the 
tree is wounded (“ferito”), the grass trampled by the passer-by spills blood (“sangue”), 
the gardener chops off limbs (“membra”) from the plants he is pruning, culminating in 
the portrayal of the garden as a large hospital (“largo ospitale”). The individual beings 
                                                   
456  Interestingly the note ends on a (paradoxical) denial of strict pessimism: this is not the worst of all 
possible worlds, says Leopardi, because “Chi può conoscere i limiti della possibilità?”. 
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of the garden feel the violence of life with the same sensations and reactions that man 
experiences towards the horrors of being.  
 
One more feature invites comparison with one of the crucial moments of Leopardi’s 
engagement with the relationship between humans and leaves. The structure underlying 
the Zibaldone note and Leopardi’s rendition of Semonides’ poem present one 
remarkable similarity. Just as in XL the various evils that can befall man were 
introduced by the anaphora of (mostly demonstrative) pronouns (translating the Greek 
articles τούς and οἱ with pronominal value, also in anaphora), so in Zib. 4175 the list of 
the various suffering creatures that animate the garden is introduced by a long anaphora 
of demonstrative adjectives (“quella rosa”, “quel giglio”, quell’albero”, etc....). Like 
Semonides 1 W2 and Leopardi’s XL (which, however, had focused more narrowly on 
humankind), Zib. 4175 explores the various declinations of the evil of existence. Plants, 
humanised and individualised, serve as a mirror for the torments which man is 
sometimes unable to see in his own life, to lead to the necessary conclusion – a theme 
central to Leopardi’s philosophy and to his revival of a Greek worldview – that it would 
be better for every being never to have been born.457 
 
Zib. 4270, a note from the following year, 1827, is in various ways connected to many – 
if not all – the steps we have analysed as part of the history of Leopardi’s interpretation 
of the trope of the leaves and of the Greek notion of human ephemerality. The note is 
part of a number of pages that reflect on two intertwining yet clashing facts: on the one 
hand the decadence of the writing style from antiquity to modernity, on the other the 
increase in the publications of new books, resulting in the impossibly steep path to fame 
for the modern writer. Achieving the immortality granted to the great works of the past 
is, in Leopardi’s opinion, impossible in today’s world.458  
 
La sorte dei libri oggi, è come quella degl’insetti chiamati efimeri (éphémères): alcune 
specie vivono poche ore, alcune una notte, altre 3 o 4 giorni; ma sempre si tratta di giorni. 
Noi siamo veramente oggidí passeggeri e pellegrini sulla terra: veramente caduchi: esseri di 
un giorno: la mattina in fiore, la sera appassiti, o secchi: soggetti anche a sopravvivere alla 
                                                   
457 This notion is examined in Chapter 5.  
458  The theme is prominent in Il Parini, ovvero Della Gloria. 
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propria fama, e piú longevi che la memoria di noi. Oggi si può dire con verità maggiore che 
mai: Οἵη περ φύλλων γενεὴ, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν (Iliade, VI, v.146).459 
 
The problem lies in the new status and role of books in the modern world, for which the 
only apt description is comparison with a type of insects called “ephemeral” in light of 
the extraordinary brevity of their existence.460 But the conclusion about books becomes 
a verdict about human existence, as Leopardi shifts abruptly from books to men: the 
modern ephemerality of books contributes to the inbred ephemerality of men, making 
sure that even fame – which once upon a time outlived the earthly existence of an 
individual – is now outlasted by our very life span, in itself so undeniably brief. Even 
literary glory – the one feature to challenge the ephemeral status of humans – is forever 
lost in the modern world, only to bring man’s condition down to a further level of 
decadence. The reflection prompts a new definition of the human condition, which 
conveys the shortness of human existence by once again resorting to the world of flora 
(“the morning in flower, the evening faded, or dried up”). What is more, to seal the 
reference to vegetation, Leopardi ends the passage with the explicit quotation of verse 
146 of Iliad 6.  
 
There is yet one more link with Leopardi’s interpretation and understanding of the ties 
that connect men and leaves (and all other natural beings). The definition of men used 
in Zib. 4270 (“Noi siamo veramente oggidí passeggeri e pellegrini sulla terra: 
veramente caduchi ”) echoes closely a passage of the Frammento apocrifo di Stratone 
da Lampsaco, number thirteen in the Operette, written towards the end of 1825. The 
Frammento – which Leopardi presents as the translation of a recovered fragment from 
the Greek philosopher Strato – is a deeply materialistic account of the genesis and the 
end of the world. As he tackles the former topic, Strato contrasts the immortal nature of 
                                                   
459 “The destiny of books today is like that of those insects called ephemerals (éphémères): certain species 
live a few hours, some one night, others 3 or 4 days; but it is always only a matter of days. In truth, we 
of today are travellers and pilgrims on the earth: our time is truly short: we are here for one day: the 
morning in flower, the evening faded, or dried up: destined also to outlive our own fame, and living 
longer than we are remembered. Today it can be said more truly than ever before: “Οἵη περ φύλλων 
γενεή, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν” (Iliad, VI, v.146).” The grave accent on γενεή (with comma) is in 
Leopardi’s note. 
460  Cf. Aristotle Historia Animalium 5.19, Cicero Tusc. 1.94 and pseudo-Plutarch Cons. Ap. 111c, on 
which Audano (2014a), 19; cf. also Polizzi (2011), 114 suggesting Leopardi’s note may in fact be 
drawn from Cons. Ap. 111c. 
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matter – which never increases or decreases – with that of the “various modes of the 
existence of matter, as they can be in those we call material creatures”: 
 
Per tanto i diversi modi di essere della materia, i quali si veggono in quelle che noi 
chiamiamo creature materiali, sono caduchi e passeggeri; ma niun segno di caducità né di 
mortalità si scuopre nella materia universalmente, e però niun segno che ella sia cominciata, 
né che ad essere le bisognasse o pur le bisogni alcuna causa o forza fuori di se. Il mondo, 
cioè l’essere della materia in un cotal modo, è cosa incominciata e caduca.461 
 
The antithesis between matter and its modes of expression is as stark as it could be: 
whereas matter is ever unchanging, material creatures are “caduchi e passeggeri”. It 
may or it may not be coincidence that Giovanni Cecchetti, translator of the Operette 
into English, chose to render this couple of adjectives as “ephemeral and transient”, thus 
referencing the very adjective that had been so strong a part of Leopardi’s reflection on 
human nature. The word-by-word correspondence with Zib. 4270 (“Noi siamo 
veramente oggidí passeggeri e pellegrini sulla terra: veramente caduchi”) can hardly be 
a coincidence.462 Rather this echo, just like the two passages’ common concern about the 
fleeting character of human and worldly existence, should prompt us to consider the 
years between 1823 and 1827 as the core of Leopardi’s long meditation on the quality 
and significance of the human condition. From the repeated readings of the Iliad to the 
intense labouring over the texts of Simonides (and Semonides), from the interpretation 
of Pindar’s gnome to the invention of a Greek philosopher’s system parading the 
ephemerality of all beings,463 these years bear witness to Leopardi’s rediscovery of 
ancient Greek notions of existence, and of their conscious and programmatic revival 
throughout his works. 
 
 
                                                   
461  My italics. TPP (2013), 578. Cecchetti (1983), 383: “Thus, the various modes of the existence of 
matter, as they can be seen in those we call material creatures, are ephemeral and transient; but no 
sign of decay and morality can be uncovered in matter generally, and therefore there is no sign that it 
had a beginning and that to exist it needed, or needs, any power outside of itself. The world, or rather 
the existence of matter in that particular form, is something transient that was begun.” 
462  My italics. 
463 Galimberti (1998a), 403-404 on the influence of D’Holbach’s Système de la nature on Strato’s 
philosophical system in the Frammento, and (convincingly) on Leopardi’s choice of Strato as the 
example of the materialistic philosopher. 
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III 
Schopenhauer, Greek Leaves, and Leopardi 
 
The Greeks, their thought, their literature and attitude to beauty appear consistently 
throughout Arthur Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, but perhaps 
nowhere is their presence so extensive and acute as in the Supplements to the Fourth 
Book.464 Two chapters of the Supplements – Chapter 41 “Ueber den Tod und sein 
Verhältniß zur Unzerstörbarkeit unsers Wesens an sich” and Chapter 46 “Von der 
Nichtigkeit und dem Leiden des Lebens” – delve with particular intensity into ancient 
Greek thought. Among other references, Chapter 41 offers Schopenhauer’s 
interpretation of the Iliadic trope of the leaves and Chapter 46 provides – in the setting 
of examples of “großer Geister aller Zeiten” who shared Schopenhauer’s worldview – a 
brief and yet effective account of the ancient Greek pessimistic worldview.465 The last 
words of Chapter 46 are, remarkably, about Leopardi’s role in this history of pessimistic 
thoughts, but we shall come back to this passage at the end of this section. I wish here to 
discuss Schopenhauer’s engagement with Greek thought in these two chapters, and 
especially to observe how his interpretation of the simile of the leaves in many ways 
complements Leopardi’s. 
 
In Chapter 41 Schopenhauer discusses the role of death in the life of the human species, 
especially insofar as consciousness of it prompts humans to metaphysical enquiry and to 
the formulation of religious and philosophical theories. With the aid of empirical data 
(such as the experiences of people experiencing death-like situations such as fainting, or 
the direct observation of dead bodies), and with the backup of famous thinkers (ranging 
from Socrates to Voltaire) or major religions such as Buddhism, Schopenhauer sets out 
to show what death really signifies for conscious living beings. The chapter is crammed 
with references to ancient Greek thought, from ideas from Socrates and Plato to the 
                                                   
464  Some notion of Schopenhauer’s relationship with Greek thought (although with almost exclusive 
focus on Euripides’ Bacchae) can be found in Nussbaum (2006), and various articles on Nietzsche 
and the Greeks discuss Schopenhauer in passing. Yet as of today, and to the best of my knowledge, no 
work has yet solely and thoroughly explored Schopenhauer’s relationship with the Greeks. Cf. 
Cartwright (2010), 117, 133 on Schopenhauer’s study of Greek.  
465  All quotations from Schopenhauer come from the German edition by von Löhneysen (1960-1965). 
The English translations consulted are Payne (1966); Norman et al. (2010), although the second 
volume, more relevant to this chapter, is yet to be published. 
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teachings of Epicurus.466 It is thus undeniable that the work of the philosophical schools 
of Greece permeates the discussion of death. And yet, on a different level, there is 
another sense in which Greek thought is fundamental to this chapter. In a less striking 
manner the reader is made aware that also the poetic wisdom of ancient Greece plays a 
crucial role in shaping Schopenhauer’s conception of death – just as it will do with his 
conception of life’s suffering in Chapter 46. Some of these poetic references lie on the 
outer shell of Schopenhauer’s relationship with Greek thought; so for example the 
mention of Odysseus’ strength in bending the bow – a reference to Odyssey 22 – is 
possibly more of a learned note than anything else.467  
 
Yet there is more. Shortly before the mention of Odysseus’ force – used as an example 
for the disappearance or perpetuation of energies or non-corporeal forces – 
Schopenhauer had been dealing with the similarity between the time of non-existence 
after death and that before birth. Reflecting on the fact that we do not fear the time 
before existence, but we dread that which comes after existence, Schopenhauer seems to 
invite the reader to use the little he knows about the first period of non-existence to shun 
terror about the second period, i.e. death. This is possible on the grounds of the quasi-
total identity between these two parts of eternity, which, as Schopenhauer puts it, “are 
not distinguished by anything except by the intervention of an ephemeral dream of 
life”.468 In the midst of an attempt at a definition of death stands, in fact, a definition of 
life, which is the part we positively know. The juxtaposition of the image of the dream 
with the idea of ephemerality leads me to suggest that behind this one characterisation 
of human life stands Pindar’s definition of human existence in Pythian 8 (vv. 92-97), 
which Schopenhauer had already quoted from the Greek in his Book 1.5.469 At this point 
in the Supplements Schopenhauer is not concerned with defining life as much as he is 
                                                   
466  Cf. Nussbaum (2006), 351 n. 7 on how the paragraph discussed shows “how deeply Schopenhauer 
was steeped in both Platonic and Hellenistic, as well as Eastern, thought”, saying that “Schopenhauer 
refers frequently to the Hellenistic philosophers, both Epicurean and Stoic, citing the texts in both 
Greek and Latin.” 
467  Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 601. 
468  My italics. Translation from Payne (1966), 467 with small modifications, cf. von Löhneysen (1960-
1965), vol. 2, 629.  
469 Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 1, 49. Payne (1966), 17. The idea of ephemerality comes up 
repeatedly in Chapter 41.  
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with exploring death, but the analysis of the defining features of existence lies only a 
few pages away, in Chapter 46. As we shall see, the piercing characterisation of the 
brief span of existence as an ephemeral dream acquires a different flavour when seen in 
the light of the reflections on Greek conceptions of human life in Chapter 46, and so 
does Schopenhauer’s engagement with Greek thought in Chapter 41.  
 
But there is something more that connects the two chapters and their outlook on Greek 
existential ideas – aside from the presence of Greek characters such as Odysseus or the 
allusion to Pindar. Chapter 41 had opened with the discussion of the meaning of death 
for mankind, after which follows the study of the significance of death for the wider 
system of nature. Schopenhauer’s analysis means firstly to highlight the patterns and the 
mechanisms that guide the functioning of natural life, whose symbol he identifies in the 
circle: nature does not conceive of the individuality of the single insect or dog, but only 
cares about their race or species, which is unhindered by the individual birth or death of 
each particular insect or dog. The death of individual beings does nothing to the system 
itself, since for the one creature that dies many others are generated and the overall 
balance of the system is preserved. It is at this point that Schopenhauer brings the focus 
back to humanity: the discussion of the role of death within the wider natural system is 
supposed to have supplied the data needed for the understanding of the role of death in 
human existence, and Schopenhauer seems to imply that man is in fact fully ready to 
accept this mechanism insofar as it concerns the animal and vegetal beings. Yet when it 
comes to the understanding of his own death, man clings to the belief in his own 
individual importance, and remains oblivious of the similarity between himself and the 
rest of nature.  
 
Schopenhauer’s previous examples taken from natural life included a dog, a bird, a frog, 
and an insect. But this time, as he attempts to tackle the full extent of human delusion 
and to explain how man should instead look at his own existence and death, 
Schopenhauer chooses to talk about leaves.470 The man who thinks of future generations 
and fails to see the link between himself and them, between his own disappearance and 
the perpetuation of the species which is possible through future humans, is like a leaf 
                                                   
470 Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 609-610. 
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that, about to wither and fall, complains and cannot see the use of its death and of the 
life of the new green leaves. Schopenhauer’s language makes ample use of examples, 
comparisons, and metaphors; the trope of the leaves – to which he gives the voice of a 
deluded human – is thus entirely consistent with his usual style. But whereas the reader 
is not always given a chance to learn about the provenance of his examples, this time 
Schopenhauer explicitly references the source for the leaves trope.  
 
Verse 146 from book 6 of the Iliad is quoted in full to conclude the section about 
leaves.471 We have already discussed the Homeric passage, but let us remind ourselves 
of one feature that makes it so important for Schopenhauer in this context. The circular 
motion that pervades the simile – the death of the leaves at 147, their rebirth at 148, and 
the new start of the circle brought about by 149’s reworking of 146 by inverting the 
position of ἀνδρῶν in the line – hints at the circularity of nature’s mechanisms. The 
simile gives us the sense that in the eternal cycle of births and deaths the (different and 
individual) leaves that are born and die form one continuum which propagates the 
species and makes up for the disappearance of the individual.472 It is this circularity 
inherent in the Homeric passage that Schopenhauer now reworks and concentrates on.  
The comparison with the leaves reminds men that although as individuals we are born, 
wither, and die, our race survives in the multitude of generations that precede and 
succeed us on the earth.473 And whereas the implicit comparison with the immortal gods 
– who are not subject to any of the described mechanisms – fosters a sense of gloomy 
necessity, the idea of rebirth in the new entities of the species opens to a new 
understanding of the mechanisms of the cosmos.474  
 
                                                   
471 Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 610. 
472  Cf. Lowry (1995), 198 on how leaves signify “large or indeterminate quantities”, cf. the process of 
generalisation described for ants in Chapter 2. 
473 Cf. Vox (1979) analysing this aspect of the Homeric simile by drawing a comparison with Hesiod’s 
generations of men at Op. 109ff. The generations are different one from the other and yet they share 
their destiny, death: “le stirpi degli uomini, in quanto umane, si succedono effimere”. Yet Vox sees a 
major difference between the Homeric and the Hesiodic passage: the Iliadic genealogy traced by 
Glaucus is, as a whole, “unilateral” (insofar as it it avoids envisioning the end of Glaucus’ γενεή for 
encomiastic reasons). Hesiod instead is “tracing the non-encomiastic history of humankind”, and is 
more keen to mention the two “physiological complementary moments”, i.e. births and deaths (which, 
in Glaucus’ speech, are only present in the simile of the leaves). 
474 Cf. Kirk (1990), 176 who sees instead in the passage “no suggestion of rebirth”. 
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In the context of the encounter between the two warriors it is precisely the incessant 
turnover of generations that can guarantee the safety of both warriors. Glaucus’ 
introduction, consisting of his description of his lineage and ancestors, rather than 
ensuing combat prompts instead the discovery of mutual bonds of hospitality dating 
back to the far past of their ancestors (Il. 6.215-218) and triggers the pair’s decision not 
to fight. 475  It is the ancestors – those leaves that have already fallen to the ground – that 
secure present survival for the new generations. There is a positive side to the short-
lived measure of human existence, and it lies in the bonds that genetically tie each 
generation to the following.476 
 
These features of the Homeric passage must have informed – if not in fact contributed 
to shaping – Schopenhauer’s notion of the cycle of natural existence. In the attempt to 
convince man of the vanity of his fear of death as loss of individuality, Schopenhauer 
seems to ultimately emphasise the moment of rebirth over that of death. The text of 
Schopenhauer leading up to the Iliadic quotation stresses the ideas of regeneration and 
growth inherent to – but not exclusive in – the Homeric simile:477 that which is the end 
for the individual is nothing but the progression of the species. Yet, this realisation 
cannot but be a confirmation of pessimistic interpretations of the destiny of man on 
earth: the acceptance of death as a common, natural, and unavoidable part of existence 
strikes the very core of the will to live which animates humans. Thus Schopenhauer’s 
exuberant testimony to the regenerative power of natural life is also, implicitly, proof of 
                                                   
475 Although inherent to Glaucus’ story is also the fact that he has divine ancestry, as Piccaluga (1980), 
249-251 detailedly shows; Piccaluga’s analysis of Glaucus’ genealogy also suggests that although 
many of Glaucus’ ancestors try to reach the divine status, many “tuttavia ricadono nonostante tutto 
nell’ineluttabile sorte degli uomini, quella di essere soggetti alla morte”. 
476  Taking a slightly different perspective and yet supporting my point Piccaluga (1980), 248 suggests 
that the positive aspect implied by the passage (in the context of the comparison between mortals and 
immortals) is humans’ ability to procreate: “Ci si riferisce, in concreto, all'eventualità di scorgere, 
sullo sfondo di questo inesorabile proclama della finitezza del genere umano, la rivendicazione di 
quella specie di “surrogato di immortalità” concesso a questo, implicito nella facoltà di riprodursi, per 
cui, pur essendo effimeri come le foglie, appunto come queste gli uomini continueranno ad 
avvicendarsi sulla terra”. 
477  Cf. Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 607-609. 
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the vanity of man’s will to individual existence and validation of the fact that “So weilt 
Alles nur einen Augenblick und eilt dem Tode zu.”478  
 
Interestingly, the aspect of the trope explored by Schopenhauer is never explicitly 
tackled by Leopardi in connection with the trope itself. Nonetheless, the ideas 
underlying Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the comparison of men and leaves are 
central to Leopardi’s worldview: man’s unjustified conviction about his own superiority 
(and that of his own race) was expressed, amongst others in the Operette, by the 
dialogue of Sprite and Gnome just as by Schopenhauer’s talking leaf. More than 
anything however, there is no clearer expression of the belief in the survival of the 
species against that of the individual than the words that Leopardi attributes to Strato 
just a few lines after the passage previously analysed:479 
 
Ma imperciocché la detta forza non resta mai di operare edi modificar la materia, però quelle 
creature che essa continuamente forma, essa altresì le distrugge, formando della materia loro 
nuove creature. Insino a tanto che distruggendosi le creature individue, i generi nondimeno e 
le specie delle medesime si mantengono, o tutte o le più, e che gli ordini e le relazioni 
naturali delle cose non si cangiano o in tutto o nella più parte, si dice durare ancora quel 
cotal mondo.480 
 
Both Schopenhauer’s understanding of Greek thought and Leopardi’s role in this 
analysis of the history of the pessimistic worldview becomes more apparent in Chapter 
46, which explores the theme of the “vanity and suffering of life” (“Von der Nichtigkeit 
und dem Leiden des Lebens”). The chapter, which is as much a vindication of 
pessimism as it is a rebuttal of optimistic theories, eventually aims at demonstrating that 
                                                   
478  Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 611. Redfield (1975), 102 analyses insightfully both sides of the 
Iliadic episode: on the one hand he sees it (and Glaucus’ speech in particular) as a praise of kinship; 
on the other hand he shows clearly the pessimistic notion underlying the episode’s ultimate reflection: 
“only within the order of culture do men have proper names and individual identities; as creatures of 
nature they are perfectly ephemeral. Nature cares nothing for the life of the individual and everything 
for the life of the species. To speak of the generations of men as like the growing of leaves is to see 
oneself as, after all, insignificant”. 
479  Another central passage is Zib. 4169, cf. Di Meo (2001), 82-83. 
480  TPP (2013), 579; Cecchetti (1983), 385: “But since that power never ceases to act upon and to change 
matter, it destroys those very creatures that it continuously forms, and from their matter it forms new 
creatures. Thus, although individual creatures are destroyed, as long as their genera and species are 
mostly preserved and as long as laws and the natural relations of things remain wholly or mostly 
unchanged, we can say that the world still exists.” 
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this is the worst of all possible worlds, that life consists mainly of evils, and that, as a 
consequence, it would be better for mankind not to be born and for this world not to 
exist. 481  The demonstration of such assumptions takes place on various levels. 482 
Schopenhauer’s first argument is the impossibility for humans to experience real 
happiness, happiness which is conceivable only at different points in time – the past or 
the future, and never in the present – and never by itself, but only in relation to the 
absence of suffering and pain. Then (sorely intertwined with the absence of real 
happiness) comes the explanation of the violent dominion of evils, anguish, and pains 
that rules the world of men, sufferings which are both inflicted upon men by external 
forces and events and exacerbated by the destructive behaviour of men towards other 
men. Seen in this light, concludes Schopenhauer, life is nothing but the paying off of a 
debt contracted with birth, a debt that pains the borrower only to ultimately end with 
death.483 As the reasoning progresses, Schopenhauer shifts his attention from time to 
time to the existence of man and to that of the world.  
 
By the end of the chapter Schopenhauer feels he has sufficiently proven his points, 
either through the example of real life situations, the authoritative words of famous 
thinkers (ranging from Diogenes, to Hume, to Voltaire), or by confutation of specific 
optimistic theories. But it is at this point that, to further support his argument and to 
show the reader that such an understanding of the world predates his own theories, 
Schopenhauer provides evidence of “great men of all ages” who expressed similar 
concerns about the state of the world:484 
                                                   
481  Note how this chapter opens with another definition of life as “dream”, cf. Von Löhneysen (1960-
1965), vol. 2, 733. 
482  At this point the image of the leaves has not yet left Schopenhauer’s mind: a poem by Byron (number 
126 of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, in Dearbon (1835), 37) is quoted in full by Schopenhauer as vivid 
expression of these truths about the world in the poem men are rained upon with sorrows and diseases 
“like dew”, thus feeding into the image of the tree, its branches and leaves of a few verses above. 
483  Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 742-741. On the idea of life as a debt see Cons. Ap. 10. It is 
difficult to say whether the Consolatio ad Apollonium could be a direct source for the idea; 
Schopenhauer certainly knew Plutarch’s Moralia, from which he quotes often in the Supplements. 
Janaway (2006b), 318 and n. 2 sees this tendency “to speak more often in the vocabulary of value” as 
typical of Schopenhauer. 
484  Cf. Dahlkvist (2007), 95: “most of the pessimists go to some length yo show that most of the great 
minds in the history of mankind have been proto-pessimists”, quoting Agnes Taubert’s statement that 
“Der Pessimismus is so alt wie die Reflexion der Menschen über sich und sein Leben”. One should 
recall that Leopardi himself wrote something similar in his Dialogo di Tristano e di un amico, TPP 
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Wollte ich nun schließlich, zur Bekräftigung meiner Ansicht, die Aussprüche großer Geister 
aller Zeiten in diesem, dem Optimismus entgegengesetzten Sinne, hersetzen; so würde der 
Anführungen kein Ende seyn; da fast jeder derselben seine Erkenntniß des Jammers dieser 
Welt in starken Worten ausgesprochen hat.485 
 
What follows is in fact a series of quotations of various lengths, which, by 
Schopenhauer’s programmatic declaration, start with the Greeks, who “although [...] 
they decidedly stood at the point of view of the assertion of the will, were yet deeply 
affected by the wretchedness of existence”.486 The quotations follow one another 
without any strict chronological order. Herodotus’ statement about the Thracian custom 
of mourning the new-borns (Hdt. 5.4.2) is followed by a poem transmitted by Plutarch 
and then topped up with a Mexican tradition much resembling the aforementioned 
Thracian custom; to this again Schopenhauer connects Swift’s “custom of keeping his 
birthday not as a moment of joy but of sadness” and his habit of reading on that day a 
Biblical passage related to the theme (Job 3). 487  The first few lines following 
Schopenhauer’s remark about the great men of all ages start in fact with the Greeks, but 
then wander off into a complex mise en abyme of references on the idea of the necessity 
of mourning birthdays; the references reduplicate, intersect, and craftily fit one inside 
the other like Russian dolls. The choice of referencing thinkers across the ages serves a 
double and somewhat contrasting purpose: on the one hand the antiquity of some of the 
quotations provides validation to Schopenhauer’s point. On the other hand the multitude 
of quotations coming from all corners of human history dissolves the significance of 
linear time: from the beginning of recorded history great minds have agreed about 
Schopenhauer’s assumptions and the freedom with which he skips from quotation to 
quotation highlights the unity and a-temporality of such an understanding of the world. 
But it is the Greeks who resurface once more after Swift’s anecdote. After Plato’s 
                                                                                                                                                     
(2013), 603, cf. the Epilogue to this thesis. Cf. Dahlkvist (2007), 29 n. 37 on “the Aristotelian account 
of all great men as melancholics” (Aristoteles, Pr. 30.1), see Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl (1979), 17 
and 18-29. 
485  Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 750. 
486  Cf. Miranda (2005), 36: “Ancor prima di Nietzsche, e contestando l'interpretazione classicista che, in 
nome del mito della serenità olimpica, identificava mondo greco e ottimismo, Schopenhauer aveva 
riconosciuto lo sfondo pessimistico della cultura greca.” 
487  In Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 751. Leopardi worked on the vulgarization of a fragment of 
the Book of Job, see TPP (2013), 446.  
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Apology 40c-e and Heraclitus B48 DK488 comes a series of poetic quotations: Theognis 
425-428 and Sophocles’ Oedipus Colonus 1225 (both on the idea of µὴ φῦναι), 
Euripides’ Hippolytus 189 on the painful nature of human life, and finally Homer with 
the verses on the miserable condition of human beings among other creatures from 
Odyssey 18.489 
 
Overall, the balance of quotations tilts heavily towards the Greek texts: they are for the 
greatest part explicitly quoted rather than merely referenced, as most of the other texts 
are, and they outnumber any other literary or philosophical tradition recalled by 
Schopenhauer. The prominence given to the Greek quotations is probably owed to the 
extreme clarity and directness of the Greeks’ sentiment towards non-existence and to 
the diffusion of such sentiment in their writing, facts that Schopenhauer had clearly 
noticed. More than merely suggesting that death is preferable to the vanity and suffering 
inherent in life, the Greeks repeatedly and lucidly stated that never to exist would be the 
very best for man. It becomes now apparent that some of the core principles of this 
worldview (which now Schopenhauer clearly traces back to the Greeks) featured 
throughout Chapter 46 well before Schopenhauer admits their connection to the Greek 
conception of human existence. The connection between the end of Chapter 41 and the 
very end of Chapter 46 lies not only in the crucial presence of Greek thought, but also in 
the aspects of Greek thought that Schopenhauer chooses to lay emphasis on. 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic reading of the Homeric trope of the leaves fits perfectly 
with the worldview conveyed by Chapter 46’s quotations. It seems then no coincidence 
that the Iliadic passage is treated or quoted in conjunction with many of the other 
pessimistic statements – such as the ones regarding the idea of better not to be born – in 
both Barthélemy’s chapter and in Burckhardt’s account of Greek pessimistic thought.490 
 
As the chapter now approaches its conclusion Schopenhauer provides a few further 
references to “großer Geister”: Pliny, Shakespeare, Byron, and Gracian. But the very 
last paragraph of the chapter is devoted to a sole author, Leopardi: 
                                                   
488  Number 48 in Kirk (1954), 116; Schopenhauer has βίῳ instead of τόξῳ. 
489  Schopenhauer quotes Theognis 425 with the variant ἀρχὴν µὲν at the beginning of the verse, cf. the 
apparatus in West (1989), 194. 
490  Burckhardt et al. (2005), 358. 
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Keiner jedoch hat diesen Gegenstand so gründlich und erschöpfend behandelt, wie, in 
unsern Tagen, Leopardi. Er ist von demselben ganz erfüllt und durchdrungen: überall ist der 
Spott und Jammer dieser Existenz sein Thema, auf jeder Seite seiner Werke stellt er ihn dar, 
jedoch in einer solchen Mannigfaltigkeit von Formen und Wendungen, mit solchem 
Reichthum an Bildern, daß er nie Ueberdruß erweckt, vielmehr durchweg unterhaltend und 
erregend wirkt.491 
 
No individual quotation is singled out from the works of the Italian thinker, and 
Schopenhauer’s own words justify the impression that he is thinking of the entirety of 
Leopardi’s work and thought as he knew it.492 Schopenhauer’s admiration for Leopardi 
shines through in other places in the works of the German philosopher, where it is 
repeatedly addressed as a “similarity of spirit”. In the letter sent to Schopenhauer urging 
him to read the works of the Italian thinker in February 1858 – the same year in which 
Schopenhauer added the final paragraph on Leopardi to Chapter 46 – Adam von Doß 
called Leopardi “this southern doppelganger in pessimism”, a definition echoed in 
Schopenhauer’s letter to David Asher (3 January 1859), where the German philosopher 
calls Leopardi “meinen Geistesverwandten”.493 The two authors’ interests in Greek 
thought, its heritage, and its relevance for modernity meet at several points, not least in 
their common attention to the meaning and significance of the trope of the leaves.494 But 
Schopenhauer’s fondness for Leopardi relates not only to the themes explored by the 
Italian thinker, but also to the imaginative and multifaceted manner in which Leopardi 
explores such themes. As we have seen, the way Leopardi so variously tackled the 
Greek idea of human ephemerality seems like the perfect illustration of such an attitude; 
                                                   
491  Von Löhneysen (1960-1965), vol. 2, 754. The passage is discussed by Dahlkvist (2007), 97-98, who 
specifies that this entire paragraph is “an addition included in the third edition of the book, from 
1858” and who links Schopenhauer’s interest in Leopardi to letter of 20 February 1858 from Adam 
von Doß which he cites from Hübscher (1978), 154 (which I unfortunately could not get access to). 
492  On the relationship between Schopenhauer and Leopardi see De Sanctis’ (2007), 52: “Leopardi e 
Schopenhauer sono una cosa. Quasi nello stesso tempo l'uno creava la metafisica e l'altro la poesia del 
dolore. Leopardi vedeva il mondo così, e non sapeva il perché. [...] Il perché l'ha trovato 
Schopenhauer con la scoperta del Wille”. On De Sanctis’ dialogue, Dahlkvist (2007), 100-101. Ibid. 
95-102 is possibly the most detailed account of the relationship between the two authors. 
493  Again citing from Hübscher (1978), 440 in Dahlkvist (2007), 99; cf. ibid. 99-102 on Schopenhauer’s 
conviction of his similarity with Leopardi on account of the shared pessimism, providing anecdotes 
reported by contemporaries of Schopenhauer. 
494  Ibid. 98-99, Schopenhauer owned the first two volumes of Leopardi’s Opere, containing the Canti, 
the Operette, the Pensieri, and some of Leopardi’s translations from Greek and Latin. 
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the same themes are toured and probed from multiple perspectives and in a mesmerising 
number of settings. The scholarly approach is harmonised with the inventive (and in a 
way unscholarly) act of (mis)attributing ideas to ancient philosophers; poetry – both in 
the act of translation and in that of creative reinterpretation – and prose are equally  
valid exploratory tools. Leopardi’s relationship with the intellectual history of 
pessimism, and in particular with the part that the Greeks played in this history, is 
another tile in the mosaic of pessimistic inventiveness which Schopenhauer praised so 
wholeheartedly: the continuous exchange between the words of the ancients and the 
needs and understanding of modernity triggers the fact that Leopardi’s “system” of 
pessimism contains not only nominally, but in fact structurally and essentially the 
wisdom of the ancients. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Human Questions, Divine Answers: Silenic Wisdom and the Worth of 
Existence 
 
“And that is the very thing that alarms me,” returned Dantes. 
“Man does not appear to me to be intended to enjoy felicity 
so unmixed; happiness is like the enchanted palaces 
we read of in our childhood, where fierce, fiery dragons 
defend the entrance and approach; and monsters of all shapes 
and kinds, requiring to be overcome ere victory is ours. 
 
 A. Dumas (1844) The Count of Monte-Cristo495 
 
I 
Leopardi and the µὴ φῦναι: Brief Notes on an Encounter 
 
Non siamo dunque nati fuorchè per sentire, qual felicità sarebbe stata se non fossimo 
nati? Striking in its composed violence, the note is dated February 18th 1821; no further 
comments or reference are added, and the question echoes unanswered on page 676 of 
the Zibaldone. In a manner nearly absurd given its laconic brevity, the note grapples 
with issues – life and its value, existence and non-existence, and, last but not least, the 
complex web that forms human ideas about the nature of happiness and its attainability 
– the gravity of which is also almost completely at odds with the various annotations 
that crowd the very same page.496 The question as Leopardi formulates it is not strictly 
rhetorical; the reader gets glimpses of both the (ever so slight) struggle of the author in 
embracing the affirmative answer and its tragic implications, and the author’s pained 
disbelief at the full vanity in which human life is cast by such insight. It is precisely the 
affirmative answer and the belief at its core that represent the note’s paradoxical centre 
of attraction, the monstrous and yet fatally hypnotic possibility that it would in fact be 
better for man not to have been born.  
 
                                                   
495 In Chapman and Hall (1846), 27-28.  
496 A variety of annotations on entirely unrelated subjects, ranging from the saying Quot homines, tot 
sententiae to M.me de Lambert’s reflections on womanly love. 
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And despite its seeming loneliness in the context of Zibaldone 676, this theme – the 
paradox embedded in the happiness that comes with non-existence and its ties with 
ideas about the human condition – is in fact a magnetic pole throughout Leopardi’s 
work, and an utterly crucial element in his thought. The reader of the Operette, of the 
Canti, and of the Zibaldone will remember it cropping up at multiple points. Even just a 
look at one of the last passages observed in Chapter 3 of this thesis (the Leopardean 
description of the suffering garden) provides an apt example of the wide-ranging 
presence of this idea. The raging (and yet profoundly lucid) attack on existence that fills 
three pages (Zib. 4174-4176) of the Zibaldone’s manuscript – starting with the outcry 
“everything is evil” and then blooming into the extensive symbolic depiction of the 
suffering garden – had closed on the comparison between the garden itself and a 
hospital, whose inhabitants ought to feel that non-existence would have been preferable 
to existence (“certo è che il non essere sarebbe per loro assai meglio che l’essere”).  
 
The vividly pictorial way by which Leopardi describes the garden and wraps up the 
significance of its existence does full justice to the importance of this idea in his wider 
work: hand in hand with the denunciation of the harm inherent in existence – so central 
in the garden passage – the notion that it would be better not to be born is in fact both 
pivotal and ubiquitous in Leopardi’s thought. Just as in the present case, it invariably 
represents the resting point of any argument about the value of life; very few other ideas 
in the whole of Leopardi’s works are scrutinised as intensely, and reworked so often and 
so passionately, as the case for non-existence.  
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1. Biographical Data and Biblical Wisdom 
 
Salomon et Job ont le mieux connu et le mieux parlé de la misère de l’homme, 
l’un le plus heureux et l’autre le plus malheureux; l’un connaissant 
la vanité des plaisirs par expérience, l’autre la vérité des maux. 
 
B. Pascal, Pensées 221497 
 
Both the Zibaldone and Leopardi’s letters bear witness to the fact that our theme had 
become precociously central to the poet’s mind. As early as 1819 a 21 year-old 
Leopardi – who had just failed in his attempt to escape the paternal home in Recanati – 
was writing to his younger brother Carlo that “It would have been better (humanly 
speaking) for them and for me, if I had not been born, or that I had died a long time 
ago”.498 What is especially striking in his personal history is the fact that Leopardi was 
directly and precociously exposed not only to facts and events that may have triggered 
such a pessimistic worldview, but really to the notion, to the pondered idea that it is 
preferable not to exist. An especially significant medium was the (religious) education 
imparted to Leopardi by his mother. From Leopardi’s writings the reader learns how 
Adelaide Antici steadily inculcated into her children the idea that existence is in itself 
sin, evil, and danger, and that departure from life (especially a premature one, such as 
that of infants) must be rejoiced over. Both Adelaide’s words and behaviours, described 
in a variety of settings by Leopardi, testify to one essential belief, though she seems to 
always have stopped short of this extreme formulation: it would be better for humans 
not to be born.499  
 
Even though space only allows us to note this point briefly, it is worth remembering that 
                                                   
497 In the edition by Kaplan (1982), 190. 
498 My translation. In TPP (2013), 1185. Cf. Grilli (1982), 58.  
499 Two Zibaldone passages are especially telling in this respect. One is Zib. 353-355, describing the 
rejoicing attitude of a very religious mother towards the loss of her children (or risk thereof). In 
Leopardi's insightful words, the mother's behaviour is a testimony to the almost perfect equation 
between sin and existence: life equals numberless chances of temptation and sin; Giacomo deduces 
from such conduct the unequivocal belief that, by dying, the children not only have lost nothing, but 
really have gained much. Whether we want to believe or not that the mother depicted in the page is in 
fact his own, it remains unquestionable that Leopardi was not only precociously drawn to ponder over 
the matter of bereavement, but also exposed to behaviours that questioned the natural reaction to 
(especially untimely) death. 
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Biblical wisdom played an important role in triggering Leopardi’s obsession with the 
theme.500 The notion so actively believed by Leopardi’s mother appears with articulate 
limpidity in the Ecclesiastes itself (4.2-3) – which Leopardi repeatedly cites in his 
notes.501 Likewise the figure of Job,502 a pious man struck by countless banes, is chosen 
in Zib. 504 to exemplify the reaction of strength of the ancients (who searched for 
reasons and faults outside themselves, in the adverse gods and fate), is remembered for 
his defiant cursing of his birth, and reappears (more or less overtly) elsewhere 
throughout Leopardi’s work.503 Not least, the Book of Job appears (albeit quite covertly) 
in Leopardi’s Detti memorabili di Filippo Ottonieri, an 1824 piece in the style of 
memorabilia displaying the life philosophy of Ottonieri. Ottonieri is a modern Job on a 
smaller scale, who, shortly after alluding to the Biblical book in his description of life as 
a night spent sleeplessly on an uncomfortable bed,504 turns to reinterpret the Zibaldone 
                                                   
500  Brief selection of general literature on the subject: Casoli (1990); Negri (1997); Niccoli and Salvarani 
(1998); Rota (1998). 
501  Cf. Ecclesiastes 4.2-3 on which Presti (2016), 174; In general on Leopardi and Job and Leopardi and 
the Ecclesiastes Marcon (2007a), drawing a parallel between Solomon and Leopardi; Presti (2016), 
especially 170-177, who strongly disagrees with Marcon’s religious reading of Leopardi’s relationship 
with the Ecclesiastes. It must be mentioned that we find little help for the present research in 
Marcon’s works, that seem for the most part based on rather loose text comparisons and analogies, for 
which they have been criticised by Biscuso in his 2010 review. The impact of his mother’s teachings 
interweave in his writings with his reflections on religion: by February 1822, 23 year-old Leopardi 
(Zib. 2381-2383) can see the practical application of what he has distilled from his mother’s acts and 
words in other aspects of Christianity, and in particular in the renunciation of existence operated by 
Christian monasticism. For Leopardi on Solomon and Homer see the Epilogue to this thesis. 
502  Cf. Marcon (2007a), 1 noting how “fin dal finire dell‟ ‘800 Leopardi venne chiamato ‘Giobbe di 
Recanati’”, quoting Carducci’s “Introduzione a G. Leopardi”, in AA. VV. (1898), xiii.  
503  Cf. Presti (2016), 145. Compare the letter Leopardi sent to Pietro Giordani on April 24th 1820: “Se noi 
fossimo antichi, tu avresti spavento di me, vedendomi così perpetuamente maledetto dalla fortuna, e 
mi crederesti il più scellerato uomo del mondo. Io mi getto e mi ravvolgo per terra, domandando 
quanto mi resta ancora da vivere. La mia disgrazia è assicurata per sempre: quanto mi resterà da 
portarla? quanto? Poco manca ch’io non bestemmi il cielo e la natura che par che m’abbiano messo in 
questa vita a bella posta perch’io soffrissi”. My italics. Text in TPP (2013), 1199, on which cf. Presti 
(2016), 178. Cf. Zib. 507 again on Job. 
504  Cf. Galimberti (1998), 322 n. 36 who reports Della Giovanna’s (1899) suggestion of the Book of Job 
as a reference for this passage, but seems more inclined to think that “il comune spunto si spiega, oltre 
che con ascendenze letterarie […], con la spontanea forza icastica del paragone.” Recently, Presti 
(2016) analyses the allusion to the Book of Job and links the passage with Zib. 4104. The Book of Job, 
which had been so relevant in the composition of the note Leopardi wrote one month earlier (Zib. 
504), supplies here another layer of comparison, engaging with the Socratic image. The image of 
tormented and sleepless nights is twice present in chapter 7 of the Book of Job: first, it is a restless 
night which longs for the wake of dawn (3-4), second comes the night plagued by terrible dreams and 
visions. It is significant that in the Book of Job too the sleepless nights are a metaphor for the nature of 
existence: chapter 7 is introduced by “Does not man have hard service on earth?” to which follows a 
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note on which this chapter started, Zib. 676. This time, rather than leaving the 
(rhetorical) question open as he had done in the Zibaldone note, Leopardi casts it as 
Ottonieri’s assertive and witty response to “to what purpose are men born?”505 Ottonieri 
responds: “To find out how much better it is not to be born”.506  
 
2. The µὴ φῦναι: Existing Research, Barthélemy, and a Problem in Focus 
 
A third and potent role in the formation of Leopardi’s ideas of the evaluation of 
existence and non-existence is played by his wide-ranging readings, which exposed him 
to various and diverse interpretations of this notion. Amongst the various literary and 
philosophical traditions, just as Schopenhauer will later note,507 the ancient Greeks 
figure prominently for both the space they dedicate to the exploration of this notion and 
for the precocious entry of such meditations into the landscape of Western literature. 
Because of the undeniable relevance of this theme in Leopardi’s work, and perhaps due 
to the provocative nature of the µὴ φῦναι itself, two works of scholarship have directly 
tackled the theme of this chapter, i.e. the connection between Leopardi’s view of 
existence, non-existence, and birth, and the ancient sources that proclaim that it is best 
for man not to be born.508  
 
The first is Alberto Grilli’s “Leopardi, Platone, e la filosofia greca”, from the 
proceedings of the 5th Convegno internazionale di studi leopardiani. The second is 
                                                                                                                                                     
grim comparison between life and slavery. The image is also reminiscent of the Socratic description 
of death as comparable to the dreamless night, a night anybody – even the Great King – would 
consider better than any other (Apol. 40C-e). Thus Socrates’ example and Job’s comparison of life 
and slavery – where parts of such life are precisely those unbearable restless nights – offer the reader 
ancient proof of the discomforts of existence.  
505  TPP (2013), 559. The two sentences differ in one respect. Whereas the Zibaldone note openly speaks 
of happiness (that happiness which is certainly impossible once one is born, but of which one 
paradoxically imagines non-existence to be made of), Ottonieri employs the word “spediente”, which 
pertains rather to the semantic field of the idea of “usefulness”. One could imagine Ottonieri to be 
voicing an even darker notion than the one drafted by Leopardi three years before: happiness is so out 
of the question that the criteria of usefulness is the one now used to define the gap between existence 
and non-existence. 
506  TPP (2013), 559. Cecchetti (1983), 303. 
507  And we have seen in Chapter 3 III. 
508  This is especially unusual given the general lack of research on the subject of Greek pessimistic 
thought in Leopardi’s work. 
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Guido Polizzi’s “La scoperta del ‘meglio non essere mai nati’”, presented at the 12th 
Convegno internazionale di studi leopardiani and strongly connected to the research 
that was to result in his 2011 Giacomo Leopardi: la concezione dell’umano, tra utopia e 
disincanto, a work I mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis. Both articles 
concentrate heavily (if not exclusively) on one moment in the history of Leopardi’s 
contact with the µὴ φῦναι, i.e. on his reading of Chapter 26 and 28 of Barthélemy’s 
Voyage in 1823, in the conviction (shared by a great part of the scholarship)509 that this 
is the moment of Leopardi’s encounter with this notion in Greek thought.510  The main 
focus of their analysis is a series of pages in the Zibaldone (2671ff), written in Rome in 
December 1823, which document with annotations and word-by-word transcriptions 
Leopardi’s reading of these chapters in the Voyage.511 The passages copied or referred to 
by Leopardi contain references to some of the central occurrences of the µὴ φῦναι in 
ancient literature.  
 
Despite the importance of this material for any study on this subject, in taking this 
stance the two articles fall short of the task in two respects. First, they neglect a great 
deal of crucial evidence, failing to consider the elements in Leopardi’s work and 
thought which address this idea before 1823 and the reading of Barthélemy,512 and how 
those elements connect with ancient sources. The second shortcoming is a side product 
of the two articles’ rigorous philological approach, aimed at assessing whether or not 
Leopardi ever came into direct contact with the sources mentioned by Barthélemy 
(especially Grilli) and at scrutinising the details of Leopardi’s contact with 
Barthélemy’s text itself (especially Polizzi). Obsessed with the Zibaldone pages and the 
relevant sections of Barthélemy, these scholars fail to acknowledge, but most 
importantly to discuss, the role that the µὴ φῦναι plays in the Canti and in the Operette 
                                                   
509  Stefano Brogi (2012) briefly tackles Leopardi’s interaction with the µὴ φῦναι in the context of his 
focus on the idea of the nolo renasci, indeed present in Leopardi’s work. Given the strong connection 
between the notion of the nolo renasci and that of the µὴ φῦναι one could have hoped Brogi would 
treat the theme himself; yet, he merely refers back to Timpanaro’s work and to Barthélemy’s Voyage, 
in Brogi (2012),15-16 and note 10. 
510  The reading took place during Leopardi’s trip to Rome at the end of 1823; the edition he consulted, 
printed in Paris, is referenced at Zib. 2670.  
511  Cf. note 44 in Chapter 1. For bibliography on Leopardi’s time in Rome, cf. Polizzi (2001), 61 n. 1. 
512 Cf. Grilli (1982), 58 who spends only a brief paragraph mentioning the aforementioned letter to Carlo 
and Zib. 353-354. 
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in a series of passages that testify to the enormous (albeit less literal) impact that the µὴ 
φῦναι had on Leopardi. Failure to observe these passages (otherwise highly commented 
upon) through the lens of the µὴ φῦναι results in a restricted view of Leopardi’s 
interpretation of Greek pessimistic thought (and of the µὴ φῦναι in particular) and a lack 
of appreciation of the nuances of such interpretation. This chapter aims at remedying 
such shortcomings by focusing on a selection of passages where Leopardi uses the µὴ 
φῦναι, in one way or another to connect his insights with those of antiquity. The chapter 
is organised in short sections, which do not aim to fully explore each issue. Rather, they 
centre on a number of original observations, hoping to enrich the standard 
interpretations of these passages, and ultimately to bring to light some of the flickers 
that testify to the continual link between Leopardi and ancient pessimistic thought.  
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II 
Greek Stories of Non-Existence 
1. Sappho, Existence, and Homeric Pessimism 
 
The path of fascination with both the poetry and the (real and mythical) persona of 
Sappho that was to lead Leopardi to the composition of his Ultimo canto di Saffo (1822) 
started at least as early as 1814, the year of his first translation from the Lesbian 
poetess.513 As we read in the unpublished foreword to it, the Ultimo canto – the very 
peak of this path – is meant to sing of the unspeakable misfortune inherent in 
ugliness.514 In it Sappho is in fact a splendid and suffering soul in an ugly body, depicted 
by Leopardi as she speaks (to herself, to us, to the gods, fate, and nature) about her 
unhappiness at the dawn of the day that will see her suicide.515  This is not the place for 
a detailed treatment of Leopardi’s complex relationship with Sappho’s work and life, a 
subject that has intrigued generations of scholars and that continues to spark new 
research, nor do we have room for a thorough analysis of the Ultimo canto itself.516 
Rather, the nature of this poem gives us the chance to make a few brief observations 
regarding the way in which insights into the meaning of existence and its connection 
with suffering are, for Leopardi, always rooted in the wisdom of antiquity.  
 
Two interconnected movements of thought mark Sappho’s last song and her insights 
into existence. First is the pained and yet lucid connection Sappho draws between her 
unhappiness and her own existence, a connection that has already been made by the 
time she is singing in front of us. One thing is now limpidly clear to Sappho: her own 
suffering – which sprung from the unbridgeable gap between the beauty of her soul and 
the unseemliness of her body, and consequently her tragic and unreciprocated love – is 
                                                   
513  On the poem L’impazienza, translating PMG 58 in Page (1962), cf. especially Gigante (2003), 64-67.  
514  TPP (2013), 471-472. 
515  As Leopardi himself declares, his main source is Ovid’s Heroides 15. 
516  A selected bibliography on the poem (excluding the commentaries on the Canti): Dell’Aquila (1979); 
Blasucci (1987); Lonardi (1992); Gigante (2003); Felici (2002) reprinted in Felici (2005); Lonardi 
(2005); Raboni (2012); Presti (2016), 27-31. 
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one and the same as her life.517  Her grief and misery commenced with her very 
existence, and are inextricable from it.  
 
This insight resonates throughout the Canto, manifesting itself insistently in the form of 
the emphatic appearance of the theme of birth, which recurs with almost rhythmical 
insistence throughout the poem, as obsessive in the head of the reader as it is in 
Sappho’s. We see it first in verses 37-39, expressing the notion that not only birth, but 
the moment such birth was decreed to happen and the individual’s life was set into 
existence, are at the core of one’s unhappiness (“What monstrous fault, what impious 
transgression/ Stained me before my birth [natale], making the Heavens/ So ill-disposed 
and fortune turn her face?”).518 It appears once more at vv. 47-49: “We are neglected/ 
Children [prole], and born [nascemmo] to weep, whose raison d'être/ Rests with the 
gods.”519 The theme crops up not only at different points throughout the poem, but also 
at different stages in its drafting, as we can see in a previous version of the 
aforementioned verses 37-39, where verse 37 appears as “Which fault, before I opened 
my eyes to the day”.520 The recurrent reference to the moment of birth is an indirect and 
yet revealing testimony to the importance of this moment as symbolic of Sappho’s 
acquired insight.  
 
But there is a second, wider movement of thought sweeping through the Ultimo canto. 
The clue is – among others – in that first person plural that Sappho repeatedly adopts, 
and on which interpreters have long dwelled.521 “We are neglected/ Children, and born 
                                                   
517  Cf. Raboni (2012), 119 on the connection between the Ultimo canto and the Inno ai Patriarchi, both 
discussions of man’s unhappiness as the result of something that predates birth (in the Inno it is, in a 
Christian perspective, the original sin).  
518   My italics. 
519  Cf. (my italics) Il sogno (1820-1821), v. 55: “Nascemmo al pianto/ Disse, ambedue; felicità non rise/ 
Al viver nostro; e dilettossi il cielo/ De’ nostri affanni” and the Inno ai patriarchi, v. 7, composed a 
few months after the Ultimo canto: “Immedicati affanni/ Al misero mortal, nascere al pianto,/ E 
dell'etereo lume assai più dolci/ Sortir l'opaca tomba e il fato estremo,/ Non la pietà, non la diritta 
impose/Legge del cielo.” 
520  My translation. In the original: “Qual fallo mai, qual sí nefando eccesso/Macchiommi anzi il natale, 
onde sí torvo/ Il ciel mi fosse e di fortuna il volto?” 
521  Cf. among others Dell’Aquila (1979), who also explores the relationship between the use of plural 
and autobiographism; Lonardi (1992), 180-181: “Il riferimento si muove con ambiguità ‘ricca’ tra l’io 
singolo, il duale (io Saffo parlo a te Saffo) e tutti noi, tutti nati al pianto”; Felici (2002), 348 “ora un 
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to weep, whose raison d'être/ Rests with the gods”; we, and not I, is what Sappho 
sings.522 Sappho’s realisation is that not only is she not alone in her fate, but her 
unhappiness is ontologically the very substance of life, affecting every person from the 
dawn of existence.523 The universal nature of Sappho’s definition of life as expressed in 
vv. 37-39 is reiterated again at 61-62, as she addresses the one who has rejected her: 
“Live happily, if ever on this earth/ A happy mortal lived”. Her wish of happiness for 
Phaon is poisonously entangled with an idea that, despite being formulated as 
hypothetical, does not lose its menacing and gnomic tone: “no mortal man can be 
happy” is the subtext of Sappho’s words. The fact that Phaon shares none of Sappho’s 
personal grounds for unhappiness – as far as we know he is neither ugly nor suffering 
from unrequited love – is not a guarantee of his future happiness, because no mortal is 
exempt from the misery inherent in birth and human life.524 The continuous intertwining 
of these two insights – the connection between pain and existence on the one hand, and 
the universal nature of such an axiom on the other – makes the Ultimo canto a perfect 
specimen of Leopardi’s deep and complex relationship with the idea of the identity 
between life and unhappiness, and thus an ideal springboard for this chapter’s 
observation of Leopardi’s thoughts on the preferability of non-existence. 
                                                                                                                                                     
noi che si estende all’intera umanità”; cf. Raboni (2012), 121 for a summary of the scholarship on the 
various functions of Sappho’s plural at different points in the Ultimo canto; Presti (2016), 28, 30. 
522  The fact that Sappho is not singing merely of herself is accepted by scholarship. Two especially 
enlightening discussions are Blasucci (1987), esp. 844-845 and Raboni (2012), 117 who suggest the 
universal value at the core of the Ultimo canto as the reason for the poem’s place in the final edition 
of the Canti. Raboni (2012), 120 suggests that the change (with the removal of the first person 
singular possessive pronoun) to verse 37 from “Qual de la mente mia nefando errore” to the final 
“Qual fallo mai, qual sì nefando eccesso” is motivated by the same intent.  
523  Cf. Dell’Aquila (1979), 19: “pessimistica visione di una condizione umana destinata al dolore”; 
Lonardi (1992), 181: “Saffo giunge a questa uscita dall’io verso tutti nell svolgersi stesso del suo 
canto-riflessione. Dapprima può pensarem come è appunto degli antichi secondo Leopardi, che la 
sventura sia solo sua.” (It must be noted that this thesis profoundly disagrees with Lonardi’s 
suggestion that, for Leopardi, the ancients only realised the individual’s suffering. As this whole 
thesis shows, although he began by supposing the ancients happier than the moderns, Leopardi saw in 
antiquity the first conscious realisation of the universal character of human misery: one example 
among all, the “principato dell’ infelicità” identified by Homer, at the very onset of ancient literature, 
cf. TPP (2013), 593 and at Chapter 2 III.2 in this thesis.) 
524  In the original: “Vivi felice, se felice in terra/ Visse nato mortal.” In a note to the verse, Leopardi 
explains – once again resorting to the theme of birth – that the addition of “nato” to “mortal” was 
necessary to distinguish humans and gods. My translation of the note (capitalisations by Leopardi): 
“The Gods, according to the ancients, were BORN, and not MORTAL; and many of these had lived 
for some time ON EARTH; and many were earthly and always lived there, such as the nymphs of the 
woods, rivers, sea, etc. Pan, the sylvan gods, etc. etc.” 
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To reach any certainty about the fact that Sappho’s plural – appearing as early as verse 
8 – is not merely an idly used “royal we”, but rather a deep marker of comprehension of 
human life, the reader needs to listen to the Greek wisdom which softly but clearly 
murmurs in between Leopardi’s – and Sappho’s – words. But this wisdom is not 
(Leopardi’s) Sappho’s (or rather, not only Sappho’s, at least for what Leopardi could 
have known about her): rather it is the cumulative and deeply assimilated force of Greek 
poetry – and of one poet in particular, Homer – that speaks to us through Sappho’s 
voice, conveyed more or less consciously by Leopardi to strengthen the poetess’s claim. 
The presence of this ancient wisdom is the other reason for starting this chapter with 
this poem: Sappho’s insights cannot be fully understood if one fails to perceive that they 
are grounded in Leopardi’s wider reception of ancient ideas about the worth of 
existence, thus making the Ultimo canto an exemplary case of Leopardi’s relationship 
with and use of his sources. The wide impact of ancient sources on the Ultimo canto – 
chiefly Ovid and Virgil – has been explored extensively, and we shall thus limit 
ourselves to sketching some of the connections that link the Ultimo canto’s insights 
with ancient thought.  
 
One of the clearest signs of the presence of ancient ideas is the mention of the jars of 
Zeus at 63-64, an allusion to the speech of Achilles to Priam in Iliad 24.527ff: two jars 
lie at Zeus’ feet, one of evil and one of good, and from them comes the lot of mankind. 
The voice is that of Achilles, but it is an Achilles who is speaking not just for himself, 
but for Priam, Hector, for his own father and for the whole of humanity; an Achilles 
who in the course of the epic has learned and changed, to the point of being chosen as 
the one to utter one of the most sweeping, strong, and controversial ideas about 
humanity in the whole of the Homeric poems. But the point here is that this (quite 
overt) reference helps explains another, tying Sappho’s conception of life very tightly 
with that of Achilles. In Achilles’ speech the tale of Zeus’ urns comes as an explanation 
for his previous, harsh statement at 24.525-526 (ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι 
βροτοῖσι/ ζώειν ἀχνυµένοις), an aetiology for man’s necessary and inescapable 
unhappiness. Similarly, Sappho’s recourse to the myth of the two jars expands what the 
poetess has slowly been building from the start of the poem, from the idea that man is 
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born to weep (47-48) to the certainty that no man, not even those superficially blessed 
with more abundant gifts, can ever be happy (61-62). It is not by chance then that one 
section of verses 47-49 is glossed in a note by Leopardi with an explicit reference to 
Homer and to the formulaic verse (θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται) that acted as a direct source 
for Leopardi’s 48-49.525  
 
Both this realisation and Sappho’s wish for Phaon with its underlying definition of the 
human condition, are Leopardi’s reinterpretation of Iliad 24.525-526; Sappho feels 
things differently from Achilles, and their situations are not similar, but nevertheless her 
grasp of life echoes directly that of the Greek hero. Perceiving Achilles’ voice – and, 
with it, the entirety of Achilles’ deep insights into the human condition at this point in 
book 24 – is thus vital to appreciating both the universalism at the core of Sappho’s 
lament and the ageless significance that Leopardi attributes to it. 
 
Something more can be said concerning Sappho’s use of the myth of the two jars of 
Zeus and its significance for Leopardi’s reception of Homer. Here is what Sappho says 
at 62-65: “Jove has not sprinkled/ Me with the liquor meaning happiness/ From his 
ungenerous jar, from when illusions/ Died with my dreaming youth.” The Iliad tells of 
Zeus’ two jars (δοιοὶ πίθοι); yet Leopardi’s Sappho alludes to the myth in a specific 
way, i.e. by only mentioning the one jar – that of good, from which she has received so 
little – and by conspicuously refusing to name the other. The absence of the second jar – 
all the more glaring if we bear in mind how famous a passage Achilles’ speech in Iliad 
24 is – has the effect of bringing the reader’s attention to the jar which is not mentioned. 
The effect is further emphasised if we think that in one of the versions preceding the 
final publication Leopardi chose the word “ampolla” to describe the jar of good 
things;526 the fact that good comes from a phial – a container that cannot hold more than 
a few drops – can only make us wonder (again, by contrast) about how large the other 
                                                   
525  E.g. Il.17.514, Od.1.267. 
526  Cf. Leopardi’s own note on why Sappho calls Zeus’ jar a “phial”: “Homer says a cask, Sappho a 
phial, which is, as you see, far less: (to know) the reason she wishes to call it so, ask those who know 
about life” (my translation). See Felici (2002), 326; Lonardi (2005), 129 on the role played by 
Vincenzo Monti’s translation of the Iliad (1810 and following) on Leopardi’s language choices, 
among which “doglio”.  
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receptacle must be.527 The choice of giving the jar of evils indirect and yet powerful 
prominence is obviously programmatic, aimed at making its absence a statement, a 
silent but irresistible apophasis of the real substance of the lot given to humanity.  
 
A similar glaring absence features in Achilles’ explanation of the tale of the two jars, 
which describes two possible outcomes for humans: man can either receive a mixed lot, 
meeting now evil, now good, or he can be given only evils. Nowhere is the possibility 
that someone could be given only good things ever hinted at in Achilles’ speech; it is 
precisely this absence that acts as the best possible elucidation of Achilles’ bleak maxim 
at v. 525 (ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι/ ζώειν ἀχνυµένοις). In this case 
too it is an absence that exposes in all its cruelty the ordeal intrinsic to human life. And 
it is this belief and understanding of the human condition that is the vital interpretative 
key to the connection between Sappho’s statement about the human possibility of 
happiness and her reuse of the story of Zeus’ jars.528 Leopardi’s Sappho testifies to her 
author’s complete and dauntless appreciation of the bleak philosophy propounded by 
Homer’s Achilles. This belief is the one underlying Sappho’s words and Leopardi’s 
thought, and it is distinctly Homeric. The comprehension of the fact that real happiness 
is utterly outside the grasp of humanity and that it is, in fact, the very antonym of the 
human condition comes to Leopardi – at least at this point in time and in this context – 
                                                   
527 The fact that Leopardi eventually settled for “doglio” does not weaken our argument. In fact, the fact 
that very little good comes from a larger container only speaks of the stinginess of he who is in charge 
of it. Besides, the fact that Leopardi began by thinking of the jar as a “phial” only supports the view 
that from the very beginning Leopardi thought of Sappho’s conclusions as universal: the size of the jar 
is the same for everybody, not just for Sappho. The second version of the Ultimo canto thus seems to 
me to stress the negative role played by external and superior forces in the life of humans. In the 
Canto itself the external giver is a poignantly mixed crowd that ranges from “nature” to “Jove”, to 
“fate”, as if to encompass every external force man as ever thought of, and to signify their cohesive 
and relentless disregard for human happiness; on these external forces’ relationship with Leopardi’s 
concept of “Natura”, cf. Felici (2002), 357.    
528  Cf. Pindar Pyth. 3.82-83: ἓν παρ ̓ ἐσλὸν πήµατα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς ἀθάνατοι, on which see 
Young (1968), 50-51 arguing that in describing three jars (one of good and two of evil things) – 
Pindar interprets accurately Il. 24.527 and that such understanding corresponds to “the attitude of 
most Greeks toward life itself”. Cf. Fränkel (1975), 118 n. 11 on the fact the jars of the Iliad become 
one jar of evil things in Hesiod’s myth of Pandora at Op. 82, 94; cf. also Hesiod Op. 179 saying that 
ἀλλ ̓ ἔµπης καὶ τοῖσι µεµείξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, although at 175 it described a time of sorrow in 
which χαλεπὰς δὲ θεοὶ δώσουσι µερίµνας. 
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through Homer.529 Achilles’ deep insights into the human condition are the substratum 
of the pessimistic philosophy of Ultimo canto. So deeply has Leopardi listened to the 
profoundly pessimistic message voiced by the Homeric hero that he can now seamlessly 
improvise on it with his Sappho.530 
 
2. “Favole” or the Art of Facing the Truth: A Note on Interpreting Fiction 
 
The issue at the core of the Dialogo di un fisico e di un metafisico is one that runs 
through much of Leopardi’s production,531 and one that we have observed at work in the 
Ultimo canto di Saffo in the previous section: whether life is per se worth living or 
whether existence is only desirable when gifted with happiness (a possibility that, as the 
reader already knows, Leopardi denies a priori).532 The trigger to the piece is, once 
again, a Zibaldone note (Zib. 352, that eventually finds space in the Dialogo itself in the 
author’s note 2) describing both a Mr Hufeland‘s lessons on “the art of prolonging life” 
and Leopardi’s opinions on such an idea.533 The dialogue is a complex re-enactment of 
this note, where one party, the Scientist, argues for Hufeland’s theory. His counterpart, 
the Philosopher, decidedly conveys Leopardi’s own belief, as one can gather from the 
Zibaldone’s clearly stated conviction that “life in itself has no importance whatever” 
(Zib. 351): existence is (or rather would be) worth it only when happy, and until this is 
possible, one ought rather to find a way to shorten life.534 
                                                   
529  Leopardi mentions the encounter between Priam and Achilles multiple times, e.g. Zib. 99; 261; 1083; 
2767ff; 3162. 
530  Cf. Gigante (2003), 55 n. 24 commenting on Lonardi (1969) and on the role of Homer for Leopardi’s 
thought. 
531 In Cecchetti’s translation the two characters are “scientist” and “philosopher”. We shall keep to this 
translation while bearing in mind the implications of the original names.  
532 On the dialogue cf. Almansi (1997); Biscuso (2006). Small’s (2007) The Long Life tackles the 
philosophical history of issues at the core of the Dialogo di un fisico e di un metafisico, in particular 
the connections (or oppositions) between a long life and a good life.  
533 On Hufeland, German doctor and author of Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern, 
published in Jena in 1797 cf. Biscuso (2006); Marcon (2007b) proposing that Hufeland “embodies a 
trait-d’union between the philosopher Immanuel Kant and the poet-philosopher Giacomo Leopardi”; 
Biscuso (2003). 
534  On the topic of suicide in the dialogue cf. Biscuso (2006), 12-13, linking the present dialogue with the 
Dialogo di Plotino e Porfirio, also suggesting that suicide is for Leopardi foreign “al sentire umano” 
and that (n. 44) “non a caso nel Dialogo di un Fisico e di un Metafisico chi si suicida sono dèi, come 
Chirone, o esseri mitici come gli Iperborei, privi di effettive caratteristiche umane (sono immortali ed 
esenti da infermità o altri mali”; cf. Marcon (2007b), 61 who quotes Leopardi’s Disegni letterari: 
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Since their fundamental disagreement cannot be solved by the initial confrontation, the 
Scientist tries to shake his opponent’s convictions by posing the possibility of eternal 
life for man (“If man could and did live forever – I mean to say, without dying, and not 
after death – don’t you think that he would like it?”). The Philosopher’s reply to the 
Scientist’s challenge is a turning point in the dialogue: “To a fictitious premise, I’ll 
reply with fiction”, says the Philosopher.535 From here on, the Philosopher’s response is 
grounded on exempla, which are drawn, as he himself admits, from what he calls 
“favole”; since nobody has lived forever, only the fabulous characters of literature can 
offer insight into such an unrealistic premise. The Philosopher lists, in order, the stories 
of the 18th century alchemist Cagliostro, of the centaur Chiron, of the Hyperboreans, of 
Cleobis and Biton,536 of Agamedes and Trophonius,537 and finally of a number of 
populations said to live a maximum of forty years.  
 
The significance of Leopardi’s seamless introduction of the idea of “favole” – and the 
choice of which fictions to introduce – has been overlooked by critics. In her recent 
commentary to the Operette, Laura Melosi quickly disposes of the issue by explaining 
“favole” in a footnote as “in popular culture ‘false tales’, stories without real foundation 
[…]”.538 Yet what is here once again at stake is the relationship between poetry and 
philosophy, which fuse in this dialogue like no other to make a united front against the 
fatuous idiocy of the Scientist’s view of life, dumbly blinded by τὰ φυσικά.539  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
“Qui si auspica l’avvento di qualcuno atto ad insegnare «l’arte della felicità», anche se, anni dopo, 
Leopardi progetterà un «arte di essere infelice» poiché «quella di essere felice, è cosa rancida; 
insegnata da mille, conosciuta da tutti, praticata da pochissimi, e da nessuno poi con effetto», in TPP 
(2013),  1112. 
535 “A un presupposto favoloso risponderò con qualche favola” in TPP (2013), 526. Cecchetti (1983), 
155. 
536  Interestingly Chiasson (2005), 42-43 suggests that Herodotus alerted “his audience at the outset to the 
legendary nature of the story to follow”; cf. Fowler (1996), 78 and Hdt. 1.31.2. 
537  On this myth, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1979);  
538  Melosi (2015), n. 21 page 238: “popolarmente ‘fole’, storie senza fondamento, di genere diverso da 
quelle ‘antiche’ che popolano le Canzoni”. 
539 Cf. Biscuso (2006), 3: “Il Fisico impersona invece quel tipo di scienziato moderno che opera 
ingenuamente […]in quanto […] crede che […] un maggior sapere accresca necessariamente la 
felicità.” 
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How are we supposed to interpret the Philosopher’s notion of “favole”, and 
consequently, what are we supposed to make of the ones he uses? I suggest that two 
interconnected passages from the Zibaldone can help us answer such questions. The 
first passage (Zib. 637) is an early (1821) reflection on the meaning of the myth of Eros 
and Psyche, that Leopardi interprets as symbolising the harm inherent in the knowledge 
of man’s fate on earth. This myth, that he sees as a “progeny of the most ancient 
wisdom and knowledge of the nature of man and of this world”, Leopardi calls 
“favola”.540 Further confirmation that “favola” can be for Leopardi an explicit token 
signifying depth of philosophical perception, and that Zib. 637 is not an isolated 
thought, comes from one of the notes adduced at the outset of this thesis.  
 
One of Leopardi’s most profound reflections on ancient poetics, Zib. 2940 observed the 
inextricable bond existing in antiquity between poetry and philosophy, and more 
particularly between poetic forms and philosophical ideas and enquiries. The note 
originated from Leopardi’s discussion (2939) of the many myths, tales, and stories that 
in antiquity (both in Biblical and in Greek and Latin texts) spoke of the connection 
between man’s knowledge and use of reason on the one hand and man’s unhappiness on 
the other. According to Leopardi, the harm inherent in a lucid understanding of the fate 
of man in the world is at the root of the ancients’ tendency to disguise the truth with 
poetry. One of the examples of these “truths […] announced in verses” is  – two years 
after the 1821 note – once again the myth of Eros and Psyche, and, more importantly, a 
myth which is still referred to with the word “favola”. 
 
The Philosopher’s remarkable insistence on the word “favola” – a term that he first 
introduces into the dialogue and which crops up five times in the first section of his 
reply alone – should alert the reader to the fact that Leopardi means to make a point 
with it. Far from signifying mere triviality and fantasy, “favola” is in this context a 
token of wisdom and a warranty of philosophical veracity. The metaphysical dignity 
that Leopardi’s reflections grant to the poetic and fictional world described by the 
                                                   
540  “[…] appena posso discredere che quella favola non sia un parto della più profonda sapienza, e 
cognizione della natura dell’uomo e di questo mondo”. For reasons I fail to comprehend, the 2013 
Zibaldone translation has “part” for “parto”.  
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Philosopher empowers the substance of the “favole” themselves, informing the reader 
of how he is supposed to receive them. 
 
There is something to be said about which “favole” the Philosopher chooses. In his 
Zibaldone reflections, Leopardi had seen in antiquity (again both classical and biblical) 
a special genius in fostering the spark that derives from the connection between poetry 
and philosophy.541 This conception of ancient poetics is reiterated in the Dialogo di un 
fisico e di un metafisico through the Philosopher’s selection of exempla, consisting for 
the main part (five out of six instances) of ancient material, testifying to Leopardi’s 
understanding of ancient wisdom as the perfect incarnation of ancient poetics. In turn, it 
explains the Philosopher’s – as well as Leopardi’s – appeal to antiquity: it is not for lack 
of other options, but rather in light of the uniqueness of antiquity’s grasp of both the 
human condition and the way to convey it.  
 
2.1. Lucian’s Chiron: Anything But Life 
 
The second exemplum provided by the Philosopher is that of the centaur Chiron, a story 
that Leopardi gathers from one of Lucian’s Dialogi Mortuorum (as he himself specifies 
in a note to the dialogue):542 “[…] the great sage, Chiron, who was a god, with the 
passing of time grew tired of life, secured Jove’s permission to die, and died.”543 The 
Philosopher’s account summarises (at the same time as it elaborates) on the Lucianic 
dialogue, a discussion of Chiron’s choice to renounce immortality and to die, taking 
place in Hades between him and Menippus. The dialogue is built on a subtle and 
continuous paradox, which is rooted at the core of the idea of Dialogues of the Dead: 
although they are dead, Menippus and Chiron are in a locus, and can interact, and even 
discuss. More than any other in the Dialogi Mortuorum, the one between Menippus and 
                                                   
541  Leopardi could read an interpretation of this very point – utterly pivotal throughout his own work – in 
Plutarch’s De audiendis poetis 36d-f, which he was reading in the very same days in which he was 
consulting Barthelemy’s French edition in Rome. It is a tempting idea to see in Plutarch’s definition 
of the use of poetry as a validation for philosophy a trigger also for Schopenhauer’s recourse to poetic 
sources in his list of pessimistic große Geiste aller Zeiten; Plutarch’s work figures in fact as one of his 
sources. 
542  The note: “Vedi Luciano, Dial. Menip. et Chiron. opp. tom. 1, p. 514.” as we know from his Elenchi 
di letture in TPP (2013), 1113ff, Leopardi had been reading Lucian with some constance from 1819. 
543  TPP (2013), 527. 
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Chiron fully and consciously exploits the premise of the whole work – the idea that 
death is a type of existence, at least insofar as it grants the characters the possibility to 
discuss – as an integral part of the dialogue’s topic, i.e. the differences in nature and 
worth between life and death.  
 
Thus Menippus’ questioning and challenging of Chiron’s choice hinges precisely on the 
similarity between the life Chiron has abandoned and the one he is currently “living”, a 
similarity which the centaur does not seem aware of and that provokes Menippus’ 
repeated nudges. The lack of ποικιλία – a lack which is the ancient precursor of 
Leopardi’s noia and Schopenhauer’s Langeweile – has pushed Chiron to give up 
immortality, but, as Menippus insinuates, is at risk of presenting itself again in this 
other life which Chiron is leading in Hades. The idea that something in Chiron’s 
bargain has gone wrong becomes all the more explicit towards the end of the dialogue, 
as Menippus suggests that Chiron could find himself in the position of having to look 
for ἄλλον βίον. 
 
 On the one hand then, Lucian seems to question (and possibly deride) Chiron’s 
decision, which has only led the centaur from one life into another. And yet, as usual, 
Lucian’s irony aims at multiple (and almost conflicting) targets. Just as we can read in 
the dialogue a mockery of Chiron’s short-sightedness, we can also get a hint of the 
slight544 caricature of a passage from one of Lucian’s favoured satirical victims, Homer. 
The Homeric nekyia of Odyssey 11 is obviously an immediate precedent of a work like 
the Dialogi Mortuorum. But besides being in general a piece of reception of Odysseus’ 
encounter with the Underworld, the dialogue of Menippus and Chiron seems to play 
especially with the vision conveyed by many of the ghosts of Odyssey 11. One of 
Menippus’ questions interrogates Chiron on whether he does not miss seeing the light 
of day (οὐχ ἡδὺ ἦν ζῶντα ὁρᾶν τὸ φῶς; 1). The mention of the light of day resonates 
heavily with one of the sorest points for the spirits encountered in the Homeric nekyia. 
First Teiresias at 11.93, followed by Odysseus’ mother at 11.223, and finally by 
Achilles at 11.498, the ghosts of Hades hold φῶς/ φάος – the light of day, but also, one 
                                                   
544  Lefkowitz (1969), 84 makes a similar point about Bacchylides 5. 161-162 “ἀελίου […] φέγγος”, 
suggesting that “Heracles’ pity for Meleager and the formulaic phrase “light of the sun” again recall 
the scene where Odysseus and Heracles meet in Hades (Odyssey 11.617-626)”. 
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should bear in mind, a synecdoche for life itself –545 as one of the most dearly missed 
features of life on earth. 546  It is not by chance that Lucian’s own nekyia (the 
Necyomantia, explicit parody of the Odyssean episode) begins with Menippus’ mention 
of light (ἐς φάος, Nec. 1). The Homeric characters’ insistence on the precious nature of 
light/life seems to be joked about by Lucian; Chiron answers Menippus’ question with a 
brief and perfunctory οὔκ, and then proceeds unscathed with his own explanation for 
hating life. One could thus read in the Lucianic dialogue also an ironic reversal of the 
Homeric characters’ nostalgia for the world of the living, an irony and a reversal that 
would have certainly appealed to Leopardi.  
 
Leopardi’s alertness to Lucian’s sharp and multifaceted irony and to the various levels 
of interpretation of the dialogue seeps through in the Philosopher’s characterisation of 
Chiron as “saggio”. In the Lucianic dialogue, Chiron is not only never labelled as sage; 
rather, the centaur is the victim of Menippus’ cutting irony, who, inviting Chiron to be 
συνετός, is indirectly suggesting that the centaur might not have been all that smart in 
the first place, renouncing life for another (possibly equally monotonous) existence.547 
Just as with Lucian, we are left wondering about Leopardi’s exact interpretation of 
Chiron’s choice. Whether he is suggesting that Chiron is in fact smart (because any 
existence is better than this existence), satirising on the god’s spoiled perception of 
existence,548 or simply smilingly winking at Menippus’ clever rebuttal of the centaur’s 
choice, Leopardi has chosen Chiron for the dense tangle of poetic ideas on the worth of 
existence. Perhaps, this multiplicity is what Leopardi (and Lucian) might have 
preferred: there is no simple answer to the questioning of existence. 
 
                                                   
545  Especially in archaic poetry, cf. Homer Od. 10.498; Hesiod’s λείπειν φάος ἠελίοιο in Op.155; Thgn. 
569. 
546  One could be reminded of Anaxagoras’ response to the question  τίνος ἕνεκ’ ἄν τις ἕλοιτο γενέσθαι 
µᾶλλον ἢ µὴ γενέσθαι in Aristotle Eud. Eth. 1.1216b, indicating the contemplation of the sky and the 
cosmos as sufficient reasons for chosing existence. Anaxagoras’ opinion is referenced one section 
after Aristotle’s discussion of the reasons why men might prefer non-existence: πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι 
τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, <δι’ ἃ> προΐενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περιωδυνίας χειµῶνας· ὥστε δῆλον 
ὅτι κἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἱρετὸν ἦν, εἴ τις αἵρεσιν ἐδίδου, διά γε ταῦτα τὸ µὴ γενέσθαι. (1.1215b) on which 
Laurenti (1985), 53. 
547 Menippus answers indirectly to Chiron’s own remark in section 1, Ἐρῶ πρὸς σὲ οὐκ ἀσύνετον ὄντα. 
548  Compare with Fénelon’s pious and optimistic Chiron in his Dialogues des morts 3, on which Weinbrot 
(2005), 76-77. 
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The idea that even gods could be drawn – for a variety of reasons – to renounce 
existence, makes one striking appearance in the Odyssey. Yet it is not boredom but 
suffering – the suffering inherent in his existence – that pushes the god Hephaestus to 
wish he had not been born.549 While there is no proof that this episode was on Lucian’s 
mind as he composed the dialogue of Menippus and Chiron, or indeed in Leopardi’s 
mind as he retold the centaur god’s mishap with existence, it is beyond reasonable doubt 
that both authors shared a profound familiarity with the Homeric epic;550 it is thus worth 
briefly reminding ourselves of this episode, which grapples with themes extremely 
relevant to both authors’ reflections.  
 
Demodocus’ song, performed at the Phaeacian court in the presence of Odysseus, 
recounts the affair between Ares and Aphrodite, and of Hephaestus’ discovery and 
punishment of the cheating couple.551  But when the success of his trick faces him with 
the bare and unforgiving reality of his wife’s infidelity, Hephaestus cries out to the 
assembled gods (8.311-313): 
 
                         ἀτὰρ οὔ τί µοι αἴτιος ἄλλος,  
ἀλλὰ τοκῆε δύω, τὼ µὴ γείνασθαι ὄφελλον.  
ἀλλ’ ὄψεσθ’, ἵνα τώ γε καθεύδετον ἐν φιλότητι. 
 
Conscious that Aphrodite’s unfaithfulness is primarily caused by his own physical 
lameness and monstrosity (8.307-311), Hephaestus’ lament is grounded on the 
recognition that the very cause of his suffering is his own essence and that the only ones 
to blame are those who begot him.552 Thus the lament over an unfaithful wife becomes a 
reflection on the persistence of one’s existential marks. Hephaestus’ wish is of course 
                                                   
549  I am here reassessing some of the material discussed by Yoav Rinon’s article on “Tragic Hephaestus”, 
Rinon (2006), although Rinon fails to discuss the god’s wish not to have been born. Rinon (2008) also 
fails to mention the part of Hephaestus’ speech in Od. 8 which concerns his wish never to have been 
born. 
550 Leopardi mentions Demodocus at Zib. 130 and 4328. 
551  For interpretations of the connection of the second song of Demodocus to the context of book 8 and to 
the Odyssey in general see Burkert (1960); Braswell (1982); Newton (1987); Brown (1989); Rinon 
(2008), 114-126. 
552  See Halliwell (2008), 83 n. 78.  
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prompted by the god’s unique status;553 alone among the gods he shares two of 
mankind’s prerogatives, i.e. physical limitation and the fatigue of work. It is this 
extreme and unparalleled proximity to human life that prompt his peculiar exposure to 
suffering.554 The god’s terrible – and quasi-human – wish not to have been born can 
only be explained in this light. This divine recognition is thus extremely informative of 
(some of the) Homeric ideas on human life: if even a god is led to wish never to have 
been born, how powerful and ineludible must be the suffering intrinsic to human life?  
 
2.2. Of Gods and Life: A Note on Divine Opinions 
 
Commentators agree unanimously about the fact that Leopardi did not derive the story 
of Cleobis and Biton directly from Herodotus’ Histories, but rather from pseudo-
Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Apollonium.555  The fact that the myth came to Leopardi from 
the Consolatio and not from Herodotus can be confirmed – more than by the simple 
impossibility of proving he ever read Herodotus, on which Timpanaro and others seems 
to rely – by the verbal similarities between the Operette’s and the Consolatio’s versions. 
The oxen (βόες) of Herodotus 1.31.2 become mules (ὀρεῖς) in the pseudo-Plutarchean 
text and consequently in the translation consulted by Leopardi.556 The idea behind the 
Greek ὑποδύοµαι – which describes the brothers’ action of going underneath the 
carriage to carry it on their shoulders – is translated by Leopardi with the very same 
verb “sottentrare” chosen by Adriani.  
 
                                                   
553  Which is discussed by Rinon (2006) and (2008), 127-144. Rinon speaks explicitly of Hephaestus as 
“tragic” and his 2006 article is targeted to show how the tragic character of Hephaestus is based on his 
experience of “irretrievable loss as well as constant pain”.  
554  It is certainly true that the other gods too can experience suffering through closer contact with 
humanity: Zeus can be distressed for the death of his son Sarpedon (Il. 16.458-461) and Aphrodite can 
sense physical pain if injured in battle (Il. 5.343). Any contact with mankind is likely to bring to the 
gods a brief taste of the very consistency of human life, suffering. Yet whereas for the rest of the gods 
this taste is impermanent and ephemeral, Hephaestus is condemned to essentially and eternally share 
something human within himself. 
555 On the myth of the two brothers, see especially Regenbogen (1930); Lloyd (1987); Sansone (1991), 
stressing the ritualistic character of the story; Shapiro (1996) on the consonance between the beliefs 
upheld by Solon and by Herodotus; Stahl (1975), despite briefly tackling the myth; Chiasson (2005); 
Pelling (2006) although not directly tackling the myth, provides a useful springboard for the analysis 
of Solon’s wider speech. 
556  Adriani (1825), 315: “i muli che tiravano il carro”. 
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I wish to add one brief but significant point to this discussion. It seems to me that the 
best proof that (at least at the time of the composition of this dialogue) Leopardi had not 
read the story of Cleobis and Biton in the Herodotean original is the fact that Leopardi’s 
version fails to include a detail that not only would have suited the narrative of the 
Leopardean dialogo extremely well, but that is in itself strikingly fitting with Leopardi’s 
wider thought. Having described the two youths’ efforts in carrying their mother to the 
temple, Herodotus (1.31.3) says that τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου ἀρίστη ἐπεγένετο, διέδεξέ τε ἐν 
τούτοισι ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἄµεινον εἴη ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι µᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν. Cleobis’ and Biton’s 
death is in Solon’s words the proof that the god (here Hera) believes that it is best for 
men to die rather than to live.557  
 
This detail – the fact that the divine itself (with all the necessary implications) is the one 
to admit and decree that man would be better off outside existence – is nowhere in 
Leopardi’s retelling of the myth of Cleobis and Biton.558 And yet the connection 
between divine status (signifying both entitlement to immortality and superior insights) 
and the worth of life clearly features in the dialogue, since one of the Philosopher’s first 
exempla is the god Chiron. The emphasis on Chiron’s divinity is marked: “Now think; 
if gods repine at immortality, how would men like it?” asks the Philosopher.559 But even 
more telling of Leopardi’s keen interest in the role of the divine with respect to the 
value of life is what we read in the Dialogo della natura e di un’anima,560 written only 
one month previously, and tackling the direct correspondence between excellence and 
unhappiness. Nature – a god-like figure in Leopardi’s thought, as we have already 
observed in the Ultimo canto – is forced to break the news to the Soul about to enter 
existence that she is doomed to be miserable. But this fate does not await just this soul – 
                                                   
557  Lloyd (1987), 25: “The function of this detail in the story is to show that there was nothing in the lives 
of Cleobis and Biton that would make death a blessing for them in particular […] The point is that 
death is best for everyone, even for those with an adequate livelihood.” Cf. Lloyd’s comparison of 
Hdt. 1.86.3 with Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1100a 10-17. 
558 The detail is absent from the Consolatio. The retelling of the story in the Voyage mentions it indirectly 
saying that the two youths are made to sleep and die “comme si les dieux n’avoient pas de plus grand 
bien à nous accorder, que d’abréger nos jours”. The detail as told in the Voyage is significantly 
different, because it omits the divinity’s own opinion, on which the strength of the Herodotean 
passage is based. 
559 TPP (2013), 526. Cecchetti (1983), 157. 
560  Melosi (2015) indicates how Nature’s initial invitation “Vivi, e sii grande e infelice” comes from 
D’Alembert’s “Soyez grand et malheureux” in his Éloge de de Sacy, quoted by Leopardi at Zib. 2414. 
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who is nevertheless destined to a deeper unhappiness in light of her excellence – but 
really any soul that comes to life. Twice Nature utters with gnomic certainty the fate of 
men: “And of necessity all men are born and live unhappy”, at the beginning of the 
dialogue, and again at the end of it “All souls of men are given prey to unhappiness 
through no fault of my own”.561   
 
Just as Herodotus’ Hera (who, like Leopardi’s Nature, is divine and yet not directly 
responsible for the quality of the human condition) had stated that death was better than 
existence for humans, Nature incontrovertibly affirms that life and unhappiness are 
inseparably tied. This type of external validation of man’s painful insight about the 
harmful nature of existence lies at the core of both stories. One could hardly believe 
that, had Leopardi read the Herodotean version (strikingly similar to the one of the 
Consolatio, except for the lack of this specific part), he would not have been struck by 
how well the divine statement would fit the narrative of the dialogue. Ultimately, to 
“prove” Leopardi’s lack of contact with the details of Herodotus’ passage helps to 
highlight Leopardi’s intellectual proximity to the thought portrayed by Herodotus, a 
thought which Leopardi independently portrays in the Dialogo della natura e di 
un’anima.  
 
3. Pessimism and “Greekness”: a Thracian Anecdote 
 
The Storia del genere umano, the first of Leopardi’s Operette, narrates the various ages 
in the prehistory of humankind, from a childish and happy golden age to man’s 
progressive discovery of the world’s physical and theoretical limitations, which pull 
humanity down into despair. From then on, the Storia recounts the numerous attempts 
of the gods at modifying the state of man’s life, these attempts’ constant and inevitable 
failure, and the increasing misery of man’s condition. To fully render the boredom and 
the hatred for life that engulfs humanity, Leopardi tells the reader that it is during one of 
these attempts that the custom originated of mourning the day of birth of an infant, and 
of celebrating the deaths of humans: 
 
                                                   
561 TPP (2013), 513, 514. Cecchetti (1983), 105, 113. 
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[…] nacque allora, come si crede, il costume riferito nelle storie come praticato da alcuni 
popoli antichi che lo serbarono,
 
che nascendo alcuno, si congregavano i parenti e loro amici a 
piangerlo; e morendo, era celebrato quel giorno con feste e ragionamenti che si facevano 
congratulandosi coll'estinto.562 
 
Leopardi himself provides a note to the Storia supplying a number of sources for his 
anecdote – whose historical accuracy serves him well in the setting: 
 
Erodoto, lib. 5, cap. 4. Strabone, lib. 11, edit. Casaub. p. 519. Mela, lib. 2, cap. 2. Antolo- gia 
greca, ed. H. Steph, p. 16. Coricio sofista, Orat. fun. in Procop. gaz. cap. 35, ap. Fabric. Bibl. 
Graec. ed. vet. vol. 8, p. 859.563 
 
But, aside from the sources he provides in the note, and as is often the case with 
Leopardi’s published works, the roots of this passage can be traced back also to two 
pages in the Zibaldone. The first, dating to 1822, is Zib. 2607, a note treading once 
again the fine line between the reception of personal experience, of Biblical sapience, 
and of ancient wisdom.564 Like the other Zibaldone passages mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, it conceives of the entrance into life as the beginning of all sufferings (as seen 
in the text, with “burden”, “sorrows, and ills, and passions”, “suffering”, “damage”). 
Like Zib. 676 – and as if no other reaction was possible in this matter but an incredulous 
questioning – the note does not close on a statement, but on a series of questions. Not 
one but three questions are stacked one upon the other to convey the essential absurdity 
of human existence, an absurdity that no answer or statement can account for.565  
                                                   
562  In TPP (2013), 494. Cecchetti (1983), 29, 31. “It was then that among some ancient peoples the 
custom began whereby, when a child was born, relatives and friends would gather together to mourn 
him; and when someone died, the day was celebrated with festivities and speeches and congratulating 
the deceased.” 
563  Cf. Grilli (1982) for full analysis of the note. 
564  In the later (1829) Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia Leopardi will tackle once again 
both the idea that birth is the beginning of all suffering (and that man ought to be consoled for coming 
into life) at esp. 39-54. and the notion that a life full of misery is not worth living (at the core of the 
Dialogo di un fisico e di un metafisico): “Nasce l’uomo a fatica,/ Ed è rischio di morte il nascimento./ 
Prova pena e tormento/ Per prima cosa; e in sul principio stesso/ La madre e il genitore/ Il prende a 
consolar dell'esser nato./ […]Ma perchè dare al sole,/ Perchè reggere in vita/ Chi poi di quella 
consolar convenga?/ Se la vita è sventura,/ Perchè da noi si dura?/ at 39-56 and at 143 “[…]E' funesto 
a chi nasce il dì natale.” My italics. 
565  Zib. 2607: “Per Dio! perchè dunque nasce l’uomo? e perchè genera? per poi racconsolar quelli che ha 
generati del medesimo essere stati generati?”. “Good God! Why then is man born? And why does he 
procreate? To console those he has given birth to for having been born?” 
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The other source is Zib. 2671, part of the series of annotations from the reading of 
Barthélemy’s chapters 26 and 28 that Leopardi made in Rome in February 1823, a note 
that in turn incorporates a number of ancient sources: 
 
Parmi plusieurs de ces nations que les Grecs appellent barbares, le jour de la naissance d’un 
enfant est un jour de deuil pour sa famille (Herodot. l. V, c. 4; Strab. XI, p. 519. Anthol., p. 
16).566 Assemblée autour de lui, elle le plaint d’avoir reçu le funeste présent de la vie. Ces 
plaintes effrayantes ne sont que trop conformes aux maximes des sages de la Grèce. Quand on 
songe, disent ils, à la destinée qui attend l’homme sur la terre, il faudroit arroser de pleurs son 
berceau: (Eurip. fragm. Ctesiph., p. 476; Axioch., ap. Plat., l. III, p. 368; Cicero, Tuscul., l. I, 
c. 48, t. II, p. 273). Même ouvrage, ch. 26, t. III, p. 3 (8 febbraio 1823). 
 
This first excerpt comes from Chapter 26 (De l’éducation des Athéniens) of the Voyage. 
The chapter describes Athens’ (and occasionally other cities’) system of education, 
from the very birth of an infant onwards. The narrative interweaves general information 
about the standard treatment of children, sourced from a variety of ancient writings on 
the subject, with the account of the birth of his friend Apollodorus’ son as witnessed by 
Anacharsis himself. In this setting – where it is not unusual to hear of customs of other 
peoples as a comparison for those of the Athenians – Barthélemy inserts the passage 
quoted by Leopardi. 
 
The way the anecdote in the Storia is formulated reflects very clearly the fact that 
Leopardi must have drawn directly from one (or more) of the primary sources; 
differently from Barthélemy in fact, the Storia passage is bipartite in structure, 
highlighting not only the behaviour at the birth of a child – which is the focus of the 
French author, as his Anacharsis is presently witnessing the birth of a child in his 
guest’s house – but also the ritualistic traditions that occur at the death of an individual. 
This binary arrangement dates back to the original source of the Thracian anecdote, 
Herodotus 5.4.2, and is carried through much of its reception, to include the text of 
                                                   
566  The passage from Strabo is 11.11.8, quoting Euripides fr. 449, cf. Lasserre’s (1975) commentary in 
vol. 8. 
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Pomponius Mela that Leopardi references in the Storia.567 The passage is part of 
Herodotus’ description of the Thracians during Megabazus’ march into their territory; in 
particular, Herodotus focuses on the customs of the different Thracian tribes, among 
which are the Trausi. Here is the excerpt from Herodotus 5.4.2: 
 
τὸν µὲν γενόµενον περιιζόµενοι οἱ προσήκοντες ὀλοφύρονται, ὅσα µιν δεῖ ἐπείτε ἐγένετο 
ἀναπλῆσαι κακά, ἀνηγεόµενοι τὰ ἀνθρωπήια πάντα πάθεα· τὸν δ᾽ ἀπογενόµενον παίζοντές 
τε καὶ ἡδόµενοι γῇ κρύπτουσι, ἐπιλέγοντες ὅσων κακῶν ἐξαπαλλαχθεὶς ἐστὶ ἐν πάσῃ 
εὐδαιµονίῃ.  
 
The very same binary structure is visible also in a fragment of Euripides’ Cresphontes, 
another of the sources mentioned by Leopardi as he copies the text of Barthélemy’s 
Voyage. According to our sources, the Cresphontes told the story of the protagonist’s 
return to his homeland to regain the throne usurped by his father’s slayer, Polyphontes. 
Fragment 449 (I read from Collard’s edition) consists of four verses, whose contextual 
interpretation is particularly difficult given that we lack the rest of the speech that, 
judging from the papyrus, encircled the short gnome:568 
 
ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡµᾶς σύλλογον ποιουµένους 
τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά, 
τὸν δ'αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυµένον 
χαίροντας εὐφηµοῦντας ἐκπέµπειν δόµων.  
 
The way in which relevant scholarship has viewed the relationship between Leopardi 
and this passage calls for some observations. In his aforementioned article, where he 
meticulously analyses the impact of the various ancient sources behind this anecdote in 
the Storia, Grilli, among others, notices how Leopardi copied the reference to the 
Cresphontes so exactly from the Voyage that he replicated a mistake contained in the 
                                                   
567  Pomponius Mela De situ orbis libri III 2.2. Cf. Timpanaro (2008), 16 and n. 37 on how Leopardi 
“Lesse per esempio qualcosa di Erodoto, ma assai meno di quanto si sia supposto”; ibidem, 60 n. 25 
on Leopardi’s project of translating Herodotus. Ibidem, 158 n. 39 Timpanaro explains in detail why he 
disagrees with Setti (1906)’s idea that Leopardi read all of Herodotus 
568  See TrGF Kannicht (2004), 486-487 for testimonia. On the fragment see Harder (1985), 92-98 who 
also lists other loci that discuss the tradition of mourning births; Collard, Cropp and Lee (2009), 142-
143. On the use of passages such as this in consolatory literature, cf. Kassel (1958), 75-76, Lattimore 
(1962), 205-210.  
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edition itself, which read “Ctesiph.” as opposed to “Cresph.”569 Grilli’s reading is 
somewhat confused: on the one hand he deduces that Leopardi never worked out what 
the correct reference was, and that direct contact with the text of Euripides must be 
excluded. Yet, Grilli himself reveals that Leopardi attentively read the fragment of the 
Cresphontes (in the Latin version) in Cicero’s Tusculanae 1.115, and that he was in fact 
strongly influenced by it when writing up his Storia anecdote. Leopardi does not 
reference the Tusculanae (possibly, and tellingly, because he knew the source so well 
and had used it so profusely in the past)570 but Grilli convincingly highlights the textual 
similarities between Cicero’s version of Euripides and Leopardi’s texts.571 I wish to add, 
since it has not been pointed out before, that Leopardi had at least two more 
opportunities to read the original text of Euripides: first, in the (many times quoted) 
edition of Stobaeus’ Anthologium, which preserves the second verse of the Euripidean 
fragment at Stob. 4.34.75 (a chapter especially favoured by Leopardi who references it 
multiple times) in the context of Plato’s Axiochus 368a and (the full fragment) at 
4.52b.42.572 Leopardi could also read it (although devoid of its first line) in Plutarch’s 
De audiendis poetis 36e-f.573 Neither of these authors mentions the source as Euripides’ 
Cresphontes (4.34.75 and Plutarch’s text lack any reference, and 4.52b.42 in the 
Gessner edition reads “Sophoclis, al. Euripidis in Themistocle”). Ascertaining with 
absolute conclusiveness whether Leopardi did, or did not, read the Greek original of the 
Euripidean fragment while at the same time being conscious that the text he was reading 
was in fact the Cresphontes is ultimately trivial. What remains is the fact that, besides 
reading the idea as Euripides phrased it in Cicero’s translation, Leopardi had repeated 
chances to come across it elsewhere.574 The perspective on existence expressed by the 
Cresphontes’ passage – whether read only in Latin, or only read partially, or even read 
                                                   
569  Grilli (1982), 63 calls it “grossa ‘bevue’”. 
570  This does indeed tell us something about Leopardi’s modus citandi.  
571  Grilli (1982), 63 on “si congregavano” (taken from Cicero’s coetus celebrantes and “congratulandosi 
con l’estinto” derived from hunc omni…laude et laetitia exsequi. 
572  Cf. the text and translation of the Axiochus in Hershbell (1981).  
573  From which he quotes at Zib. 2673-2674 in Opuscoli morali di Plutarco volgarizzati da Marcello 
Adriani il giovane (1819). Mere lines before quoting fr. 449, the Axiochus cites Il. 24.525-526 and Od. 
18.130-131 (Axioch. 367d). See Giannattasio Andria (2006), 118. On De audiendis poetis cf. the 
commentary by Hunter and Russell (2011), esp. 206-207. 
574  The fact that Leopardi never commented upon the Cresphontes elsewhere or never fixed the incorrect 
reference to the “Ctesiph.” does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that he used the text and knew what 
he was using (Cicero does explicitly reference both Euripides and the name of the play).  
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in the ignorance of its authorship – must be considered when looking at Leopardi’s idea 
of the custom or necessity of mourning birth and celebrating death.  
 
Let us go back to where we left off. Barthélemy is not the only one to perceive the 
similarity between the Herodotean tale and the tragic excerpt. In the very same section 
of his Supplements which we discussed in Chapter 3, when composing his catalogue of 
pessimistic große Geiste aller Zeiten, Arthur Schopenhauer had started it with the 
Greeks and more particularly with selected quotations on the necessity to mourn 
existence.575 On this topic Schopenhauer weaves together two modern sources (a 
Mexican custom and an anecdote from the life of Jonathan Swift) and two ancient ones: 
Herodotus’ anecdotes about the ritual of the Trausi tribe at Hdt. 5.4.2 and TrGF fr. 449 
from Euripides’ Cresphontes as related by Plutarch in his De audiendis poetis 36e-f.576 
 
The two passages are indeed remarkably similar. Both centre on the notion that 
existence is a bane, whose beginning ought to be mourned and whose end celebrated. 
The striking similarity between the two passages – highlighted by Barthélemy's choice 
to present them together – has been observed before.577 As Annette Harder pointed out, 
such similarity goes beyond the topic to include the formal structure and details of the 
phrasing.578 Scholars like Harder thus believe that the two passages are directly related, 
and in particular that Herodotus’ anthropological anecdote influenced Euripides’ verses. 
 
But the similarity between the tragic text and the presumably pre-existing Thracian 
custom sparks an obvious question, already addressed by various scholars: what is the 
connection between the ritual described by Herodotus and Greek customs and 
                                                   
575  Cf. Chapter 3 III. Schopenhauer then goes on to a series of references on the µὴ φῦναι. 
576  Cf. Hunter and Russell (2011), 206-207 connecting the passage to other loci of Greek literature, and 
referencing the testimonia in TrGF Kannicht (2004), 486-487. 
577  Cf. Harder (1985); Browning (1961). Notice that Barthélemy’s paraphrase of Hdt. 5.4.2 only includes 
the first half of the notion; the presence of the second half augments the resemblance. The 
commentary in the 2000 Belles Lettres edition of Euripides’ fragments points too at the similarity with 
Herodotus and suggests the latter as a source for the tragic fragment. 
578 Harder (1985) suggests so on the grounds that “Herodotus tells a ‘historical fact’, which is then 
adapted by Euripides to fit a statement on the sadness of life”. 
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culture? 579  Speaking exclusively of the Herodotean passage, Elizabeth Irwin has 
similarly highlighted its “capacity […] to evoke two contrary responses, difference from 
and identity with the Greeks”.580 What is the connection between these barbarians’ 
custom and “Greekness” lato sensu?  
 
As well as being validated by modern commentators –581 who agree that the pessimistic 
view of life expressed by the Thracian rituals is in accord “with one side of Hellenic 
sentiment” –582 the consonance between the belief upheld by such rituals and Greek 
thought is explicitly stressed by Barthélemy himself in the aforementioned passage. 
Judging from the happiness of Apollodorus’ family, the reader could be drawn to 
believe that Barthélemy believed the practice to be fully alien to the Greeks’ 
understanding of life. And yet, as he references the Thracian custom, Barthélemy does 
not neglect to remark that such belief is in fact entirely consistent with the thought and 
wisdom of ancient Greece.583  It is to support this point that Barthélemy adds a number 
of references to Greek works, among which is Euripides’ Cresphontes.  
 
Did Leopardi see the custom (or the idea at its core) as Greek in any sense? Two details 
in the Storia prompt us to think he probably did. Having developed the custom of 
mourning birth and celebrating death – and having thus theorised the link between 
                                                   
579  Cf. Bianchi, Horewtiz and Girardot (1971), 233 n. 10: “The ancient authors also remember the 
curious Thracian custom (not necessarily anticosmic, perhaps simply apotropaic) of crying at the birth 
of children and of rejoicing at funerals. But Herodotus (5. 4) applies that as the distinctive fashion of 
the Trausoi in contrast to other Thracians.” 
580  Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 62. 
581  Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 62 usefully summarises commentators’ opinions on the matter.  
582  Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 62. Ibid. see also the quote from How’s and Wells’ commentary 
(1912): “This Trausic custom, like Suttee (chap. 5), evidently rests on the faith in a better life beyond 
the grave, held also by the Getae (iv. 95), and embodied in the Thracian cult of Dionysus (Rohde, 
Psyche, ii. 1). This belief is primitive and widespread (H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, chaps. 13, 
14; Tylor, P.C. chaps. 12, 13), while the pessimistic view of the present life (cf. Soph. O.C. 1225; 
Theogn. 425) is in accord with one side of Hellenic sentiment (Butcher, Gr. G. 154f.), and with H.’s 
own oft-repeated opinion (cf. introd. § 36). Euripides turns this custom to account, whether he learned 
it from the work of H. (Stein) or at the Macedonian court (Blakesley).” Hornblower’s (2013) 
commentary: “The general gloomy idea that not to be born is best is found elsewhere in Greek 
literature (e.g. Thgn. 425-428, Bacchyl. 5.155-62); the parallel between Hdt. and Eur. consists in 
similar elaboration of detail.” 
583 In Chapter 26 Barthélemy (1789-1790), tome 3, 3: “Ces plaintes effrayantes ne sont que trop 
conformes aux maximes des sages de la Grèce”. 
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existence and unhappiness – this generation of men turn “to impiety”.584 The author of 
the Storia inserts here a brief reflection on the origins of unhappiness and of impiety, 
judging that “wrong are those who believe that human unhappiness was originally born 
of iniquity and of the offenses committed against the gods; but on the contrary, the 
wickedness of men originated from their calamities and not from any other source.” 
Human unhappiness has not originated – says the narrator – from man’s wickedness 
against the gods; on the contrary, it is the result of the calamities (in itself a word that 
highlights man’s passive status and the presence of external forces at work in human 
existence) befalling man. It does not seem farfetched to see in this debate about the first 
origin of human misery an echo of the speech of Zeus at Od. 1.32ff, and of its 
discussion of the source of human unhappiness.585 Just as Zeus had not denied that 
man’s own doing plays only a part in man’s unhappiness – thus admitting the role of 
divine forces in the making of human misery – the Storia’s narrator draws an 
unbreakable link between the divinely decreed condition of men and suffering.  
 
But there is a second and more compelling link between the Storia’s use of the Thracian 
custom and Greek myth and thought. The wickedness of this very generation of men is 
punished by the gods with a flood, which Leopardi characterises as “Deucalion’s 
flood”, specifying that the only two survivors of the human race were Deucalion and his 
wife Pyrrha. Leopardi’s main source for the myth of Deucalion and the flood – Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses book 1 –586 openly specifies that, among other things, the location of the 
couple’s survival is in Greece (Mount Parnassus, Met. 1.316-317), that Deucalion is no 
less than Prometheus’ progeny,587 and thus that both the myth and the setting are 
Greek.588 But more than knowing and accepting that the myth he is reworking is Greek, 
Leopardi twists the Ovidian tale in a manner that is nothing but Greek. Whereas Ovid’s 
Deucalion (Met. 1.363-364) had prayed to play an active part in the recreation of 
humanity (O utinam possim populos reparare paternis/ Artibus atque animas formatae 
                                                   
584  TPP (2013), 494. Cf. Aristophanes’ speech in Plato Sym. 190c-191b, on the ἀνδρόγυνος’ impiety 
being punished and leading (as a result) to unhappiness. 
585 We mentioned this passage already in Chapter 1 II.2 regarding the speech of Philocles in the Voyage. 
586 Cf. Anderson (1997), 181 on the older sources of the myth in Apollodorus 1.7.2 and Hyginus 152. 
587 Cf. Anderson (1997), 181 on Apollodorus’ emphasis on the fact that Deucalion is the son of 
Prometheus. 
588 Cf. Anderson (1997), 181 on how “in the more Roman account of Hyginus, the landfall is Mount Etna 
in Sicily”. 
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infundere terrae!), Leopardi’s couple wish they had perished along with the rest of 
mankind, call aloud for death to come and take them, but, more importantly, declare “to 
themselves that nothing could be more beneficial to the human race than its total 
extinction”.589 The fact itself that the son of Prometheus – the god symbolising human 
advancement – is chosen to loudly claim the benefits of the annulment of mankind is 
highly revealing of Leopardi’s aims.590 The reversal of the Ovidian myth is complete 
and revolutionary. Greek wisdom – the wisdom Leopardi had also observed distilled in 
Barthélemy’s list of Greek sources on the µὴ φῦναι – takes the place of the forward-
looking and optimistic attitude of the Ovidian character.  
 
The portrayal of the generation of men who, in the Storia, are made to devise the 
“Thracian” custom resonates with various elements of Greek mythology, literature, and 
thought, leading us to believe that Leopardi fully shared Barthélemy’s opinion about the 
harmony between this custom and a Greek worldview. It becomes in this sense 
important to note that at least two of Leopardi’s potential sources for Euripides fr. 449 
(Cicero’s Tusculanae and Stobaeus 4.52b.42) mention Euripides as the author of the 
fragment. Could Leopardi derive from this the idea that there was a link between such 
attitudes towards life and death and the Greek mind?  
 
The possible direct link between the Herodotean passage and the fragment of the 
Euripidean play reinforces both Barthélemy’s and the modern scholars’ point: although 
the custom portrayed by the historian is that of a non-Greek people, the very Greek 
Euripides can conceive of presenting it to a Greek audience within the story of the 
Heraclid Cresphontes, rightful king of Messenia. Whatever one may believe with regard 
to the original placement of the passage,591 the undeniably philosophising tone of the 
fragment has led interpreters to attribute it to major characters or to minor characters 
                                                   
589 They also “sat on the top of a cliff and called death with vehement desire”, in Cecchetti (1983), 31. 
TPP (2013), 495: “[…] affermando seco medesimi niuna cosa potere maggiormente giovare alla stirpe 
umana che di essere al tutto spenta, sedevano in cima a una rupe chiamando la morte con 
efficacissimo desiderio […]”. 
590 Cf. Blundell (1986), 168-170 on  Prometheus as “mythological representation of progress”, and 
suggesting that the combined myths of Prometheus and Pandora myths represent progress’ intrinsic 
“ambiguity”.  Cf. also Awad (1963), 43-44 on the fact that modern retellings of Prometheus’ myth see 
the liberation of the Titan as the beginning of a Golden Age.  
591 Harder (1985), 95 usefully lists all the various scholarly opinions on the matter. 
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endowed with special wisdom, and often at key times in the architecture of the play. 
The presence of this kind of “philosophising” in such a setting testifies to the fact that 
the Greek audience had at least the ability to relate to this idea. This point, and the fact 
that Euripides was not only very well acquainted with the idea, but also ready to present 
it (albeit through the words of a character) to an Athenian audience, is shown by the 
idea’s recurrence in a fragment of his Bellerophon (fr. 285), which I mentioned at the 
outset of Chapter 1.592 
 
As Euripides’ example testifies, there is then an unspoken but enduring connection 
between the Thracian custom and the worldview it conveys and Greek thought and 
culture, a connection that is reinforced by the repeated association of the two in their 
reception by future interpreters. To those who, like Barthélemy, Schopenhauer, and 
Leopardi, are lucidly alert (although in different ways) to the darkly pessimistic side of 
Greek culture, there is something exquisitely Greek in the idea of mourning birth and 
celebrating death.593 
 
4. A Homeric Topos: Epic Wishes and the Questioning of Existence 
 
This chapter ends with an open suggestion, an idea that is necessarily speculative. The 
Homeric epics – whose influence on Leopardi’s work has been discussed at length 
throughout this thesis – have so far been entirely neglected when looking at the possible 
influences behind Leopardi’s conception of existence and non-existence. This failure is 
easily explained by the state of research in the field of Classics itself, where to this day, 
and to the best of my knowledge, no work has ever tackled the role of the µὴ φῦναι in 
the Homeric epics, or even admitted that such a role is there to be tackled. The reason 
for this is, perhaps, that the epics only present a nuanced and subtle reflection on the µὴ 
φῦναι: nowhere in the epics do we find such an indisputable, adamant gnome as the one 
uttered by Silenus or Oedipus, a maxim valid for the whole of mankind. Yet both epics 
are punctuated with individual characters questioning the value of their own existence 
and both powerfully tackle the consequences of existence for man. Perhaps because of 
                                                   
592 Which Leopardi could read in Stobaeus 4.33.16 and 4.34.38 
593 One other instance, which is not analysed here, is Leopardi’s translation of Alexis fr. 145, TPP (2013), 
448. 
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the fact that their use of the µὴ φῦναι is (at least formally) restricted to individuals, and 
because none of these individuals ever directly suggests that this would be the best for 
all men, these passages have often been interpreted as merely formulaic and rhetorical, 
and the two epics have not been considered when looking at the history of this topos.594 
Yet in many cases either the speaker chosen to convey such truth about himself, the 
context in which the idea is inserted, or the special relationship of such statements with 
other passages in the epics, make of that personal epiphany something much deeper, and 
extend its importance way beyond the life of a single individual, ultimately to say 
something about human life itself.  
 
The cry of a character questioning existence resonates fourteen times in the epics (nine 
in the Iliad, five in the Odyssey). In all of these instances, the moment of reflection and 
insight finds its outlet in the making of a wish. One can distinguish two groups. The first 
group is made of four proper examples of the µὴ φῦναι, with characters wishing they 
themselves or somebody else had never been born.595 The second group (made of ten 
instances) presents instead characters questioning the value of their existence by 
wishing they themselves or somebody else had died already or could die at present. 
Although this second group would ideally be worth exploring too as deeply revealing of 
the Homeric conceptions of the individual’s existence and of the universal relationship 
between existence and suffering, in this context we need to concentrate concisely on the 
first group only.596  
 
As he wishes he had never been born at Od. 8.311-313, the god Hephaestus is mirroring 
and imitating the humans he so painfully resembles; the same wish as his appears three 
times in the Iliad. At 3.39 Hector – the one who not only shares a familiar bond of birth, 
but who will feel the practical burden of Paris’ behaviour soonest and hardest – wishes 
                                                   
594  The very fact that the linguistic formulation changes tells us that each of these passages has authority 
and relevance of its own. 
595 Il. 3.39; 18.86-87; 22.481; Od. 8.311-313. 
596  Il. 3.172-175; 3.428-429; 6.280-285; 6.345-348; 21.279-283; 24.764. Od. 1.59-60; 5.306-312; 18.202-
205; 20.61-63. Other passages in the epics share some of these passages’ features, but do not fit the 
group as neatly; I have chosen not to include them here. 
 187 
his brother had never been born.597 The wish, voicing a desire shared by many, is 
echoed again in a different form – wishing for Paris’ death – by Hector himself at 6.285 
and by Helen at 3.428-429, and highlights the fact that Paris’ lack of courage and 
forethought are matched by his failure to realise the extent of the negative impact of his 
own self. At Il. 22.481 it is Andromache who utters the wish for herself, as she discerns 
the doomed link between her husband and herself, making Hector the next in the line of 
people close to her to be slain by Achilles. Andromache holds no responsibility for the 
current situation: if she had not been born Achilles would have probably still killed her 
father and her siblings, and he would still be chasing Hector on the plain. Free from any 
direct regret or responsibility, Andromache’s wish voices simply the purest 
correspondence between (her) existence and suffering. It should be noted that although 
she never expresses the wish not to have been born, Helen is the single Homeric 
character who explicitly reflects on the possibility of non-existence versus existence 
most frequently (four times).598 
 
We are left with what is perhaps the most remarkable instance, that of Achilles. More so 
than in any other case, the tale of Achilles’ wish never to have been born is inextricably 
entangled with the story of his self-development in the course of the epic. Much 
happens between the offended and self-concerned hero of book 1 and the profound 
                                                   
597  Unable to wish for his brother to have been ἄγαµος, given Paris’ nature as γυναιµανής, Hector wishes 
Paris had never been begotten. Kirk’s commentary insists on the fact that the emphasis is placed by 
Hector on ἄγαµος rather than on ἄγονος, that the idea of ἄγαµος is not consistent with Hector’s speech 
as a whole, and that the whole idea is very likely to be merely a rhetorical formulation. Yet the wish 
that Paris had been ἄγαµος is almost an adynaton given his very nature of γυναιµανής: that he had not 
been born seems thus the only way of preventing future sorrowful events. Hector’s speech to his 
mother Hecabe as he walks into Troy again in book 6 clarifies further the reasons behind Hector’s 
wish at 3.39-40: at 6.280-285 he wishes Paris could die eaten up by a gape in the earth below him, as 
Paris is a πῆµα (calamity, bane) to the Trojans.  
598  Aside from the case mentioned above, 3.172-174; 6.345-348; 24.764. This is, of course, not by 
chance. Helen’s tragic causative role in the events of the Iliad allows her an extraordinarily marked 
understanding not only of her existence, but also of the deeper meaning of the events of the war at 
Troy, a level of insight perhaps only shared by Achilles. Helen’s deeper insight is also manifest in the 
repeated connections she draws between suffering and the role of songs, see Clader (1976); Griffin 
(1980), 96-97, 102; Macleod (1982), 1-8; Pantelia (2002), 25-26; Halliwell (2011), 72, 76, 89-91. See 
also Garvie's (1994) commentary on Od. 8.580, which lists other instances in which Helen shows 
peculiar wisdom about the essence of the world. Compare also Helen’s actions and speech during the 
banquet at Menelaus’ court at Od. 4.221ff. On “Helen and blame for war” see Taplin (1992), 96-100. 
See also further below in section 6.  
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interpreter of human life of book 24. 599  The trigger behind Achilles’ dramatic 
metamorphosis is the realisation – dawning on him only with the death of Patroclus – 
that he belongs to mankind and is, as such, subject to the lack of control and to the 
unpredictability inherent in the human condition, whereby humans do not get to decide 
their destiny. As he speaks to Thetis in book 18, Achilles is faced with the truth of his 
responsibility for his companion’s death – a death that followed from Achilles’ own 
request to Thetis in Iliad 1 (Il. 18.74-77). He is thus confronted with the extent of his 
delusion about his own condition and with a newly-gained cognizance of the vanity of 
what he has obtained (18.86-87): just when one believes oneself to be in control of life’s 
mechanisms, life proves that cannot happen. Faced with this inescapable truth, the only 
thing to do is to wish life itself could be erased right from its very roots: Achilles wishes 
the marriage between his parents had never taken place and that, consequently, he had 
not been born: αἴθ ̓ ὄφελες σὺ µὲν αὖθι µετ ̓ ἀθανάτῃς ἁλίῃσι / ναίειν, Πηλεὺς δὲ θνητὴν 
ἀγαγέσθαι ἄκοιτιν (Il. 18.86-87).600 Life is not what Achilles believed it to be, a thing to 
be moulded and shaped to one’s (semi-divine) liking. As he himself says as he laments 
once more the death of Patroclus at 18.328, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ Ζεὺς ἄνδρεσσι νοήµατα πάντα 
τελευτᾷ. Human desires – here symbolised by Menoetius’ thwarted wish to have 
Patroclus back and by Achilles’ own desire to see himself avenged – can (and often 
will) be frustrated.  
 
Achilles’ µὴ φῦναι is thus the embodiment of the hero’s awareness of his irretrievably 
human status, causing him to share the condition of all other mortals, whose aims and 
desires can be effortlessly thwarted. As such, the hero’s wish is central to his developing 
                                                   
599 Cf. Most (2003), 66-67 maintaining that the change in Achilles’ attitude is prompted by his 
acknowledgment of, and pity for, the sufferings of his fellow human beings, beginning with Patroclus 
and extending then to the Greek army. Rinon (2008), 13-14 instead individuates the reason of 
Achilles’ change in the hero’s progressive recognition of his own repeated ill-synchronisation with the 
kairos, i.e. his repeated refusal to relinquish his anger and accept compensation. Cf. also Kim (2000) 
on Achilles’ development in the epic, with a focus on the role of pity and the connection between the 
embassy of book 9 and his final insights. 
600 Edwards (1991), 157 believes that the stress in Achilles’ speech is on the “sympathy” for his mother’s 
sufferings because, had Peleus married a mortal wife, Thetis “would not have to grieve for him 
(Achilles) forever, as Thetis will”. This interpretation underestimates the literal meaning of Achilles’ 
wish, a failure that is also due to the fact that Edwards does not compare this instance of the will not 
to have lived with the other examples in the Iliad, thus making of this an isolated and unimportant 
remark.  
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conception of human existence and of the gods’ attitude towards men, and an essential 
step for the deep insights he will display in the speech to Priam in Iliad 24.601 This wish 
contains in nuce and yet unmistakably the roots of that Homeric pessimism that 
Leopardi repeatedly shows himself to have detected and assimilated. Once we grasp the 
extent to which the Homeric poems do tackle the idea of non-existence and its benefits 
for humankind, we can suddenly make better sense of the Certamen’s episode from 
which Chapter 1 of this thesis took its start. Far from being incongruous with his work 
and thought, Homer’s response to Hesiod synthesises – in a language and in a form 
enriched by the literature intervening between Homer and the Certamen itself – the 
composite multitude of reflections on existence and non-existence that punctuate the 
Homeric epics.602 Such reflections are essential for the development of the idea of the 
µὴ φῦναι within Greek and Latin literature and for the unparalleled role they played in 
Leopardi’s thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
601  Achilles’ “freshly learned lesson” in Taplin (1992), 272. On the speech of Achilles, cf. Macleod 
(1982); Richardson (1993), 330-333; Adkins (1960), 64; Deichgräber (1972), 66-69; Edwards (1987), 
309- 311; Lynn-George (1988), 244-248; Taplin (1992), 270-272; Zanker (1994), 121-122; Heath 
(2005), 144-147; Rinon (2008), 40-43. 
602  It is remarkable that Greene (1935), 31 n. 2 (a note listing the occurrences of the µὴ φῦναι in Greek 
Literature) does not connect Homer’s maxim in the Certamen with any of the passages discussed in 
this chapter, but merely with Il. 23.71. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
Although, as we have seen, Leopardi never explicitly suggests that his interpretation of 
the µὴ φῦναι comes from the text of Homer, one passage in the Operette draws a 
powerful connection between the Greek poet, the µὴ φῦναι, and, more widely, the 
Greek pessimistic worldview. This passage is part of the Dialogo di Tristano e di un 
amico (1832), last of the Operette. Separated by a few years from the other Operette, 
Tristano’s dialogue is an ardent declaration of fervour towards the beliefs that the whole 
Operette so varyingly display, a testament to their enduring validity, and a most 
compelling reiteration of their fundamental arguments.  
 
The piece enacts a conversation between Tristano – author, as we gather, of a 
melancholic book conveying his despairing view of life and powerful alter-ego of 
Leopardi himself – and a friend, vehement believer in progress and in the superiority of 
the present century, and obstinately intent on deflecting Tristano from his pessimistic 
view of the world. For a good part of the dialogue Tristano acts as if he had been 
convinced, as if he had eschewed his dark worldview and embraced his friend’s faith in 
the achievement of the 19th century. Ultimately, though, the veil is dropped and 
Tristano’s real stance is made visible. The reader thus hears Tristano’s pessimistic creed 
twice, once as he forsakes it, and then again when it is revealed that he has never 
stopped living by it. Throughout, and even during the pretended act of renunciation, 
Tristano’s words flicker with a passion all too clearly directed to the pessimistic 
philosophy he is supposedly forsaking.  
 
Se questi miei sentimenti nascano da malattia, non so: so che, malato o sano, calpesto la 
vigliaccheria degli uomini, rifiuto ogni consolazione e ogn’inganno puerile, ed ho il 
coraggio di sostenere la privazione di ogni speranza, mirare intrepidamente il deserto della 
vita, non dissimularmi nessuna parte dell’infelicità umana, ed accettare tutte le 
conseguenze di una filosofia dolorosa, ma vera. […] Io diceva queste cose fra me, quasi 
come se quella filosofia dolorosa fosse d’invenzione mia; vedendola così rifiutata da tutti, 
come si rifiutano le cose nuove e non più sentite. Ma poi, ripensando, mi ricordai ch’ella 
era tanto nuova, quanto Salomone e quanto Omero, e i poeti e i filosofi più antichi che si 
conoscano; i quali tutti sono pieni pienissimi di figure, di favole, di sentenze significanti 
l’estrema infelicità umana; e chi di loro dice che l’uomo è il più miserabile degli animali; 
 191 
chi dice che il meglio è non nascere, e per chi è nato, morire in cuna; altri, che uno che 
sia caro agli Dei, muore in giovanezza, ed altri altre cose infinite su questo andare.
 
E 
anche mi ricordai che da quei tempi insino a ieri o all’altr’ieri, tutti i poeti e tutti i filosofi 
e gli scrittori grandi e piccoli, in un modo o in un altro, avevano ripetute o confermate le 
stesse dottrine.603 
 
Amidst the memories of his (seemingly past) pessimism, Tristano remembers the 
discovery (or, as he calls it, the recollection) of the fact that his worldview had preceded 
him. At this crucial point in the Operette, Leopardi blends in his Tristano both his long-
lived conviction in the combined powers of poetry and philosophy, and his debt to 
antiquity for its grasp of the human condition.  
 
It is here that Homer appears, together with Solomon, to introduce Leopardi’s own 
version of Schopenhauer’s list of the pessimists of all ages: Tristano speaks of his 
worldview as “filosofia”, just as Leopardi had called his Operette “cosa filosofica”, and 
yet the two auctoritates called to epitomise Tristano’s worldview are the writer of 
religious wisdom Solomon, and ὁ ποιητής, Homer. The choice of Homer is the ultimate 
embodiment of Leopardi’s reflection on the genetic similarity between the role of the 
poet and that of the philosopher, as he expressed it (among others) in Zib. 1650, from 
which this thesis began. 
 
But beyond personifying (as he had in Zib. 1650) the fusion of the forces and roles of 
poetry and philosophy, Homer is chosen to portray the entirety of ancient pessimistic 
                                                   
603  My italics. TPP (2013), 603. Cecchetti (1983), 489: “Whether these feelings of mine are the 
result of illness, I don’t know; what I do know is that whether ill or healthy, I despise the 
cowardice of men; I reject all the consolations and all the childish deceptions and have the 
courage to endure the deprivation of all hope, to look intrepidly at the desert of life, not to 
dissimulate to myself any part of human unhappiness, and to accept all the consequences of a 
philosophy that is painful but true. […] This is what I said to myself, almost as if that painful 
philosophy were of my own invention – when I saw it rejected by everyone, just as novel and 
unheard of things are rejected. But then, thinking it over, I remembered that it was as new as 
Solomon and Homer and the most ancient poets and philosophers we know, all of whom teem 
with figures, with fables, with sayings, pointing out the extreme unhappiness of man. One of 
them says that man is the most miserable of animals; another that it is better not to be born or, if 
born, to die in the cradle; still another that whoever is dear to the gods dies young; and finally 
others say innumerable other things of the same nature. I also remembered that from those times 
until yesterday or the day before, all poets and all philosophers and all writers, great and small, 
one way or another, had repeated and confirmed those doctrines.” 
 192 
thought, and to be the name and the face for the quotations that Tristano presents as 
ancient examples of his worldview. The three quotations can be traced back respectively 
to Homer himself, to one of the many voices of the µὴ φῦναι within Greek literature, 
and to Menander.604 The concepts expressed in two of these passages exist in cognate 
forms in the Biblical tradition, and, most importantly, in two works traditionally 
ascribed to Solomon himself, the Ecclesiastes – containing, as we have mentioned 
already, a version of the µὴ φῦναι – and the Book of Wisdom, which elaborates on the 
idea that those dearest to God join him sooner.605 And yet both Leopardi’s phrasing of 
these ideas and the fact that he used some of these passages elsewhere in his work – 
providing, in those instances, clearer allusions or references to the Greek sources –606 
tell us that his Tristano was thinking of these ideas first and foremost as Greek. 
 
Just as it will be for Schopenhauer’s große Geister aller Zeiten, for Leopardi too the 
Greeks – and Greek poetry in particular – are the real epicentre of pessimistic thinking 
throughout the ages. Within the Greeks, Homer stands tall, not only as the symbol par 
excellence of the thought, wisdom, and culture of ancient Greece. Crucially, and by 
representing Leopardi’s whole work, Tristano recognises and attests to the magnitude 
and profundity of the Homeric epics’ influence in the history of pessimistic thought. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
604  Homer Il. 17.446-447 and Od. 18.130-131, expressing a notion which, as we have seen, is at the core 
of Porphyry’s admiration of Homer in the Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio; Menander Dis. Ex. 4 in 
Sandbach (1972), 41-42 (ὃν οἱ θεοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀποθνήισκει νέος), which Leopardi used also as 
epigraph to his Amore e Morte (1832) and which he could read in Stobaeus 4.52b and at Cons. ad Ap. 
119e. Cf. Audano (2014b). 
605   Ecclesiastes 4.2-3 and Book of Wisdom 4.7-15. 
606  I am thinking of the Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio for the Homeric passages in TPP (2013), 593 and 
of the epigraph to Amore e Morte for Menander’s fragment.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
1. Sources in the section of J. J. Barthélemy’s Voyage Chapter 28. 
Speaker Idea Source Provided 
(1) Disciple 
of 
Heraclitus 
All living beings are in a constant 
state of war or ruin. All living 
beings perpetuate a state of 
mutual persecution and 
destruction. 
 
(2) Disciple of 
Democritus 
The death of the individual – 
observed in the flow and 
succession of the generations – 
does not matter and should not 
afflict us more than the 
succession of the ocean’s 
waves or the fall of the leaves. 
Mimnerm. ap. Stob. serm. 
96, p. 528. Simonid. ap. 
eund. p. 530. 
[Mimnermus fr. 2 W; 
Simonides fr. 8 W.] 
(2) Disciple of 
Democritus 
Each being lives again once his 
atoms unite again in a different 
form. 
Plin. hist. nat. lib. 7, cap. 55, 
t. 1, p. 411. Bruck. hist. 
philos. t. 1, p. 1195. [Nat. 
Hist. 7.55] 
(3) Another 
speaker 
We interpret the world according 
to our feelings (hatred, love, 
joy, sadness). 
Aristot. de. Rhet. lib. 1. c. 2. 
tom. ii,  p. 515. [Aristotle 
Rh. 1.2.] 
(4) Another 
speaker 
The only motives behind 
existence are destruction and 
reproduction. 
Aesop. ap. Stob. serm. 103, 
p. 564. [Stobaeus 
4.41.61] 
(1) a) Have the gods created us for 
their amusement or with a 
serious design? b) To be born 
is the greatest misfortune, to 
die is the greatest happiness. c) 
Life is the dream of a shadow. 
d) Life is nothing but 
meditation on death. e) Life 
begins with tears and cries, 
youth is ruled by masters and 
then by duties. f) Man is 
subject to his vices and virtues.  
a) Plat. de. leg. lib. 1, t. 2, p. 
644. [Plato Laws 1.644d] 
b) Sophocl. In Oedip. 
Colon. v. 1289. Bacchyl. 
et. alii ap. Stob. serm. 96, 
p. 530 et 531. Cicer. 
Tuscul. lib. 1, cap. 48, t. 
2, p. 273. [Soph. OC 
1224-27; Bacchyl. Ep. 
5.160-161; Cicero Tusc. 
1.114] c) Pind. pythic. 8, 
v. 136. [Pindar Pythian 
8.95-96] d) Plat. in 
Phaedon t. 1, p. 64 et 67. 
id. ap. Clem. Alex. 
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stromat. lib. 5, p. 686. 
[Plato Phaedo 64a] f) 
Sophocl. ibid. v. 1290 
etc. Axioch. ap. Plat. t. 3, 
p. 366. Teles. Ap. Stob. 
p. 535.  [Soph. OC 1224-
27; Plato Ax. 366d; Teles 
in Stobaeus 4.34.72] f) 
Plat. in Phaedon t. 1, p. 
69. [Plato Phaedo 69a]  
(5) Youth a) Comparison between human 
life and puppets moved by 
strings b) comparison between 
the strings and the human 
passions. 
a) Herodot. lib. 2. c. 48. Lib. 
de Mund. ap. Aristot. c. 
6, t. I, p. 611. Lucian de 
Dea Syr. c. 16, t. iii, p. 
463. Apul. de Mund. etc. 
[Hdt. 2.48.2; Aristotle De 
Mundo 398b; Lucian Syr. 
D. 16; Apuleius De 
Mundo 27] b) Plat. de 
leg. lib. 1, t. 2, p. 644. 
[Plato Leges 1.644d] 
(6) Disciple 
of Plato 
Life is at once comedy and 
tragedy. 
Plat. in Phileb. t. 2, p. 50. 
[Plato Phileb. 50b] 
 
 
2. La ginestra  
Qui su l’arida schiena 
del formidabil monte 
sterminator Vesevo, 
la qual null'altro allegra arbor nè fiore, 
tuoi cespi solitari intorno spargi,                       5 
odorata ginestra, 
contenta dei deserti. Anco ti vidi 
de’ tuoi steli abbellir l’erme contrade 
che cingon la cittade 
la qual fu donna de’ mortali un tempo,             10 
e del perduto impero 
par che col grave e taciturno aspetto 
faccian fede e ricordo al passeggero. 
Or ti riveggo in questo suol, di tristi 
lochi e dal mondo abbandonati amante,            15 
e d’afflitte fortune ognor compagna. 
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Questi campi cosparsi 
di ceneri infeconde, e ricoperti 
dell’impietrata lava, 
che sotto i passi al peregrin risona;                   20 
dove s’annida e si contorce al sole 
la serpe, e dove al noto 
cavernoso covil torna il coniglio; 
fur liete ville e colti, 
e biondeggiàr di spiche, e risonaro                    25 
di muggito d’armenti; 
fur giardini e palagi, 
agli ozi de’ potenti 
gradito ospizio; e fur città famose 
che coi torrenti suoi l’altero monte                   30 
dall’ignea bocca fulminando oppresse 
con gli abitanti insieme. Or tutto intorno 
una ruina involve, 
dove tu siedi, o fior gentile, e quasi 
i danni altrui commiserando, al cielo                35 
di dolcissimo odor mandi un profumo, 
che il deserto consola. A queste piagge 
venga colui che d’esaltar con lode 
il nostro stato ha in uso, e vegga quanto 
è il gener nostro in cura                                     40 
all’amante natura. E la possanza 
qui con giusta misura 
anco estimar potrà dell’uman seme, 
cui la dura nutrice, ov’ei men teme, 
con lieve moto in un momento annulla             45 
in parte, e può con moti 
poco men lievi ancor subitamente 
annichilare in tutto. 
Dipinte in queste rive 
son dell’umana gente                                         50  
le magnifiche sorti e progressive. 
 
Qui mira e qui ti specchia, 
secol superbo e sciocco, 
che il calle insino allora 
dal risorto pensier segnato innanti                     55 
abbandonasti, e volti addietro i passi, 
del ritornar ti vanti, 
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e procedere il chiami. 
Al tuo pargoleggiar gl’ingegni tutti, 
di cui lor sorte rea padre ti fece,                         60 
vanno adulando, ancora 
ch’a ludibrio talora 
t’abbian fra sè. Non io 
con tal vergogna scenderò sotterra; 
ma il disprezzo piuttosto che si serra                 65 
di te nel petto mio, 
mostrato avrò quanto si possa aperto: 
ben ch’io sappia che obblio 
preme chi troppo all’età propria increbbe. 
Di questo mal, che teco                                     70 
mi fia comune, assai finor mi rido. 
libertà vai sognando, e servo a un tempo 
vuoi di novo il pensiero, 
sol per cui risorgemmo 
della barbarie in parte, e per cui solo                75 
si cresce in civiltà, che sola in meglio 
guida i pubblici fati. 
Così ti spiacque il vero 
dell’aspra sorte e del depresso loco 
che natura ci diè. Per questo il tergo                 80 
vigliaccamente rivolgesti al lume 
che il fe palese: e, fuggitivo, appelli 
vil chi lui segue, e solo 
magnanimo colui 
che se schernendo o gli altri, astuto o folle,      85 
fin sopra gli astri il mortal grado estolle. 
 
Uom di povero stato e membra inferme 
che sia dell’alma generoso ed alto, 
non chiama sè nè stima 
ricco d’or nè gagliardo,                                     90 
e di splendida vita o di valente 
persona infra la gente 
non fa risibil mostra; 
ma se di forza e di tesor mendico 
lascia parer senza vergogna, e noma                 95 
parlando, apertamente, e di sue cose 
fa stima al vero uguale. 
Magnanimo animale 
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non credo io già, ma stolto, 
quel che nato a perir, nutrito in pene,               100 
dice, a goder son fatto, 
e di fetido orgoglio 
empie le carte, eccelsi fati e nove 
felicità, quali il ciel tutto ignora, 
non pur quest’orbe, promettendo in terra         105 
a popoli che un’onda 
di mar commosso, un fiato 
d’aura maligna, un sotterraneo crollo 
distrugge sì, che avanza 
a gran pena di lor la rimembranza.                   110 
Nobil natura è quella 
che a sollevar s’ardisce 
gli occhi mortali incontra 
al comun fato, e che con franca lingua, 
nulla al ver detraendo,                                       115 
confessa il mal che ci fu dato in sorte, 
e il basso stato e frale; 
quella che grande e forte 
mostra sè nel soffrir, nè gli odii e l’ire 
fraterne, ancor più gravi                                    120 
d’ogni altro danno, accresce 
alle miserie sue, l’uomo incolpando 
del suo dolor, ma dà la colpa a quella 
che veramente è rea, che de’ mortali 
madre è di parto e di voler matrigna.                125 
Costei chiama inimica; e incontro a questa 
congiunta esser pensando, 
siccome è il vero, ed ordinata in pria 
l’umana compagnia, 
tutti fra sè confederati estima                            130 
gli uomini, e tutti abbraccia 
con vero amor, porgendo 
valida e pronta ed aspettando aita 
negli alterni perigli e nelle angosce 
della guerra comune. Ed alle offese                  135 
dell’uomo armar la destra, e laccio porre 
al vicino ed inciampo, 
stolto crede così qual fora in campo 
cinto d’oste contraria, in sul più vivo 
incalzar degli assalti,                                         140 
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gl’inimici obbliando, acerbe gare 
imprender con gli amici, 
e sparger fuga e fulminar col brando 
infra i propri guerrieri. 
Così fatti pensieri                                               145 
quando fien, come fur, palesi al volgo, 
e quell’orror che primo 
contra l’empia natura 
strinse i mortali in social catena, 
fia ricondotto in parte                                        150 
da verace saper, l’onesto e il retto 
conversar cittadino, 
e giustizia e pietade, altra radice 
avranno allor che non superbe fole, 
ove fondata probità del volgo                            155 
così star suole in piede 
quale star può quel ch’ha in error la sede. 
 
Sovente in queste rive, 
che, desolate, a bruno 
veste il flutto indurato, e par che ondeggi,        160 
seggo la notte; e su la mesta landa 
in purissimo azzurro 
veggo dall’alto fiammeggiar le stelle, 
cui di lontan fa specchio 
il mare, e tutto di scintille in giro                      165 
per lo vòto seren brillare il mondo. 
E poi che gli occhi a quelle luci appunto, 
ch’a lor sembrano un punto, 
e sono immense, in guisa 
che un punto a petto a lor son terra e mare        170 
veracemente; a cui 
l’uomo non pur, ma questo 
globo ove l’uomo è nulla, 
sconosciuto è del tutto; e quando miro 
quegli ancor più senz’alcun fin remote             175 
nodi quasi di stelle, 
ch’a noi paion qual nebbia, a cui non l’uomo 
e non la terra sol, ma tutte in uno, 
del numero infinite e della mole, 
con l’aureo sole insiem, le nostre stelle            180       
o sono ignote, o così paion come 
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essi alla terra, un punto 
di luce nebulosa; al pensier mio 
che sembri allora, o prole 
dell’uomo? E rimembrando                               185 
il tuo stato quaggiù, di cui fa segno 
il suol ch’io premo; e poi dall’altra parte, 
che te signora e fine 
credi tu data al Tutto, e quante volte 
favoleggiar ti piacque, in questo oscuro           190 
granel di sabbia, il qual di terra ha nome, 
per tua cagion, dell’universe cose 
scender gli autori, e conversar sovente 
co’ tuoi piacevolmente, e che i derisi 
sogni rinnovellando, ai saggi insulta                 195 
fin la presente età, che in conoscenza 
ed in civil costume 
sembra tutte avanzar; qual moto allora, 
mortal prole infelice, o qual pensiero 
verso te finalmente il cor m’assale?                  200 
Non so se il riso o la pietà prevale. 
 
Come d’arbor cadendo un picciol pomo, 
cui là nel tardo autunno 
maturità senz’altra forza atterra, 
d’un popol di formiche i dolci alberghi,            205 
cavati in molle gleba 
con gran lavoro, e l’opre 
e le ricchezze che adunate a prova 
con lungo affaticar l'assidua gente 
avea provvidamente al tempo estivo,                 210 
schiaccia, diserta e copre 
in un punto; così d’alto piombando, 
dall’utero tonante 
scagliata al ciel profondo, 
di ceneri e di pomici e di sassi                           215 
notte e ruina, infusa 
di bollenti ruscelli 
o pel montano fianco 
furiosa tra l’erba 
di liquefatti massi                                              220 
e di metalli e d'infocata arena 
scendendo immensa piena, 
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le cittadi che il mar là su l’estremo 
lido aspergea, confuse 
e infranse e ricoperse                                        225 
in pochi istanti: onde su quelle or pasce 
la capra, e città nove 
sorgon dall’altra banda, a cui sgabello 
son le sepolte, e le prostrate mura 
l’arduo monte al suo piè quasi calpesta.           230 
Non ha natura al seme 
dell’uom più stima o cura 
che alla formica: e se più rara in quello 
che nell’altra è la strage, 
non avvien ciò d’altronde                                  235 
fuor che l’uom sue prosapie ha men feconde.607 
 
Ben mille ed ottocento 
anni varcàr poi che spariro, oppressi 
dall’ignea forza, i popolati seggi, 
e il villanello intento                                         240                          
ai vigneti, che a stento in questi campi 
nutre la morta zolla e incenerita, 
ancor leva lo sguardo 
sospettoso alla vetta 
fatal, che nulla mai fatta più mite                      245 
ancor siede tremenda, ancor minaccia 
a lui strage ed ai figli ed agli averi 
lor poverelli. E spesso 
il meschino in sul tetto 
dell’ostel villereccio, alla vagante                     250 
aura giacendo tutta notte insonne, 
e balzando più volte, esplora il corso 
dal temuto bollor, che si riversa 
dall’inesausto grembo 
sull’arenoso dorso, a cui riluce                          255 
di Capri la marina 
e di Napoli il porto e Mergellina. 
E se appressar lo vede, o se nel cupo 
del domestico pozzo ode mai l'acqua 
fervendo gorgogliar, desta i figliuoli,                260 
desta la moglie in fretta, e via, con quanto 
                                                   
607 My italics. 
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di lor cose rapir posson, fuggendo, 
vede lontan l’usato 
suo nido, e il picciol campo, 
che gli fu dalla fame unico schermo,                 265 
preda al flutto rovente, 
che crepitando giunge, e inesorato 
durabilmente sovra quei si spiega. 
Torna al celeste raggio 
dopo l’antica obblivion l’estinta                        270 
Pompei, come sepolto 
scheletro, cui di terra 
avarizia o pietà rende all’aperto; 
e dal deserto foro 
diritto infra le file                                              275 
dei mozzi colonnati il peregrino 
lunge contempla il bipartito giogo 
e la cresta fumante, 
che alla sparsa ruina ancor minaccia. 
E nell’orror della secreta notte                          280 
per li vacui teatri, 
per li templi deformi e per le rotte 
case, ove i parti il pipistrello asconde, 
come sinistra face 
che per vòti palagi atra s’aggiri,                        285 
corre il baglior della funerea lava, 
che di lontan per l’ombre 
rosseggia e i lochi intorno intorno tinge. 
Così, dell’uomo ignara e dell’etadi 
ch’ei chiama antiche, e del seguir che fanno    290 
dopo gli avi i nepoti, 
sta natura ognor verde, anzi procede 
per sì lungo cammino 
che sembra star. Caggiono i regni intanto, 
passan genti e linguaggi: ella nol vede:            295 
e l’uom d'eternità s’arroga il vanto. 
 
E tu, lenta ginestra, 
che di selve odorate 
queste campagne dispogliate adorni, 
anche tu presto alla crudel possanza                 300 
soccomberai del sotterraneo foco, 
che ritornando al loco 
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già noto, stenderà l’avaro lembo 
su tue molli foreste. E piegherai 
sotto il fascio mortal non renitente                    305 
il tuo capo innocente: 
ma non piegato insino allora indarno 
codardamente supplicando innanzi 
al futuro oppressor; ma non eretto 
con forsennato orgoglio inver le stelle,             310 
nè sul deserto, dove 
e la sede e i natali 
non per voler ma per fortuna avesti; 
ma più saggia, ma tanto 
meno inferma dell’uom, quanto le frali            315 
tue stirpi non credesti 
o dal fato o da te fatte immortali. 
 
 
Translation of Strophe 5 
Just as a tiny apple in late autumn 
(Ripeness is now enough 
To make it fall, without more help, to earth) 
Drops where a tribe of ants have made their home, 
Hollowed – their work was huge – 
In the soft soil; and drops 
On stored-up riches which those careful creatures 
Amassed so rapidly and with such effort 
And with such prudence in the summertime,    210 
To lay their labour waste 
At one blow; so, plummeting from above 
Thrown from the thundering womb 
Into the depths of sky,  
Ashes and pumice and stones – in avalanching 
Ruinous nighr, involved 
With boiling rivulets, 
While, down the mountainside 
And raging over grass, 
Molten boulders en masse,                                220 
Melting metal, and sand that was alight 
Swept like a river in spate –  
Smashed those cities upon whose farthest shore 
The moving ocean washed, 
Confounded and covered them 
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In a few seconds; so that now the goat 
Browses above, and new  
Cities arise which have their very base 
On those long buried whose demolished walls 
The rugged mountain crushes underfoot.          230 
Nature has no more care 
For man, and no more love 
Than for the ant: and if she massacres 
Men and women less often, 
That is because our race 
Is simply not so very numerous. 
 
 
3 a.    Simonides 8 W 
ἓν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χῖος ἔειπεν ἀνήρ·  
“οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν”· 
παῦροί µιν θνητῶν οὔασι δεξάµενοι 
στέρνοις ἐγκατέθεντο· πάρεστι γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἑκάστωι 
ἀνδρῶν, ἥ τε νέων στήθεσιν ἐµφύεται.             5 
θνητῶν δ’ ὄφρά τις ἄνθος ἔχηι πολυήρατον ἥβης, 
κοῦφον ἔχων θυµὸν πόλλ’ ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· 
οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχει γηρασέµεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι, 
οὐδ’, ὑγιὴς ὅταν ἦι, φροντίδ’ ἔχει καµάτου. 
νήπιοι, οἷς ταύτηι κεῖται νόος, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν      10 
ὡς χρόνος ἔσθ’ ἥβης καὶ βιότου ὀλίγος 
θνητοῖς. ἀλλὰ σὺ ταῦτα µαθὼν βιότου ποτὶ τέρµα 
ψυχῆι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τλῆθι χαριζόµενος. 
 
3 b.   Leopardi, XLI Dello stesso 
Umana cosa picciol tempo dura, 
e certissimo detto 
disse il veglio di Chio, 
conforme ebber natura 
le foglie e l’uman seme.                                    5 
Ma questa voce in petto 
raccolgon pochi. All'inquieta speme, 
figlia di giovin core, 
tutti prestiam ricetto. 
Mentre è vermiglio il fiore  
di nostra etade acerba,                                      10 
l’alma vota e superba 
Cento dolci pensieri educa invano, 
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nè morte aspetta nè vecchiezza; e nulla 
cura di morbi ha l'uom gagliardo e sano. 
Ma stolto è chi non vede                                   15 
la giovanezza come ha ratte l'ale, 
e siccome alla culla 
poco il rogo è lontano. 
Tu presso a porre il piede 
in sul varco fatale                                              20 
della plutonia sede, 
ai presenti diletti 
la breve età commetti. 
 
All human things last only a short time; 
The old blind man of Chios 
Spoke but the simple truth: 
As are the lives of leaves, 
So are the lives of men.                                      5 
But few there are who take 
Those words to heart; while everyone receives 
Unruly hope, the child 
Of youth, to live with him. 
As long as our first age                                     10 
Is fresh and blooming still, 
The vacant headstrong soul 
Will nourish many pleasant dreams, all vain, 
Careless of death and age; the healthy man 
Has no regards for illness or disease.              15 
But he must be a fool 
Who cannot see how rapidly youth flies, 
How close the cradle lies 
To the funereal fire. 
So you who are about                                       20 
To step into the land 
Where Pluto holds his court, 
Enjoy, since life is short, 
The pleasure hard at hand. 
 
4 a.     Semonides 1 W2 
ὦ παῖ, τέλος µὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος 
πάντων ὅσ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τίθησ’ ὅκηι θέλει, 
νοῦς δ’ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώποισιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπήµεροι 
ἃ δὴ βοτὰ ζόουσιν, οὐδὲν εἰδότες 
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ὅκως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός.                     5 
ἐλπὶς δὲ πάντας κἀπιπειθείη τρέφει 
ἄπρηκτον ὁρµαίνοντας· οἱ µὲν ἡµέρην 
µένουσιν ἐλθεῖν, οἱ δ’ ἐτέων περιτροπάς· 
νέωτα δ’ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ δοκεῖ βροτῶν 
Πλούτωι τε κἀγαθοῖσιν ἵξεσθαι φίλος.             10 
φθάνει δὲ τὸν µὲν γῆρας ἄζηλον λαβὸν 
πρὶν τέρµ’ ἵκηται, τοὺς δὲ δύστηνοι βροτῶν 
φθείρουσι νοῦσοι, τοὺς δ’ Ἄρει δεδµηµένους  
πέµπει µελαίνης Ἀΐδης ὑπὸ χθονός· 
οἱ δ’ ἐν θαλάσσηι λαίλαπι κλονεόµενοι            15 
καὶ κύµασιν πολλοῖσι πορφυρῆς ἁλὸς 
θνήσκουσιν, εὖτ’ ἂν µὴ δυνήσωνται ζόειν· 
οἱ δ’ ἀγχόνην ἅψαντο δυστήνωι µόρωι 
καὐτάγρετοι λείπουσιν ἡλίου φάος. 
οὕτω κακῶν ἄπ’ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ µυρίαι                 20 
βροτοῖσι κῆρες κἀνεπίφραστοι δύαι 
καὶ πήµατ’ ἐστίν. εἰ δ’ ἐµοὶ πιθοίατο, 
οὐκ ἂν κακῶν ἐρῶιµεν, οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ἄλγεσιν 
κακοῖς ἔχοντες θυµὸν αἰκιζοίµεθα. 
 
 
4 b.   Leopardi, XL Dal greco di Simonide 
Ogni mondano evento 
è di Giove in poter, di Giove, o figlio, 
che giusta suo talento 
ogni cosa dispone. 
Ma di lunga stagione                                          5 
nostro cieco pensier s’affanna e cura, 
benchè l’umana etate, 
come destina il ciel nostra ventura, 
di giorno in giorno dura.  
La bella speme tutti ci nutrica                           10 
di sembianze beate, 
onde ciascuno indarno s’affatica: 
altri l’aurora amica, 
altri l’etade aspetta; 
e nullo in terra vive                                           15 
cui nell’anno avvenir facili e pii 
con Pluto gli altri iddii 
la mente non prometta. 
Ecco pria che la speme in porto arrive, 
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qual da vecchiezza è giunto                              20 
e qual da morbi al bruno Lete addutto; 
Questo il rigido Marte, e quello il flutto 
del pelago rapisce; altri consunto 
da negre cure, o tristo nodo al collo 
circondando, sotterra si rifugge.                        25 
Così di mille mali 
i miseri mortali 
volgo fiero e diverso agita e strugge. 
Ma per sentenza mia, 
uom saggio e sciolto dal comune errore           30 
patir non sosterria, 
nè porrebbe al dolore 
ed al mal proprio suo cotanto amore. 
 
Whatever happens here 
Is in the power of Jove, O son of man, 
And he decides it all 
According to his will. 
But blindly we take thought                               5 
And struggle after things of distant date, 
Although it is our fate, 
As Heaven determined was to be the way, 
To live from day to day. 
Hope is attractive, and she suckles us              10  
On fine appearances; 
So all of us live striving, and in vain: 
One waits a better dawn, 
And one a better age; 
And no one lives on earth                                 15 
Who for the future does not have in mind 
A generous god of wealth 
And other gods as kind. 
But one, before these hopes have been fulfilled, 
Is overcome by age,                                          20 
And one is led to Lethe by disease; 
One man is snatched by cruel Mars, and one 
By the tempestuous sea; another, worn 
By gloomy care, or twisting round his neck 
A dreadful know, seeks refuge underground.    30 
A savage, various band 
Of mortal miseries 
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Harries our wretched race and hunts it down. 
And so, in my opinion, 
A wise man, rescued from the common error,  35 
Would not agree to suffer, 
Nor give to his affliction 
And to his own distress so much affection. 
 
 
5.       Zibaldone 4175-4177 
Non gli uomini solamente, ma il genere umano fu e sarà sempre infelice di 
necessità. Non il genere umano solamente ma tutti gli animali. Non gli 
animali soltanto ma tutti gli altri esseri al loro modo. Non gl’individui, ma le 
specie, i generi, i regni, i globi, i sistemi, i mondi. 
Entrate in un giardino di piante, d’erbe, di fiori. Sia pur quanto volete 
ridente. Sia nella più mite stagione dell’anno. Voi non potete volger lo 
sguardo in nessuna parte che voi non vi troviate del patimento. Tutta quella 
famiglia di vegetali è in istato di souffrance, qual individuo più, qual meno. 
Là quella rosa è offesa dal sole, che gli ha dato la vita; si corruga, langue, 
appassisce. Là quel giglio è succhiato crudelmente da un’ape, nelle sue parti 
più sensibili, più vitali. Il dolce mele non si fabbrica dalle industriose, 
pazienti, buone, virtuose api senza indicibili tormenti di quelle fibre 
delicatissime, senza strage spietata di teneri fiorellini. Quell’albero è 
infestato da un formicaio, quell’altro da bruchi, da mosche, da lumache, da 
zanzare; questo è ferito nella scorza e cruciato dall’aria o dal sole che 
penetra nella piaga; quello è offeso nel tronco, o nelle radici; quell’altro ha 
più foglie secche; quest’altro è roso, morsicato nei fiori; quello trafitto, 
punzecchiato nei frutti. Quella pianta ha troppo caldo, questa troppo fresco; 
troppa luce, troppa ombra; troppo umido, troppo secco. L’una patisce 
incomodo e trova ostacolo e ingombro nel crescere, nello stendersi; l’altra 
non trova dove appoggiarsi, o si affatica e stenta per arrivarvi. In tutto il 
giardino tu non trovi una pianticella sola in istato di sanità perfetta. Qua un 
ramicello è rotto o dal vento o dal suo proprio peso; là un zeffiretto va 
stracciando un fiore, vola con un brano, un filamento, una foglia, una parte 
viva di questa o quella pianta, staccata e strappata via. Intanto tu strazi le 
erbe co’ tuoi passi; le stritoli, le ammacchi, ne spremi il sangue, le rompi, le 
uccidi. Quella donzelletta sensibile e gentile, va dolcemente sterpando e 
infrangendo steli. Il giardiniere va saggiamente troncando, tagliando 
membra sensibili, colle unghie, col ferro. (Bologna. 19. Aprile. 1826.). 
Certamente queste piante vivono; alcune perchè le loro infermità non sono 
mortali, altre perchè ancora con malattie mortali, le piante, e gli animali 
altresì, possono durare a vivere qualche poco di tempo. Lo spettacolo di 
tanta copia di vita all’entrare in questo giardino ci rallegra l’anima, e di qui è 
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che questo ci pare essere un soggiorno di gioia. Ma in verità questa vita è 
trista e infelice, ogni giardino è quasi un vasto ospitale (luogo ben più 
deplorabile che un cemeterio), e se questi esseri sentono, o vogliamo dire, 
sentissero, certo è che il non essere sarebbe per loro assai meglio che 
l’essere. (Bologna. 22. Apr. 1826.). 
 
Not only individual men, but the whole human race was and always will be 
necessarily unhappy. Not only the human race but the whole animal world. 
Not only animals but all other beings in their way. Not only individuals, but 
species, genera, realms, spheres, systems, worlds. 
Go into a garden of plants, grass, flowers. No matter how lovely it seems. 
Even in the mildest season of the year. You will not be able to look anywhere 
and not find suffering. That whole family of vegetation is in a state of 
souffrance, each in its own way to some degree. Here a rose is attacked by 
the sun, which has given it life; it withers, languishes, wilts. There a lily is 
sucked cruelly by a bee, in its most sensitive, most life-giving parts. [4176] 
Sweet honey is not produced by industrious, patient, good, virtuous bees 
without unspeakable torment for those most delicate fibers, without the 
pitiless massacre of flowerets. That tree is infested by an ant colony, that 
other one by caterpillars, flies, snails, mosquitoes; this one is injured in its 
bark and afflicted by the air or by the sun penetrating the wound; that other 
one has a damaged trunk, or roots; that other has many dry leaves; that 
other one has its flowers gnawed at, nibbled; that other one has its fruits 
pierced, eaten away. That plant is too warm, this one too cold; too much 
light, too much shade; too wet, too dry. One cannot grow or spread easily 
because there are obstacles and obstructions; another finds nowhere to lean, 
or has trouble and struggles to reach any support. In the whole garden you 
will not find a single plant in a state of perfect health. Here a branch is 
broken by the wind or by its own weight; there a gentle breeze is tearing a 
flower apart, and carries away a piece, a filament, a leaf, a living part of 
this or that plant, which has broken or been torn off. Meanwhile you torture 
the grass by stepping on it; you grind it down, crush it, squeeze out its blood, 
break it, kill it. A sensitive and gentle young maiden goes sweetly cutting and 
breaking off stems. A gardener expertly chops down trunks, breaking off 
sensitive limbs, with his nails, with his tools. (Bologna, 19 April 1826.) 
Certainly these plants live on; some because their infirmities are not fatal, 
others because even with fatal diseases, plants, and animals as well, can 
manage to live on a little while. The spectacle of such abundance of life 
when you first go into this garden lifts your spirits, and that is why you think 
it is a joyful place. But in truth this life is wretched and unhappy, every 
garden is like a vast hospital (a place much more deplorable than a 
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cemetery), and if these beings [4177] feel, or rather, were to feel, surely not 
being would be better for them than being. (Bologna, 22 April 1826.) 
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